Interview of Ben Margolis, Law and Social Conscience, Ben Margolis : electronic version

1. Tape Number: I, Side One May 14, 1984

Balter: Ben, although we won't follow a strict chronology in this oral history necessarily, but it's usually convenient and customary to begin at the beginning or before the beginning. I wonder if you could start off telling me some things about your family, when or where you were born, and so on.

Margolis: Yes. My father [Samuel Margolis] was born in Latvia, Russia, and came over to the United States after the 1905 Revolution in the Soviet--in what was then Russia. My mother [Anna Gerwits Margolis] was born in a place called Bialystok, which is in an area which historically has at times been part of Russia and at other times part of Poland. At present it is part of Russia. She came over here to the United States about the same time, or shortly after, my father came here. I'm not sure of the year, but it was about 1906, 1907, that they came over. Both settled in New York. Met and were married in New York in 1907, 1908--I don't know the exact date.My father was a painter, a house painter. He was a radical, as was my mother. Neither of them were religious Jews. As a matter of fact, I think it would be correct to say that they were both atheists, at least agnostics if not atheists--probably atheists. My father worked as-- We lived on the East Side of New York, and my father worked as a painter. Became a member of the painters union in New York City. His principal organizational connection was with an organization known as the IWO, the International Workers Order, which was basically a social democratic group which had some--just one or two left-wing chapters or groups. And he belonged to one of the left-wing groups. Considered himself a socialist all of his life, and I was brought up in that sort of an atmosphere. My mother also considered herself a socialist.I was born in New York City on April 23, 1910. We lived in the Jewish ghetto--I think it would be fair to call it--at that time.

Balter: Where exactly?

Margolis: We lived on, for a time-- I'm not sure of, I don't have the addresses, but I know we lived on Cherry Street for a time, and I think we lived on one or two other streets on the East Side of New York. I can't be any more specific than that.I talked Yiddish before I talked English. As a matter of fact, I really began to speak English fluently only when I started in kindergarten at the age of about five and a half in New York. My mother and father gradually spoke more and more English, although when I was very young the language was primarily Yiddish, not only in the house but in the neighborhood in which we lived. I went to school there until I was seven years old.When I was seven years old, I fell down some tenement stairs. Either as a result of that or concurrently with it, I developed asthma, a rather severe case of asthma, leading to a doctor recommending that I be taken out of New York to California. It was as a result of this illness that my family moved to California sometime in 1917.

Balter: Ben, before we go on, let me ask you a couple of things. First of all, for the record, why don't we get the names of your mother and father, their full names.

Margolis: Yeah. My mother's name was Anna, and my father's name was Samuel. They did not have middle names, as I do not have a middle name.

Balter: Did you have any brothers or sisters at any time?

Margolis: I've one brother, who is about nine and a half years younger than I am and who was born in California.

Balter: In California. And his name is Harry? Is that his name?

Margolis: Harry. That's right.

Balter: Okay. You mentioned that both of your parents came to the United States soon after the 1905 Revolution. Let me make sure I understand. Did they know each other in Russia [or] they met in New York?

Margolis: They did not know each other in Russia. They came from widely separated geographical areas. They did not know each other. They met in New York.

Balter: Did they give any explanation to you, at any point in your childhood, as to why they decided to leave Russia?

Margolis: Yes, they did. They had both lived in villages where there had been pogroms. They had both suffered from the discrimination that was involved, and they both wanted to get away from that. And there was a terrible reaction after the 1905 Revolution, which caused them both to leave. My father had an additional reason: that is, he was about to be taken into the military service, which he wanted to avoid, and he did that by coming to the United States.

Balter: Were any relatives of theirs injured or killed in the pogroms? Did they have any stories to tell about their experiences?

Margolis: No, apparently their family came through in pretty good shape. They told of injuries, and they told of neighbors and friends, some being killed and others being injured seriously. But so far as I know, and I believe that it's true, there were no members of their immediate families that were killed.

Balter: You mentioned that your parents were radicals in Russia. About how old were they when they left Russia? Or do you know their birth dates?

Margolis: While I don't know their birthdays, my father was about two years older than my mother. I think he was about nineteen when he arrived here in 1907 or 1908, and-- He may have only been one year older. She was seventeen or eighteen.

Balter: Were they involved in radical activities in Russia?

Margolis: No. They were sympathetic to the activities. But they lived in villages, and there wasn't much opportunity in the villages for Jewish people to get involved in those activities. They were poor Jewish families.

Balter: So I take it that from the time you were very young, this radical influence or socialist influence began to impress itself on you.

Margolis: That is true.

Balter: Okay. Well, now, in going back to more the chronology, you had just moved from New York. Do you recall the name of the school that you went to in New York for the first few years, before you moved out here?

Margolis: No, I do not. I don't recall the name. I was only-- As a matter of fact, I had my seventh birthday on the train coming out to California, so I was little when I-- Which was several months after I contracted asthma, so I guess I was closer to six and a half when I got the asthma. My father initially made a trip to California to sort of see what the lay of the land was and whether he could make a living. Then came back and brought my mother and I out, and I had my seventh birthday on the train on the way out.

Balter: He was a painter, as I understand.

Margolis: House painter.

Balter: How well was he doing in New York before he left?

Margolis: He was making a living, you know, a bare living, but we were never hungry. We were never in dire need, but we certainly had no extra money for anything.

Balter: So then you've moved to California. What happens next?

Margolis: Well, we moved to a little place by the name of Sierra Madre [Los Angeles County]. We went there because the doctor advised a very dry climate, and Sierra Madre fit that very well. We lived there for almost exactly a year and, during that year, my asthmatic condition greatly improved. As a matter of fact, almost disappeared, and within a few years thereafter, completely disappeared. So that whether living in Sierra Madre did it or not, I did get over the asthma in a rather short period of time.I went to school there. Had my first contact with a way of life that was entirely strange to me when I came out here. I had a Buster Brown haircut, which was the kind of thing you had for your boy children in New York City, and wore white shoes and white little pants and all that sort of thing. And then I went to school here in Sierra Madre. The first day I got beaten up by guys with bare feet and overalls, or, you know, pants and shirt. I remember that my father finally took me and got me a haircut and let me get a different kind of clothes--all of which greatly distressed my mother--and I began gradually to become a California.

Balter: [laughs] When the kids beat you up, was there any anti-Semitic undertone to that, do you think?

Margolis: Not particularly. I don't think it was anti-Semitic at that time. I was just the sissy from New York who was dressed like a girl, had a girl's haircut, and that kind of thing. But whether or not there was any underlying anti-Semitism, I can't be sure, but I rather doubt it. As a matter of fact, I must say that I have not in my lifetime directly experienced a great deal of anti-Semitism, although I have been aware of a great deal of it, with respect to others.

Balter: So you were in Sierra Madre for a year. Do you have any memories of that town?

Margolis: Yes, it was during-- Why, I remember we entered the war and we were doing knitting, knitting socks, and I was knitting. There were patriotic demonstrations and, while my mother and father weren't particularly active in these things, we went along. Had a flag on the outside of the house we lived in; it was virtually compulsory in those days.I think perhaps one of the reasons why there wasn't a display of anti-Semitism was because the feeling against the Germans was so high. The Germans were simply not safe on the streets there. Of course, there weren't any real Germans, but there were some people who were suspected to be Germans, and they had a bad time. There was terrible prejudice against them.

Balter: Now, was your parents' outward support for the war effort, was that matched by their inward feelings about it, or how did they really feel about World War I?

Margolis: Well, you want to remember I was only between seven and eight years old. I do not have a distinct recollection of any discussion about it, but I know from discussions afterwards, when I was older, that they did not believe in the war. They did not support it, but that they felt that they couldn't participate in any fight against it either.

Balter: At this point, after they moved to California, were your parents-- For example, one question would be, of course, was your father still working as a painter?

Margolis: Yes, he got work as a painter. At that time things were pretty good, and he had lots of work. While we were by no means rich, we lived comfortably. We ate well, and, you know, those were different kind of times. Nobody had a car. There weren't any cars around to speak of. Living was much less expensive. But we had a small house, a comfortable house, and we lived in this small community very decently, much better than we had lived in New York City.

Balter: Now, did your mother work or not?

Margolis: She didn't work while we were in Sierra Madre, but at a later point she did work. While I was in Sierra Madre, also I broke my left leg. I fell off a swing, broke my left leg, and I was home in bed for some little time. I remember that, and I remember all of the neighbors bringing me funny papers to read. They didn't have comic books at that time, but they had funny papers.

Balter: You said that you were in Sierra Madre for a year.

Margolis: Approximately a year, yes.

Balter: What led to your moving, and where did you go?

Margolis: Well, Sierra Madre is still a small place, but it was much smaller then. I don't remember the population, but it was a really very small place. My family wanted to move to a somewhat larger place. My mother had a sister [Jennie Aronow] who lived in Santa Barbara and I think-- Again, you want to remember that, at that age, I wasn't in very much on the decision making. But I think-- I'm sure one of the reasons we moved to Santa Barbara was that my mother's sister was there, and also there was work there for my father. He again went out and looked over the place before we moved. And he did, when he was in-- By the time he got to Santa Barbara, at least at some point, he started working for himself as an individual contractor, rarely hiring anybody but occasionally, very occasionally. Being his own boss, doing his own work, and, again, making a modest living.

Balter: By the way, just to parenthetically, at this point, where-- Your grandparents on your mother and father's side, where were they at this point? Were they still in the Soviet Union?

Margolis: We apparently had lost track of them, and I have no-- I've never met them, never seen them--on either side. Whether something happened to them, I don't know. I know very little about them. My parents never talked much about them.

Balter: Why do you think that was?

Margolis: I really don't know. You want to remember that before I became-- They were not in this country, and so there were no grandparents to introduce me to. I was very young, and I guess they didn't talk to me much about that kind of thing. My belief is that they died or were killed or something happened along those lines. But they were not in contact with them for one reason or another after that. At some point when I was very young, I think that happened.Now, there were some other relatives on my father's side, who came to New York after we had already gone to California. I've had very minimal contact with them. My father and they didn't get along very well. They were very conservative. Came here and went into business. They didn't see eye to eye. My father was just not interested in having any relationship. Occasionally, we'd hear from them and they would hear from us, but there was never any real relationship established.

Balter: Okay. I assume that your aunt who lived in Santa Barbara, that was on your mother's side I believe--

Margolis: That's right.

Balter: Did she come to the U.S. about the same time as your mother?

Margolis: I think so, but I am not sure about that. I'm almost-- I think she was an older sister and, again, this is an impression rather than a recollection, that she came here first and then helped my mother come over. That's the impression I have. They were very close. She was also a radical person.

Balter: Except for some of the relatives on your father's side, this was a tradition of both your mother and father's sides.

Margolis: Right.

Balter: Now, you've moved to Santa Barbara. How long did you live in Santa Barbara?

Margolis: I think I was nine years old by the time we moved, or close to nine. We lived in Santa Barbara together until 1926. So it was about 1919 when we moved there, and we lived there together until 1926. In May, I think it was, of 1926, my mother died from infection following surgery involving a miscarriage. In the meantime, my brother [Harry Margolis] had been born. He was born in, let's see, October of 1920. My birthday's in April, so he's about nine and a half years younger than I am. And when I graduated from high school, I went through-- Finished grammar school, went through junior high school and high school in Santa Barbara, and I graduated in 1926 when I was sixteen years old. I graduated a month or so after my mother died. My father, then, together with my brother, who was then between six and seven years old, shortly after my mother's death, within two or three months, moved to San Francisco. I think his motivation was that it was very hard for him to work and to take care of my brother, and he wanted to remarry. Felt it was necessary for him to have a home for my brother, and there was no-- He wouldn't have, although he wasn't-- There wasn't anything political about it. It wouldn't have even occurred to him to have married anyone who wasn't Jewish, not because of any religious reasons or anything like that. But I guess he would never have been comfortable with anyone else, and there were no opportunities of that kind in Santa Barbara. (There were only a few Jewish families in Santa Barbara.) So he moved to San Francisco with my brother and did--oh, about a year after my mother's death--did get remarried to my stepmother [Etta Boyarski Margolis], who then raised my brother. I stayed on in Santa Barbara.

Balter: You did?

Margolis: Yes. I graduated, I think it was, in June of '26. And I almost immediately got a job as a night clerk with the Western Union Telegraph Company in Santa Barbara, working from four to twelve at the counter--taking in telegrams and doing clerical work--at seventy-five dollars a month, which was enough to live on, quite comfortably, at that time.Oh, after my mother's death, my father and I and my brother had moved into a boardinghouse in Santa Barbara, where we had rooms and our meals at the boardinghouse. When my father and brother left, I stayed on at this boardinghouse. I think my room and board was thirty-five or forty dollars a month-- something like that--and took care of my laundry and everything. So I was in pretty good shape as far as getting by financially was concerned.I entered Santa Barbara--I think it was called--[State] Teachers College then. It later became Santa Barbara State [College, 1935], and later became University of California, Santa Barbara [1958]. At the time I went to school there, it was up on the hills, the Riviera, in Santa Barbara. Later, it moved out to Goleta and became a much larger school. I went to school there for two years, working all of that time at the Western Union Telegraph Company. Making seventy-five dollars a month and supporting myself quite comfortably.I was very ambitious at that time. I also for two years, during the Christmas season when we had Christmas vacation, went into business selling Christmas trees and made some extra money. I saw my father, brother, and stepmother only during the Christmas season. I remember the last Christmas Eve I ran to catch the train, going from my business. Took a night train to San Francisco and then spent the next week or so there, until school started. Came back to Santa Barbara. So that I guess I was very, very busy. I was going to school from eight to four and working from four to twelve. But I had a job where I could do some studying on the job. If it wasn't busy at the counter, I could sit and do some studying. So it really wasn't very hard for me. I worked six days a week and had Sundays off. Saturdays off from school. My main recreation, as I remember, was playing tennis on Saturdays and Sundays.My friends--your last question about anti-Semitism--my only really close friends were the two young people about my age who were Jewish in Santa Barbara. There were only three of us about the same age.

Balter: Do you remember their names?

Margolis: Yes. One was George Snavice. He was about a year younger than me. And Max Hein, who was about a year and a half older than me. Later on, there was a third family that moved in with a person about our age, and the name was [Herbert] Motto. I can't think of his first name. We were always together. We were the only-- Close friends. Again, I didn't directly feel the anti-Semitism, although I suppose some of it was there. On the other hand, I had some pretty good friends in school, although not socially, who were not Jewish. So again, I think there was some anti-Semitism present, but it wasn't overt and very troublesome. So, I stayed on for the two years. The Santa Barbara State [Teachers] College was only a two-year college at that time, but you could get credit to go into a university.In the meantime, Max Hein, the one who was older than I was-- Well, you might be interested in a little bit about their families. George Snavice's father was a peddler. He got fruits and vegetables, and peddled them around neighborhoods. And he had several, several, several kinds-- In business for himself, so to speak, in that kind of an area. Max Hein's father was sort of one of the best-off Jews in town. He had an army and navy store after the war. He did very well, so that he had acquired some property, which our family didn't. I might mention one other thing. Before my mother died, we lived for a while in an area called Mission Canyon and-- Oh, while we were living on the Riviera, my mother worked as a waitress at a hotel called the El Encanto Hotel, which was the swank hotel at that time.

Balter: I'm sorry. What was that?

Margolis: El Encanto Hotel. It was the swank hotel in Santa Barbara at that time, and she did quite well there. Evenings, I used to very often go there with her and sit in the kitchen and read. I was an avaricious reader, read book after book. I'd have dinner there very often, and all sorts of goodies, in the kitchen--she worked there.Then we moved to this Mission Canyon area and built a small grocery store there, which my mother ran and which I helped out in. It was a very tiny, very tiny place. Never made much money, but it made a little money to supplement my father's income. And, as I say, during this period also I-- I never remember any period that, at least as far as I knew, we were in want, but we never had a lot of money. As a matter of fact, my father about 1924 bought a Model T Ford, which not everybody owned at that time. It was a secondhand one, but nevertheless, he had a car. Of course he used it in his business, but he had that. So that was pretty much my life there.

Balter: Now, let me ask you just a few things. This Mission Canyon area, does that still exist as a district of Santa Barbara?

Margolis: Yes, yes.

Balter: Okay, 'cause I'm not real familiar with the terrain there.

Margolis: Yes, there's an old-- The Santa Barbara Mission is one of the famous old missions in California. And then there's a road-- One road from Santa Barbara Mission goes up to the Riviera, and another road goes into a canyon called Mission Canyon, which was a very lovely area: lots of trees and a nice residential area, but middle-class homes, then. I don't know what they cost at that time, but now you'd say homes that would cost today maybe $75,000. Of course it cost a tiny fraction of that at that time.

Balter: What are some of your-- You've told me some of your recollections of some of your friends in Santa Barbara as you were growing up there. Are there any other memories that come to mind throughout your childhood and lessons in Santa Barbara?

Margolis: Yes, I can give you a few of them. I had a bicycle. I used to ride, when we lived on the Riviera, I used to ride down from the Riviera to the high school that I was going to-- No, this was the junior high school at that time that I was going to. Then I'd ride back up the hill, walking part way. They didn't have the geared bikes in those days.On one occasion I was passing an automobile--there were streetcar tracks--my wheels got caught in between the track and the road, you know, in that space there. Threw me off the bike, right in front of a car that went over me, without touching me. And I remember I went on to school that day. I was bruised. I went on to school that day, and then I came home and told my mother about it. And my bike was smashed. I remember she put me to bed for two or three days, even though I had gone to school. I came out of it all right. But I remember that as one of the scary moments of my life: flying over the handlebars in front of the car. Would happen today you'd be--if anyone--you'd be dead. Cars at that time were quite high.

Balter: A little higher up?

Margolis: Oh, much higher than they are now. But I was still-- As long as it happened, it happened in a very fortunate way.I remember particularly that I went out for athletics, particularly baseball. I was never very good at it. I never succeeded in making the team. I was on the debating team at school. When I was a junior or a senior in high school [Santa Barbara High School], I took a course in commercial law that they gave at the high school, and my teacher said I was very good at it. I liked it, and I, then and there, I decided to become a lawyer.

Balter: In high school?

Margolis: In high school when I was either a junior-- I think I was a junior, and I never changed my mind. I guess I was at that time, I was probably fourteen years old. I was a good student. School was easy for me, and I enjoyed school. I always liked it and I was particularly-- I read constantly--all the time. When I worked for Western Union Telegraph Company, I suppose out of the eight hours that I worked, I had two, two and a half hours of just--broken up--sitting around. I spent maybe an hour studying, the rest of the time reading. And I just read a tremendous number of books.

Balter: What types of books did you read?

Margolis: I read almost every kind of book. I started out in my younger years with the Tarzan books [by Edgar Rice Burroughs], you know, those books. And I read hunks of the Book of Knowledge at one point. Then I read all of Jack London; I became very fond of Jack London. And then I read some of the classics at a later stage when I was in high school. I wasn't at that stage reading anything political, but I was reading many, many, quite, quite good books as well as a lot of junk. I loved mystery stories and things of that kind. I read almost anything. My tastes were indiscriminate rather than discriminate, but it included the good as well as the bad: I just loved to read.Let's see, what else? I remember particularly what Halloweens were like in Santa Barbara. That was the one time of the year when my friends and I would generally get together with other fellows, and we'd go out raiding, knocking over outhouses. We were very destructive in those days during Halloween--much more destructive--and did all kinds of things. People more or less expected it and, to a considerable extent, accepted it. Why? I don't know. Dirty up, soap up cars, and do all kinds of things which now seem to be totally stupid, but that was what the others were doing. We wanted to be part of what was going on, so we did it too. Remember going out--It was a country village then. Well, Santa Barbara had about thirty thousand people, but there were, I remember, areas where we grew watermelons. We used to go steal watermelons and sit on the curb and throw the rinds of watermelons at passing cars. I don't know why we did this, but these were the sort of things that kids were doing at that time. Fortunately, we weren't very good shots, and, as far as I know, we never hurt anybody or anything.After my father was gone from Santa Barbara, I continued to live at the boardinghouse, where there was a very nice woman, whose name I don't recall now, who was kind of motherly in her approach to me. But also, particularly the families of my two friends, on weekends I would have dinner with them and that kind of thing. My aunt, who was still living there, we didn't get along at that point very well.

Balter: I'm sorry, who is still living there now?

Margolis: No, she's dead now.

Balter: She was still living there.

Margolis: Yes. She was living there during the two years my father was gone. She and my father had had a falling-out, and it apparently extended over to me. I saw them only occasionally. She had one son, Albert, last name Aronow, which was her first husband's name. At that time, her first husband had died and she was married to a tailor by the name of Pasman. She was very tall. My mother was a tall woman. My mother was possibly six feet--very tall. But Jennie was maybe six feet two; I'm not sure, but she was over six feet. She was taller than my mother and a very big woman. I would see them only occasionally.Now Albert is living here now. He became a chemist, and he's now retired from Sinclair. He was the lead chemist for Sinclair Paints companies--now retired. I see him once or twice a year. Our views are quite different, but on a personal level we're friendly. Let's see, what else? During the Santa Barbara days, I'm trying to think, other things may come to me, but nothing especially occurs at the present time.

Balter: We have a few other things I wanted to ask you, but what I think what we'll do is turn over the tape at this point.

2. Tape Number: I, Side Two May 14, 1984

Margolis: One thing that I remembered is that when I was going to Santa Barbara Teachers College, which was also a junior college at that time, I was active in dramatics and on the debating team of the school. In connection with the dramatics, I got an opportunity to participate in a play at the art theater, the Lobero Theater. I think it's spelled L-O-B-E-R-O Theater. I remember the name of a play for reasons that will become apparent. It was Caesar and Cleopatra [by George Bernard Shaw], and it was directed by a man by the name of [Irving] Pichel, who, many years later, I represented as one of the Hollywood Nineteen, later reduced to the Hollywood Ten.

Balter: So you were in court because of his plays. [laughs]

Margolis: Yes. Well, not a very important part, but-- [laughter]

Balter: That's very interesting. Did he, years later when you represented him in the Hollywood Ten case, did he remember you as the one--?

Margolis: No, he didn't remember me because I wouldn't expect him to, but I remembered him, of course. [laughter]

Balter: Of course. [laughter] That's great. Listen, we've talked a lot about your activities in school, and I was wondering if you remember the names of your elementary school, your junior high, your high school in Santa Barbara.

Margolis: In one of my-- I think I told you this in the beginning: I am terrible on names. My memory about events and the relationship between things is pretty good; my memory on names is just terrible.

Balter: Okay, we'll get that one some other way. We'll get out the yearbooks. A couple of questions, really, I'll just sort of throw them together. We talked about your father and your brother. When your father and your brother left Santa Barbara to go up to San Francisco and you stayed behind, did your father want you to go with him, or was there conflict over the decision of your staying in Santa Barbara?

Margolis: As I recall it, it was-- No, it was mutually agreed that it was the right thing for me to do for several reasons: One was I had a good job. I wanted to go to school there; I had an opportunity to go to school there. My father had enough of a problem moving just with himself and the younger son, my brother. All and all, it just seemed the right thing to do. I do remember that we discussed it, and there was no disagreement about it.

Balter: Tell me a little bit about your mother and your father: what they were like, the way that they brought you up, what life in the home was like.

Margolis: Well, my mother was by far the stronger person in the relationship. She was a very strong woman, who was the one who sort of controlled the money and was even more businesslike than my father and-- She pretty much ran things. They were very much in agreement on their political outlook on life, which was Left. They were in agreement as to the friends they liked and those they didn't like. I remember, for example, while we were living in Santa Barbara, the Jews there formed a small synagogue shul. They were urged to join, and they refused. They said that they just didn't believe in that. I'm not sure they were right, by the way, looking at it now. But at any event they were very firm in that, and I remember that there was no disagreement between them at all.As I remember, whatever tension there was--and there is always some in every family--it was that my mother was generally pushing my father to do a little more. She was the one who, for example, as I remember, when we built the store in Mission Canyon, she was the leader of that. It was her idea. She pushed-- My father was not a lazy man. He worked, and worked hard, you know, and made a living for the family, but he wasn't pushing the way she would for constantly bettering one's self in the economic sphere.

Balter: Was he a painter this entire time?

Margolis: The entire time of his life until his death. Yes.

Balter: Now, you sort of hinted a little bit about the possible religious upbringing, if any, that you had. What was that like?

Margolis: Well, I had no religious upbringing. I didn't go through the usual ceremonies, for example. I had no education in Hebrew or in any-- None, none of it. I wasn't bar mitzvahed, which was almost looked upon as a crime in those days, and I guess [by] most Jewish people now. I, as I look back on it, I think maybe that wasn't altogether the best thing, but I'm not sure. I know that I did the same thing with my own children. Although in the case of my children, my wife wasn't Jewish. But in any event, I was never told I couldn't do any of these things. I was just never required to do them. Not being required to do them, I had no interest in doing those things. So I didn't learn some things that might have been useful for me to learn if they had pushed me into it.

Balter: Did your parents consider themselves agnostics or atheists, or did they express any of their concerns?

Margolis: Well, I would say they were probably atheists, although there might have been some degree of their being agnostics. I think it would be fair to say that they were atheists.

Balter: To what extent did either your mother or father, or both, discuss politics with you and press their views upon yours? What would you say?

Margolis: My political discussions took place much more after my mother's death than they did before. Remember, again, that my mother died when I was sixteen years old. At that time, while I had some limited interest in politics, it wasn't very much. I, of course, heard talk around the house about things. Afterwards, later, I talked a great deal more to my father about politics, but no point of view was ever pushed on me by my parents. I don't mean that I wasn't affected by their views, but no one said this is what you ought to believe and this is what you ought to do. There was not that kind of compulsion on me.

Balter: Did your parents, at any time while they were living in Santa Barbara, get involved in any political activities? Was your father-- You had mentioned earlier that he was in the painters union in New York. Was he in the union in Santa Barbara, for example?

Margolis: Yes, he continued to be in the union. I think he was a union member all of his life. Continued to be a union member, and he supported the union, although he was very critical of the union. His political activities were within the IWO, and they-- The point is that when we lived in Sierra Madre and Santa Barbara, there really wasn't much opportunity for him to get involved in any kind of politics. Now, when he moved to San Francisco, there was an IWO branch there that he joined. He used to go to meetings. He became a member of a Jewish chorus. (He had a very good voice, sang very well.) So, while he was in San Francisco, he participated in that way in left-wing organizational activities. As far as I know, not while he was in either Sierra Madre or Santa Barbara.

Balter: Did your family ever take trips out of Santa Barbara? Did you go to Los Angeles?

Margolis: Occasionally, occasionally.

Balter: What were some of the places that you went to?

Margolis: A trip to Los Angeles when we had the car. It was a four-hour drive each way. If you made the round trip with only two flat tires, you were doing exceedingly well. But we went there, and they had some friends there. We visited there, but only occasionally. A hundred miles-- Santa Barbara is a hundred miles from Los Angeles, and that was a fairly long trip at that time. So we didn't do very much traveling.We had some friends in Santa Paula [Ventura County], which is a little community about, I think about thirty miles from San Francisco, and there again--

Balter: You mean to say Santa Barbara?

Margolis: From Santa Barbara, excuse me, from Santa Barbara. And there, again, the two daughters, one of them [Zelma Gussom] became the wife of Mike [Michael] Wilson, who is one of the blacklisted writers, and the other one [Sylvia Gussom] was the wife of a very close friend of mine, also, Paul Jarrico. That is not surprising because the reason we traveled so far as thirty miles for a relationship is because this was a Jewish, progressive, I guess, left-wing family. There wasn't anybody like that in Santa Barbara, so we occasionally used to go to Santa Paula, and they occasionally used to come to Santa Barbara on the thirty-mile trip, which took a couple of hours each way.

Balter: And this was in your dad's Model T?

Margolis: Yeah. Yes, Model T. I don't remember, I think the-- I can't think of the last name of the other family [Gussom], but I should know it. It will probably come to me. They used to come in their car to Santa Barbara, but it was once or twice a year, three times a year, that kind of thing. But there was an ongoing relationship because they craved so for some political companionship. Now, there was my aunt and her husband, who had very similar views, although they didn't always agree. They were Left, but didn't always agree. And the relationship wasn't always very good for various reasons.

Balter: Of course, as time went on and they had been in the country for some time at this point, did your parents feel intimidated as immigrants? Were they fearful at any time of the political views that they held and [of] discussing them with other people?

Margolis: I don't think so. You know, my father became a citizen. I think-- No, I'm not sure whether my mother became a citizen. Again, see, I don't know that much. When my father was a citizen, I think my mother became a-- I'm almost positive, my mother was a citizen also. I don't think there was any hesitancy in their speaking out--at least, I can't recall.

Balter: At least, none that you detected.

Margolis: Nothing that I detected.

Balter: Okay. Well, going back to-- I think where we are in the chronology, you have been attending college in Santa Barbara and you're working for Western Union. At the time that you entered college, as I understand it, you have already decided that you wanted to be an attorney. So, I assume that you were taking courses towards that end and so on.

Margolis: Yes, prelegal is really a very, very general kind of thing that you do to prepare--for prelegal. There wasn't the great variety of courses in those days that there is now. See, this was--I went to school then--'27 and '28.And then in '29, I went to University of Southern California. The reason I happened to go to USC was that my friend Max Hein had gone up there a year ahead, yeah, a year ahead of me, and entered pharmacy school there. He had joined a fraternity, Tau Epsilon Phi, a Jewish fraternity. You want to remember I didn't have many friends of my own age, at least no close friends. And he induced me to come to USC and to join the fraternity and live in the fraternity house, which is one of the silly things I did in my life. But it gave me a base, you know, with the only people I knew and I was accepted. I had friends and companions.

Balter: Now, you were still an undergraduate?

Margolis: Well, I was only at USC one year. What happened was that I went to USC in 19-- I guess it was September of 192-, let's see, '27, September of '28, and this was just before the Depression. And I got a job. See, I still had to support myself.I got a job with the Western Union Telegraph Company, as a result of my work in Santa Barbara--in their accounting department. I got a job, as a matter of fact, in a-- I worked in a basement pulling out copies of telegrams that they needed. Copies of telegrams would be stored there, and then they'd need it because there was a claim of a rate error or some other error, or some other reason for getting it--somebody wanted to check way back. I became quite proficient at that. I had a forty-hour-a-week job, but actually worked pretty much by myself. Was able to do it in about thirty hours a week or twenty-eight hours a week, and got away with that. So I had what was a good job. I was making, still, seventy-five dollars a [month]. And I think, again, I was living in the fraternity for forty dollars a week, I mean, a month. Seventy-five a month for forty dollars a month.Then sometime in '29, things began to go bad before the stock market collapsed. And with Western Union Telegraph Company, things began to go bad. I had very low seniority, and I was let go. I had managed to get along fine, but I never saved any money. Well, I saved money when I was in Santa Barbara to pay my tuition and for my books, which wasn't very much at that time at USC. But then here, all of a sudden, I'm without a job. It was lucky I was in the fraternity house because I had lived there for several months without-- Paying only part. I got odd jobs: I did tutoring, and I worked as an extra in a number of movies. Those were the two main things, tutoring and working as an extra in movies. But I wasn't making any seventy-five dollars a month. I was probably making fifty dollars a month or forty-five dollars a month, and so I was going into the hole.When school was over, I decided that I would go to San Francisco. I went to San Francisco, moved in with my dad and stepmother.

Balter: What was your stepmother's name, by the way?

Margolis: Etta.

Balter: Do you know what her maiden name was?

Margolis: I can't think of it, but I can get it for you [Boyarski]. I can't think of it at the moment. She was a very, very different person than my mother was. She was a very religious woman. Kosher and-- But a very wonderful woman, a very fine woman. She raised my brother. She really became every bit a mother to him and felt like a mother to him. I also had a very good relationship with her. She was a very caring person and very genuine. She had been over from Russia a much shorter period of time. I don't remember just when she came over. So I moved in with them.I couldn't, for a while I couldn't get a job at all. And then I guess I-- When I stayed out of school a year, that was probably, I would say, the most miserable year of my life. I got a job on--what was it on?--on Geary Street in a market in San Francisco as a clerk and delivery boy. I was making something like sixty-five dollars a month. I'm not sure it was that, but it was less than I had been making at the telegraph company. You would try to get any kind of a job. I think I was working ten hours a day, six days a week. And the job, every minute of which I hated because it was just the dullest job. My work with the telegraph company had been not uninteresting; I hadn't minded it. This [job] was just terrible. I suppose each ten-hour day was like thirty. But anyway, I went through the year, and I finally managed-- I was trying to get a job at the Western Union Telegraph Company, and I finally got a job [there]. Somebody left. I got a job in the accounting department of the Western Union Telegraph Company in San Francisco. I started in at seventy-five dollars a month again, and after a while I was getting eighty-five dollars a month, which was pretty good money in those days. You get a good dinner for thirty-five cents, fifty cents--real good. I continued to live at home, although I spent a large part of the time in an apartment where a close friend of mine--went to law school--lived.I entered Hastings law school [University of California, Hastings College of the Law] there. So that after being out of school a year, one of the reasons-- There were several reasons why I entered Hastings: One was it was called "the poor man's Boalt Hall." (Boalt Hall is the [University of California] Berkeley law school.) And you went to school at Hastings-- Virtually everybody who went to school at Hastings worked. You went to school six days a week, carried fifteen units, and you went three days from eight to ten, or three days from eight to eleven. Anyway, you were out no later than eleven every morning. I used to go either at ten or eleven directly to my job at the Western Union Telegraph Company, and get home seven or eight o'clock at night from that. So that's what enabled me to go back into school. Another reason why I went there is because it was in San Francisco. There was no tuition, or if there was tuition, it was almost nothing. It was a state school. All you needed was like twenty-five, thirty dollars for books for the year.I went through three years of law school there. I worked all of the time. Graduated number two in my class. Found law school, except for the first semester when I had a great deal of trouble adjusting, I found law school quite easy. I was able really without great difficulty to work and go to school and do other things as well. Although, again, I wasn't politically active, I had not as yet become politically active. Although by that time I was thinking much more politically than I had been previously.

Balter: I take it that you didn't complete your bachelor's degree, but you decided to go on.

Margolis: Well, you're right. That was another reason I went to Hastings. At Hastings, you can go to the end-- Most law schools require four years of prelegal. Hastings required only three years of prelegal, and I had that. I finished two years at [Santa Barbara State Teachers College] and one year at USC. And that was another reason I went there. If I had gone to US[C]-- I had originally planned to go to USC law school, but I would have had-- Well, I would have still graduated at the same time because I would have stayed in school. I suppose if it hadn't been for the Depression, that's probably what would have happened.

Balter: Before we go on to law school and the beginning of your law career, I did want to ask you one thing. Since we're all from Hollywood, we must indulge ourselves. You mentioned that you had worked as a film extra. Do you remember any of the films that you worked on?

Margolis: Yes, I worked on, I remember, two or three Jack Oakie films. Does that name Jack Oakie mean anything to you?

Balter: Sure.

Margolis: And they were-- I worked on at least two films that were football films where I was-- They used to get their students, a student body crowd from it. And gee, we made-- I remember we got twenty-five dollars a day, I think, as an extra--and lunch. That was a lot of money for a day's work. Believe me.

Balter: That's more than they pay now. [laughs] No, they couldn't, probably couldn't be.

Margolis: No, no. Today, I think it's probably a hundred and fifty or something like that. But I think twenty-five then was more than a hundred and fifty now.

Balter: That was what? A third of your monthly salary?

Margolis: Yes, it was a third of my monthly salary. Of course, I only got, I guess, maybe eight or ten days all together, of this kind of work. But if eight days would be a couple of hundred dollars, ten would be $250. So I made somewhere between $200 and $250 dollars, which was a large part of my income over-- I was in school there for about five months after I lost my job at Western Union, so it was a large part of my income. The only other income I had, I got some tutoring jobs through the college, through USC, and I don't know what I got.

Balter: Was there a specific studio that you worked for as an extra?

Margolis: No, no.

Balter: How did it work? How did you get your work as an extra?

Margolis: We got the jobs through university employment. The university maintained an employment office-- And they were very good about it. They sent you out on the basis of need, so that whenever there was work of that kind, I got it because [laughs] I really needed it. It was mob scenes, and it got-- I remember that, you know, you work maybe an hour, sit around for five or six hours and play cards. It's like the movies are today, so it was really like a picnic in those days. And what you did [chuckles] was no great thing. Were mob scenes, student body scenes--you cheered or something--so it was no big problem. And if it hadn't been for that, I would have starved to death. [laughs] Well, I don't know. The one good thing about the fraternity was that they carried me during this period. I eventually paid them, but years later.

Balter: Although you said a little earlier that joining the fraternity was kind of a silly thing that you have done. How did you mean that?

Margolis: Well, it was a typical fraternity with all of its emptiness and, you know, there was the-- Most of the people in the fraternity were very well-off: came from rich families. Most of the people--remember this was '29--had their own cars (and you had to be rich in those days to have your own car) and had money to spend (they spent more on little things than my income was for a month). They were really not interested in anything except having a good time. I belonged to the debating team, for example, while I was in school there. I was the only one in the whole fraternity. Well, there were a lot of bright young kids there, but I was the only one who had any interest in doing things of that kind. There were some athletes. We had some athletes in the house. I remember particularly one became a very well known lawyer here, Jerry [Jerome] Nemer, who was a great basketball star. Really, one of the great basketball stars of that era, who was in our fraternity house, and he was-- That was the, the big thing--and they, you know, they sat around, played bridge, and the only time I ever played bridge in my life was during my year there--and the social events. But they were really very good to me. They would take me out on the dates and I wouldn't have to pay anything towards the car and things like that. So in a way, I got opportunities that I wouldn't have had any other way. But by the end of the year, I knew that if I went back to USC I would not live at the fraternity house. That I knew, although I stayed friendly with many of the people. But none of them ever did anything of the kind I was interested in.

Balter: I assume that you were probably not alone in terms of having to drop out of school at that period of time. Were there--

Margolis: Well, as far as my fraternity house was concerned, I think I was the only [one] that had to. Max Hein, my friend, his father owned the army-navy store. Although I'm sure he was hit hard, he was pretty well-to-do. I'm sure that many others dropped [out]. But you want to remember USC at that time was considered a rich person's school, and so most of the people there came from well-off families. But I'm sure at other schools, they were having a tough time.

Balter: Now, the three years that you were at Hastings law school, did you live at home with your father?

Margolis: I maintained my home there, and paid room and board. I worked during the entire period of time, but I spent a lot of time-- I formed one very particularly close friendship [with] a fellow named Myer Symonds, Myer C. Symonds, who became a Honolulu lawyer later on. He also worked his way through school. He was from Vallejo, California, and he had an interest-- His father had a hock shop. What is it? What do they call it where they hock things?

Balter: Pawnshop.

Margolis: Pawnshop in Vallejo, but was not particularly successful. And Myer worked for-- He got some help from his father. He worked for a bankruptcy lawyer by the name of [Ernest] Torregano.A very interesting story about this guy too--I'll take a moment just to tell it to you--because Torregano was very dark and he was very successful for a Ne-- And his origin was in New Orleans. He was a member of the French Club, which was a very fancy club in San Francisco at that time. And then he died a few years after I got out of law school. (I was still in San Francisco.) And it was discovered that-- It was an all-white club, and it was discovered that he was a Negro: he was black. [laughter] I just remember that with some interest. [laughter]

Balter: Did it create a scandal at the club?

Margolis: I guess it did. I understand there were-- I just thought it was funny at the time. Anyway, Myer Symonds and I were very close friends. We studied together, and I used to stay-- As a matter of a fact, he and my friend Max Hein, who moved to San Francisco and became a pharmacist then, and was working in a pharmacy, they had an apartment together, and I spent a lot of time there. They had an extra room, and I stayed there a great deal of time. But actually, my clothes-- I was living at home with my father, and that was until I got married, I continued to live at home.

Balter: Some of the early friends that you've mentioned--George Snavice, Max Hein, and Myer Symonds--are any of them still alive?

Margolis: Yes, Myer Symonds is still alive. His story is a very interesting one, but it's a long story. Max Hein is dead, and George Snavice is dead. Max Hein died about three years ago--heart condition. And George Snavice, who changed his name to Davis, died about ten, twelve years ago here in Los Angeles. He had a tough time all of his life, making it economically.

Balter: This wouldn't be the same George Davis who worked on the Tom Mooney case.

Margolis: Oh, no, no, no. He changed his name. No, he's not a lawyer. He married a woman--what's her name?--who came from a well-to-do family. Retail stores I think--what kind of stores?--I think hardware stores. He got jobs in their stores and managed one of the stores, but always had a tough time. Had a lot of health problems and died at a very young age.Max Hein did very well. He was a pharmacist. And he moved to Burlingame [California]. He owned his own drugstore for many years. I'll tell you an interesting side story there. [laughs] At one stage I worked for a patent lawyer by the name of [Adelbert] Schapp. I didn't work for him really. I had office space with him and did work for him in exchange for my space. I never really ever worked for anybody, except in exchange for space. He had a daughter, Phyllis. Schapp was a German Jew, and they wanted me to marry their daughter. Now, I just wasn't, I just wasn't really interested. One of the things that happened is that Max and I, while we remained very friendly throughout our lives, grew very much apart politically. Now, he was never a reactionary or anything like that. He was just apolitical. He never really had any interest or concern to speak of. A decent person, but that's about it. So, we had very little in common. And this family was an apolitical family, and Phyllis was an apolitical person. By this time I was already becoming quite a political person from the standpoint of, at least, of my interest if not my knowledge. And she just didn't interest me. She just wasn't that kind. Although when my wife [Valerie Kayly Margolis] and I married, it wasn't particularly political either, but my wife went along more with what I was doing than-- I knew that family would expect me to establish a conservative practice, and they were ready to set me up and help me do that. And I wanted no part of that. So I introduced--at one stage I introduced her [Phyllis Schapp] to Max Hein, and they went for each other and got married. [laughter] Had a son, Jared. They were married for many years, and she died of skin cancer about twenty-five years ago. She died at quite a young age. Again, as I say, we remained friendly, but not close after those years. George, I rarely saw. Again, he was totally apolitical. What happened was that all these friends-- Except for Myer Symonds, who I pulled into the political thing and he went along in a very big way, except for him, I just lost interest in my friends because we had nothing in common. My life was different than that. You know, when Max and I were going out looking for girls and that kind of thing, I was, you know-- That was no longer [laughs] my main interest in life, and so we very much grew apart.

Balter: Would you date the beginning of your active political life from during law school or what would you say was the turning point?

Margolis: No, I was too busy, in law school. I was going to law school-- remember?--working eight hours a day and having some social life. I really had no time or energy for much politics at that time. I was putting in forty hours a week there. Fifteen hours a week of classes, and you're supposed to study three hours for every one. I was putting in maybe fifteen hours of studying, so I had a seventy-hour week to begin with. And I just didn't do much of anything else, except socially.

Balter: Do you remember any of your professors or fellow students?

Margolis: Yes, I remember a few of them. I remember some of my fellow students. Myer Symonds was the only one who politically went along in the same direction as I did. Most of the rest of them became quite successful lawyers and did well. But, again, with many of them, I was reasonably friendly. I remember I went to one reunion--our twenty-year reunion--and I decided that I'd never go again because it was just so dull, so uninteresting so far as I was concerned. And the people were so interested in so much different and so many different things. Boasting how they have even cheated clients out of fees, you know. It was not something that-- I don't mean that all of them were that way, but that's one of the things that concerned me. None of them had any concern beyond their own immediate welfare: how well they were doing in the practice, how they could get ahead, and so forth.

Balter: Let's see. Your twentieth reunion, graduating from law school, that would have been--

Margolis: [Nineteen] fifty-three.

Balter: Right in the middle of the McCarthy period, and you were a very well known, so-called red attorney--they were calling you--in those days.

Margolis: That's right. It's one of the reasons I went. I wanted to see-- And I must say that I was greeted in very friendly fashion. I didn't raise the question, and others didn't raise the question. I just wanted to see what their reaction would be. And I don't think that anybody, as far as I can remember, nobody really attempted to avoid me, or was unfriendly, or attempted to take me on. None of that. And by that time, you see, I had represented-- I had a lot of publicity representing the Hollywood Ten. I tried the Los Angeles Smith Act case. Yes, I-- It's a very interesting thing. Within the profession, during the height of the period, many people tried to avoid me. I never really had much animosity expressed by fellow members of the bar. By politicians, yes, but not by fellow members of the bar.

3. Tape Number: II, Side One May 14, 1984

Balter: Ben, we talked about Myer [C.] Symonds, one of your friends from law school [University of California, Hastings College of the Law]. Do you recall the names of any of your other classmates and of your professors in law school--some details about them?

Margolis: Yes, I remember there was a class of fifty--exactly fifty--and there was one woman: forty-nine men and one woman. No blacks, all white, no Latinos, Anglos-- There were several Jewish students. I don't remember just how many, but there were several.

Balter: Any Asians in the class?

Margolis: I beg your pardon?

Balter: Any Asians in the class? Japanese, or Chinese?

Margolis: No, none. The woman's name was Little, [Frankie] Elizabeth Little, and she became a fine-- But she-- Oh, well, before I get to that, they-- No, wait a minute, I've given you the wrong information. There were a hundred in our class to begin with: one woman, ninety-nine men.I remember the first day. The dean's name was [David E.] Snodgrass. And he, I remember, addressed us on the first day we were there, which was a ritual at that time. Not only at that school, but in other law schools, and I think even to this day it's done in some law schools. I remember his saying, "Look to your right and look to your left. And I want to tell you that out of two of you, only one will be here on graduation day. It's a question of who makes it."He was absolutely right: exactly fifty people graduated from my class. Whether that was an accident or not, I don't know. But it was pretty much a policy of weeding out the lowest fifty, and quite a few dropped out the first semester. I had a great deal of difficulty adjusting myself the first semester, but I got over it and did all right after that. In any event, some of the people who-- I remember there was a fellow I was at that time quite friendly with, who came from a Northern California county, and he became a U.S. senator. Engle was in my class, and we were quite friendly.

Balter: Clair Engle.

Margolis: Clair Engle, that's right. As a matter of fact, I don't remember all of the details, but he got into marital trouble while he was in school. I may be confusing things, and I want to be sure it was him. But I think it was him. He married some older woman; there was a divorce, I don't remember the details, but in any event he was a-- No question that he was a very bright guy, a very energetic guy. He was one.I remember a fellow by the name of [Herbert D.] Armstrong who came from a very-- I remember him because I once visited his home over in Berkeley, and he came from a wealthy family, which wasn't typical of the class. He and, I think, one other person came from a well-to-do family. This other person, whose name I don't recall, had gone to Harvard for a year. I think he flunked out, or at least hadn't made it, and started all over again in the first year there and did quite well at Hastings.There was a fellow who I remember quite well, for different reasons, who was a year ahead of me, by the name of Ben [K.] Lehrer, I believe it is, who came from a wealthy Jewish family and who failed to pass the bar. I remember him very well because he thereafter studied with us, with Myer Symonds and me and all three of us passed. He, the second time that he took the bar, and Myer Symonds and I, the first time we took the bar, which was in 1933, when they passed the lowest percentage of those who took it in the history of the bar. Twenty-nine percent of those who took it passed, and we pulled him through. He was never a very good student, very bright in the law, but Myer and I give ourselves credit for pulling him through. We worked very hard, by ourselves and with him.I remember him particularly, because I had no money and he had money. Later, on my first case, my first contingent case, I didn't have money to finance the case, so I went to him to see if he would help me because I knew he had money. He loaned me, I think, $300, some such amount, to finance the case. And in exchange took half of my fee in addition to the return of his $300: something which I've always resented. I won the case. I then got an $1,800 recovery. He got back his $300. My fee was, I think, $600, and he got, I think, 40 percent of-- No, either 40 percent or half, I think half. So I made $300, and he made $300 for loaning me $300. And I never spoke to him again after that. [laughter]

Balter: After what you guys had done for him.

Margolis: And he became the head of a very large firm. He died a number of years ago, but I remember him very well.I have trouble remembering names. There was one fellow who I got to know quite well years later--his name escapes me for the moment--who became a top lawyer for the unemployment insurance board. Many of the lawyers became quite successful and did very well. At the moment I-- Oh, I was very friendly with a fellow by the name of [Martin] Tieburg, who became a moderately successful lawyer over in Oakland. Also, a fellow by the name of [J. Bruce] Fratis. Well, he worked at the Western Union Telegraph Company. We worked in the accounting department on similar jobs. As a matter of fact, we pulled him into left-wing activities for a short period of time, but he pulled out of them. Well, I think he was always a fairly progressive guy and a decent guy. Would not-- Left the Left wing, he-- I think he departed during the McCarthy period. A lot of people did, and there was good cause to be frightened. Let's see if any others. I'm sure other names will come to me.

Balter: How about professors, especially the ones that were very influential on you?

Margolis: Yeah. Well, I suppose the most reactionary professor in the school--from the standpoint of teaching you how to think in law school--was a fellow by the name of [Robert W.] Harrison, who was chief deputy attorney general of the state. Our classes were in the state building, and his offices were upstairs. And he had actually run the attorney general's office for many years. He was at that time, I think, a man in his late fifties.But he was, from the standpoint of being a teacher, I think the finest teacher I've ever had. He taught one course that isn't even taught anymore. The course was sales, which is now really a part of contracts, but in those days, it was a separate course. I remember we had a textbook, and we took the first case in the textbook. We spent about 80 percent of the semester on that one case: analyzing it and learning what made it tick and everything. By the time we finished that, the rest of the cases were easy. We went through the rest of the cases in a matter of a few weeks--two or three weeks. But I remember that he-- Well, he was a very reactionary guy. He was a guy who, from the standpoint of just legal thinking, had the finest mind of anyone in that law school.Then we had a professor who taught us procedure. I remember he had one of those little eyes--what do you call these?

Balter: Monocles.

Margolis: Monocles. A dapper dresser. I don't remember whether his first name or his last name was Marcel. I think it was Marcel something. He [Marcel E. Cerf] practiced for many years. He just knew a great deal. I learned a lot from him. We had a number of pretty good professors. We had some terrible ones, too, who-- But I found out that you got your thinking from a few of these people. The rest of it you learn for yourself, which is the way it went. Hastings later became a school where retired professors from other schools used to go on to teach. I think they still do that. But the days when I was there, that wasn't the situation.

Balter: What was the-- I'm sorry, go ahead.

Margolis: And they had very few full-time professors. There was one for-- Great big tall, big hunk of a man--name I can't recall--who represented employers, whom I ran into-- Later, I opposed him in several bits of litigation involving labor law. I can't think of his name at the moment [Barr]. If Myer Symonds was here, he could tell you [snaps fingers] every name just like that. He's wonderful on names. And of course, Myer Symonds, whom I worked with very closely all through law school.

Balter: And that's a friendship that has endured.

Margolis: Endured right up to the present time. As a matter of fact, I hear from him all the time.

Balter: You're going to law school, obviously, during what they call the depths of the Depression, to use a pretty worn-out phrase, I guess. What was the political and social atmosphere on campus? Now, you've indicated that you, by this time, already knew that you wanted to be an attorney who wasn't going to be representing corporations, obviously, but representing the little guy. To what extent was there that kind of consciousness among the other law students?

Margolis: If that existed to any extent at all, I wasn't aware of it. Very busy people, you didn't see-- Most of them, I would say, at least 90 percent were working. That's why they were going to that school, because you could go those hours and work. They were people who didn't have a hell of a lot of time for those things, and you didn't talk too much about that.By that time, I already knew that what I wanted to be was a labor lawyer. I had arrived at that conclusion from, I guess, talking with my father and reading. By that time, I had begun to do some political reading, not a hell of a lot, but some. And so I think the general approach to this, by most of the people of the school, was simply they wanted to get out of the school and make a living. At that time, making a living was a pretty desirable objective.

Balter: Probably looking at it from today's perspective now-- Nowadays, there are a lot of attorneys who start law school and they have this idea that they're going to be, what we call, a public interest attorney. Now, we even have internships and programs, and back then there wasn't any--

Margolis: There wasn't any such thing.

Balter: So this was not a concept, even, that existed.

Margolis: Wasn't even a concept that existed. There were no legal aid offices, there was none of that. None of those things existed at that time. You want to remember that law didn't play nearly as important a part in our society as it does today. I'm sure the programs and number of lawyers was very much lower than it is today. Law was, as compared today, relatively simple. You went out to practice law. You practiced virtually every aspect of law except maybe patent law. Even tax law wasn't that complicated at that time. So that lawyers were much more generalists, and their basic social concepts of the functions and purposes of law had not developed very much.What did exist at that time, but I wasn't involved in it, was the ILD, the International Labor Defense. The Communist Party was doing things for people, and there were lawyers helping out. But that was on the left-wing political-- And I at that time had no relationship or association with them.

Balter: This is a similar question. I know from my research that shortly after you graduated law school, you became involved in cases where the constitutionality of the Wagner Act [National Labor Relations Act, 1935] was being developed and was finally upheld [1937].

Margolis: Well, that was some time. I think the Wagner Act was passed in '36, wasn't it?

Balter: 'Thirty-six, I'm not sure.

Margolis: I think it was--maybe '35.

Balter: If so, then that would negate my question, which was whether you had-- Well, let me pose the question differently. Given what you have said about the difference in the way that law was practiced then, when you wanted to be a labor attorney and when you began to feel in law school that you wanted to be a labor attorney, what at that time did that mean?

Margolis: Well, I wanted to represent unions. That's what I wanted to do, but the concept of representing unions at that time-- In 1933, there wasn't that much direct trade union work. There was some, but there wasn't that much. But if you represented a trade union, then you were doing work for its members: you were representing the little guy. That's what you thought of--of doing some work for the union. But there really at that time was very little concept of many lawyers who really could practice law just representing unions, just doing what we now call labor work. That developed during the time I was very--From the standpoint of what I wanted to do, I couldn't have graduated and started practicing at a better time. Because labor law developed when I was a young lawyer, and I got in on the ground floor of labor law. Was opposing people who have practiced fifteen, twenty, thirty years, but who were as green in the field as I was, you see. It was a whole new field, so that you didn't come in as a young lawyer with the same kind of disadvantages you would have if, let's say, if you were going to try a breach of contract case or something of that kind. We were entering an absolutely new field, and I was among those who had the opportunity to enter it at that period.

Balter: We'll be talking quite a bit about that as we go on, but I think this is probably a good place to stop for today.

4. Tape Number: II, Side Two June 14, 1984

Balter: Ben, when we left off last time, you were just on the verge of graduating from Hastings law school, which I understand was in 1933. That would have been in June or so, in 1933?

Margolis: June, I believe it was June of '33.

Balter: What did you do next after graduation from law school?

Margolis: Well, I was working at the time, as I worked all through law school, for the Western Union Telegraph Company in their accounting department, and I continued on that job. In my spare time, I studied for the bar examination, which was given I believe in August, but I'm not sure of the month. In any event, several months after I graduated--that was in 1933. And this was the depth of the Depression. Things were very bad for lawyers generally. In November or December, the list of those who passed came out, and I was among them. They passed the lowest percentage of students in the history of the bar, before or since, 29 percent of those who took it. Of course, the reason for it was that they had already many more lawyers than could make a living. This was sort of a closed shop operation: they were trying to keep the number of lawyers down.But, in any event, I was admitted and I was sworn in. I believe it was in December, but it could have been late November of 1933. Right after I was admitted, I obtained office space right near the place where I was working for the Western Union Telegraph Company, just kitty-corner across the street. I remember on the sixth floor of the De Young Building, with a man by the name of Young, who was not young (he was in his sixties). I was supposed to get office space in exchange for helping him with his legal work. This man had had a successful career by representing small business people.

Balter: Do you recall his first name, by the way?

Margolis: No, I do not. I think it was Sam [Donald], but I'm not positive. In any event, I never did any legal work for him because he didn't have any. My assistance to him consisted of going down from the sixth floor to the first floor to the cigar stand--they had a lot of cigar stands at that time in San Francisco--and getting him cigars.In the meantime, I was continuing to work part-time at the Western Union Telegraph Company. I continued that for almost a year, something less than a year, working out-- I had a very good arrangement where I could work almost when I wanted to, but that was my major income.At the end of six months, my employer, the one who had given me the office space, jumped out of the sixth-floor window and was killed. He committed suicide, which, by the way, was the sort of thing that was going on. It was quite prevalent in those days. This was a man whose life had been destroyed. You know, he was a comfortable middle-class lawyer who, all of a sudden, had nothing. And literally nothing--I'm not exaggerating--he just had nothing. He lost his entire practice. Had no place to go to get any new practice: there wasn't any.During that period of time, I think I made in the first six months, I think I made something like $250 out of my law practice, which consisted of handling a couple of divorces that I managed to get ahold of, at $50 a piece.A friend of mine, Myer Symonds--we had gone through law school together--he worked for a bankruptcy firm, Torregano and Stark.

Balter: I assume that they were probably doing a little bit better. [laughs]

Margolis: The bankruptcy business was fairly good, at least as compared with others. My friend, who had worked for that firm while he was going to law school, continued [there] as a lawyer. We started together, and he was admitted the same time I was. And he got me-- You have to have a trustee appointed for each bankruptcy, and on the very small cases he could get me [cases] which nobody else wanted and where the fee was $10, $15, $20. He got me appointed as trustee and that was merely a nominal job. It wasn't really practicing law, but it brought in a few dollars. On those things, I made, as I say, in that six months maybe $250 somewhere. But I was also working part-time at the Western Union Telegraph Company.After he jumped, Young jumped out of the window, I got office space with a patent lawyer by the name of Schapp, [Adelbert] Schapp. While I was with him, I tried my first case by myself and participated in another case with him which I shall always remember. It was an action against I. Magnin [and Company], which is a-- It was against the women's department [store], and Mr. Schapp represented an inventor of the divided skirt. [laughter] We were suing for breach of that patent, because Magnin was selling divided skirts, which was claimed to be-- We were in court for some little time--I don't remember how long--and the case was settled. Magnin paid something. I don't remember how much it was, but I'm sure that in terms of today's dollars it was very little.Also, through my stepmother [Etta Boyarski Margolis], I got my first personal injury case--and, you know, these first ones you always remember, together with all of the details--and this was an elderly woman. (At that time, I thought she was elderly; she was fifty, fifty-five. I wouldn't say that now.) At that time, she had-- There was an alleyway where she had gone across the street in the middle of the block, from one side of the alley to the other, and there was a hole in the street right next to the curb. She didn't see it, and she stepped into the hole and broke her leg. I sued the city. I needed a couple hundred dollars or so for costs: I didn't have it. I had also--there was a fellow, whose name I could give you, but I just assume, I venture he's dead now.

Balter: I think you might have mentioned him last time. This is the fellow who lent you the money to do the case?

Margolis: Yes, he [Ben K. Lehrer] lent me the money for the case, and I paid him back that money when I won the case plus half of my fee. I won: I got a judgment, I believe. Everybody said you couldn't win the case, you know. Middle of the block--the woman should have seen the hole. But I got a judgment for $1,800, which was quite a lot of money in those days. I think I had it on a 40-percent basis. So for me, I made several hundred dollars even after giving half the, you know, fee, well, which was my first big fee. I was also continuing to do the trustee work and some occasional divorces.I don't remember whether it was while I was still with Young or after I moved to Schapp, because there was only a period of six or eight months in there-- I had always-- I wanted to be a labor lawyer. That's what I wanted to be when I started a practice. There was then going on the Tom Mooney case [Ex parte Mooney], in which the supreme court of the state of California had granted a very unusual kind of writ. As a matter of a fact, I'd never heard of it being used before or since. Called a writ of coram nobis, which is sort of a writ, an unusual writ, to correct the wrong when other remedies are no longer available. And this writ had been filed by a San Francisco attorney by the name of Davis.

Balter: George T. Davis?

Margolis: George T. Davis. And I believe the New York lawyer was also named Davis. I'm not sure.

Balter: Well, according to my notes, some of the members of the legal team in New York were Roger [Nash] Baldwin, Arthur Garfield Hayes, Frank Walsh--

Margolis: Yes, but they were not the ones who tried the case. George T. Davis and-- I think the man's name was Davis, but I'm not positive about that. I may be confused. What had happened is they [Frank C. Walsh, John F. Finerty, and George T. Davis] filed [a] writ [of coram nobis] with the [California] Supreme Court and it granted the writ. The supreme court had appointed a special master to take evidence and report back to the supreme court. The claim was that Mooney had been convicted on perjured, unfair evidence and so forth, and that the district attorney [Charles M. Fickert] had conspired to use that kind of evidence.I went up and talked to George Davis about it and volunteered my services. The hearing had been completed by that time. I was not present at any part of the hearing, but there was a transcript, a written transcript. I remember when I first went in, I think it wasn't quite ready. When it was ready, what I did was I analyzed the transcript. I dictated from the transcript the substance of what was in it, on a volunteer basis. And I worked for I don't remember how long, but for a number of months, several hours a day, summarizing this transcript which was, I don't know, twenty thousand pages or something, some such figure.At that point, through doing that I also got involved with George Davis, in helping him on some of his litigation. I remember only one of the cases that I tried with him. (When I say "I tried it with him," I sat in court and took notes and was sort of a, you know, a gofer--did a little bit more than that.) There was a cattle-stealing case, [laughter] and Davis represented a man charged with stealing several heads of cattle. He was acquitted. I remember that, I don't remember any of the other details of the case.

Balter: By the way, how did you make your first contact with Davis and his firm, when you started working on the Mooney case?

Margolis: My recollection is that there was a lot of publicity about the case, and George is-- No secret or what, I simply went up to his office and said, "I'm a newly admitted, I've got lots of time on my hands, I want to help."And he said, "We don't have any money."I said, "I'll help without money."He said, "That's fine."He put me to work. Although I, that was not-- I really wanted to help and get involved, but as a result, I got some work, because I was paid, you see. George Davis was paid something for the Mooney case, but not very much. On the other matters that I worked with him, he was getting his regular fees and he paid me. I don't remember again how much, but reasonably for work. I got some work as a result of it.But more, most important was, at that time, Mooney was a famous worldwide character. And one of the things that happened is when the supreme court granted the writ of coram nobis, they ordered him brought to the county, out of San Quentin, to the county jail in San Francisco. In the county jail, he was set up. He had virtually a suite in the county jail of a couple of connecting cells all of his own, a typewriter, and some comfortable chairs. And he had visitors. He got visitors from all over the world, who came to see him. He was a fascinating man. He had used all of his years and-- See it was 1916 when he went to jail, and by this time it was 1934, '35--yeah. So he had been in jail for seventeen, eighteen years. He had become widely read, and he met all sorts of famous people, and he had written.I used to visit him. One of the things I got, as a result of this, is I became a friend of his because he loved to talk. And I used to visit him, I suppose, during this period, maybe eight or ten times, and got to know him. It was a very important thing to me to get to know this famous, worldwide, militant working-class leader.

Balter: In your getting to know him and your conversations with him, did he feel that he was eventually going to prevail? Was he pessimistic, optimistic? How would you characterize his attitude towards the whole thing?

Margolis: Oh, he was optimistic. As a matter of fact, everybody was optimistic. The record in the case is an absolutely unbelievable record. I have seen lots of things in my career; I have never seen anything to compare with that. There was no question, it was definitely proved, that the district attorney not only secured perjured evidence, but let me give you an example of the kind of evidence they let in at the trial [January, 1917]. A woman testified at his trial that she had seen Tom Mooney place the satchel which allegedly contained a bomb--you know, there was a bomb that exploded [on July 22, 1916]--at the place where the explosion took place. The defense, during the trial through some-- I don't remember how it happened, but they got a picture of her on top of a roof, several blocks from that place, where there was a clock on the roof. In the picture, it showed her and the clock, and the time was about two minutes before the bomb exploded, about two blocks from the scene of the explosion. There is no way--she had said that she saw him put it down a few minutes before the explosion--no way she could have been there.On cross-examination when they asked her about it, she said, "Well, I saw it in my mind's eye. I visualized it. I know it was him." And they allowed the evidence to stand. Well, this was during a time of great hysteria and antilabor feeling then.By 1934, things were moving in a different direction. Not only was Mooney optimistic, but he was optimistic with very good reason. It wasn't a false optimism. Everybody thought that the supreme court would let him out. The very fact that they issued a very unusual thing, the writ of coram nobis, and the world pressures were enormous. All over the world, people were calling for his release. Not only radicals, but conservatives. It was a thorn, even on the side of the conservatives and the reactionaries. It was such a bad case, so he was optimistic, with good cause. The fact is the supreme court never acted on his case, because [Culbert L.] Olson ran. One of the planks of his platform was that he would pardon Tom Mooney. And the thing that Olson did, as he made his inaugural speech-- He was sworn in [as governor in 1938], made his inaugural speech, stepped to one side, and signed the pardon for Tom Mooney: right then and there. And so all of the work that I had done was never directly useful to anybody.But I also worked in Olson's campaign. There were only two political campaigns. No, more than that, two major political campaigns. I worked on them: one was Olson's, the other one was later Upton Sinclair's.

Balter: I believe that Upton Sinclair ran for governor in '34.

Margolis: Oh, yeah, Upton Sinclair and then Olson, that's right, earlier. That's right, I was-- Yeah, earlier.

Balter: I'm interested now in your involvement in the Sinclair campaign. One of the reasons, especially, is because in my reading about that campaign I'm always given to understand that things were much more organized in Southern California than in Northern California. What was happening in San Francisco around that campaign?

Margolis: Well, I don't know that I'm too good a judge of it. I didn't play an important part in the campaign. I did such things as help get out mailings, and I think I did some house-to-house stuff. In the Olson campaign, I was chairman of the speaker's bureau for Northern California, but that was later. The Olson campaign had a very well organized and good campaign.The Sinclair campaign--there was much more emotion around the Sinclair campaign. It was a terrific campaign from the standpoint of moving people and involving people. People feeling deeply about the case, more so than the Olson campaign. There were the wonderful slogans: "End Poverty in California" and "Production--" What was it?

Balter: "Production for Use"?

Margolis: "Production for Use, Not for Profit." I think something like that-- and then just very short. He had some wonderful slogans. There was tremendous interest; more, I think, than in the Olson campaign. But Olson was better organized.

Balter: Right. Do you remember the names of any of the leaders in San Francisco in the Sinclair campaign?

Margolis: No. As I say, I helped some mailings. I just don't remember much about it. And it wasn't that I did a tremendous amount, I was just involved to some extent. Let's see, where am I?

Balter: While we're on the Olson campaign, since you were active in that, why don't you tell me some things about that too.

Margolis: Well, I really-- I'm very bad on names, and I can't remember the name of Olson's campaign manager for Northern California [M. Mitchell Bourquin]. I think I'd know it if I heard it. I might know it, but I don't remember it. He was the one-- How I got to know him, I don't remember. But anyway, he asked me to act as the Northern California chairman. Mainly it was San Francisco, Oakland, Alameda, and some in Marin County. (Marin County wasn't as big of a development at that time.) I helped get speakers out, and I went out and spoke myself. I did that for about two months. It seems to me that the campaigns weren't quite as long then. Why, I don't know. I may be wrong on that, but it just seems to me they were shorter. They started later.

Balter: Maybe there wasn't as much money as there is now. [laughs]

Margolis: I'm certain there wasn't as much money. It was pre-TV, and radio wasn't used that much. In any event, I met Olson a number of times. I never met Sinclair. Well, I think I shook hands with him once, but, I mean, I never met him.I met Olson a number of times. Olson was a very difficult man. He did not make a very [good] governor, in my opinion. He was not a good administrator. He didn't know how to work with people.

Balter: What was he like personally, if you recall?

Margolis: Kind of standoffish, at least that was the impression I got. Maybe not intentionally, but one of these people that you felt you couldn't get close to. He was an intellectual, no question about that. I was used to working with people, like in the labor movement, you know, an entirely different kind of people, like [Harry] Bridges.

Balter: Which we'll talk about. By the way, on the Olson campaign, do you recall-- Sinclair had come under such vicious attack by the newspapers, by the motion picture industry, by the farmers--everybody, that is, everybody who saw him as a threat. When Olson ran against [Frank F.] Merriam, do you recall if Olson attempted to distance himself from what you might call the legacy of Sinclair? Or was the legacy of Sinclair something that was held up proudly by the campaign? What was the attitude?

Margolis: Oh, he did not run on the same platform. Upton Sinclair was-- He didn't call it a socialist program. It was really a socialist platform. As a matter of fact, I thought much better run than saying I'm a socialist, although he never denied that he was a socialist.Olson was not nearly as radical as Sinclair was. I don't know that he disavowed Sinclair, but he certainly made it clear. He had a liberal platform, which includes, as I say, freeing Tom Mooney, which wasn't all that advanced at that time. If somebody had done that in '27, that'd mean a different story. But he had a good-- I don't remember the details, but he had a good program, but not a radical program; whereas Sinclair had a radical program.

Balter: Now, just one last question on this issue. Olson was elected to the state senate in '34 as part of the EPIC [End Poverty in California] movement. Was he attacked by the opposition, by the Merriam camp, for having been associated with the EPIC movement, for having been elected as part of that?

Margolis: Yes. Red-baiting wasn't so much-- Though there was tremendous red-baiting of Sinclair himself, but that was mainly around the slogans. I don't remember. You know, my memory isn't that-- Even though I was involved in the way I indicated in the Olson, most of my time was being spent at that time in the practice. I was already heavily into labor law practice at that time. And my recollection is that it wasn't a big thing.The Sinclair thing was a battle, you know, a running battle of-- An ideological battle from the beginning to the end. I don't think Olson's was quite that. Merriam was a very conservative man with very conservative positions. Didn't have the same qualities, as I remember. There wasn't the same bitterness. The studios said, "We'll move out of California." For Sinclair, not for Olson. An insurance company said, "We'll move out." None of that as I re-- Nothing like that happened during the Olson campaign. It was different.

Balter: Now, as you said, during this time, you were beginning your career as a labor attorney. How long did you stay with the George Davis firm?

Margolis: I wasn't with George Davis. I was in the Schapp office. To get there, again, I was with Schapp, getting office space and rendering him part-time services, and they were legal services. But he was a patent lawyer. I really had no interest in his type of law. But while I was there, I did the Mooney thing, I worked with George Davis, and I began to do some other things. But I was only with him about a year or a year and a half--somewhere in that. Let's see--'34, [pauses] about the middle of '35, I think it was, I got an opportunity to go in on the same basis with the son of [United States] Senator Hiram [W.] Johnson. Hiram Johnson--was it the third? Hiram Johnson III, I think he was called. Yeah, Hiram Johnson, Jr., or the third. Now, isn't that funny.

Balter: I think it's junior, but I'm not sure.

Margolis: I think it's junior. [Hiram W. Johnson, Jr.] And an interesting thing just-- I don't know if you know anything about Hiram Johnson, Senator Johnson. Big tall man, six three or four and broad shouldered, an imposing figure. Junior was junior in every respect: Size, he was about five eight or nine. He was a small man in every respect.But as a result of his father's political connections, he had two main clients, out of which he made an income, I think, of $50,000 a year, which was, believe me, that was an awful lot of money in those days, $50,000 dollars a year. He represented the Bay Bridge authority [California Toll Bridge Authority, as it was called in the late 1930s], for which he got $25,000 a year. And he did the lobbying for the tobacco interest in the state legislature, for which he got $25,000 a year, even though the legislature met every other year at that time. It was much later that the legislature started to meet every year.I really began to do a little bit better--from making a living out of the practice of law--when I went to him. Because if he had a $150 divorce case, a $200 divorce case, which was a lot of money as far as I was concerned, he wouldn't think of handling it, and so he'd just turn it over to me. Where I've been handling $50 divorce cases, I got one occasionally for $150 and some other work which paid much better, because clients that he wouldn't take because they didn't pay enough were big money to me.And I got-- Quite a little work for him, I-- He did virtually nothing. About every week he had to write an advisory opinion or two for the Bay Bridge authority. I would write-- Then, I really did legal work for him: I'd research the question, write the opinion. He'd look at it and generally sign it without changing it, without changing a word. And he was getting $25,000 a year; I was getting office space. [laughter] But also getting cases referred.

Balter: What situation was the bridge authority in, at that point, that it needed all this legal help?

Margolis: Well, you know, it's a big institution. I don't remember the details this far-- But they had legal problems all the time. They had suits brought against them for personal injuries; of course they had insurance companies for that. They had labor, not labor-management problems, but they had labor problems, like workers compensation things. They had tax questions, because they were not the state itself. There were questions of-- There were all kinds of questions. There were legitimate questions, and, you know, that's big business--that Bay Bridge. That ought to have cost several million dollars. I don't remember how much, but it was an expensive bridge.

Balter: I'm trying to remember whether any of the bridges up there were built around this time.

Margolis: They had been built earlier. Well, the Bay Bridge authority had been built earlier. And in any event, they did have-- It was a political sinecure for him, and it worked out very well for me. I think the biggest side benefit I got out of--and again, it wasn't the purpose--but the biggest side benefit I got out of getting involved in the Mooney case was I began to meet the labor people, because the labor movement was strongly in support of Mooney. I met Bridges and a number of other people. And then I met--there were two young laywers-- Richard Gladstein, who was admitted the year before I was admitted, and Aubrey [W.] Grossman, who was admitted the same year I was admitted, who had a firm called Gladstein and Grossman at that time. Sometime in 1936 while I was in Johnson's office-- He was in the Mills Building [220 Montgomery Street] and they were in the Mills Tower. It's really the same building; one of them is called the tower. (I think part of it was built after the other.) So I became quite friendly with them.They represented the ILWU [International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union], the Marine Cooks and Stewards Union, a number of the militant trade unions of that time. And they were getting some personal injury work. I had won this first case of mine, which was a very difficult case, and so I started trying some of their personal injury cases for them. But that isn't really what I wanted. What I wanted was to get into the labor work, and gradually I started doing it.Then in the spring of 1937, I left Johnson's office and moved over, and the firm became Gladstein, Grossman, Margolis. We often kidded about why they took me into the firm. I had established credit with a bank, where I could borrow up to, I think, a couple of hundred dollars. I had borrowed money to buy a car, and I paid them back. Once you've done that, you've got credit. And we needed credit. They needed credit. [laughter] We were drawing twenty-five dollars a week at that time, which wasn't all that bad, but there were weeks when the twenty-five dollars wasn't available. So I came into the firm and I was able to borrow money for the firm. Within a short period of time, I was spending all of my time doing labor work, which is what I had always wanted to do. I was really very fortunate to be able to get into it at that time, particularly to get into it with that kind of a practice. We represented the ILWU, and it was-- The relationship between attorneys and the unions they represented was very different, then, than it is now. For example, we used to attend the conventions and participate in the conventions, draft resolutions, do all kinds of things. And for all the first-- Up until the time I left San Francisco in '43, there were only four honorary members of the union: that was Richard Gladstein, Aubrey Grossman, myself, and Paul Robeson. We were the only four honorary members. But we had a very close, day-to-day working relationship. Also then, of course, the Bridges deportation case, in which I did not play a principal role. The principal role was played by Richard Gladstein and Aubrey Grossman, but I did participate in conferences, and I did examine some witnesses. Particularly, I remember I handled a handwriting expert on the card that was supposed to be Harry Bridges's Communist Party card.

Balter: We'll get into the deportation trial in a little bit more detail in just a little bit. But first I wanted to ask you a couple of things. One, I get the impression that there were not very many labor attorneys then. Of course, I suppose, maybe there aren't very many now, but at that time, at any rate, this was something very new. You've discussed some of your own motivations. Tell me a little about Gladstein and Grossman and what their background and motivation were for getting into that.

Margolis: Same as mine. They were radicals. We saw eye to eye politically. We saw each other as people who were going to change the world. We were going to have a socialist America. [chuckles] Didn't quite succeed, but we tried.

Balter: What were they like personally, those two men?

Margolis: Well, we had a very interesting office. Richard Gladstein, who is now dead--died about two or three years ago--was an extraordinary lawyer: a brillant courtroom lawyer, one of the best I've ever seen in all my practice and recognized as that generally throughout the bar. An intellectual who, you know, could quote the Bible and the classics and could use them in his courtroom presentations--a fine strategist.Aubrey Grossman was also brilliant, but erratic. Richie, a very stable person whose judgment was generally quite, quite good. Aubrey Grossman, in a way, in this one characteristic, was something like Harry Bridges. He had brilliant ideas, and they were either totally right or totally wrong. He was never a halfway guy. He always had the furthest out ideas and the most creative kind of ideas, but some of them were crazy. [laughter]

Balter: Do you remember any of the crazy ones?

Margolis: They were mostly in the legal field, of the kind of arguments that we were going to make. I do remember we used to have conferences. It almost brought the building down. We were all very volatile; we shouted at each other. But we generally--we managed to work together. Because all of us were very much involved in what we were doing and felt very deeply about what we were doing, so we were very intense in our discussions.All I remember is that some of the things were just so far out, although I remember one idea that he had [laughs] that worked beautifully. And it was his [Grossman's] idea. We had an injunction hearing in the 1937 strike, I think it was '37, maybe-- Anyway, an injunction was issued against the longshoremen, which they ignored. And there was a hearing. An order-- There had been a temporary restraining order. It was a hearing on a preliminary injunction directed against the union and all of them.Aubrey said, "You know," he said, "every member of the union is involved."There were at that time about thirty-five hundred longshoremen, four thousand maybe, a lot of longshoremen and others related to the union. Maybe five thousand working on the waterfront all together.He said, "They all ought to go to court and let's see what the court's reaction is going to be." And so a call went. "This is your case. Go see what's going on."You couldn't get into the courthouse. The streets, for blocks, were blocked off. You couldn't get up the stairs. The judge couldn't get in. [laughter] The police finally had to clear the way to get him in. And he continued the hearing without [laughs] issuing an injunction.But that was one of the-- It was that kind of an imaginative thing. And it worked. It worked. But those are the kind of ideas that he had. Also, in legal points too, he'd have some of the ideas. Some of which were-- What do I say? Didn't make much sense, although brilliant. So that's how the two of them worked.When I came into the firm, they had already had-- They had started in '34, and so they'd had about two and a half years of experience in labor work, and I had not had any, really. The [Mooney] case was a specialized thing, but it was not really a-- Was a labor matter in one simple-- Really, a criminal case is what it was. So I learned a lot from them.Then, one of the things that happened, along came the Bridges deportation case, and Carol [Weiss] King was brought in from New York. The three of them were full-time on this for six, eight months--maybe more. And I was carrying the whole load of labor work as well as from time to time-- But we did have a young woman we brought in, at that time, to work in the firm. So I was working eighty, ninety hours a week during this period.

Balter: You were sort of picking up the slack while they were--

Margolis: I was handling all of the-- There were three of us [before] who had been very busy doing labor work--very busy. And I, with the assistance of this young woman, [now] handled it all.

Balter: Do you remember her name?

Margolis: You know, it's really a shame. She was such a fine person, but she was only with us for about a year. Then she got skin cancer and died at a very early age. For the life of me, I can't think of her name. Such a sweet, hardworking, dedicated person, didn't leave her work until a month or so before she died.

Balter: By the way, is Aubrey Grossman still alive today?

Margolis: Aubrey Grossman is still alive. He is, I think, more or less retired. He and Richie Gladstein continued in the law firm when I left. By the time I left, it had become Gladstein, Grossman, Margolis, Sawyer, and Edises. Our firm grew quite-- We had, oh, ten or eleven lawyers by the time I left. We had built up quite a practice.You see, one of the big advantages that we had, Mike, was that-- You said there weren't many labor laws. You're right, there weren't many. There wasn't much labor law. All of the labor legislation was in the process of being passed, and all was new. It was just as new to lawyers who had been practicing for twenty, thirty, forty years as it was to us. And so we went in on almost equal footing. The lawyers we were against--representing the big corporations--were all anywhere from fifteen to twenty-five or thirty years older than us and with a background of practice. But we were able at least, partially because of the newness of the subject, to hold our own with them, and actually do better than hold our own with them. We got in on the ground floor of an absolutely new field of law.

Balter: I want to get into some more detail on that, but let's go to the next tape.

Margolis: All right.

5. Tape Number: III, Side One June 14, 1984

Balter: Ben, we had begun to talk about the state of labor law when you first got into it. I know that the Wagner Act, so-called the National Labor Relations Act, had just been passed in July of 1935, just at the time when you were getting involved in labor law. Finally, its constitutionality was upheld by the [United States] Supreme Court in [March] 1937, I believe. As a labor attorney working with other labor attorneys, what do you recall as the immediate impact of the passage of that act on how you viewed labor law, the field, in general?

Margolis: Well, you really have to go back to the period prior to the enactment of the law in order to understand the impact of the law, because it's the change that this brought about that is most significant. Up until that point, labor lawyers, or labor itself, viewed virtually every aspect of the law as being antilabor: Injunctions against picketing were issued at the drop of a hat. There were criminal prosecutions. Every time there was a strike, there were dozens of criminal prosecutions for almost anything that happened, including rigged traffic cases--all kinds of things. The law operated as the enemy of labor. Now, there might have been an occasional acceptance, but that was the picture.And here along comes an agency, which, by god, is on the side of labor! And it really is on the side of labor. First of all, the [new] law, as it was originally enacted, was designed to protect the rights of labor to organize and bargain collectively. It gave nothing to the employer. It was intended to correct the terrible imbalance that existed between the rights of the few and the many.Second, the [new National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)] was staffed. The labor board was staffed with prolabor people, so that you had people working for the board who were trying to help labor to organize and to bargain collectively, which was trying to carry out the purposes of the act. It wasn't that they were doing something that the law didn't intend; they were doing what the law intended they should do.For the first time, for example, if you had unfair labor practice charges against an employer, you worked hand in glove with a government official. Who ever heard of such a thing, working hand in glove with them? You were both on the same side of the table--of the conflict. This affected the whole aspect of the ability to organize, of the ability of the labor movement to move ahead.There isn't any doubt in my mind, first, that even without that law, there would have been a great organizing drive, and there would have been considerable success. But equally, there's no doubt in my mind that it would not have had the extent of the success that it had as a result of this act being passed.

Balter: By the way, do you recall any of the labor movement's activities in terms of lobbying for this bill? Is that something that people you were associated with, or you yourself, were involved with in any way?

Margolis: The labor act? The NLRB?

Balter: Yes.

Margolis: No, you see, I think it was passed in '36, '35.

Balter: 'Thirty-five.

Margolis: Well, you see, I had gotten-- I really had not become involved in the labor movement, except for the [Tom] Mooney case, which was just one single, isolated thing, until, oh, the spring-summer of '36 and then only tangentially. I was handling, originally, just personal injury cases for a labor law firm. And so towards the end of '36 and early '37, I began to become involved in labor law and really to know the people, know what's going on. I was not involved in any aspect. At a later point, however, I was the legislative representative for the state CIO [Congress of Industrial Organizations] in Sacramento.

Balter: What period of time would that have been?

Margolis: It was during the [Earl] Warren administration [1943-53], during the first Warren-- See, Warren served two terms, didn't he?

Balter: I believe so.

Margolis: Two terms. It was during the first Warren term [1943-46]. And then there were legislatures-- The legislatures, then, I think were still in session every other year, unless there was a special session called. And I think I was there for two sessions. I don't remember the years. That's another aspect, but if we got the Warren years of governorship, it would be at that time. When was he appointed to the Supreme Court? When was [Dwight D.] Eisenhower elected?

Balter: 'Fifty-two.

Margolis: Nineteen fifty-two. Shortly thereafter, Warren was appointed chief justice of the Supreme Court [in 1953], and he was then, I think, in his second [third] term, if I remember correctly, as governor.

Balter: Yeah, I'm not sure actually.

Margolis: So, it was probably about '46 and '48 that I was in Sacramento--something like that.

Balter: You mentioned the CIO. At the time that you actually began to become a labor attorney, at what point in the succession of the unions which formed the congress-- Let me-- [tape recorder off] The AFL [American Federation of Labor] unions that formed the Committee for Industrial Organization [1935] that later left the AFL, where were things at with that, to the point where you became involved as a labor attorney?

Margolis: I really don't remember except that it was quite early in my involvement, which was, as I say, late '36, early '37. I think some of the first steps had already been taken, if I remember correctly, but it hadn't really reached a very high point by then--I don't think.

Balter: If the dates would help, according to my notes, the AFL executive board ordered the Committee [for Industrial Organization] dissolved in January of 1936, and in August, ten of what were later to be CIO unions were suspended from the AFL. Of course, they didn't form the CIO until 1938.

Margolis: Let me tell you what-- You see, I was out here on the West Coast. It was different in different sections of the country. Our principal client was the ILWU [International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union], led by Harry Bridges, who was of course a leader in the entire labor movement. At that time, they were still in the AFL. The longshoremen out here were part of the International Longshoremen's Association [ILA]. When I began to get involved, the beginning of a break away from the ILA was in the air. And Harry Bridges of course-- [telephone rings] Not supposed to call me. [tape recorder off] Harry Bridges was working closely with John L. Lewis by that time. But I don't recall just what the organizational structure, so far as the CIO was concerned, it certainly wasn't more than a committee within the AF of L at that time.

Balter: Do you remember the basic-- Generally, one of these things we've talked about is a disagreement on the issue of vertical organizing of workers in basic industries. Is that also your recollection of what some of the key differences were that were emerging? Were there other issues also?

Margolis: The basic trade union issue was the one you have mentioned: the question of industrial versus craft organization, with the craft unions taking the position that the industrial unions were invading their jurisdiction, even though they were organizing workers that had never been organized before. But that was simply one manifestation of an entirely different political approach. Where the AF of L essentially followed the conservative political position on almost every issue, the Committee for Industrial Organization was taking a liberal and very often quite a left-wing position on most issues.

Balter: Now, I know from talking to your law partner, John [T.] McTernan, because this is apparently how he met you and you met him, that you were beginning at this time to represent various unions and various locals before the National Labor Relations Board. And John was an attorney for the board. You found yourselves on the same side apparently. Do you remember any of those early cases? What some of the issues were? When you first began to represent people before the board, when the board came into existence, what issues presented themselves legally?

Margolis: There were unfair-labor-practice cases, representation cases, election cases, typical kinds of cases. I think the case [Cowell Portland Cement Co. v. NLRB] that John and I were involved in might be taken as an example. We represented the--let's see what? I think they were organized into the warehouse union, a group of workers employed by the Cowell Portland Cement Company in Cowell [Contra Costa County], California. They had been organized. They had engaged in a strike and then had been locked out, and I think about a hundred or more [172] employees--all men--had been fired.We filed an unfair labor practice charge, alleging that the company had refused to bargain in good faith, recognize the union and bargain in good faith, and that the company had illegally, because of their union membership and activities, discharged these hundred or so employees. Our case involved a demand for recognition, collective bargaining, reinstatement and back pay.John was one of the substantial number of board lawyers who traveled around the country participating as the board's trial counsel in what the board considered important or substantial cases. So he came out here to represent the board in that case.Oh, also in that case, the company had formed a company union, and we alleged that that was an unfair labor practice. The first hearing on that, I think, was in '38, about '38, something like that. Things were still relatively new as far as the board was concerned, and I represented the union. We tried the case in Cowell, California, which is a very small community consisting largely of the Cowell Portland Cement Company, about twenty, twenty-five miles outside of Oakland. The company union had affiliated with the AF of L. There was an attorney by the name of [Charles J.] Janigin, I remember him, who represented the company union. And there were several attorneys who represented the Cowell Portland Cement Company. The firm was the firm of [Max] Thelan and [Gordon] Johnson. (Johnson later became, I forget whether it was an assemblyman or a state senator, one or the other, or it was his brother who became that. They were a very influential family in politics.)We tried the first case for six or seven weeks in Cowell. The board eventually issued an order giving us all of the relief we had asked for; however, the board had failed to serve the company union. It had taken the position that the company union was not a genuine union and therefore was not entitled to be served. The case went up to the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court reversed the case on the sole ground that the company union was entitled to its day in court and should have been served.Then about 1941, '42, John and I tried the case a second time. I think the second time, it took sixteen weeks, something like that. Took about almost three times as long to try the case. And again we won the case. It went up again, was affirmed this time, and the Supreme Court denied a hearing [April 23, 1945]. All of this from the date that the charge was filed, which I believe was '37, some date [July 17, 1937] until the--We finally had hearings to determine the amount of back pay that the men should receive about thirteen years later, because it had gone up and down twice, in addition to being argued before the board twice. We recovered in that case, my recollection is, for the men something like $200,000, which again you've got to think in terms of those days. Today, $200,000 isn't very much; it was a lot of money in those days. It was one of the big recoveries as far as California was concerned. That was one of the kind of cases that we were handling. Of course, there was a good deal of organizing going on.We also represented the warehouse local of the longshoremen's union, Local 6, and they did most of the organizing. We were handling petitions and handling elections, that kind of thing.

Balter: What kind of situations during these organizing periods did the union leaders run into? What types of things would the employers do? Was there any, I guess what we would call, extralegal or illegal tactics, or things that come to mind that the employers used to try to prevent being organized?

Margolis: Certainly was. Up until, I would say, '40, '41, the direct, virtually open use of illegal means by employers was present in the majority of the cases. They would openly and directly fire people for their union activities. They would. Or even if they tried to cover up, the cover-up would be very, very thin. There was a period of total lawlessness on the part of 95 percent of the employers. And that made the cases in those days relatively easy to try, because, later on, employers became more subtle in their activities. They didn't try to be subtle in those days. They went out to terrorize the union, to put the fear of their jobs in the minds of the men, and to break the union before it started. They openly refused to bargain. There was every kind of flagrant violation. At the same time, we were getting relief from the board. The big problem was that it took so long. The procedure, which was set up under the National Labor Relations Act, was so slow and so cumbersome that where an employer resisted, years would expire between the time of a filing of a petition for an election, or a charge, and relief being obtained.

Balter: Now, when you did get a favorable ruling finally after all of this, then what about enforcement?

Margolis: We did get enforcement. I can't remember any instances where we did not get enforcements.

Balter: Now, during this period of time when the split between the AFL and the CIO was beginning to develop, which finally resulted in an organization entirely different, or rather, excuse me, founding of an entirely new organization, in your law firm, Gladstein, Grossman, and Margolis, was there any question, was there any debate, within your law firm about how you as labor attorneys should approach this developing split? Which side you should be on? Whether you should try to, what-- Do you see what I'm getting at? What types of discussions took place in your firm about how you should be relating to all of this that was going on?

Margolis: Far as I can recall, we were always supportive of the Committee for Industrial Organization and the new organization because that organization represented both our political and our organizational views as to where the labor movement should go. That's where the militant labor movement was. That section of the labor movement was a section that was organizing. While there was some organizing going on within the old AF of L unions, they were primarily raids [on other unions]. What the AF of L was doing in those days, for the most part, the old AF of L, was rather than going out and doing initial organizing, [it] would wait until a committee union or, later on, a congress union started to organize and then would come in and try to take over, either after the organization had been completed or to prevent the organization. And they, the old-line AF of L unions, were to a substantial extent playing the game of the employers.

Balter: Was there any discussion, in any circles that were involved in this, about the consequences of splitting-- Let me back up just for-- My, maybe, looking at it from a present-day point of view, it would seem as though it was unfortunate, although perhaps necessary, but unfortunate that the craft unions and industrial unions would have to split since the conception was that there shouldn't be such a split, but there should be a vertical organization. Yet the development of the CIO, to some extent, represents a sort of culmination of a split. You know that's my view, looking at it, which-- I wonder how people were looking at it back then, and whether there was an attempt to try to avoid a split at that time.

Margolis: There was an area of difference of opinion. At some point around '38, I don't-- Dates as I say are difficult, but '38, '39, somewhere in that period, it became evident that the AF of L was either going to bring the CIO unions into line or was going to expel them. And there was a dispute that went on among the unions as to whether they should fight to stay within the AF of L, even though they knew that ultimately they probably would be expelled, or should say to hell with you [and] withdraw. There was that kind of conflict going on, as to which was the best course of action.Looking at it with hindsight, it didn't make one hell of a lot of difference. As a practical matter, some of the unions did withdraw before they were expelled. They would have been expelled if they hadn't. Others waited until they were expelled.I might add one other thing. There were some legal aspects to some of it, as to rights to retain property and so forth, that arose in some instances, but those were not really the principal considerations.

Balter: You're talking about property that belonged to the union?

Margolis: Unions, yes.

Balter: So there were some cases. Was the AFL suing the CIO in some cases?

Margolis: AF of L local unions versus internationals and that kind of thing. I was involved in a great deal of that litigation, largely with an attorney by the name of Matt [Matthew O.] Tobriner on the other side. Matt Tobriner later [1962] was appointed a justice of the supreme court of the state of California (and is now dead). He left the court a year or two ago and died shortly thereafter. Became a really great justice. Matt was a very fine lawyer, a very nice man. Even though we were on opposite sides of the fence, we got along very well together.

Balter: By the way, in the article that John McTernan wrote for the National Lawyers Guild Dinner Journal, when you were honored a couple of years ago, he mentions one situation--I don't recall the details, perhaps you do--where Tobriner, despite the fact that he was representing the AFL at that time, recommended you to handle an appeal of some cases that the AFL was involved in. Do you recall that?

Margolis: Yes. Yes, that was really a very, very unusual sort of thing. The unemployment insurance act had recently become law. And I did a good deal of work, at the appellate courts, involving sections of the law relating to its application in a number of ways, including its application in labor disputes. There was a point at which there were, I think, three cases or four cases, simultaneously in the supreme court of the state, raising a multitude of questions. One of them was a longshore case--I remember the name of that one, Abelleira. Abelleira versus the state of California [Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal of the State of California; Abelleira v. California Employment Commission], that I was handling. And there were a couple of others that three of us-- Mark Hopkins, Inc. v. California; Bunny Waffle Shop v. California.

Balter: Bunny Waffle Shop?

Margolis: Bunny Waffle-- They are chain restaurants, I think they're a chain in San Francisco called Bunny's Waffle Shop. Matt came to me one day. We saw each other all of the time, because we were frequently in litigation on the other side, and he was in the Russ Building right across the street from where we were. As a matter of fact, all of the lawyers in San Francisco at that time, by and large, were concentrated in a few buildings downtown, in the Montgomery Street section of downtown.We discussed the cases. He was responsible for-- He was the chief AF of L counsel at that time. I suppose his firm [Tobriner, Lazarus, Brundage, and Neyhart] was sort of the counterpart of our firm. And we talked. I gave him some ideas, we exchanged ideas, and he said to me, "Look, I want to see if I can talk people into having you argue the cases in the supreme court. Would you be willing to do it if I talk to them?"I said, "Sure. We have absolutely common interests."To my great suprise he came in one day and said, "You're hired." And I handled the cases.

Balter: Now, was this okay with [Richard] Gladstein and [Aubrey W.] Grossman?

Margolis: Oh, sure. You want to remember that wherever there were common interests, we were always working with them. For example, there were another series of cases which were argued in the California Supreme Court, where they were both AF of L and CIO cases, which established the right to peacefully picket in California. (Odd to think of a time when there wasn't a right, a constitutional right to peacefully picket.) There were five or six cases that came up together, and I argued the CIO [case]. There was only one CIO case. CIO was much smaller than the AFL. That was Renzel [E.H. Renzel Co. v. Warehousemen's Union, ILA], I think, the case I handled. There were four or five other cases, which Tobriner and two or three other AF of L attorneys handled. We all met together. Discussed how the arguments should go and who would take--who would argue what. Because we had a common interest in getting the same result. And it worked very well. The lawyers got along very well, despite the fact that we fought each other as hard as we could in court on the cases where we were on the opposite side. Cases where we were on the opposite sides were primarily property disputes between withdrawing locals or organizations and old organizations.

Balter: So things weren't so bitter that the unions couldn't pull together when they did have common interests, I take it.

Margolis: During those days, during those days. We're talking, remember, before the Congress of Industrial Organizations became a separate organization. I distinguished between the AF of L and the CIO. Actually we were in the AF of L, but we were Committee for Industrial Organization. We were part of the AF of L, so really I wasn't accurate when I said CIO and AFL. Both [then were] AFL.

Balter: That does raise the point though. Once, in 1938, the CIO really was formed and John L. Lewis becomes its first president and so on, then what was the situation?

Margolis: Well, it became more difficult, but I believe that the unemployment insurance cases were in '39 if I remember correctly. Even after, the lawyers--we always had good relations. We always tried to get along; we always cooperated and it wasn't-- That relationship continued to a substantial extent. As a matter of fact, when I came out here to Los Angeles, we represented a number of Hollywood AF of L unions during the 1945 and '46 strikes. It was only after, when the Cold War started, that then we were absolutely-- Our firm was blacklisted as far as the AF of L unions were concerned. But we still remained friendly with most of the attorneys, although they were afraid to publicly do anything about it.

Balter: Now, we sort of began a couple of times talking about Harry Bridges and his deportation trials. But before we get into some of the details of the trial and some of the things that were going on at that time, do you recall the first time you met Harry Bridges, and what your first impressions of him were?

Margolis: No, I really don't. I have the impression that I probably met him along with a group of people the first time, but it wasn't a one-to-one private meeting. I must say that I was very much in awe of him, you know, before I got to know him. After which that changed to respect for the ability he had and also anger at times [laughs] for some of the things that he did.

Balter: Like for example?

Margolis: Well, Harry was a very independent kind of guy. For example, I used to try cases when I was still in San Francisco, I used to try cases for the CIO in Los Angeles. And I tried a couple of cases where I needed to have Harry as a witness. So I'd go talk to Harry.He'd say, "Oh, you can handle it yourself. You know me: I got more important things to do."Things of that kind. We'd argue back and forth. Generally I'd get what I wanted in the long run. It was always-- It was a struggle to get him to do anything that he didn't feel enthusiastic about, but ultimately he recognized his responsibility. But I used to-- There were occasions when I was very angry with him. Or I'd ask him to-- Tell him, "I want to meet you at eight o'clock in the morning to discuss your testimony. You're going to the stand at ten o'clock, and I need two hours with you." And he'd show up at nine twenty. You know, that kind of thing used to make me furious at him, but we were good friends.

Balter: When you joined the Gladstein firm, was Bridges already a client at that point?

Margolis: Oh, yes. As a matter of fact, the firm was set up I believe in '34, with its first client being the ILWU.

Balter: Was this out of the [San Francisco] General Strike, things that had happened during the general strike?

Margolis: Yes.

Balter: We sort of passed over that, but what do you recall, as a hopeful labor attorney, shall we say, in 1934, what do you recall about that general strike? What impression did it make on you?.

Margolis: Well, I can tell you that I think of all of the single things that I've witnessed in my life, the thing that impressed me the most--always remain in my memory--was the parade of the longshoremen after Bloody Thursday [July 5, 1934], during the general strike: When block after block of longshoremen, with their caps off, walked silently. Absolutely silently, down the street. Not a policeman in sight, with huge crowds on both sides of the street. And total quiet. It was an unim-- You can't imagine how quiet and this demonstration of strength and of unity. You've got to--you had to be there to feel it. I can't describe-- It doesn't sound like much, does it? Just men walking silently down the street and people just keeping absolutely silent: block after block of them. Anyway, it was something I'll never forget.

Balter: No, I think that the power of that kind of thing is something that is possible to imagine.

Margolis: Well, in any event, it's certainly affected me. At that point, I was not, you know-- I think I had already started, perhaps, doing some work on the Mooney case, but I really had no real relationship of any kind to the labor movement, except my interest in it.

Balter: And that was what took you to the march, I see.

Margolis: Yes. Oh, of course. And then, of course, the general strike and the way the longshoremen--and the AFL unions were led by the longshoremen--took over that town. You know, it's something you could dream about, where they said which gasoline stations would remain open, what hours, and what stores would remain open. And they controlled-- That town was controlled. It was a union town for three or four days. It was an extraordinary experience. I think only twice in the history of this country that it happened: once here and once in Seattle [1919]. I think the Seattle-- When was the Seattle one?

Balter: I believe it was quite a few years earlier if I recall--

Margolis: Yeah, I don't remember when the Seattle--

Balter: Might have been in the twenties, I believe.

Margolis: Yeah, but those are the only two times in the history of the country that anything like this happened.

Balter: Do you remember, even though it was only three or four days-- and of course you recalled the parade--do you remember any of the other things that you witnessed or experienced during those few days?

Margolis: The main thing I remember is that you had to get permits for certain things and how well organized it was and you got them when you needed them. How well treated, how courteous everybody was. How calm things were! Things were really extraordinarily calm. There were police around, but they weren't doing anything. They weren't causing any trouble. You know, the effect of that. You know what I refer to by Bloody Thursday, don't you?

Balter: Yes, when a couple of national guards killed some longshoremen.

Margolis: Yes. Three longshoremen, I believe it was, were killed, and the general strike followed. The police were very subdued, following that.On the day of that parade, I think that if any of the police had started to cause any trouble of any kind, or even been very physical, they would've been torn to pieces. This was an angry group of men because there was absolutely-- It wasn't as though the police had acted in self-defense or anything like that. It was an absolutely unjustified murder. My impressions of that period are sort of general of just what was going on. Of the control-- It was, for me, a very thrilling time.

Balter: Of course, at this time you were set in your decision to become a labor attorney, so it was just a matter of--

Margolis: I was set in my desire to become a labor lawyer. First of all, it was hard at that period to get any kind of legal work, and labor law constituted one-tenth of one percent of whatever legal practice there was. So my desire was there, but I didn't have much else.

Balter: Now, the Harry Bridges deportation trial, you mentioned earlier that you were not front-stage center on that one, but I did want to talk to you about a few things about that because you were in on some of the conferences. One question that I wanted to ask you was in my reading about the trial, I have in-- What the legal issue seems to have been-- perhaps we can confirm this--is that the Supreme Court decision in Kessler v. Strecker had just come down, which laid down the criterion for how-- I guess one way of putting it would be how close you had to be to the Communist Party in order to get yourself deported. It was the impression I have gotten about what the decision meant.The government had brought Bridges to trial, and the issue was very much whether he was or was not a communist, or whether he was affiliated with the Communist Party. I guess, really out of a series of questions, the first one would be, in your discussion of the strategy, to the extent to which you were involved in those discussions, was there discussion about-- Was there any-- Clearly, Bridges was standing on the position that he was not and had never been a member of the Communist Party.Was there any concern among Bridges and those of you who were defending him that there would be an impression given that there was something the matter with being a member of the Communist Party? I know that at one point in time you were a member of the Communist Party and were sympathetic to that politics. Was there a question or a problem with whether or not that was a good position to take, or what the effect publicly would be of being in it?

Margolis: There was a question, but not quite the way you put it.

Balter: Please help me out here.

Margolis: It was very, very-- Somewhat related to what it is. There wasn't any question that Bridges and the ILWU had received substantial support of various kinds from the Communist Party--open, open support. Not only did the press support them, but money was raised for him. Food was furnished. All kinds of things were done to help the longshoremen, and nobody at any time proposed that that be denied.The only real question was is this something that you, in effect, admit or that you assert? There's a difference between the two. You admit, sort of defensive, and say, "Uh, yes, uh, uh," and sort of try to get it excused.The decision was made to assert it, to put it straight out front: "Yes, of course, I did. I get the help from wherever I can get it, and they helped me. I'll take help again. They were loyal and honest and supported us. We want that kind of support from everybody, and I will never turn down support from the Communist Party." That kind of thing. A defiant standup approach on the thing, rather than perhaps saying, "Well, maybe I made a mistake" or "After all, I was in so much trouble that I had to take help." It was an assertive position with respect.The fact is-- By the way, Harry Bridges was never a member of the Communist Party. He was never a member. That doesn't mean that he wasn't fairly close to the Communist Party and that he didn't support the great many of their views. But organizationally, I think it is correct. I know it's correct: he's not a member.I think it is correct that he did not meet the definition of affiliated, because that has an organizational connotation that to some extent you are bound to do what they do, so forth. Well, Harry Bridges was never bound to do what anybody told him to do. He was very sympathetic and supportive, perhaps [of] most of their views, but he supported them as an individual. And he would take those views entirely apart from the Communist Party.I think it's factually and legally correct that he-- Well, first, that he was not a member for certain. The affiliated question becomes more difficult because the word "affiliated" is a rather ambiguous word with many possible connotations. But the decision was made to fight it out by accepting help, even agreeing with their policies. He never helped formulate their policies. He never did that. He never.But he'd admit that he knew communist officials, that he had met with communist officials. He asserted those things. He didn't, you know, he didn't, oh, he didn't say, "Well, I accidentally met him," or "He came to see me." [Bridges said] "Sure, I went to see him and I talked to him and I asked him for it."

6. Tape Number: III, Side Two June 14, 1984

Margolis: As I was saying, and he would say things like "And I asked him for help and for support, and I even asked his advice. I didn't necessarily follow it, but I asked everybody for advice. The rank and file decide on what we would do. I decided what I will tell them to do. But I was not afraid to go to the communists and ask them what they thought. And I did so." I'm not saying he used those exact words, but this was the approach that he took in his defense.

Balter: By the way, before that approach was arrived at, was there any significant debate among the legal team or with Bridges about what approach to take in the hearing or in any other circles for that matter?

Margolis: I can't remember any, but that doesn't mean that there wasn't. My present recollection is--you know how many years ago that is--I would be surprised if there wasn't somebody [laughter] who made a comment. I would really be surprised. But if they did, it didn't last very long. It never became a serious issue.

Balter: And speaking of the legal team, I know that Carol [Weiss] King came out, and as I understand it became lead defense counsel.

Margolis: She was officially the lead counsel. I would say most of the examination of witnesses was done by Richard Gladstein.

Balter: What was the reason for bringing Carol King out? Of course she was quite well known at that time, associated with Sacco and Vanzetti, the Scottsboro case, and so on. What was the purpose for bringing her out?

Margolis: None of us were immigration lawyers. Remember, this was a deportation case. Carol King was recognized at that time as one of the foremost immigration lawyers in the country: She had practiced extensively in the field; she had handled many cases on appeal; she knew the law thoroughly; and therefore, she was an expert. She was our expert in a field where, to some extent, we became slightly expert, but she was the expert.

Balter: Is she still alive, by the way?

Margolis: No, no. She's been dead for many years.

Balter: What are your impressions and your memories of what she was like?

Margolis: Carol was a very unusual person. She didn't care a thing about her appearance. We all got along very well with Carol, but I remember that particularly Richie used to fight with her about her appearance and try to get her to look a little bit neater, to look a little bit better for the press, to dress a little less-- A little more carefully. I don't mean that she was dirty or anything like that, but she didn't care about whether she mixed colors that were wrong or any, any-- Or how her hair looked or have her-- And Richie felt that that was important, and I think I, to some extent, supported Richie in that. We felt that she had a tendency to ignore her appearance too much.She was a kind of, to a certain extent, a loner. We went out to dinner occasionally, but she used to like to go back to her hotel. Get fruit and read for the time that she was alone. We were very good friends, all of us. There was never-- When I say they fought, I don't mean that there was any bitterness--personal bitterness--but they simply disagreed. Her position was that appearance didn't make a damn bit of difference and to hell with it. She wasn't concerned with it. As a matter of fact, for many years after that, whenever I went to New York, I'd see Carol; she came out to California, she'd see us. You know, it was a very good relationship.But she was primarily the lawyer: the one who knew the law and how to apply the law to the facts of our case and to help develop strategy.

Balter: Either before or after the Bridges hearing, had you worked, either you or your firm, worked with her?

Margolis: No.

Balter: This is the first time you'd worked with her, on this case?

Margolis: That's right. Didn't know her before.

Balter: And then how about afterwards?

Margolis: Well, yes, we worked on some things afterwards. We knew her for many years, yes.

Balter: One question. Harry Bridges has written that the hearing took place on Angel Island, because the government wanted to portray him as being very dangerous or thought that he was dangerous or whatever. What is your impression or remembrance of why the hearings were held on Angel Island? People tell stories of having to take the ferryboat back and forth every day.

Margolis: It wasn't a ferryboat; they were kind of speed boats. And one of the things is they were limited-- We were most opposed to it for one reason: that there was limited access to the public. Supposed to be a public hearing-- It was public, but there was only an ability to carry a few people over, and that was our main beef about that; otherwise, we really didn't care very much. It was very quiet and nice over there. You got over there and you had that one thing to do. It had certain advantages, but our principal opposition was that we wanted to have more of the public have an opportunity to attend.

Balter: You began to mention earlier the role that you did claim in the hearing, concerning the handwriting expert and the alleged Communist Party membership card.

Margolis: Yes. They had a membership card which was not in the name of Bridges. It was in another name, and I can't remember the name ["Harry Dorgan"]. They put on a handwriting expert to testify that it was his handwriting.I hadn't known anything about handwriting before then. Actually, the reason that this task was assigned to me was because it was a kind of a specialized task that was different from whether somebody was telling the truth. It was a very technical task. I read a couple of books on handwriting, and I consulted with a very good handwriting expert. I cross-examined this handwriting expert. Whether as a result of that or other reasons, as I recall, [James M.] Landis [the trial examiner] found that it was not his [Bridges's] card. See, if they'd found that this was his handwriting and his card, we would have had a very difficult time. So it was a very short phase. I think it lasted one day if I remember right--maybe a day and a half. It was an important part of the case.

Balter: Now, the case, as I understand what you're saying before, because the case went on for, well, almost three months, from July to September of 1939-- Do you recall when you were-- I take it that most of the time you were kind of handling--watching the store back at the office? Would that be correct? Or were you at each one--

Margolis: That's one hundred percent correct. So far as I can remember, I was only over there for two or three days. I went over there when the handwriting expert was due to be put on, and I was there until this cross-examination was finished and the balance of that day. I don't think I attended any other hearings. I just had no time.

Balter: By the way, did you know or meet at that time Estolv [E.] Ward?

Margolis: Sure.

Balter: Who wrote the book about [Harry Bridges]. What are your remembrances of him?

Margolis: Well, Estolv just called me. He's still alive. Estolv called me about two or three months ago. He's just written a book [The Gentle Dynamiter: A Biography of Tom Mooney, 1983].

Balter: Another one?

Margolis: Well, it's just come out, I think. What was it about? I promised to get it, and I haven't done it. I got so busy. Estolv, well, we were social friends. Estolv and his wife-- If you happen to know it, I'd recognize it, but I can't think of it.

Balter: No, I'm afraid I'm not going to be able to help on this one. [laughs]

Margolis: Estolv, he handled a lot of the public relations and newspaper stuff. Very nice, a very able guy.

Balter: He was with the defense committee as I understand it.

Margolis: Yes, yes.

Balter: Bridges Defense Committee.

Margolis: That's right. Harry Bridges relied heavily on him in that area. That's the principlal thing I remember about him other than that we saw each other socially fairly frequently.

Balter: By the way, did-- Of course, the first deportation hearing, the government lost and James Landis, who was the judge, ruled in favor of Bridges, but later another deportation order was issued. Now, did you or your firm represent Bridges in that, in those later situations?

Margolis: My old firm represented him.

Balter: You had already come down--

Margolis: I'd come to Los Angeles, I believe, or I was about to go to Los Angeles. I had nothing to do with the second deportation case.

Balter: Okay. Listen, I think this is probably a good place to stop for now, and next time we'll get into some whole new topics.

Margolis: Okay.

7. Tape Number: IV, Side One July 2, 1984

Balter: Ben, we left off last time talking about the Harry Bridges deportation case in which you had somewhat a limited [participation] but somewhat of a role concerning the handwriting expert. I want to jump ahead in time a little bit, while we're talking about Harry Bridges, to a case that I know you were involved in, actually two combined cases, as I understand it, Bridges v. California and Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court of California, concerning some free speech issues with Harry Bridges and the Los Angeles Times. Certainly no friends of each other, but nevertheless, thrown together, [they] had been cited for contempt. Can you set the scene for us a little bit on these cases and tell us about your own involvement?

Margolis: Yes, there was in the Los Angeles Harbor a rather unusual situation, so far as the ILWU [International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union] was concerned. For some reason, that I never really understood, the local had been incorporated. As a result of that incorporation, the board of directors controlled the union as against the wishes of the rank and file on many, many instances. The board of directors was an anti-Bridges group of pro-AF of L [American Federation of Labor], anti-CIO [Congress of Industrial Organizations] group, who were known as the "Dirty Dozen." There were twelve of them and that was the name by which they were known. When the ILWU affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, they said that they were going, the Dirty Dozen said that they were going to keep a Los Angeles local in with the AFL--were not going to go along.What happened then was-- Let me see if I can remember the sequence. When the Dirty Dozen announced what they were going to do, there was a picket line established, a rank-and-file picket line established by the [local] longshoremen and longshoremen from various parts of the coast. There was an injunction proceeding against that picket line on the ground that there were some technical grounds. I don't remember the details at the moment, but the fact that there was a corporation was an element in the whole setup.

Balter: It was the board that sought an injunction?

Margolis: No-- I think it was the board. Yes, the board sought an injunction, or it may have been the shipowners. The picket line, I think, extended beyond the port and tied up the ships. I guess it was the boat owners, yeah, the boat owners sought an injunction, or the stevedoring company sought an injunction, on the grounds that this was an internal labor dispute and should not be allowed to shut down the port.There were I and the attorney Al [Abraham Lincoln] Wirin, who was-- This was in 1939. I was still in the San Francisco office. Al Wirin was a member of a firm--Johnson, Gallagher, and Wirin, I believe it was [Gallagher, Wirin, and Johnson]--that represented the progressive unions in the Los Angeles area, including the ILWU Local 13. So I was sent by the international to participate in this litigation, and Al Wirin was acting on behalf of the local people.I prepared an affidavit for Harry Bridges to sign. In that affidavit, Harry Bridges said that if an injunction was issued and men were required to work here, the whole coast would be shut down. Contempt proceedings were filed against Bridges. Oh, Charles [J.] Katz was another attorney who was involved in this, although he didn't handle the hearings. All he did was to file-- See, I was in San Francisco. I prepared the affidavit with Bridges. Sent it to Charles; Charles filed it. Contempt proceedings were started against Harry Bridges for having made the affidavit and against Charles Katz for having filed the affidavit. The theory being that this was a threat directed against the court, an attempt to influence the court by a threat of this kind of economic action. When these contempt proceedings were started, Charles, Charlie hired outside counsel. The outside counsel pleaded something like nolo contendere and he was fined $500.We pleaded not guilty on this charge. We had many defenses, but the one that is the most interesting is the following: The Los Angeles Times was writing editorials which were criticizing the courts for not being harder on the longshoremen, for not enforcing this. We filed an affidavit claiming denial of equal protection of the laws on the grounds [that] they're proceeding against the union, or against Bridges, for contempt, for allegedly threatening the court; and the Times was doing something very similar and that they were home free. As a result of this, the judge requested the bar association, I think it was the Los Angeles Bar Association, to file contempt proceedings against the Times on behalf of the superior court and that was done.So here you have, suddenly, the Los Angeles Times and Harry Bridges on the same side as far as the issue of law was concerned [but] around an issue on which they were on opposite sides of the fence as to what should happen. Al Wirin was retained by the-- I guess not. Al Wirin-- I'm just trying to remember. Al Wirin, yes, was retained by the Los Angeles Times to represent them in this case. Both Bridges and the Times were found in contempt of court for allegedly threatening the trial court.Our defense was that we weren't making any threat. It was just that the union had a policy that they all worked together or none of them worked. That they were simply advising the court of the fact that this was their policy. It was no threat at all. But somehow, the trial judge saw it as a threat. It went up on appeal. Finally decided by the [United States] Supreme Court, which was faced with an interesting situation. The Supreme Court pretty much was in the situation where either it had to hold both the newspaper and Bridges in contempt, or neither of them in contempt. It would have been not impossible, but very difficult for the Supreme Court to distinguish the two cases without appearing to discriminate against Bridges and in favor of the Times. So they finally handed down a decision in which they set aside the contempt proceedings against both and said they were legitimate exercise of free speech.

Balter: Somewhere in here, I'm not sure exactly how this fits in, there was the issue of a telegram to Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins that Harry Bridges sent. How did that fit into this picture?

Margolis: Some of this comes back to me a little more clearly now. The way that it was alleged in the-- We sent a telegram--we, that is, the ILWU. I was, as I say, in the middle of this; I was acting as the lawyer in this situation. We sent a telegram to Perkins saying that this situation--and explaining the whole situation--could lead to a shutdown of the entire port. Asking her to intervene, to see to it that this disaster of the shipping didn't occur. Instead of saying directly in the affidavits what was going to happen, we merely attached the telegram to the affidavits. Said we sent this telegram--and attached the telegram to it--and we were also claiming the right to petition the government on this and inform the court of the fact that we had petitioned the government to intervene in what was a serious situation. This helped us to eventually get the favorable decision that we did.

Balter: So it was actually, as I understand you, it was the act of simply attaching an exhibit to your affidavit that got you in contempt.

Margolis: Well, yeah. We said we had sent that telegram. And I'm pretty sure that we said in the affidavit--I'm positive--that this was a truthful statement that we had made to her. That was the basis for the contempt. Of course, the courts said, "What you're trying to tell us is that unless we rule in your favor, you're going to shut down the whole coast."Said, "No, we're not trying to tell you that; we're trying to tell you that's what will happen. [laughs] We're not threatening you." That was the situation.

Balter: As I understand it from my research, the judge's name was Judge Ruben [S.] Schmidt; does that correspond with your memory?

Margolis: That's right. One of the most conservative judges on the superior court here, who really gave us a very, very bad time in the course of it.It was in the course of this case that something else very interesting happened. Prior to the time that the Los Angeles Times was brought in, we moved to disqualify Judge Schmidt. We filed an affidavit of bias and prejudice on the ground that he had proceeded against Bridges and had not proceeded against the Times. He refused. Ordinarily, the practice was to turn the hearing on such a challenge over to another judge. He refused to do so and heard the matter of his qualifications himself.It was a real circus. We said we wanted to ask him some questions.He said, "You can't ask me any questions, but if you want to state what your questions are, I may answer them or I may not."And so we would ask a question. The other side would object, the counsel representing the judge would object. Then we would make a motion that the judge call in another judge to rule on the objection, because he couldn't rule on an objection to a question put to him. He would overrule that objection and then go ahead and answer the question. He would sustain the objection of the question, and then go ahead and answer it. [laughter] Anyway, it was one of those real circuses.

Balter: By the way, I understand that the Times had its own attorney, who apparently worked with either Wirin or with you later on the appeal before the Supreme Court, [Terence] B. Cosgrove. Do you recall him?

Margolis: Yes. Cosgrove was the Times' regular counsel. He was not an expert particularly in this area, although he did know a great deal about the area of free speech. He worked primarily with Wirin.

Balter: There's a story that I have heard that both Wirin and yourself--I don't know to what extent, what exactly, what role each of you were playing at this point--wanted to cite as precedent a case in which the Supreme Court had upheld free speech rights of communists. Apparently, Cosgrove was first very reluctant to allow that citation to be used as an attorney for the Times. It was of course notoriously anti-red at that time. Does that incident ring a bell with you?

Margolis: Yes. You want to remember, I did not represent the Los Angeles Times. They did not retain me; they retained Al Wirin. And, Al Wirin--I met once or twice with Cosgrove--we're just talking about the cases. I don't think that question was raised. So what I know about it is primarily what Al Wirin told me when-- We had cited that case in our brief, and he [Wirin] wanted to cite it in their brief. He told me about the discussion that he had with Cosgrove, and my recollection is that Cosgrove gave in and finally permitted the case to be cited.

Balter: I believe that's true. Yeah, yeah. Had you known Al Wirin before this case?

Margolis: Oh, yes.

Balter: When did you first meet him, or know him?

Margolis: Al Wirin at that time-- I'm wrong about the name of the firm at that time. The name of the firm was Johnson, Wirin, and Gallagher; or Johnson, Gallagher, and Wirin. I don't know if that's the way that I gave it before.

Balter: I'm not quite sure.

Margolis: Anyway, Wirin was then representing the ILWU and a number of other unions as part of the firm of Johnson, Gallagher, and Wirin. I was utilized by the ILWU in various parts of the country, where there was litigation in which the international was particularly interested or where it wanted help to local counsel. I went to various parts of the country and handled that litigation on behalf of the ILWU. During that period of time, I handled quite a number of cases in Los Angeles--sometimes with Wirin, sometimes with [Grover] Johnson, sometimes with [Leo] Gallagher--so that I knew Wirin very, very well.

Balter: Can you give me some examples of the types of cases that you were doing at that time concerning the ILWU? I know that we've talked about the fact that the local board in Los Angeles of the ILWU wanted the organization to stay with the AF of L. What types of cases came out of the dispute between the CIO and the AF of L?

Margolis: Well, there were similar cases. I remember one case, Pfeiffer--it's odd, it sticks in my mind--Pfeiffer v. Borun Brothers. Borun I think became Thrifty Drug [Stores Company] later on, series of drug-- And that involved not the longshore local, but the warehouse local, ILWU [Local] 26. There had been the change of affiliation of the ILWU, and Borun Brothers brought an action to-- One of two things happened, either Borun Brothers canceled the contract and we brought an action to enforce it, or Borun Brothers brought an action to cancel.I don't remember the precise form that the litigation took, but the issue was whether or not the ILWU could change its affiliation from AF of L to the CIO and the locals take with them the contracts that they had had while they were part of the AF of L. We prevailed in that litigation, and there were-- I happen to remember that one because that was a very important case, because it involved a large unit, quite a number of drugstores, but there were other cases of that kind. There was another--there were furniture workers--similar case. There were a number of such cases. Then there were a couple of strikes I was involved in. Injunction proceedings where there were injunctions against picketing and then NLRB [National Labor Relations Board] proceedings, but I don't remember the details.

Balter: Well, one case, which was decided by the California Supreme Court in 1940, Renzel versus warehouse union [E.H. Renzel Co. v. Warehousemen's Union, ILA]. Do you recall that one concerning peaceful picketing?

Margolis: Yes, that was in San Jose, as I remember. The San Jose warehouse, not a Los Angeles warehouse. Yes, I represented the-- That was Local 6 of the ILWU. See, the ILWU had warehouse locals and longshore locals. Local 6 is the San Francisco warehouse local which exercised jurisdiction, oh, all over Northern California: San Jose, Sacramento, Stockton. This was a warehouse local.At that time, the right to peacefully picket had not yet been recognized by the courts of California. And the issue was-- There was peaceful picketing, and there had been an injunction granted against the peaceful picketing. There were four or five such cases. All of the others involved the AF of L locals. If someone mentioned the names of the cases, I would remember them, but I can't think of the names now. We argued those cases together before the [California] Supreme Court. They were consolidated. I remember that Matt [Matthew O.] Tobriner and I made the principal arguments before the supreme court. The decision came down that stated that the right to peacefully picket was a constitutionally protected right: part of the right of free speech.

Balter: When that decision came down, did it have an immediate effect on what happened out on the docks and so forth, or did it take a while before law enforcement and local officials began to actually follow that order? Do you recall whether there were problems afterwards?

Margolis: Oh, problems never stopped, but it was easier. What would happen then is that they would take a different approach. I can't remember any occasion after that, when any court granted an injunction against picketing simply on the grounds that you didn't have a right to picket. I don't remember that happening. That stopped. But then they would say too many pickets [were] threatening and intimidating. Various things that they'd raise, so the issues changed. Injunctions were certainly harder for the employer to have, but the injunction struggle continued in a slightly different area.

Balter: By the way, one question that I had on-- Back when we were talking about the Bridges injunction case, you mentioned that the American Bar Association [ABA], I believe, asked for a contempt citation against the Times.

Margolis: No, not the American Bar Association.

Balter: I'm sorry, the local?

Margolis: I believe it was the Los Angeles Bar Association.

Balter: The Los Angeles Bar Association.

Margolis: I believe so.

Balter: Okay. Now, it just might have-- Pardon my ignorance on this, but what kind of standing would that organization have to seek a contempt citation? What did they have to do with it?

Margolis: The contempt citation was brought on behalf of the court, but in order to institute that sort of a case, papers had to be filed and someone had to act. Judge Schmidt requested the Los Angeles Bar or the Los Angeles County Bar Association to act as his attorneys. And so they were acting as attorneys for the court, at the request of the court. That was perfectly proper for the court to ask a bar association to appoint members to act on his behalf in such a situation.

Balter: Is it still done that way today?

Margolis: Yes, it's done from time to time.

Balter: I see, okay. We've been talking-- Some characters have begun to present themselves; I'm talking about Leo Gallagher and Al Wirin. One issue that I wanted to discuss with you--and in Fred Okrand's oral history there's some discussion of this--was the issue of the internment of the Japanese after Pearl Harbor and the role that-- Many were involved: yourself, Al Wirin, Leo Gallagher, the CIO, the Communist Party (which you had begun to represent at that time as I understand). I know that Al Wirin eventually split with the Gallagher law firm because of his feeling that the internment should be fought. What do you recall about all the conflicts and debates and so forth that went on around that issue? Who took which position and why?

Margolis: Well, that was a kind of a unique period in American history because on many issues where there would have ordinarily been sharp breaks between the Left and the Right, they [sat] shoulder to shoulder. And around many of the issues relating to the conduct of the war that was so. The Communist Party at that time took the position that everything else had to yield to whatever was necessary in order to win the war. And that was the trade union position, both the AF of L and the CIO. It was, I suppose, the position of 95 percent of the people in organizations in this country, and I don't think I am exaggerating.I must say that I also supported this. And while I recognize in my career that I made many mistakes, this is the only one that occurs to me, at the moment, of which I am deeply ashamed. But I did wholeheartedly support the position of the CIO and-- Well, the position of almost everyone at that time.Al Wirin, to his credit, said no. And he had very, very good grounds, which the rest of us simply ignored, for saying no. He left the firm, not because of his differences with other members of the firm--although other members of the firm supported the internment of the Japanese--but because the CIO took the position that they didn't want an attorney representing them who was doing this, which I gather is to their great discredit. But that was a time when that was what was the attitude of many people.He had left the labor firm and went-- It was then that he started, I believe shortly thereafter, to spend most of his time, or a very large portion of his time with the ACLU [American Civil Liberties Union], which I think was the only organization in the country, or the only organization of consequence, that opposed the internment.

Balter: Now, of course, this was early 1942. You were still in San Francisco.

Margolis: Right.

Balter: Was there any debate? I know you've said 99 percent of the people supported this. Was there any other than Al Wirin? Is there anybody else that comes to mind who raised any questions about it, either in your law firm or in the CIO?

Margolis: My recollection, there was very little if any. Certainly, there was no strong debate. The position that was taken was that winning the war was so important that you simply didn't take even the slightest chance of sabotage or anything like that. Of course, there was no evidence--nothing to support the concept that there was any more danger from the Japanese than from anyone else. But there was virtually-- I can't remember any discussion, except with Al Wirin, who argued very strenuously, very strongly for his position.

Balter: Of course, you were in San Francisco and he was in Los Angeles, but did you ever participate in any direct discussions with him around this?

Margolis: Oh, sure, sure. I used to be in Los Angeles fairly frequently. When I was in Los Angeles--as a matter of fact, we're good friends--we discussed that. He stated his position, and I remember saying substantially, "Al, you may be right about everything you say, but we would never forgive ourselves if you were wrong. We got to do this." That's what I said.

Balter: Thinking back on your own perceptions at the time of this, was it a case that you believed that it might be possible that there was disloyalty and possibility of sabotage from the Japanese? Or was it more that you believed that the government shouldn't be crossed on this one?

Margolis: Well, they're both things. The idea that you don't fight the government, that you don't create issues, that you get unity--broad, broad unity. You don't create issues that are divisive was one of the very important considerations. But I think, as I think back, I think I accepted and argued that sure, there was very little chance, very little possibility, but after all, we didn't know, and the government knew more than we did. (I can't imagine myself arguing that, but I did.) Therefore, in this situation we had to yield to what the government thought best. A very, very--As a matter of fact, I cannot remember specifically any other person taking Wirin's position, with whom I was in contact.

Balter: Now, by this time the National Lawyers Guild had been organized. Am I safe on this from what you have said, should I assume that the National Lawyers Guild took an identical position?

Margolis: Yes, it supported it.

Balter: I want to go on in a minute to talk a little bit about the founding of the guild, but before I do, a little bit more on Al Wirin. What were your impressions of Al at that point? What type of relationship did you have with him? I know it's a little bit of a loaded question because at one point you actually were on opposite sides of the case from him and Fred Okrand, which we can discuss in a minute. But what do you recall about Al, at least especially in those early days?

Margolis: Oh, we had a very good and a very close working relationship. Al was a very, very able courtroom tactician and spoke well; handled himself very well in court. We occasionally had slight differences because I was one who believed in preparation to the ultimate extent, and Al Wirin relied more on being able to make an impassioned presentation in court. We sometimes had slight differences about the question of adequacy of preparation, but nothing, nothing serious. We were very good friends. As a matter of fact, my wife would come down with me sometimes. Al at that time was married to a very fine woman, Helen, Helen Wirin, and we used to socialize. We'd go out together, and we enjoyed each others' company. We were very good friends. At that point there really wasn't an issue; that developed later on with respect to Al's attitude towards the Communist Party.

Balter: Can you elaborate?

Margolis: Well, my differences with Al developed-- Well, first of all, do you want to talk about that case, that case with him that was-- Did we talk about the furniture workers case?

Balter: Yeah, the Gus Brown case.

Margolis: The Gus Brown case, yes. That was a case-- Al did not go to work immediately full-time for the ACLU. They couldn't--they weren't big enough at that time. But he established the law firm which became Wirin, Okrand, and Rissman, I believe. This case was handled for Wirin's office by [Robert] Rissman, not by Wirin himself. As a matter of fact, that's one of the-- what I said was--inexcusable excuses that Wirin had for this.This was a case which involved the withdrawal of-- The furniture workers international [United Furniture Workers of America] stayed with the AF of L after a bitter fight as to whether it should go CIO or stay with the AF of L. A majority decided to stay with the AF of L, but the Los Angeles local, headed by a man then by the name of Gus Brown, decided that it would withdraw and go into the CIO, which in fact it did. There was litigation over who had the right to the assets of that local, and the Wirin firm represented the international furniture workers union against the local.The bitterness developed over the fact that in the course of their briefs and arguments to the courts handled by Rissman, there was vicious red-baiting. I had a big fight with Wirin at that time, saying, "You know you're a principled guy. You know that that's no basis-- I say you have a right to represent these people--argue what the Constitution means, who has a right to the property, and so forth--but you know how unprincipled this is."As I remember Wirin was weak-kneed about it. Said, "Well, Rissman is handling the case, and I can't control him."Never did anything to stop him. And I always knew that Wirin really controlled that firm. He was the strong person in that firm, and if he had wanted to stop it, he could have. That was the first big fight I had with Al. Our differences from that point on, in one way or another, were around that issue, although there were some other questions that might come up later in the Smith Act case [Yates v. United States].But Al had a habit of-- You know he represented communists many times. Represented the Communist Party, came in amicus [curiae], and did some pretty good work in those areas. But he would stand up before the court and say-- Yes, start out by saying, "I want the court to know I am not a communist. And I absolutely disagree with them, but the worst people are entitled to the protection of the Constitution." And he would repeat that and do that all of the time.I said, "If you were representing a murderer, you wouldn't stand up and say you were against murder. Besides, you know well and good that you agree, or at least used to agree, with virtually everything that the Communist Party stood for."I told him that I felt that he was an opportunist in that area, which is peculiar, because I had thought he had been so highly principled--as indeed he was--in the Japanese area. That cooled our relations, so that the personal closeness stopped, although we didn't become enemies.

Balter: Okay. Ben, I know that you were one of the founders of the National Lawyers Guild. I believe in 1937 your organization first got started. What do you recall about the founding of that organization? Who was involved? Why was it founded?

Margolis: Well, let me say that I was one of the founders of the organization in one sense: I was in contact with a number of people in the East. The guild was primarily-- The primary organizational efforts were in New York City-- maybe to some extent Washington, D.C.--by a group working there. We got calls from some of the people and gave support to that, but didn't actually participate in the meetings there, except that we agreed to immediately set up, as part of the organization, a San Francisco--that was when I was in San Francisco in '37--a San Francisco chapter of the guild.If you want to know how the guild came into existence, well, a lot of people say--and there is some truth but not complete accuracy in the statement--that the guild was organized around the [Franklin Delano] Roosevelt court-packing issue. You may remember that.The Supreme Court of the United States had been declaring unconstitutional measure after measure that had been initiated under Roosevelt as part of the New Deal. What they were doing was saying that property rights were being violated. For example, there was a children and women's labor law that they declared unconstitutional. They said this interfered with the right of the women to contract their labor; in other words, outlawed them.There were many, many that they held unconstitutional which we considered as an extension, in modern times, of the Dred Scott decision, which placed the rights of slave property over the human rights of the slaves. Here they are placing the rights of big corporations, big business, over the human rights of the workers. The New Deal was simply being prevented from coming into effect, as a result of what the Supreme Court single-handedly was doing. Roosevelt--I don't remember whether it was by a speech, or just how it happened--indicated one way or another that he wanted to increase the size of the Supreme Court so he would have enough appointments to turn the minority of the Supreme Court into a majority, which would have prevented this.The guild was formed around this issue of the Supreme Court preventing any progress. In the course of it, it is true that many of the lawyers in the guild supported the court-packing idea, but the concept back of it was really a much broader concept: the concept of property rights versus human rights. As a matter of fact, in the first constitution of the guild, that's the major phrase of the constitutionally stated objectives of the guild, to give preference to human rights over property rights, and that was the area in which it was formed. It was originally quite a broad organization.It is true that there are many-- Virtually all of the Left lawyers belonged to it. Lawyers who had any relationship to the Communist Party and other Left organizations belonged to it. But there were also liberals, New Dealers, New Deal lawyers. Many, many government lawyers, because the government was filled with lawyers who philosophically supported the New Deal, either from a Left standpoint or a liberal standpoint. All of the CIO labor attorneys, without exception, representing the internationals belonged, participated in forming the guild, or joined it in the very early stages. Some AF of L lawyers. Goldberg, for example, was an AF of L lawyer. I don't remember, I think he came a little later, but he was at one point-- Arthur [J.] Goldberg, who later became a justice of the Supreme Court--

Balter: He was involved in the guild?

Margolis: Yeah, I think he came in a little later. But I'm just trying to indicate that it was a very, very broad organization, initially, and it had these very broad objectives.

Balter: Who were the key leaders? Well, actually, let me turn the tape over before I ask the next question.

8. Tape Number: IV, Side Two July 2, 1984

Balter: Ben, who were, in addition to yourself, who were some of the early leaders of the National Lawyers Guild on the West Coast, either in L.A. or San Francisco or what have you?

Margolis: I remember the office of which I was a part, that is, Gladstein, Grossman, and Margolis, all three of us were very active. I remember a man by the name of George [G.] Olshausen, a remarkably brilliant lawyer, but a rather strange guy in many ways, was one of the leaders. I'm just trying to think of the names. [pauses] I know that at an early stage, Edmund [G.] Brown [Sr.] was a member. He was in the office right across the street from us; he was in the Russ Building. Later became district attorney and then later governor.

Balter: Was he a very active participant?

Margolis: No, but he was a member and paid dues for I don't-- Two, three years, you know, not just in and out. He came to meetings, and as he became more involved in politics, he more and more withdrew. I can't think of the names of others. If someone mentioned names, I probably could fix on it, but I just can't fix--

Balter: Well, perhaps they'll come up later, or as we go along. You mentioned that at least, initially, the guild was formed in support of the court-packing scheme of Roosevelt. Was there anything specific that the guild felt it was going to do in that regard?

Margolis: Let me say, I wouldn't say exactly that it was formed in support of the court-packing scheme. It was formed in opposition to what the Supreme Court was doing and in support of achieving a change. I think there were some members who joined the guild who thought that wasn't the best method. But I would say that the majority did support it, and probably the guild ended up supporting it, but as a method of dealing with a deeper problem.

Balter: Well, then what were the primary tasks which the new organization set itself? What kind of activities do the attorneys get involved in?

Margolis: They got involved in all kinds of legal matters relating to the New Deal: writing amicus briefs, supporting the constitutionality of legislation, testifying before Congress on legislation, proposing legislation--wherever there were legal problems.It was basically an organization which at that time supported various progressive matters of the New Deal. It participated in trying to make legislation stronger [in] the interest of the people, like the social security law. For example, it carried on a fight as a-- One specific fight, I remember, was to have the social security payments supported by the general funds, rather than setting up what amounted to insurance (or it was so-called an insurance scheme), although it [the guild] supported it in the way it passed finally.It was on the progressive edge of all of the things that were going on at that time. All of the CIO attorneys belonged to it, and it was very active in labor matters. It had, in my opinion, some of the very best legal minds in the country among its membership. Its conventions were really high marks of legal presentations and legal analysis and creative ideas.

Balter: Did the guild get involved in activities outside of the direct legal arena, as it does often today? Or was it more strictly a legal organization at that time?

Margolis: Much more strictly a legal organization. As a matter of fact, well, it may have attended meetings that were held, of-- In other words, it may have informed its members there'll be such and such a meeting, and encouraged them to attend. But it functioned virtually entirely through legal modes, including in legal modes, legislation as well as court things.

Balter: Now, later, of course, in the forties and fifties (and the 1980s), the guild was quite strongly red-baited. I believe that various congressional committees, the House Un-American Activities Committee [House Committee to Investigate Un-American Activities (HUAC)] and so forth, claimed that the National Lawyers Guild was nothing but a communist front.

Margolis: The "legal bulwark" of the Communist Party.

Balter: Right, that's the phrase [laughs] I was looking for. Now you've already mentioned that the organization was much broader than the Communist Party. But the question I would have is how would you characterize the exact relationship between the Communist Party and the National Lawyers Guild, at least in those early days of its formation.

Margolis: Well, I would say that the Communist Party had some influence on the program of the guild by virtue of the fact that there were many lawyers who were members of the Communist Party--or if not members, were friendly to the Communist Party--and who accepted its basic concepts and carried those concepts into the guild, along with others.However, in those days, the early days at least, you have to recognize the fact that the program of the Communist Party was practically the Roosevelt program. So you could just as correctly state that the lawyers were promoting the New Deal program. Maybe it's more accurate to say that. Whether they were influenced into doing that, to some extent, by the Communist Party is another question. Probably so.

Balter: When the red-baiting of the guild did begin, did the guild lose membership? What effect did that have on the noncommunist members of the guild?

Margolis: You really have to go back to look at the particular history of the guild. Throughout the war, this unity of various forces, of the type I've talked about, persisted.Oh, by the way, the guild also-- I forgot to mention one thing. The guild from its very inception was very interested in racial matters, in ending racial discrimination. It became the first national bar association not to draw the color line, to invite all people into it. The American Bar Association [ABA] at that time had a rule that only white lawyers could belong.

Balter: There was a written rule?

Margolis: Yeah. Well, whether it was written or not, it had no black members and it was an actual policy. I think it was in writing, but I'm not positive. But there's just no doubt, and the American Bar Association doesn't dispute it, that that was so. So that was an issue around which the guild fought in addition to the New Deal.You see the New Deal itself was not that much concerned with discrimination. The New Deal was 95 percent around economic matters or matters related to economics, like the National Labor Relations Act, which after all is an economic measure ultimately. So that there the guild went substantially beyond the New Deal. But there was agreement among its members on that, there wasn't a split in that area.

Balter: Do you recall the names of any of the either black or other minority attorneys who joined the guild in those early days, who were active in it?

Margolis: After the war, the first black president of a national bar association [was] Earl [B.] Dickerson. Earl, by the way, recently just played a leading role in helping [Harold] Washington get elected mayor of Chicago. The guild had a convention in Chicago a year and a half ago, at which Washington spoke and Dickerson was with him. Washington spoke of Dickerson as his right-hand man. Dickerson was the head of a--the largest black insurance company [Supreme Life Insurance Company of America] at that time, and a lawyer. He became president of the guild, at a time, very bad time, for the guild. I'm just trying to remember who some of the original members were who were black. I cannot remember. I want to call your attention to another factor. In that time in the thirties, there weren't that many black lawyers. Even now, blacks are not represented in proportion to the population, but the percentage has increased, I don't know, tenfold, twentyfold. There were very few black lawyers.

Balter: Ben, one person, one black attorney, notable black attorney, who's now passed away, does come to mind: Loren Miller [Sr.], here in Los Angeles. Was he active in the guild?

Margolis: I don't know whether he was active in the founding stages, but when I came to Los Angeles in 1943, he was an active member in the guild. As a matter of fact, I worked very closely with him on the restrictive covenant issue, which was a big issue at that time.

Balter: Why don't we talk a little bit about that? What cases were done around that?

Margolis: My work was primarily on the organizational level--amicus briefs and things of that kind which were done through the guild--although our office handled one very important case that ended up in the supreme court of the state. It was handled primarily by John [T.] McTernan. I did some work on it, but he handled most of it, called In re Laws. The man's name was Henry Laws. That [case] involved a black family which owned a house in an area where there was a restrictive covenant. This was an action to evict them from the house that they owned on the ground that the restrictive covenant gave them no right to live there, even though they owned the house. That was finally won in the Supreme Court of California. I think you know what restrictive covenants are.

Balter: Yes.

Margolis: There was just a lot of movement around that. I remember one incident with Loren that might be of interest. It might show how little sometimes we whites understand the feelings of black people. There had been a study done in UCLA--and there was a big article about it--on the question of the determination of how much, if any "Negro blood" there was in a person as distinguished from, say, "white blood." The article said you really can't tell; there is really no way of knowing the color of-- You can have a person, as I remember the article, who has 10 percent Negro blood and still be black; and you can have a person with 90 percent Negro blood and be white. That there's just no way of telling: the blood is the same. So when you use the term Negro blood, at least as it was understood at that time-- I think by this time there had been some ultimate differences found.I remember going to Loren and saying, "Why don't we attack restrictive covenants on the ground that there is no legal way of telling whether a person is or is not black, and therefore there is no way of enforcing it?" I thought that was a good, progressive position to take.He, I remember, he was angry. He said, "We're fighting for the right of black people to be black. Not on the right that you can't tell who's black and who's white. Don't tell millions of black people here that you can't tell who's black and who's white. They know." I [laughs] backed away very, very quickly. I'm not particularly ashamed of that, but I, that I-- You know, sounded like a good idea. My motives were very good, but it shows a lack of understanding of how black people felt about the fight. I was trying to find a technical way of winning the fight, which they wanted to fight--correctly--on a principled basis of the right of black people--

Balter: Do you have any other memories about Loren Miller? What was your overall impression of him?

Margolis: Well, Loren was one of the best lawyers with whom I have ever come in contact. His ability was very, very great. Loren Miller was a liberal. He was not--Loren Miller was not a socialist. As a matter of fact, I think he believed in the capitalist system, but he was concerned primarily about what had happened to his people.I do remember that because of his membership in the guild and his association with people like me, he later could not get, for many years, could not get an appointment as a judge. Loren should have been on the supreme court of the state. He had that kind of capacity, and he had the desire. He wanted very much to be a judge, and he was a very studious kind of a guy--the kind of a guy that ought to be on an appellate bench.As I recall it, even though he broke away from the guild and stopped his associations with people like me, to a large extent, and wanted very much to get appointed a judge, I don't think he ever red-baited. You know, I don't think he became unprincipled in what he did. I respected him a great deal.

Balter: I had started to ask you before, concerning the guild, whether when the red-baiting began, especially the official red-baiting by Congress and so forth, what effect that had on the guild's membership and the willingness of liberals and other noncommunists to join the guild. How did that manifest itself?

Margolis: Well, there were, I really can-- I started to answer that question before I got sidetracked. I think that we really turn our attention to events as the signals of red-baiting generally-- When [Harry S.] Truman-- Shortly after the war, as I was saying, an act had been adopted or promulgated--his loyalty oath and loyalty tests for government employees [Loyalty Order promulgated by President Truman on March 22, 1947]. There was some attrition, but not a great deal. People were getting nervous, but they were still staying. One event which led to an overnight, tremendous decrease in membership of the guild occured at a Chicago convention of the guild. I remember it was in winter. I remember going out after one session to get some coffee at a restaurant nearby and how cold it was.

Balter: Do you recall the year?

Margolis: I think it was probably '47. Could have been '46, could have been '48, but I'm almost sure it was '47. The issue was the Marshall Plan [June, 1947]. There was a resolution to oppose the Marshall Plan, primarily on the basis that it excluded the Soviet Union and that it was really designed as an instrument to be used against--to rebuild Western Europe as a bulwark against--the Soviet Union. Remember this was a couple of years after the "iron curtain" speech [by Winston Churchill at Fulton, Missouri, 1946], and red-baiting was already in full progress by then.There was a bitter, bitter, bitter contest. At that time, maybe a third or so of the members of the guild were government employees--federal government employees. The resolution to oppose the Marshall Plan passed by a decisive vote, but with a very substantial opposition: maybe 60-40, or something like that. The next day, virtually, I think, every government employee resigned and a great many others resigned. I think virtually overnight the guild lost maybe close to half of its membership. That was the one single event where there was overnight a huge drop in membership. From that time on, there was a period of attrition. People kept dropping off--no question about it--and very few people were joining, so that the guild kept dropping in size until it was left finally with a very small number.

Balter: Would it be fair to say that when the guild became smaller that it became, [laughs] I don't want to put it indelicately, but that it became more of a Left organization? Or perhaps closer to the type of organization that it was being attacked for being, or would that not be an accurate way of putting it?

Margolis: Well, certainly it is true that the communists in the organization constituted a much larger percentage of the organization, simply because they did not drop out. The ones that did drop out were anticommunist first and then many of the noncommunists. There were some then who dropped out because of fear, but basically I think there was disagreement at first. But from that time on, I think that the people dropped out largely because of fear, rather than-- although I'm sure that there were disagreements also. So that the organization was left more and more with hard-core, if you want to use that word, people who believed in either the communist principles or who were firmly Left and willing to take the risks. And there were very real risks that belonging to the guild meant.

Balter: Now, the debate around the Marshall Plan brings to mind a question. Were there debates in the guild about just what type of organization the guild was supposed to be? In other words, how broad of an organization it would be? That it would take positions on foreign affairs or not? Were these things just automatically part of the guild, or were there debates around what the guild should be doing?

Margolis: At a later time that was a very important issue in the guild--in the seventies. But I'm sure when the Marshall Plan was argued, as far as I can remember, that was the first time when somebody suggested, "Let's not take a position on the Marshall Plan. Let's keep out of foreign affairs; let's devote ourselves only to domestic matters." That was not really an opinion that was expressed because they felt the guild should, as a matter of principle, keep out of foreign affairs, but because some people felt--and I'm inclined to think, perhaps correctly, looking back, talking now about one of the mistakes [that] I think was made--as a matter of tactics, we should not have done that. But up to that time, I cannot remember anyone saying we should keep out of foreign affairs. Remember we went through the war period where, you know, the guild, like everybody else, supported everything that Roosevelt did. We were on war footing. Oh, the guild--have we mentioned the United Nations yet?

Balter: I don't believe so, no.

Margolis: You want to remember that Roosevelt called the first UN Conference [on International Organization] to form the UN for San Francisco--gee, what year was that, '45?

Balter: 'Forty-five I think, yes.

Margolis: I think it was '45. He designated representatives of various groups as-- I don't think they were called observers, but they had some sort of a limited participation. They were not government representatives, but they were more than observers. He appointed representatives of two bar associations, the ABA [American Bar Association] and the guild, in equal numbers. The guild played a far bigger part in the formation of the United Nations than the ABA did. The ABA basically did not support the formation of the United Nations. The guild wholeheartedly supported it, so that, again, that's an example of the guild's participation in foreign affairs. Part of its activity-- I think I lost the question.

Balter: Well, actually, I have another question. I believe Alger Hiss was an attorney, wasn't he? Was he--

Margolis: I think he--Alger Hiss came along much later, I believe.

Balter: I see, because I'm thinking of his role at that United Nations--at that founding convention.

Margolis: Founding--maybe he was there.

Balter: But he was not active in the National Lawyers Guild.

Margolis: He may have been a member, but he was not an active member, to my knowledge.

Balter: By the way, you mentioned the National Lawyers Guild and the ABA. How did those two organizations get along? Was there any communication between them? Were they--

Margolis: They were on the opposite sides of almost every issue. You can almost make certain that a case in which the guild will file an amicus brief on one side, there will be an ABA brief on the other side.

Balter: [pauses] Okay, perhaps we'll come back later. Ben, at this point what I'd like to do is back up a little bit and catch up on your personal life. I know that while all of this is going on, you've gotten married and are having kids. Tell me how you met your wife and about your children.

Margolis: I met my wife (who became my wife) in 1935, about the middle of 1935. Friend of mine and I were double-dating, and this friend was going out with Val's--my future wife's--sister, Helen. I remember we went up to their apartment to pick up Helen, who's my friend's date for the night. I then met Val and decided that I wanted to see her again. Had access because my friend knew Helen's number, so I called and we started going around together.I think it was only about six months before we were married. We only knew each other for about six months, and her name was Kayly. Helen and Valerie Charlotte Kayly. We went around together for these few months. We were married on February 20, 1936--and the judge's name was King--before a Judge King in a small Northern California city. [chuckles] I know we often kidded about it, because there was an insane asylum there--what's the name of the place?

Balter: I think I know where you mean, but it's not--

Margolis: I can't-- I have a block thinking about it. Somehow because the judge's name was King, I always think of King City. But King City is not it. [laughs]In any event, from a personal standpoint, I think I had told you previously that my father had remarried--a very fine woman who was quite religious. And I married a shiksa. They did not--my father, by the way, did not feel this way about it, just my stepmother--but they did not attend the wedding. As a matter of fact, Val's mother and father and Val's sister went with us to this little place where we were married. And then we went on for our honeymoon. But my stepmother--who came to consider me and my brother as though we were her own children and who, from a standpoint of giving of herself, treated us as though we were her children--became so ill that she had to be hospitalized as a result of my marrying a shiksa. Although, to her credit, later on she overcame this. She and Val became very good friends.Well, that was 1936, February, I had not-- At that time I think I was in-- Yes, I know I was in the Johnson office. Senator [Hiram W.] Johnson's-- Hiram Johnson, Jr., Senator Johnson's son, and there was-- Having still a pretty rough, pretty rough time. Not making very much. Val was working as a dental assistant, also not making very much money, but together we had enough to live on and within less than a year, I had formed my alliance with the Gladstein, Grossman office and things began to look up financially.Our first child was born on May 17, 1940, a little over four years after we were married. Name is Kenneth, Kenneth Richard. He was one of the reasons for my--our moving to Los Angeles. He was a very sickly child and couldn't hold his food. Regurgitated a lot of his food and very-- Not at all strong. The doctor said that we ought to take him to a different climate. That he would probably do better.And then when I was asked to go to Los Angeles-- I loved San Francisco very much. Loved the work that I was doing. But one of the reasons I agreed to go to Los Angeles was that it meant a change of climate for him, which turned out very, very well. He became well in a short period and has been well ever since. My other two children were born in Los Angeles.

Balter: When were they born, and what are their names?

Margolis: Well, they were born--let's see, Roger Steven was born on March 12, 1945, and Gregory Allen was born on March 13, 1950.

Balter: Are all of your children still living?

Margolis: Yes. They're all still living, and their homes are all in Portland, Oregon.

Balter: All three of them live in Portland?

Margolis: Yes. My oldest son went to Reed College. Liked Portland very much, so he settled down there with the woman he was living with for a number of years, who later became his wife. They've now been married for seventeen years or something like that, and they'd lived together for a number of years before that.And the other two boys-- The three boys have not been very close because of the differences in ages. They were approximately five years apart, and that created differences. The difference in age was just too great for them to be close. But by the time the youngest one became eighteen and nineteen, they became very close.First, Roger moved to Portland, primarily because Kenny was there. And then Greg moved out there. Ken and Greg, the oldest and the youngest, are buying a ranch on the outskirts of Portland. Not that they earn a living out of it, but they have some cattle, fruit--things of that kind. Their houses are about a hundred yards apart on this ranch. Ken works for an environmental organization called Nature Conservancy, which is-- For fourteen years, he was in charge of their office in the five northwestern states, with the office centered in Oregon, including Alaska, Wyoming, Montana, Utah. Now he is temporarily in Washington, D.C., for approximately a year. Has been transferred to their international department and is doing a lot of traveling. Has a very interesting job.My middle son has had one ambition all of his life, and that is to be a screenwriter. He has finally gotten his first contract writing his first screenplay under contract, although he has written several before. He does motion picture reviews, and he teaches screenwriting in Portland. Handles seminars, things of that kind, but all in the screenwriting field or review of motion pictures.

Balter: Have any of the scripts been produced previously?

Margolis: No. No, this is the first contracted one.

Balter: This will be the first one.

Margolis: First contract. We don't know if it will be produced. You know, when scripts are written, the motion picture industry-- Perhaps, one out of twenty ever ends up as a motion picture. But at least he's writing one for money, [laughter] which is different from writing one on speculation and trying to sell it. This is a very rough game.And then my youngest son-- By the way, my oldest son has a boy [Jesse Margolis] who is just entering, in September, Santa Rosa Junior College. [Note: The following bracketed section was added by Mr. Margolis during his review of the transcript.] [Jesse Margolis completed two years at Santa Rosa Junior College, then transferred to Sacramento State University. He is currently enrolled there as of June 1987.] He'll be eighteen years old. My middle son has a ten-year-old son. He's divorced, but they have a-- He has the boy with him about half the time; they have a good relationship, he and his father. And my third son has a daughter, who will be three in a few days. He works as a paralegal for a law office in Portland. He has never-- He's just always been unwilling to go to law school, although I think he would make a very good lawyer.

Balter: By the way, is Sonoma the name of the town that you were married?

Margolis: No.

Balter: Isn't it Sonoma?

Margolis: Napa! Napa.

Balter: The state hospital in Napa.

Margolis: Yes, Napa.

Balter: There's one at Sonoma too, I think--that's what made me think of that.

Margolis: Yes. Napa.

Balter: Okay. When you first met your wife, did she share any or all of the political beliefs that you were already well on the way to developing at that time?

Margolis: No, she did not.

Balter: What was her outlet?

Margolis: Well, I don't think-- She was interested in music and wasn't much interested in politics. I would say she was fairly apolitical at that time. She became politically interested as time went on and has gone through all these things with me. And stuck with me.

Balter: Has she become active in her own right, politically?

Margolis: She was active for a while and then she ceased directly. She's not an organizational person. Her activity was only for two or three years during the [Joseph R.] McCarthy days.

Balter: I see. What was she involved in when she was active?

Margolis: Various civil liberties activities. We had a large house, and we used to have enormous affairs--enormous for us--affairs at our house. And she'd help organize them, you know, raising money for organizations, things like that.

Balter: Okay. I think this will be a good stopping place for today, and next time we'll pick up on quite a bit of things.

9. Tape Number: V, Side One July 9, 1984

Balter: Ben, you've made available to me several hundred pages of materials that you've received from the Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI]: documents which were prepared over several decades when you were under investigation by the bureau. Well, I certainly would assume that you would not consider this to be a source of accurate information. Nevertheless, there is material in there, which prompts some questions that I would like to ask you to comment on.First of all, perhaps on a light note, but it does raise a question. In a FBI report, dated August 1943, we read that subject Margolis, quote, "once lost ninety dollars in a big poker game following a session at the Tom Mooney Labor School." [laughs] Now that brings two questions to mind. First of all, of course, did you really lose that ninety dollars? And second of all, what was the Tom Mooney Labor School, and was that in San Francisco or in Los Angeles? The FBI report doesn't really make that clear.

Margolis: The Tom Mooney Labor School was in San Francisco. I don't think it was called the Tom Mooney Labor School [predecessor to the California Labor School]--maybe it was referred to that way. I don't remember ever playing cards there.I was in some poker games. As I remember them, they were at private homes, mostly with people from the ILWU [International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union], including Harry Bridges, [Mervyn] Rathborne, and, I believe, Henry Schmidt. I don't remember. I know that Dorothy Healey sometimes was in some of those games, but I don't remember if I was ever in the game with her. I did have some nights with some substantial losses and some nights with substantial winnings.But I don't remember the figure ninety dollars, which at that time was an awful lot of money. It's possible, but I think unlikely that it was that much. You know, I think it's one of those exaggerated stories that has a basis of truth in it. I think the place is wrong. It sounds like one of those stories that have gone from mouth to mouth to mouth and gotten exaggerated, but starting with a kernel of truth in it. So I believe probably, first, the game I actually participated in, I think it was a private home.We sometimes-- Oh, what we used to do, and this may be where that came from, we used to take money out of a pot that would go for the labor school or some other benefit. For example, you take fifty cents or a dollar out of each pot, or some such amount, and then that would go in, be set aside as a contribution. But I don't think we ever played cards at the labor school itself. So it might have been a fifteen-, twenty-, or maybe thirty-dollar loss. Had got blown up to ninety dollars.

Balter: I take it there was a labor school that you were active in.

Margolis: There was a labor school, yes.

Balter: Tell me something about it and its activities, if you remember.

Margolis: I don't remember very much about it, because I never attended the school. But I do remember making, you know, giving some contributions to the school and supporting it. I think I attended some meetings there, but I really remember very little about it.

Balter: Or perhaps who organized the school?

Margolis: I don't remember.

Balter: Okay. Some other things that come up in FBI reports, from your time in San Francisco, that I wonder if you remember. For example, in a report way back in 1937, December 11, 1937, it identifies you as having been a delegate to the state convention of something called the Labor ['s] Non-Partisan League. Do you recall that organization?

Margolis: Yes.

Balter: What it was about?

Margolis: Yes, the Labor's Non-Partisan League was a labor political movement that basically supported the New Deal. I was, I think, a delegate to two or three conventions. I'm not sure, but I know it was more than one convention. Does it say where that convention was?

Balter: Apparently in San Francisco, this particular one that they were referring to.

Margolis: Yes, well, it was basically a labor political organization.

Balter: Do you remember any of the people who were involved in it?

Margolis: Well, mostly the labor people that I knew and various other labor people. It's very difficult for me at this time, almost fifty years later, to separate other labor things from attendance at the league and so forth. I find it very difficult to separate them.

Balter: It was all part of--

Margolis: It was all--

Balter: --a lot of interrelated activity?

Margolis: That's right.

Balter: Okay. Well, with that warning in mind, let me try another one on you. There's an August 1940 FBI report that refers to your attendance at a conference of the Simon Lubin Society in San Francisco. This is an organization that, according to the FBI, had an office in the Phelan Building [760 Market Street] in San Francisco. Does that ring a bell at all?

Margolis: Rings a bell, but--sounds familiar--I can't remember any of the details. Simon Lubin Society--I've certainly heard that name before. May have been a delegate to something, but I can't remember anything more.

Balter: Okay. By the way, the reports make it quite clear that there were various informants of one kind or another that were reporting on your activities as well as other people's. In the FBI reports, they're identified as sources, with numbers: source one, source three, source four, so on--so forth. At one point, a 1937 report mentions apparently in the context [that] this individual is an informant--a man named Arthur Kent [alias of Arthur Sarit]. Does that name ring a bell to you?

Margolis: Yes, Arthur-- But what's the year there?

Balter: This would be also from the 1937 report.

Margolis: He was a man who was later uncovered as an informant.

Balter: That would seem to be the case, because his name's not blacked out in the FBI report.

Margolis: Yes, he was uncovered as an informant some years later. I don't know exactly when, and I personally don't remember very much about him. You know, I had, [phone rings] excuse me, I should have-- [tape recorder off]

Balter: Okay, we were talking about Arthur Kent.

Margolis: I don't remember very much about him. He may have been one of these persons that was always around, but never said or did very much. That would be my guess.

Balter: Now, your FBI files extend over a period of about forty years. Back in the late thirties and early forties, during this time, when this surveillance began, were you, or people who were involved in the political activities that you were involved in, aware that you were under surveillance [by] the FBI? Were there any signs that this was the case?

Margolis: We believed that we were under surveillance, but, as far as I can recall, we didn't uncover any specific evidence of the fact. But we were sure that the FBI was carrying on activities of this kind.

Balter: Well, for example, at one point, let me find the date here. Okay, according to an FBI report of October 12, 1944, right about that time, the FBI placed a thirty-day, so-called mail cover on your residence, as the parlance goes. They were reading your mail during that period of time. Did you experience episodes where your mail began to come late during periods of time, things like this, or was this done in such a way that it was not detectable by you? Later, during the Hollywood Ten hearings, where the Hollywood Ten were going before HUAC [House Committee to Investigate Un-American Activities] in '47, '48, there was a tap put on your phone for periods of time and so on and so forth.I guess what I am getting at is whether, at the time, you were aware of how intense the surveillance was, or whether this was just something that you found out later.

Margolis: I think I can answer it in this way. Periodically, over the years, there have been periods when there have been strange things happening to my mail. Whether that was so in this precise time, in 1944, I just don't remember. There must have been periods of weeks or months--ten, twelve such periods-- over the years, and I think that's all I can tell you about it.

Balter: Okay, or perhaps it may be that later on some specifics will come up that we can get into. What I'd like to do at this point is ask you-- I know that in 1943 you made a decision to leave the Gladstein firm in San Francisco and come down to Los Angeles. What was behind that decision of yours?

Margolis: There were two matters: one personal and one professional and political. When I say professional and political, those two were so much combined in my life that they were pretty much one and the same.Personal consideration was that I had a young son, a little over a year old at the time, whose health was bad. The doctor had said that the damp climate was bad for him and that if I lived in a place like Los Angeles, it would be much better for his health. I considered at that time moving down the [San Francisco] Peninsula where it was drier. That would have meant a difficult transportation problem.And then, virtually concurrently with that, there was a develpment in which I was asked to come to Los Angeles and help organize an office to represent all of the CIO [Congress of Industrial Organizations] unions in the Southern California area. I think I may have told you before that I did a lot of the out-of-town trial work for my San Francisco firm, much of it in [Los Angeles]. There was a period of, oh, I don't know, two or three years maybe, whenever there was a case that any of the internationals we represented considered important, one of us would go to Los Angeles to participate, and I think 90 percent of the time that one was me. So I had been doing a lot of work there and had established friendships and relationships.I was asked, by I think it was by Phil [Philip] Connelly, Slim Connelly, who was then I guess the secretary of the Los Angeles CIO Council, if I would consider doing that. This was about the time, or shortly after the time, that Al [Abraham Lincoln] Wirin left the firm that had been doing the CIO work, and the people there felt that the firm needed strengthening. So when I had that opportunity, along with the personal need, I accepted it and moved to Los Angeles for the purpose of helping organize a new firm.

Balter: Now the firm of Gallagher and Wirin, which then--

Margolis: It was Gallagher, Wirin, and Johnson, I guess it was.

Balter: Right, yes, we spoke of that last time. Were there any other attorneys besides Mr. [Grover] Johnson in the firm?

Margolis: Yes, there were several others who came with our firm when we opened up the new firm. There was Milton Tyre, there was Al Kaplan-- Not Al.

Balter: Victor Kaplan?

Margolis: Victor Kaplan. Al Kaplan is a different story altogether. I think those were the principal ones that came with us.

Balter: I see, in other words, at the time that [Leo] Gallagher and Wirin-- Let me make sure that I understand this. At the time that Gallagher and Wirin were together, were Mr. Tyre and Mr. Kaplan with that firm of Gallagher and Wirin?

Margolis: Right.

Balter: I see. How about Samuel Blum? He [came] later?

Margolis: No, Samuel Blum was a lawyer who worked for many, many years with Charles [J.] Katz, a very able and very well known Los Angeles attorney who represented--I think I've mentioned him before--he represented a lot of wealthy business people, particularly the auctioneers. He was a very close friend of Harry Bridges. I had become quite friendly with him [Katz] during my rather frequent visits to Los Angeles. And he was invited also to become a member of the firm. He had not done any labor work before, although he had contributed to and participated in various cause matters, and was a very active supporter of the labor movement.

Balter: So then these were the people who came together to form Katz, Gallagher, and Margolis?

Margolis: Yes, and when Charles Katz came with the firm, he brought Blum along with him.

Balter: I see, okay. Now I understand that later--this is skipping ahead a little bit in time--but I understand that later Milton Tyre-- I'm sorry, am I pronouncing it correctly? Milton Tyre gave some secret testimony to HUAC, which later came out. To set the stage, maybe you could tell me your recollections of that at this point.

Margolis: Well, Milton Tyre was then, and I guess still is, very able. Then a young man, a hard worker, and an important asset to our firm when we started it.He had a brother, Norman Tyre, who was a member at that time of the firm of [Martin] Gang--oh, Gang, something, and Tyre, it was then. It since changed its name. Or was it Gang-- Then there was a middle name of a fellow, who has since died, and Tyre [Gang, Kopp, and Tyre]. They were a Hollywood firm representing many, many big Hollywood stars and directors. During the blacklisting days in Hollywood, Gang was a clearing house for blacklisted people. Would help them prepare affidavits in which they talked about themselves and their friends and so forth--and got cleared. Worked closely with [Roy M.] Brewer and others in this sort of thing. So far as we knew--and still as far as I know--Norman Tyre, although he was a member of the firm, himself had nothing to do with it. As a matter of fact we were friendly with Norman Tyre, who on one occasion represented the firm. (If you want to, I can tell you about that later.)They started to investigate, apparently, lawyers. We knew we were all being investigated, and the hearing was probably going to come up. By that time, by the way, I think Milton had already left the firm. This was about-- No, no, Milton left the firm about '48, '49, I believe around there, at the time when we lost most of the CIO unions, because we continued to represent only the left-wing unions. And so the labor work was reduced to maybe 10 percent of what it had been. But we left on very warm, friendly terms. Kaplan left at the same time.Then later on when the pressure started coming on, apparently what happened was that Milton went to his brother Norman and said, "Jeez, I want out of this thing." Norman utilized Gang to arrange a session, a secret session, of Milton before the committee, or a subcommittee, with a promise that it would never be indicated that he had testified and that he would be excused from being called if and when there were public hearings.Well, he testified. He testified that he had been a member of the Communist Party and others [too], including myself. I think he must have named fifteen or twenty other names, people who were members of the Communist Party. And I guess he assumed that was the last he would hear of it. Then when they had the public hearings, which was, I guess, '56 or so; I don't remember the exact-- No, it may be earlier than that, '53?

Balter: I'm not sure. Yeah, I can find out.

Margolis: Yes, I don't remember exactly when. Oh, it must have been shortly after the Smith Act trial was completed, which would have been '52 or '-3. There was a session of the un-American committee of all lawyers, including myself. I think a total of twenty-five lawyers, if I remember correctly. There's been a tape made of parts of the testimony called "Voices of Resistance." (I can give you a copy of it if you want it.)During the course of that hearing, or the separate hearing, Milton Tyre was called and asked questions about himself. At that point, he refused to answer and claimed the Fifth Amendment. They then pulled out his testimony that he'd given in secret and read it, in public; thus, revealing that he had attempted to protect himself in the manner that ultimately failed him.

Balter: Now at the time--let me get the timing right here. At the time that he actually gave his testimony, if you recall, who was he working with at that point?

Margolis: He was, I think, in practice for himself. He has become a quite successful lawyer, representing employers in labor relations. He has a firm, Tyre, Kamens, and something. I can give you the full name. [interruption]

Balter: I can turn the tape off for a second. [tape recorder off]

Margolis: As I understand it, a very successful firm.

Balter: For the record, we've looked it up, and the name of the law firm is Tyre, Kamens, Katz, and Granoff. When you and other people who had previously worked with Milton Tyre found out that he had given the secret testimony, do you recall what people's reaction was at that point? Were people surprised that this had happened?

Margolis: Yes. People were very much surprised. We had been not only associates, we had been social friends. We had worked together politically, and we thought very highly of him. At all times when he was with the firm, he worked hard and well, and made a real contribution--reliable sort of a person. It was just a terrible shock when we found out about it. For me personally and I guess for John [T.] McTernan, too, we felt completely betrayed by this and felt that what he'd done was worse than having come out in the open and becoming an informer. Since then, Milton Tyre has tried very hard to ingratiate himself with people on the liberal or Left side. He has particularly attended ACLU [American Civil Liberties Union] meetings. His wife is a member of the ACLU Foundation board.

Balter: What is her name?

Margolis: I can't think of it [June Tyre]. Oh, it'll come to me. [murmurs] Try hard, hard.

Balter: Okay.

Margolis: It'll come to me some place along the line. I have seen him on a number of occasions. He has approached me as though he wanted to speak. I've never spoken to him since and never will.

Balter: So he's attempted to try to get your forgiveness or whatever it is that he's looking for?

Margolis: Well, he hasn't done anything other than appear to want to come up and talk. He has never, for example, written and apologized though, or done anything of that kind. I think I have heard from others that he has expressed his regrets as to what he had done and that sort of thing. But, as far as my personal contact with him is concerned, it's limited to having learned these things and having seen him occasionally and having refused to talk to him, or have anything to do with him.

Balter: Okay and we'll be-- And a little later we'll be talking about Martin Gang and the blacklist of course. But going back to the organizing of the new law firm in Los Angeles, Katz, Gallagher, and Margolis, what, in addition to labor cases which of course we've discussed, what other types of work was the firm doing?

Margolis: Well, what the firm was doing regularly was, I would say, 75 to 80 percent representing labor unions; 10 or 15 doing what was then called workmen's compensation (it's now workers compensation). I would say maybe 5 percent, maybe 10 percent, doing political and cause matters like the Sleepy Lagoon case, and then perhaps here and there, incidentally, some other kind of case. But our practice was virtually all labor or labor related.

Balter: Now, you mentioned the unemployment compensation cases, and in an earlier session we touched very, very briefly on those. The case of Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal was mentioned. But I wonder if at this point we could go into a little more detail, if you could outline some of the issues. I know that there were a series of cases on the rights to unemployment compensation of workers and various unions.

Margolis: Tell you what, I think it would be better if I took a look at them and refreshed my recollection so I'd be more accurate. I'll tell you the reason for it: I was involved with so many other cases later, that I may confuse these cases with some of the other cases. But I will make a note now to look at those cases and be sure I've got them right for you.

Balter: Okay, so we'll defer that discussion until next time. Why don't we go on then. I know that your current partner, John McTernan, who's your partner today in 1984, that about forty years ago, more or less, the two of you met and began working together. Now, we talked earlier about how you met. I believe we had some discussion of how you met during some of the--in the late thirties during some of the cases, up in the Bay Area, and how you first made his acquaintance. Why don't you tell me now how McTernan happened to come to the law firm.

Margolis: Okay, let me add to what I told you before. We became very good personal friends in addition to working together in these cases. We liked each other. Enjoyed working with each other. John, however, was at that time a government-- Working with the NLRB [National Labor Relations Board], and had a good and important job with them. He later became during the war, he became chief counsel for the San Francisco office of the NLRB. And then he was moved during the war to chief counsel of the OPA office in San Francisco, Office of Price Administration.After I came to Los Angeles, we were still looking for additional people--we had I believe eight or nine lawyers, eventually ended up with eleven or twelve--and I heard that John had been terminated at the OPA. He was terminated for political reasons--political activities. I wrote to him or telephoned him, I don't recall which. Maybe saw him. Told him that I would like him to consider coming and joining our firm in Los Angeles. You know, it was the kind of work in which he was eminently qualified because of his years with the NLRB and also where his interests lie. He expressed his interest. After negotiations back and forth, I think it was the latter part of '43 that he came and joined the firm, originally in a status of, I guess, an employee rather than a partner. But within a very short period of time, again I don't remember quite how long, he became a full partner. Probably some time in '44 or '45. And we have been together ever since.

Balter: Now, among the leading members of the firm, at least those who had their names on the front door--Charles Katz, Leo Gallagher, yourself and John McTernan--was there any division of labor, as it were, in terms of the types of cases that you took? Or specialization?

Margolis: One of the things that happened was, as far as Charles Katz was concerned and Blum were concerned, Charles was supposed to, more or less, gradually give up the kind of work he was doing. Come over into full-time labor work, participating in the handling of the more important cases, because he was, as I say, a very, very highly qualified lawyer. It didn't work out that way.What happened was that, Charles, Charlie, did very-- He did some labor work, but really very, very little. He kept on with his practice. What was going on was that he and Blum almost had their own little office in our larger office, because the rest of us had nothing to do with the work he was doing, and he had very little to do with the work that the rest of us were doing. Although I must say, he participated in conferences and did make contributions of that kind. But he didn't become a labor lawyer to any real extent. And in about, again my estimates of time are bad, but in about two years, maybe a little longer, he left the firm. It just never worked out.

Balter: The date I have is some time around 1947 or in 1947. Does that sound right?

Margolis: Could have been that late, yeah. It could have been--maybe it was four years--yes, it could have been. My estimates of time are very, very bad. But he went back; well, he didn't [go] back. He just simply brought his practice with him and took it with him again when he left.Now as to Leo Gallagher, Leo handled a lot of the labor criminal work, where labor people are charged with union-related criminal charges and various other kinds of labor work, almost every kind.I remember the war was still going on. I was doing the [National] War Labor Board work (traveling a lot to Washington), considerable amount of the NLRB work, and the major consulting work with the, oh, with the CIO. I participated in counsel meetings. I was the CIO representative to various things where they wanted to designate a lawyer. For example. HICCASP [Hollywood Independent Citizens Committee of the Arts, Sciences, and Professions]. That's how I got to know some of the Hollywood people, with whom I later became very good friends.John McTernan gradually worked his way into doing what I was doing. That took him a little while because his experience had been exclusively with the NLRB, whereas my experience had been much more across the board. But within a year, he was handling all of the same kinds of things I was doing. And we, we had a tremendous amount of work.We had a couple of people who were doing nothing but workmen's comp. One was Robert Katz, Bob Katz, who is still associated with the office, although he is retired. (He still has his name on the door here). And a girl, a girl, a young woman named Thelma [S.] Herzig, very able young woman. (Her husband was a patent lawyer. And her husband was one of the ones who testified before the House Un-American Committee--one of their friendly witnesses.) At that time there came, again, the break with her, although she had left the firm before that because of child. She was pregnant a couple times. Had a couple of children and left because of an inability to carry on both kinds of work. There was also a young woman who did that kind of work by the name of Selma [Mikels] Bachelis. She's now practicing law in Oakland, I believe.Milton Tyre [and] Victor Kaplan did, I would say, labor work mostly on a somewhat lower level, more local work, unimportant labor matters. Just trying to remember. I don't remember when John Porter came in. John Porter also did labor work. He was a friend of ours from San Francisco, whom we brought in. There were others. I can't remember the details now.

Balter: By the way, where were the offices of the firm?

Margolis: We were originally on Seventh Street. I think it was 112 West Seventh Street, downtown, and that was a bank building. We actually moved in there. That's where Charles Katz had his offices, and he moved from one suite into another suite in the same building. He at that time, just before, was associated with a man by the name of Gitelson. It was I think Katz and Gitelson.

Balter: Arthur Gitelson?

Margolis: Is it Arthur?

Balter: The judge?

Margolis: The judge.

Balter: The later judge.

Margolis: Yeah, he later became a judge. He was the judge who decided the school desegregation cases and was defeated for re-election because of his decision. It's not Arthur.

Balter: Alfred.

Margolis: Alfred [T.]. That's it. Al Gitelson, yes.

Balter: While we're on the subject of Alfred Gitelson, what are your memories of him? What type of person was he before he was a judge and became so well known?

Margolis: [chuckles] Al--a very, very interesting man, a very nice man, conservative, but decent. I would say conservative, not reactionary, and a very nice man to deal with.I can perhaps give you a--tell you a little bit about him by giving you an example of a case I tried against him. We did have some other work occasionally, other than labor work. Sometime in the forties, shortly before or about the time of the Hollywood Ten case-- Shortly before, we had a case--we had an investigator who worked for the office who had a claim--to impose a trust on an estate where he had a claim that a woman had promised him a certain amount of money for various things that he had done. And Al Gitelson-- I represented--his name was [Stuart N.] West, West v. Stainbach.West v. Stainbach I think is the name of the case. Gitelson represented the estate; I represented West. We tried the case, and got a judgment [for] $30,000 or $40,000, which was a lot more money then than it is now. I remember we were all up before a very old judge, a very good judge. I can't remember his name [Henry M. Willis]. We argued a motion for a new trial, and Gitelson-- I arrived there on the morning of the argument for the motion for a new trial, and Gitelson had laid out on a table, I think, at least a hundred books, all with slips of paper in each of them. He was going to argue-- He was going to cite all of these cases. The judge let him go on for an hour or so and then cut him off. The motion for a new trial was decided against him.He took an appeal, and he wrote one of the longest briefs in that kind of a case that I've ever seen. And then did something very unusual. I've never seen done before or after it. He had cited a large number of cases, and he had the cases printed up and put in a bound volume for the court. I remember very well, because it was such a unique experience, getting up to argue the case before him in the court of appeals. And the first thing that-- He was the appellant so he argued first. The first thing that the presiding justice said to him is, "Mr. Gitelson, did you prepare this brief, and did you prepare this appendix?" Gitelson said, "Yes, your Honor." (I thought he was going to be complimented, I guess.)And the judge said, "Well, regardless of the outcome of this case, you will receive no costs [laughter] for these items." I have never seen anything-- You know, you give a court this kind of a brief to read on a relatively, relatively unimportant case-- Anyway, he lost that case. He filed a petition for the supreme court, and they denied a hearing.Our personal relations were always very good. He was always very courteous and you know, nothing-- He just overtried this case. He overdid everything that he did. He was a confident man, but you know how somebody-- A good cook who over-cooks things; well, he was a good lawyer who overtried things. It was that kind of a thing. But I've always had a high regard for him. He was a man of great integrity and great decency. When he decided the school desegregation cases, it was decided on the basis of the kind of a decent man that he was. He was not, by any stretch of the imagination, a progressive.

Balter: Well, let's turn over the tape at this point, and then we're going to go on to a new topic.

10. Tape Number V, Side Two July 9, 1984

Balter: Ben, you mentioned earlier that at one point the firm lost, or no longer was representing, most of the CIO unions, but just primarily Left unions. As things developed and as I understand it, certain unions got kicked out of the CIO--a lot of ferment there. What effect did this have on the financial stability of the firm and on the firm itself?

Margolis: Well, the amount of work was reduced very, very drastically. We continued to have some labor work and some workmen's compensation work, and were taking in other work that we had not been interested in doing before. We were forced to cut down on the size of our firm. That was the time when Milton Tyre left, Victor Kaplan left, and a number of other people left. We cut down our firm, I think if I remember correctly, to about five people.Now, coincidentally, I guess perhaps not coincidentally, because they were politically related, it was about this time that John McTernan and I became employed full-time, virtually, in political cases. So we went from full-time labor-- There was a transition period when we were doing both, but there was a period of a number of years when John and I did virtually nothing except political cases. So they were left carrying on--I think three or four people in the office who were carrying on--with what we had, [and] lining up other things.We were fortunate in that we had done reasonably well financially while we were the big labor office, at least by standards at that time. Had saved some money and accumulated some reserve for the firm, and we had some fees coming in at the time, like that West v. Stainbach. I think we had a--we made a $15,000 fee, or something, in it. That was a lot of money in those days. It was those things that helped us carry on while we were doing the political work, for most of which we were getting either nothing or very, very little. And so that was the income of the office, probably dropped by maybe 75 percent or somewhere along those lines. And the number of people dropped by 60 percent or two-thirds perhaps. The office was having a tough time. For a number of years, we lost money. We got into debt. And there came a time, later on, when John and I looked at each other and said we better get into something where we can make something before we have to go into bankruptcy.

Balter: Was there a point at which the firm ran into a situation, where, for political reasons, there were people who wouldn't come to you? Or where word got around this is a left-wing law firm, this is a communist law firm, things of that sort?

Margolis: Well, I'm sure that that sort of thing obviously went on. But we really didn't have an opportunity to test it, because, as the labor work ended, John and I became so totally involved in the political work that we weren't able to handle any other work, even if people had come to us. We were totally involved. The other people left in the firm weren't as well known; didn't have the contacts that John and I had. So it was understandable in any event that they wouldn't come to the firm. However, I'm sure that we were affected by this.I must say something that I have never been able to explain altogether, but which was true. When John and I finally decided that we had to get in and build a new kind of practice for our own economic survival, we built up a reasonably good practice in a relatively short period of time. I don't know how many people didn't come to us. But I can tell you this, again a very interesting thing: that the left-wing people for whom we did political work for little or nothing, with rare exceptions, never came to us with their money cases. The exceptions were rare. There were a few, but most of them went to other lawyers for their legal works.The work we got was from nonpolitical people. The political people were afraid to come to us. The fact of the matter is that we had the interesting experience that while we got pushed around, like everybody else did all over the place, in political cases, when we were handling nonpolitical cases, we almost invariably got as good, if not better, treatment than other lawyers. The fear of the left-wing friends was real, but wasn't justified by what happened.

Balter: What fear exactly was being expressed?

Margolis: Well, they were the people who saw us go into court. They'd attend the political cases we handled. Saw us get pushed around, maltreated, saw us, you know-- Indicate that anything we did, the court would do the opposite. We were pariahs. But it wasn't we who were the pariahs, really, as it turned out; it was the causes we were handling. And that were these-- I can later on tell you some interesting stories about what some of the worst bastards of judges in the political cases did for us when we got into private work: how well they treated us and how personally decent they were to us.

Balter: Okay, and we will have an opportunity to get into some of that. What I'd like to do now is turn to one of your most celebrated cases, which is your work on the appeal on the Sleepy Lagoon case. If I understand correctly, you were not involved at the trial in the Sleepy Lagoon case during the trial. George Shibley and other attorneys were--and you came in on the appeal?

Margolis: That is correct. As a matter of fact when the case was being tried, I was practicing law in San Francisco. This case was tried in Los Angeles. There were, I think, five lawyers who tried it, but the only really effective lawyer was George Shibley, who was the lead lawyer. He was the one that, by the quality of his trial work and by the courage he had in resisting the court, made a record that made it possible to get a reversal.

Balter: How did you get involved in the Sleepy Lagoon case?

Margolis: As I've told you, I was a very active member of the National Lawyers Guild ever since its foundation. During that period of time, we used to have annually or biannually guild state conferences, consisting primarily of Los Angeles, and San Francisco, and Oakland lawyers, who would meet either in Los Angeles or in San Francisco. We'd have there sort of miniconferences, we'd have panels and discussions, and discuss statewide things. A very active member of the Los Angeles chapter of the guild was an attorney by the name of Clore Warne, who was a member of the Pacht firm, Isaac Pacht [Pacht, Pelton, and Warne]. Clore, who was a social democrat, was a very active, hardworking, and able guy. We worked together at various conferences. I was very active in those conferences, and we got to know each other through the guild. I remember this fairly distinctly that I got a-- While I was still in San Francisco-- but it was generally known that I was planning and preparing to move--I got a call from Clore, saying he wanted to come in and see me.I said, "Sure. [Is] it a guild matter?"Came in, told me that he had been working very closely with Carey McWilliams. (He was a very close personal friend of Carey McWilliams, perhaps one of the two or three closest friends that Carey had in Los Angeles.) And that George Shibley had gone into the service and that he [Clore] and Carey had established a Sleepy Lagoon Defense Committee. He told me about the case, the importance of the case, and that he and Carey had discussed it. That they had decided that as long as I was coming to Los Angeles, would I be interested in, or be willing to undertake, to handle, the case. They told me that from a fee standpoint, they would raise fees and costs. They would raise money, but undoubtedly we would not get as well paid as we would for other work. And they wanted an attorney who they felt that they could rely on to do a good job regardless of whether the attorney was well paid or not.I agreed to undertake the case. It so happened that shortly after I moved and opened up my office there, we got the transcript, and it began to become necessary to work on the brief. I worked for the next year or so quite closely with Clore, with Carey McWilliams, and with the Sleepy Lagoon Defense Committee. And wrote the brief. There were a number of other people who did work on the brief. I did the final writing of the brief, but there were several people in the office who did work on this.

Balter: Well, I have, according to my notes, one of the people who apparently worked with you--you've already mentioned--Selma Bachelis. And also I understand that Frank McTernan, John McTernan's brother, was involved in some way.

Margolis: Well, I can tell you about that. There is an attorney by the name of Abe [Abraham J.] Isserman. Abe was one of the attorneys in the [Eugene] Dennis case, and was a good friend of mine. Abe was disbarred. He was the only attorney in the Dennis case who was disbarred. Remember they were all charged with contempt and so forth? He was disbarred in New Jersey. As a matter of fact, he is the only attorney in the history of the United States who has been a member of the U.S. Supreme Court, attorney admitted to practice there, without being admitted to any other court in the land. Because the Supreme Court refused to oust him when New Jersey ousted him.Anyway, he was having a bad time. He wanted to come and join our firm. He was also an extraordinarily able guy, and we were delighted to have him. And he was in the process of getting a divorce, I believe, and remarrying. He had been separated from his wife for many years. So in the course of coming to Los Angeles, he stopped at Las Vegas to live there for, I guess, three months or some period of time that was necessary then in order to establish residence to get the divorce there.During the time that he was there, I sent him some work to do on the Sleepy Lagoon case. Frank McTernan had been in the service, or was still in the service, and somehow got to spend several weeks in Las Vegas and did some work with Abe Isserman doing that. So there were two other people. They were all doing bits and pieces of the case.

Balter: What about Selma Bachelis? What was her role?

Margolis: As I remember it, she did some of the summarizing of the record for me and some research.

Balter: By the way, I know that George Shibley had been drafted into the army shortly after the trial. Did any of the attorneys who worked with him originally on the trial work with you and your firm on the appeal?

Margolis: No. I went to talk to those of them who I was able to contact and who would see me. And they had-- None of them had any interest. They were-- Well, one of them, let me take that back, one of them did have an interest, but was capable of contributing nothing. I can't think of his name. A nice, little guy, little short man.

Balter: Oh, I've got--possibly William [O.] Wanzer or Charles [S.] Litwin.

Margolis: No?

Balter: Neither of them?

Margolis: No, Charles Litwin wasn't in the Sleepy Lagoon case--was he?

Balter: Well, according to my notes--

Margolis: He was a partner of--

Balter: --he was a partner of Shibley and involved as a research attorney. Both he and Wanzer did research on the case.

Margolis: For George. There were others. I'm talking about trial attorneys.

Balter: Oh, I see.

Margolis: No, neither Wanzer nor Litwin had any thing to do with the appeal. I don't remember why. But I told you I contacted the trial-- There was a woman, one of the women, very prominent, one of these big hat women lawyers, who was a real phony, and they-- Except for George, there wouldn't have been a record made. The boys would have gone to jail, and nothing further would have been heard of them.

Balter: Why do you think the other attorneys who had participated in the trial weren't interested in pursuing it any further?

Margolis: Well, with the exception of this one fellow who was a very decent guy, but who just didn't know much. Was not--who had practiced for a number of years but in a most meager kind of way, not really the kind of practice-- You know, going in and pleading people guilty, and doing things of that kind. They were the kind of people who-- They were court-appointed, and they didn't give a damn. I think they were court-appointed. They didn't give a damn about the people: they only went through the motions, and they weren't concerned with the appeal for the same reason.

Balter: I see. Now, you mentioned that George Shibley had left a very good record. Could you elaborate on that somewhat?

Margolis: Well, you must understand that in order to be able to raise points on appeal, it is necessary to have the objections made in the trial court or to have the attempt to present the points. If a trial judge does something wrong, but there is no objection, then you have no point on appeal.George was the only one who made a record. For example, one of the most terrible things about that case was that the attorneys were virtually barred from communicating with their own clients during the time that the trial was going on. George was the only one who kept raising that point and preserved the record on that point. George was the only one who tried to get in evidence that should have been gotten in and wasn't allowed to be put in. George was the only one who objected to the race-baiting and so forth that was going on. There were many things. I have a--it was a five hundred-page brief in that case.I have never in my whole life seen a case in which there was so much bias and so many errors expressed in a single case. And none of them--I may be overstating it, but to the best of my recollection--none of the other attorneys ever did anything of any consequence.

Balter: I know that later the court of appeals would cite an awful lot of this in agreement with you in your victory. In your experience, do you see a difference between the courts back then in terms of the degree of prejudice which would be expressed from the bench to nowadays? Has there been any improvement on this score?

Margolis: Oh, yes. Oh, definitely. The trial judge's name was [Charles] Fricke.

Balter: Yes.

Margolis: His open expressions of race bias are of a character that no judge would today say the same things. They might believe it, they might feel it, but no one would say the things he did. No one would make the kind of orders that he made, today, unless he was crazy. And yet in those days, while he was probably extraordinarily bad, there were other judges who would run him a close second.

Balter: So this was something that happened often back then.

Margolis: Yeah, discrimination, the bias that was expressed. The lack of rights to people was just an everday kind of thing. You see that's the importance of the case. It was really--well, let me start over--it was a lot of hard work. What was really required--no great skill to write the brief in that case--what was necessary was to get the court to react to this kind of a situation. That was the important thing. The record was so full of errors that the most incompetent lawyer would stumble over it. You know, it was there. But you had to present it in a way to grab the court, which so often, even on appeal, justices disregarded these things. And I think the important contribution that that case made is that it began to achieve a change in that area.

Balter: Okay. Now, you mentioned that you were active in the Sleepy Lagoon Defense Committee. I know that that became a rallying point for a lot of people, including people in the Hollywood community. Do you remember very much about what, sort of on a day-to-day level, what types of activities that committee engaged in?

Margolis: Oh, yes. It was one of the most active committees that I have ever had any contact with. There was a woman by the name of Alice Greenfield [McGrath]--still around--who was completely and diligently dedicated to that case. Worked on it, you know, every hour of the day that she was awake, and she was effective--good.There were activities all over. The most important of the activities in my opinion were the activities in the Lation community, which had been a dormant community, which had no such activity. That was another important contribution on the organizational end: that the community began to organize itself around this case and laid a basis for the future. Also, the victory in the case created the concept that you can win some of them; you don't lose all of them. And we've had a fair-- Tremendously important organizational stimulant. In addition to that, there were many--quite a number of Hollywood people who were really dedicated to the case. When I say I was active in the case, I-- There were many meetings; I spoke at quite a few about the case. I attended committee meetings from time to time to report on the progress of the legal work. So, I spent a lot of time on the case.

Balter: Let me ask you. You mentioned the activities especially in the Latino community. I have here from my research a fairly long list of people who were active on the committee. I'm interested in not going through the entire list, but in asking you about certain people and whether you remember them, those Latinos, and the extent of their role and how active they were in the committee. Some of the Latinos who were active in the [committee], according to my list, include people such as Frank Lopez, Richard Ibanez and Bert Corona.

Margolis: Would you want to start with Frank Lopez?

Balter: Yeah, let's talk about each one.

Margolis: Frank Lopez--we became good friends. Frank became the publisher of a Latin paper, of a Mexican-American paper, newspaper, I believe later on. Quite active politically. I don't know what's happened to Frank in recent years.Richard Ibanez, the lawyer. He's now a judge, a superior court judge. Has been for many years. He, for many years, he officed together with Robert [W.] Kenny, Bob Kenny, after Kenny left the attorney general's office. He was a neighbor of mine, he and his family--very decent guy. Although he's not been particularly active since he's been a judge.Who is the next one you mentioned?

Balter: Well, Bert Corona, let's talk some about him, because of course he's still such a well-known figure today.

Margolis: Well, I was active over the years with Bert Corona in lots of different things. Don't even remember what they were. All I know is that from time to time I was involved in something with Bert Corona. He was a very active person and still is to this day, one of the most active people in the community.

Balter: In the case of Bert Corona, do you know if this was one of the first things that he was involved in? Was he known as a political activist before the Sleepy Lagoon case, do you recall?

Margolis: I don't remember.

Balter: How about Ignacio Lopez?

Margolis: Ignacio Lopez--sounds very familiar, but that's all I can say.

Balter: Salome Arguello?

Margolis: Yes, I think I remember Salome. I think I remember her. Yes, but I don't remember anything particular.

Balter: I believe this was John Bright's wife, Josephina Fierro Bright.

Margolis: Oh, yes.

Balter: What do you recall about her?

Margolis: Well, she was a fiery kind of a person, a very beautiful woman. She moved to Mexico--she and John were divorced--and she ran some sort of a home for children I believe in Mexico. I think she's still doing that. Wonderful person and a dynamo, you know, one of the--a real firebrand, who lights up a meeting. A very dedicated person, very intelligent and beautiful.

Balter: Now of the people who were Hollywood celebrities, who have been associated with the committee, I'm wondering which of them were very active and which of them perhaps were more peripherally associated. For example, Anthony Quinn?

Margolis: I met once with Anthony Quinn. To get him to do something, and he did it. I don't remember what it was. But I think you would say of Anthony when-- He was not a day-to-day activist, but when he was asked to do things, he generally did them.

Balter: So he had some moderate level of activity.

Margolis: Yeah, but it wasn't that much. He was asked to do a few things and he did them. He was very supportive of the case, but he didn't spend a lot of time on it.

Balter: How about Orson Welles?

Margolis: I remember going to-- Orson Welles was then married to Rita Hayworth. I remember going to his house to meet with him. I don't even remember where it was located, but I remember the house was on top of a hill, and you had to walk way down to where the swimming pool was about, I don't know, a drop of maybe fifty feet. And I remember meeting with him and Rita Hayworth there. I think it was to get money. We didn't have money for putting in the briefs or something. And he gave some money. Again, very supportive. None of these Hollywood people were the kind of people that came to meetings of the committee or did anything like that.

Balter: Would that be true also for people such as Guy Endore?

Margolis: No, not quite true of Guy. Guy did come to meetings, and of course Guy wrote the great pamphlet on the Sleepy Lagoon case. I also became a very good personal friend of his. We used to visit. No, Guy was an exception, but Guy wasn't a typical Hollywood person. Guy was mainly a writer of books and only secondarily involved in Hollywood.

Balter: Okay. And another person--well, two other people actually--LaRue McCormick?

Margolis: LaRue McCormick was a leading communist, publicly known as a communist, who was a big heavyset woman, who was very strong organizationally. You were going to have a demonstration, let us say that she turned the people out, or you're going to have a meeting and you want to sell tickets, she'd see to it that a lot of tickets were sold. Got things done.

Balter: How about Charlotta Bass?

Margolis: Well, Charlotta Bass, whom I represented for many years, and who [pauses] was in everything-- You know, if anything was going on, a person that was involved was Charlotta Bass. Anything, you know, on the Left to progressive, and I'm really not exaggerating. So that I don't think she gave a lot of time to this, but she was totally supportive of us. She was the sort of person who makes some speeches about it, always talks about it. She was publishing the newspaper [California Eagle] of course at that time, and the newspaper carried stories about it all the time. But I would say not on a [coughs]--she wasn't active on a day-to-day basis, a week-to-week basis.

Balter: And Carey McWilliams, what was his role?

Margolis: Carey was quite active. He attended committee meetings and he was organizationally involved.

Balter: Did you, in the course of your involvement with the appeal, meet with any of the defendants in the case?

Margolis: Oh, yes.

Balter: Visit them in prison?

Margolis: Yes, I met with them in San Quentin several times. I don't remember the exact number. My guess would be four or five times.

Balter: How well do you remember them, or some of your meetings with them?

Margolis: Well, I don't remember them too much as of that time, except for a couple of outstanding ones. I particularly remember Henry Leyvas, who was the oldest and the most extraordinary member of that group. I think he was twenty-two, something like that at the time, and the youngest was about fourteen or fifteen. Many of them had little or nothing to say-- But there were a few that were very interesting. See, when I met with them, first of all, initially I felt a great resistance on their part to any really close discussion about themselves or anything of that kind. They had grown to trust George. They had been with him in this long trial. But, generally speaking, they had a great distrust of Anglos. You know, to them, big-shot boy, who's he?--things of that kind. So mostly when I met with them, they would communicate with me very, very little. Henry Leyvas to some extent was an exception. It was mainly my talking to them, telling them about the things in the case. My main purpose really in going to them was to try to give them hope and a reason for believing that they had a chance.Their original concept of the case was that they had no chance at all. They had seen what had happened to them in the trial. They knew generally what happened to people in the community, and they had-- They thought I was soft-soaping them. That I was trying to make a good thing for myself, get myself a lot of publicity, and, hey, wasn't really concerned about them. That was their initial reaction.I think, to a very substantial extent, by the time that the case was over, it was reduced, although never completely eliminated. After the case was over, we had a big party and got along very well. For a while, I saw some of them from time to time. A couple of them got in trouble at times and saw me. And then I've seen them at various affairs when the play [Zoot Suit by Luis Valdez] was on and the motion picture. I've had some contact with them. But I would not say that I ever established a close relationship with any of them, or I even got to know any of them very well, except I think I got to know Leyvas fairly well--fairly well.

Balter: What do you think it was about Leyvas that seems to have set him apart from the others? In terms of having more of a leader or--

Margolis: He had a very strong personality. He was a natural leader. The same person, under different circumstances, whatever he's doing, would, in my opinion, have moved towards leadership. He was very bright. Not much education. I don't know if you've ever seen any of the letters that he wrote while he was in jail. We used them during the campaign. They were magnificent letters; he could express himself beautifully. He had great emotions.But most important was, I think, that of all of them, he had the greatest sense that he was a member of a group that was being walked on, being discriminated against, and that he was going to fight against it. He never really established the idea that he would be able to come out in a normal--any acceptable manner to carry on the fight. But he was going to carry on the fight wherever he was. Nobody was going to walk on Henry Leyvas. That was-- That was just it. And regardless of what would happen to him, he was totally courageous and, you know, no physical fear as far as you could tell. Very headstrong. But he understood what was going on in a very fundamental sense: what was going on, and how the people were being affected. I think they all understood it to some extent, but not really at that kind of a fundamental understanding that I think Leyvas had.

Balter: Do you remember the argument before the court of appeals?

Margolis: Some of it.

Balter: Do you recall the argument? What do you recall about the argument?

Margolis: As a matter of fact, I remember that I was-- I don't think I've ever been more worked up about an argument than I was about that one. Let me explain what I mean by that. Certainly, let's take the Smith Act argument in the Supreme Court. It was fundamentally more important, more basic, and I was certainly very, very deeply involved and very deeply concerned and outraged. But I didn't have the same sense of personal outrage: of just how indecent this whole thing had been that had been done to these, mostly youngsters. It was such a picture of what our society did to minorities that I think of all the arguments that I've ever made in court--and I've made a few--I think I was more worked up on that kind of an emotional level on that argument than I have ever been. I was told I made quite an emotional argument to the court.The other thing that I recall, the court had apparently read the briefs and was quite receptive. The argument was not at all an uphill fight, at least I didn't feel so. There was one judge who asked a few unfriendly questions, but on the whole the court was very friendly, and unfriendly to the prosecutors. So that's basically what I remember about it. It was not, you know, in a way-- People, you know, [say] it was a wonderful job and so forth. It was one of the easier cases I have ever had to handle, in many, many ways.

Balter: Well, that brings to mind a question. Was there anything unusual-- Well, let me back up and ask you this way. You implied that this was something that happened a great deal, that minority youth went to jail on very flimsy evidence, I think. And certainly that was one of the points that was being made by the defense committee at the time. Was it unusual in this type of a case for the defendants to get a second chance, to get a chance, to be heard by an appeals court? Was it unusual in that sense for this to happen?

Margolis: Generally, there were no appeals taken. Quite often there were no appeals taken at all. In the first place, you want to remember that the great majority of cases involving the young Mexican-Americans, or any young racial group, are of comparatively minor offenses. I don't mean by that to say that's not important. But they'd involve three years in jail, a year for five-year probation. Most of them [were] on that kind of an order. They didn't have the-- And it was usually an individual here, or two or three individuals.Here, you had a group of fourteen: all convicted of murder and from fourteen years up to twenty-two years [of age]. So that it was a case that had a combination of qualities that most individual cases did not have, in many different ways. So, it was unusual because of that. The cases-- These were people without money. They could take appeals and have a lawyer appointed, and they'd do a half-ass job. You know there wasn't a great deal-- It was sort of accepted to a very large extent. And the courts didn't bother much with this kind of appeal. The important thing in this case was to get the attention of the court. It was a wonderful case in which to do it, because it was all there. Everything that you wanted to argue was there. All spelled out. So it was an opportunity to do something that wasn't easy to do in those days.

Balter: Let me ask you one more thing, and then I think that will be it for today. I know that several years ago when Zoot Suit, the play, and Zoot Suit, the movie, came out, that some of the handful of the defendants in the case, in People v. Zamora, sued Gordon Davidson and Luis Valdez and others, who had been involved. I was wondering whether you had come across any information that would lend some explanation as to why that all of a sudden took place.

Margolis: I think what happened-- I used to know a little bit about that; I've forgotten. My recollection is that there is somebody who said that they should have been paid some money for the use of their lives, and they weren't given anything. I think someone, who just wanted to stir something up, got to these guys and started it. I don't think anything ever happened.

Balter: I don't believe so.

Margolis: I think it was dropped. More publicity than anything else. But only a few of the fellows joined them.

Balter: That's my understanding.

Margolis: I know also that they were all contacted, and most of them refused.

Balter: Have you, in more recent years, have you had any contact with any of the defendants?

Margolis: Well, at that time I had contact. Quite a few of them attended the play, and quite a few of them attended the opening of the movie. In both instances, there was an affair afterwards, and we sat at the same table. They had a table of the defendants and their counsel. We sat at the table with them.

Balter: And that was the last--that was the most recent that you saw them?

Margolis: I think so.

Balter: Okay, I think that will be a good stopping place for today.

11. Tape Number: VI, Side One July 24, 1984

Balter: Ben, today we're going to talk about the HUAC [House Committee to Investigate Un-American Activities] years in Hollywood, the Hollywood Ten, the blacklisting of Hollywood artists, and all of the subjects that are attendant to that. Before we get into the meat of that, I'd like to ask you about your participation in some events which were certainly a prelude in various ways to what was to come shortly after. I understand that shortly after you came to Los Angeles, in about 1945 when the Conference of Studio Unions [CSU] called a major strike in Hollywood, that you were involved in representing some of the strikers, particularly at Warner Brothers [Pictures, Inc.]. As a matter of fact, I understand you were thrown off the Warner Brothers back lot at one point. I wonder if you could give me the background to your involvement in that?

Margolis: Yes. Our firm represented a number of Hollywood unions. While it is true that the incident that you are referring to occurred at Warner Brothers, the employees we represented were employees of certain categories, who worked throughout the industry. The incident happened at Warner Brothers, where the picket line was being maintained. We represented the [Screen] Office Employees [Guild], the Screen Cartoonists [Union], [Local] 698 of the IATSE [International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees], Screen Publicists Union, and I think one other that I can't remember. Throughout the strike we were-- I particularly was working in this area from my office, and I think for a couple of months spent virtually every minute of the night and day in connection with this case.

Balter: Well, what were the legal issues that presented themselves during the strike that you had to deal with?

Margolis: They were mainly legal issues relating to picketing. Although we also to some extent participated in negotiations which were not really legal issues, the question-- I'll give you an example of one which got us into trouble, out of which we got rather rapidly, but initially started trouble. The employers went in and got an injunction--a temporary restraining order, which is obtained without notice--against mass picketing at Warner Brothers and against any interference with strikebreakers going through the picket lines.Soon as we learned of it, we drafted a cross complaint in which we charged that the police department was discriminating and was beating up strikers and otherwise interfering with their rights. When we finished this--it was late at night--we went to a judge's home. We wanted a temporary restraining order for the next morning. I think the picket line usually started at five a.m., or maybe it was five-thirty or six. We wanted a restraining order before then to serve on the police. The regular clerk's office was closed before our complaint was finished, so we went to a judge's home and paid the filing fee there, as I remember it. He signed the restraining order, so that the next morning we were able to serve the police with a restraining order at the same time that the strikers were being served with restraining orders.Charges were then filed against several of us before the state bar, it being claimed that we had acted improperly in getting a temporary restraining order, based on a complaint that had not been properly filed; that a complaint had to be filed in the clerk's office; and that by doing what we did, we in effect misrepresented to the police that we had a valid restraining order. Our position was that the court was wherever the judge was, and the judge had the right to file the complaint and to issue the restraining order.There were a number of hearings on the issue. There was no direct law on the question. Finally, the state bar dropped the charges against us without ever formalizing it. In other words, what they did-- What they do is they start an investigation. Then if they feel that the investigation has sufficient basis, then they file formal charges, and there's a formal hearing. We had a number of informal hearings, and they dismissed the charges.

Balter: Who brought those charges by the way?

Margolis: One of the, or several of the attorneys for the studios, but at the moment I don't remember who they were.

Balter: I'm curious, you said that there was no law on the issue, but if the judge-- [telephone rings] I'm sorry--

Margolis: Hold it. I'll have to-- [tape recorder off] Now, where was I?

Balter: Okay, the question I was starting to ask you-- I was a little bit mystified by the people bringing you up on charges of misrepresentation, when the judge certainly fully knew the circumstances and you mentioned that there was no law on this issue. Is this something that came up--

Margolis: There was no law on the issue of whether or not a complaint could be filed anywhere other than at the clerk's office. You understand, the everyday common practice and the one that's always followed is that you take the complaint and file it with the clerk, and then if you're going to see a judge, you take the filed complaint to the judge. There's no law that says that that's the only way to do it. And there's no law that says that you can or can't do it by filing with the judge. The proceedings in my opinion were simply for harassment. And that's all they did was harass us.

Balter: Were there some other examples of this type of harassment that come to mind?

Margolis: Not to us as attorneys that I can recall, but we were constantly in court in connection with injunctions. There were all kinds of criminal cases; that is, people were charged with assault and battery, with blocking and trespassing and refusing to disperse. You name it, all of those common kinds of offenses. We tried people in bunches: three hundred, four hundred in a bunch because there were thousands of people arrested during this [strike]. People would go out, get out of jail, go back on the picket line, and be rearrested.It was a very bitter struggle in which the workers were very militant. Fought very hard. As a matter of fact, one of the things that happened is that there were so many people arrested that they didn't have room for them. They had to begin releasing some of the people who were being held without bail (because they didn't put up bail) in order to make room for others. So it was that kind of a thing that was going on. It went on for about three months on a day-and-night basis.

Balter: Now, were most of the people who were arrested actually convicted of something or other?

Margolis: I'm just trying to remember whether-- In some instances, we'd start the trial, then work out some sort of a deal where people would get off with the time that they'd already been in jail, or some sort of a very short, summary probation. Things of that kind. As I remember it, and I'm not positive about this, but my recollection is that, aside from the time that people were in jail without having put up bail, people did not serve time in jail. There may have been some exceptions, but I don't recall them.The biggest case we had that we finally got thrown out on appeal was one in which the principal defendant was Herb [Herbert Knott] Sorrell. Herb Sorrell was the business agent of the painters union. And was the center-- He was the president of the Conference of Studio Unions, to which all of these unions that we represented and many other unions that we did not represent belonged. He was the president of that conference and really ran the strike, both in 1956 and in 195-? No, 1954? Wait a minute. Nineteen fifty--

Balter: 'Forty-five and '46?

Margolis: Yeah, 1945 and '46. That's right, 1945 and '46. He was charged-- I don't remember whether it was the first or the second strike, because they run together in my mind. Except for certain, very sharp differences, they run together in my mind. He and several others were charged with a conspiracy to violate various laws. For example, trespassing or obstruction are misdemeanors, but a conspiracy to do those things is a felony under California law. And so that was a serious charge.They were really going after him in a big way. We had various hearings on injunctions and other things that went on and on. That case was finally dismissed. I don't remember now whether it was dismissed as a result of our going to the appellate court, or whether we got it dismissed in the trial court. We were going up on appeal on things. It was just a constant turmoil, with cases piling up on cases. The major difference between the two years was that in 1945, the first strike, the strike was settled on a basis reasonably satisfactory to the unions. I think it could have been called a modest victory for the union. Certainly, it was not a defeat for them. On the other hand, they didn't achieve everything that they wanted.The second strike, 1946, was a different story. The strike went on and on for months. By that time the employers--the studios--were absolutely determined that they were going to break Herb Sorrell, and the Conference of Studio Unions, regardless of the cost. It was clear that they would no longer-- That they were going to fight this through to the end, if necessary.I think I can tell you a little bit about the background of that. There was an unusual situation in the studios of that time. On the one hand, there was the IATSE. Most of the IATSE Hollywood unions-- All, with the exception of [Local] 698 which we represented, were pretty much under the control of a racketeering international who played-- That was the Bioff group from olden days. They were led by Roy [M.] Brewer, with whom I had many other fights. But in any event, at that time they played footsie with the employers. They broke the strike, or they went in with the strikebreakers, etcetera, etcetera.Another interesting thing is that at that time, during either one of the two years--again, I don't remember which one--a fellow by the name of [Ronald] Reagan, either just had been, or was, or was about to become, president of the Screen Actors Guild. He had been a, more or less, liberal Democrat. Had been, for example, a member of the board of HICCASP [Hollywood Independent Citizens Committee of the Arts, Sciences and Professions], which was a kind of a left-democratic Hollywood group. His change, from that kind of a person to what he became, began about that time. Started with his animosity to the strike. He wanted the actors to go through the picket line and to break the strike. Now, I'm not sure whether he took that position the first year, but I'm sure he took it the second year. There was a big fight within the Screen Actors Guild on that issue, too. Reagan led the red-baiting, accusing the Conference of Studio Unions and those in the Screen Actors Guild who didn't go along with his program as being reds, communists, etcetera. I think, although I'm not positive, that was pretty much the time when there was a basic change in Reagan.The second year, the employers were determined to break the strike, because Herb Sorrell had been a real power in the motion picture industry in this way: Anytime you could stop production on a picture, it would cost large, large sums of money to the studios. Every day of shooting was very, very expensive. The stars that they had to pay, the people who stood by, and the sets that they had prepared--just a terribly expensive thing for them.Herb Sorrell had taken care of that, or taken advantage of that, in this way: When anybody in the Conference of Studio Unions had a beef, they'd go to Herb Sorrell if they couldn't settle it themselves. And Herb Sorrell would go to the producers and say, "I'll call out the painters if you don't settle this beef and give them what they want." And he did call out the painters a few times. It was too expensive for the employers, the studios, and so they started giving in. So that you got almost every grievance settled to the reasonable satisfaction of the workers in the Conference of Studio Unions and to the great ire of the studios. This was a position of such power that the studios could not tolerate. It became evident during the second year that at this point the employers were not going to give in. They were either going to break the unions, or they were going to work out an arrangement, an agreement, which would prevent that from reoccurring.Most of the unions, a great majority of the unions, including all of those that we represented, took the position that they wanted to settle the strike, even on the studios' terms. That the studios were willing to have an arbitration clause and so forth; and that otherwise they [the unions] were going be destroyed, they felt.Herb Sorrell said, "Absolutely not, I will not settle with them on those term or any other terms except my terms." The unions who were opposed to him, and were in a great majority, were faced with the following dilemma. Oh, I must add one more thing. Herb Sorrell said to those unions, "If you decide to go back to work, you're going to have to go through my picket lines."So those unions, including the ones we represented, were faced with the following dilemma: either they had to continue with a strike which was being lost and which threatened their very existence or they had to become strikebreakers. Neither of the solutions, if you can call them that, were very pleasant to them. There was night after night after night spent in discussion by these representatives of these various unions. And I attended many of these meetings, most of them, in fact, trying to find a way out of this dilemma.The unions finally decided that, no matter what else, they were not going to be strikebreakers. They couldn't go through Herb Sorrell's picket line. They were all destroyed, including Herb Sorrel's painters. He became an automobile salesman later on. He just lost all of his-- You know, he had no union, nothing left. The IATSE at that point took over virtually every aspect of work at the studios and has maintained it ever since.

Balter: Now, let me back up and ask you a couple of things. You mentioned that you had-- Well, let me start over here. Besides yourself, what other attorneys, both from your law firm and perhaps from other law firms, were involved in representing the unions, especially during this period of time?

Margolis: I, during both of those strikes, was full time on them. John [T.] McTernan tried some cases and I think maybe some of the smaller ones were tried by others in our office. The attorney for Herb Sorrell was Frank Pestana. He represented Herb, the painters, and the Conference of Studio Unions. Herb Sorrell's attorney had been a man by the name of George [E.] Bodle, but George Bodle went into the service and was away during the first of these strikes. Then when he came back, Sorrell retained Frank Pestana in there. There was a man, who's now dead, by the name of Bill [William] Esterman, who represented some of the unions. I'm trying to think of who else. There were a number of other lawyers in and out, but I think that I've named the principal ones.

Balter: Okay. We'll turn off the tape for a second. [tape recorder off] We're back on tape.

Margolis: Yes. It was during this period, and again I don't remember which year it was. They run together for me. My memory. When there was a big meeting, at the American Legion Hall in Hollywood, of the Conference of Studio Unions, and there was a guest from Mexico, Vincent Toledano, who at that time was one of the leading labor figures in the world, I would say. He was a speaker. There were three speakers at the meeting: Herb Sorrell, Toledano, and myself. The place was packed.The reason I happened to remember this is because two or three years ago, when I got part of my papers from the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], I found in there a complete transcript of the speech that I had given on that occasion. I know that they must have either taped it or somebody took notes, because I don't make speeches and never did make speeches that were written and prepared in advance. I have notes, but that's all. So, it's just an interesting thing to what extent the FBI was involved at that time and how important they appeared to think a speech made at a labor meeting was.

Balter: Now you mentioned that your firm had been representing the studio unions. Was that the case even before you came down and joined the firm in Los Angeles?

Margolis: No, the firm did not exist before I came down.

Balter: Of course.

Margolis: I came down to organize a firm that had consisted-- The three principal partners consisted of Charles [J.] Katz (who I've told you about), who was not a labor lawyer, Leo Gallagher, who had been in the old labor firm, and myself. Also, we brought along a number of the younger lawyers who had worked with the old labor firm. We also brought in some additional people who had not worked with the old labor firm.

Balter: Well, that then would lead to my next question which is, how did your firm come to be the firm that was representing these unions? Was that out of the CIO [Congress of Industrial Organizations] work that you were doing, or in some other fashion?

Margolis: I am not clear in my recollection about how that happened. I think I've told you before that I was on the executive board of HICCASP, and some of the Hollywood unions were represented on that board. I may have met--not positive of this--but I think I may have met the people either at the board or as a result of people that I met at the board, and maybe some other way. And they simply asked me if our firm would represent them.

Balter: Now, tell me about some of your activities with HICCASP and the activities of that group. Its activities are fairly well known, but I'm interested in your own memories of it.

Margolis: Well, I find it very difficult to distinguish what was going on at HICCASP from what was happening in other areas. You want to remember, [when] I first came on the board, the war was going on. I know that they had activities supporting the war, but all organizations had, that I was connected with, had activities of various kinds supporting the war. I know that there was a difference. They planned various types of entertainment--people going to talk to troops or recruitment offices. In other words, they acted in their own area, where they could contribute. I remember helping arrange a conference on civil liberties. I think it was with them and the ACLU [American Civil Liberties Union] jointly. I'm not sure. It's very difficult to separate these. They were a very liberal group. They were concerned about minority participation and discrimination. The main thing was the war--war effort. I continued on the board I think for two or three years, maybe four years, but I didn't attend all of the meetings. I was involved in so many things at the time. I probably attended a dozen meetings, or less, over four years. I was generally familiar at that time with what they did; I don't think I can recall anything more specific.

Balter: Now, a little bit more on the strikes. My research tells me-- As a matter of fact, I guess what I would do would be to ask you if you recall, if this is correct, because sometimes stories get passed along, and you don't know if they're right or not. According to my research, the impetus or one of the-- The main impetus apparently to the 1945 strike, to the first strike, was over the refusal of the studios to recognize one particular union, the Society of Motion Picture Interior Decorators, which wanted to transfer from IATSE to CSU. Apparently, they went through some hearings before the National Labor Relations Board, which supported the union. Is that consistent with your recollection?

Margolis: Yes. Now that you refresh my recollection, that was one of the starting points, maybe the thing that started it, but it involved issues beyond that.

Balter: This issue?

Margolis: This issue.

Balter: So this was more of a trigger or a catalyst to what actually happened.

Margolis: I would say so, yes. It was a part of-- Both of these strikes were part of the struggle between the CSU and the IATSE.

Balter: Well, let's talk about that a little bit. When you first began to represent the unions which would then become part of CSU--fairly soon afterwards as I understand it--was there initially any period of time when there were efforts to mend the rift between the two groups, or was it essentially hopeless from the beginning?

Margolis: I know, or can recall, of no such efforts. The groups were so entirely different. The CSU were by and large very democratic unions. They ran the gamut from moderately liberal or progressive to quite left-wing. They were activist organizations; they were militant organizations in the labor field.The IATSE on the other hand was controlled by the international from the top. Their contracts were negotiated by their top people in Chicago. The rank and file of the membership had little or nothing to do with this. They had good conditions. They had gotten this as a result of the power of the gangsters who had been bribed by the employers. And what the employers got in return--When I say good conditions, what I mean is that they had very good wages, good hours, good fringes for that time, but they caused no trouble. You never heard of an IATSE local saying, "Unless you deal with us on this grievance properly, we're going to shut you down."From the standpoint of the studios, that was the decisive difference between the two groups: the militancy of one as compared with the other. As a matter of fact, with the IATSE-- There was craft unionism to the nth degree in the studios. If someone was supposed to pick up a piece of wood in one category, no one else was supposed to pick up that piece of wood, regardless of anything that happened. Well, the IATSE did. Was ready to and frequently did violate those craft lines as against unions that were CSU or became CSU. That was part of the struggle between them. Of course, the IATSE was trying to break them, and the employers were obviously on the side of the IATSE.

Balter: Was there ever on the part of people who were involved in this, was there ever any thought given to making overtures to the rank and file of IATSE, especially at the point at which IATSE began to be so antagonistic and cross your picket lines?

Margolis: I don't remember anything of that kind. There was one local, the local we represented, that fought their own international, cooperated with us, and did not go through the picket line. But they were ultimately placed in receivership and the local was taken over by the international.

Balter: Do you remember which one that was?

Margolis: [Local] 698 was the local we represented.

Balter: I see. Do you recall--?

Margolis: I mean that's film technicians. It's what it was.

Balter: Film technicians?

Margolis: Yeah.

Balter: Okay. Now, obviously you were out in the vicinity of the picket lines, and at one point you were thrown off the lot, so the legend goes. [laughs]

Margolis: I was there virtually every day.

Balter: What do you recall? I know it's a long time ago. But in terms of what you personally witnessed, in terms of the way the police acted, the way the studio security acted, and the way that members of IATSE, reportedly members of IATSE, served sometimes as goon squads when the picketing was going on, what kinds of things do you recall seeing personally when you were down there?

Margolis: Well, this wasn't a tea party on the part of either side. A strikebreaker going through the picket lines didn't exactly have a bed of roses. On the other hand, the IATSE goons went after picketers with all kinds of weapons. Not guns, as far as I can recall, but pieces of wood, steel bars and things of that kind--viciously.The difference between the treatment of these two groups as far as the police was concerned--or that the IATSE people would give them carte blanche to do whatever they wanted to--I don't remember any one of them being arrested. The CSU people were being arrested right and left in groups, in large groups.They never arrested me, although I was on the picket line. I guess they didn't want to arrest me. I was trying to remember the occasion I went inside the gate of Warner Brothers. The gate opened. Somebody went in, and I went inside to talk to somebody, who I thought I could influence about something. I don't remember the details. They immediately called the police, and the police escorted me out. It wasn't a big deal, but it got a lot of publicity. They did not rough me up. They kind of pushed me out, but not-- They didn't hurt me. You know, the place was filled with the press, and anytime anything happened, particularly if it was a lawyer, it was big news. It was front-page news for a month--everyday.

Balter: What do you think of the press treatment of the strikers, of the issues involved? The [Los Angeles Times], the Hearst papers, and so on?

Margolis: I would say that the press, particularly the Hearst press but also including the Times, (and at that time, probably, the [Los Angeles Daily News] was not as bad), had--all of them, the same biases as the police, but with various degrees of intensity.

Balter: Now, we've talked about the leaders on both sides of this thing: Roy Brewer on the IATSE and Herb Sorrell on the CSU side. Tell me a little bit about your recollections of Herb Sorrell. By the way, is he still alive?

Margolis: No, he's dead. He died seven, eight, nine years ago, I believe. Well, Herb was a-- he looked like a beer drinker, although he was not a heavy drinker, but he looked like one of them. Had kind of a florid face, heavy built, with a pot. A dynamic speaker, not a polished speaker, but dynamic and could really move an audience, particularly workers. Was really a rough, tough guy. A thousand percent honest: no one could buy him. One of the most stubborn men I've ever met in my life--whose judgment left an awful lot to be desired--who was ready to fight on every issue, good or bad.For him, there were two sides to every issue. One was the worker's side, and the other was the employer's side. There could not be a situation in which a word could be said on behalf of the employers or against the worker. No matter, if a worker came to work drunk on the job, well, he would defend him and say, "Let him take a shower and go to work," or whatever. He would fight about every issue and just as vigorously. On every issue it was one or the other. If there was ever, in that sense, a class-conscious man, it was Herb Sorrell. Although from a political standpoint, if you talked to him about class consciousness, he might not have known what you meant. He was not, in my opinion, a particularly good organizer, except that he was a terrific speaker and could move people into action. That he was, he was tops.

Balter: Now you said that you thought his judgment was lacking on occasion. Do any examples come to mind of where you and he disagreed on a particular thing that should be done?

Margolis: Well, basically I suppose I say that because of one thing, although I'm sure it reflected itself many times. We disagreed a great deal, but we were never unfriendly, you know. You simply could not convince him that there was any chance that the strike would be lost if the people just stayed solid, and that they would stay solid indefinitely. Just couldn't convince him. You try to talk to him about it, and it's no use. And this was going on. So one point you could even understand. Well, this is a strong group of people. They've been very loyal, very devoted. They're fighters. Then, people start dropping off, less and less people on the picket line, some people beginning to go back to work, and all of the signs of a strike disintegrating. In other words, anybody can see right in front of their eyes.I, for example, compare him with Harry Bridges, with whom I worked very closely in San Francisco. Who, in 1937 I think it was, or was it '39?--one of those two--called a strike and after about a week or ten days, went back to work without gaining a thing. It was all over--the strike-- And [Bridges] overcame the opposition of all of his people. Said, "We're going to get them next year. This is not the time."And he turned out to be right. He fought with judgment and with understanding. With Herb Sorrell, you just couldn't convince him. We said, "Look at what's happening!"He said, "We don't need them. We get along without them; we're better off. They're weaklings."That kind of just nonsensical stuff sometimes, but not from dishonesty.

Balter: Now, you mentioned a situation where people were beginning to go back to work and so on. Was this something that developed more in the second strike?

Margolis: Oh, yes, in the second one.

Balter: This is what you are referring to?

Margolis: As far as I can recall, it didn't happen at all in the first strike. It was very solid, and it didn't last nearly as long as the second one. There was another problem. They were only a year apart. There had been a three-month strike one year, and people had suffered. And then you had a strike eight or nine months later. This one was a long one, so it was very difficult.

Balter: By the way, the second strike, we haven't really talked about exactly what the issues were in the later strikes.

Margolis: I don't remember how it started. I think the second one started over an incident of a grievance. Calling out the painters, Herb Sorrell putting a picket line around, and everybody else getting out-- I may not be accurate on that, because I don't know if that was a fundamental issue. But whether it started that way, I'm not sure. I had forgotten how the first one started, until you reminded me.

Balter: Now, do you recall-- We've talked a lot about Herb Sorrell. Do you recall who any of his, I guess what you would call, lieutenants, or who any of the people were who were also in the leadership there?

Margolis: There was a fellow by the name of Ted [Theodore R.] Ellsworth. Costume union? Became a professor at UCLA later. I think even a news commentator for a while. Averill [H.] Berman was not a-- Frankly, they weren't very active in the strike. He was a radio commentator, who was later shot and killed by a newsman, a television newsman, who found him in the bedroom of his ex-girlfriend.

Balter: Do you remember who that newsman was?

Margolis: No. Tall, thin fellow, I can't-- I'm so bad on names.

Balter: Here in Los Angeles though?

Margolis: Here in Los Angeles. Averill Berman was a tremendous speaker, too, just a dynamite speaker.

Balter: Let me turn the tape over, and then we'll go on.

12. Tape Number VI, Side Two July 24, 1984

Margolis: There are some other names that I recall--Norval Crutcher. I don't know whether Norval's alive now or not. I don't think he is; I think he's dead.

Balter: How about Ted Ellsworth who you mentioned, is he alive?

Margolis: Well, I last heard about him a few years ago. I'm not sure. Min [Minnie] Selvin, Screen Office Employees Guild. [pauses] I'm leaving out some very important names, but I just can't think of them.

Balter: Okay. Well, that's quite a few actually. During either one of these strikes, and I suppose perhaps particularly during the first strike, did it ever occur that any of the studios seemed to be less recalcitrant than others? Sort of part two of that question: Did it ever happen that any of the studio heads approached the unions trying to cut private deals, or their own deal, with the unions to try to get people back to work?

Margolis: My recollection is that during the first strike, I was either not at any negotiations or perhaps in one session. I was not an active participant. But my recollection is that at that time there was some division among the studios, which was one of the factors that helped settle the strike. During the second strike, I did participate in negotiations, particularly after things got real tough. Things were going to pot. It's just my impression from those negotiations there was just no give and that the employers were absolutely solid.

Balter: Do you recall who any of the employer representatives were at those negotiations?

Margolis: You know, if I had a list of names of the people of that time, I could tell you. I just don't remember at the moment.

Balter: Do you recall what level of-- Were they attorneys for the studios, or were they at a higher level than that?

Margolis: There were some attorneys, but mostly they were the labor representatives, which is usually a vice president. I think at one or two meetings some of the presidents sat in. I'm just not clear in my memory on that, but there were top people. No question about that.

Balter: Not to beat this to death, but in the first strike do any of the studios come to mind, who perhaps would have been the more vacillating, or do you remember that?

Margolis: Oh, when I tell you that I believe there was a split, this is just something I heard. I don't believe-- At least let me say, I don't remember participating in negotiations during the first strike. So any information I had was secondhand. I was probably told at that time, but I don't remember.

Balter: We've talked about Herb Sorrell at some length. What do you recall, especially during this period of time--and I know he's going to come up again and again--about Roy Brewer, his tactics and actions during this period?

Margolis: Oh, Roy Brewer [pauses] is a very able man. Vicious, resourceful, red-baiter deluxe. He and Reagan became very, very close. One of the founders of that organization that he, Reagan, Adolphe Menjou, and what was--

Balter: Motion picture association for the preservation of American ideals?

Margolis: No-- Yes. Motion Picture Alliance for the Preservation of American Ideals.

Balter: That's right.

Margolis: He ran the IATSE. He just decided things for the IATSE--tough guy. I don't know what else I can add.

Balter: Let me just set the stage. You said you got into a number of fights with him later. What were the backdrops to those?

Margolis: In connection with two things: one, before the un-American committee, particularly with respect to the Salt of the Earth, the motion picture, Salt of the Earth--

Balter: Right, why don't we hold those then, because I'm going to want to talk to you about that in just a little while. Finally, on the studio strikes, reportedly the Communist Party-- We've discussed your involvement with the Communist Party and that you worked closely with it previously. Reportedly, the Communist Party, when the first strike first began, was not supportive. Apparently, there were a number of articles in the People's World, sort of a-plague-on-both-your-houses articles, at least that's what's been reported in the research that I have done. Does that ring a bell with you? Do you recall anything about the role of the Communist Party during this time?

Margolis: I seem to recall that-- My impression is that that was their position in the second--not the first--strike, but I'm not sure.

Balter: I'm interested in what you remember.

Margolis: Well, I'm just not sure, but I'm sure that-- Well, first of all, if the Communist Party opposed the strike, it did so on practical grounds, not on any other grounds. It may have supported the-- Opposed the beginning of the strike, but I know that during the strike the Communist Party gave assistance to the strikers, as it did virtually every labor dispute, to the extent that it could.

Balter: My information is only that the Communist Party at first was not supportive, but then later chipped in.

Margolis: Well, that's--

Balter: That would be consistent, yeah.

Margolis: It's possible, I just don't-- I know that the Communist Party at some point, during the second strike, took the position that the strike ought to be-- That the unions ought to save themselves. Ought to go back to work. Take the defeat. It would have been with defeat--no question about it--but they would have been able to hold their unions together and live to fight another day. I know that position was taken during the second strike, and that they were very critical of Herb Sorrell. Those things I know. I don't remember any position like that on the first strike, but there may have been.

Balter: Now you mentioned that Herb Sorrell began selling cars after all of this was over. Do I assume from that that he didn't get his job back at the end of the strike? That he was out of the industry?

Margolis: He was a full-time union official for many years and of course-- No, he didn't. Not only didn't he get-- He didn't get his [job] back. What happened was that-- Part of the thing was that the studio started getting permanent replacements, and most of the people who worked for the CSU unions or for [Local] 698 never got back to work. There were some wonderful people. As a matter of fact, I got a letter from one of them the other day, George Stoica, who was a grip, I think. He was calling me about a fellow by the name of Bob [Robert] Ames, a wonderfully talented man who did great woodcarvings. Out here in the hallway, there is a picture of one of his finest woodcarvings. I'll show it to you.

Balter: Yeah, that'll be good. Let's go out. Take just a second. [tape recorder off]Ben, we're about to launch into what will probably be, at least I hope it will be, a fairly lengthy and detailed discussion about the investigations of the House Un-American Activities Committee in Hollywood and the things it let out of that. When the subpoenas from HUAC reached Hollywood in September of 1947, of course, forty-three people were subpoeonaed; nineteen of whom were later dubbed the "unfriendlies."

Margolis: The Unfriendly Nineteen.

Balter: The Unfriendly Nineteen. How did you first become involved, and at what point did you, Charlie Katz, and other people from your firm first become involved with the HUAC investigation?

Margolis: Oh, what I can remember is that one of the people, or maybe two or three of the people, who were part of the Hollywood Nineteen (whom I knew before that), came to see me and asked me if I would act as one of the attorneys. At the moment, I am not sure as to who it was. If I were to make a guess, I would say that in all probability it was, or at least included, Jack [John Howard] Lawson.

Balter: Well, let me, I have here-- I don't have a list with me of the nineteen, but I do have a list of the ten. Let's go off tape and let me show it to you. See if any of these names might ring a bell with you. [tape recorder off]We're back on tape. So you were just saying that you don't recall who the first person might have been other than it might have been John Howard Lawson. When you were first approached, were you approached to represent the entire nineteen or just certain individuals?

Margolis: Either at that time or subsequently, I learned that the plan was to get a number of attorneys to work together on this. I don't remember when it was decided that the number was six. I think I was asked to make some recommendations, and that I made, I believe that I made some of the recommendations that were accepted. For example, I was working at that time quite closely with Robert Kennedy, Bob Kennedy-- Bob [Robert W.] Kenny, I mean, Bob Kenny. Maybe I'm thinking that I would have mentioned-- Well, I believe I did mention him as someone they certainly should have, and I'm almost positive I suggested Martin Popper, Marty Popper, in New York. I think it was he who suggested Samuel Rosenwein, whom I had not-- Well, I think I may have known him previously, but didn't know him well. Bartley [C.] Crum was selected by one of the nineteen, or two or three of the nineteen, who were personal friends.

Balter: Would that have been Edward Dmytryk and Adrian Scott? Does that sound right?

Margolis: It's entirely possible, but I'm not--

Balter: That's what I have in my research.

Margolis: It's entirely possible. I just don't remember. [laughter] But I know that he was personal friends with one or more of the Hollywood group. That I know.

Balter: And then Charles Katz was involved, of course.

Margolis: And Charles Katz, I don't know whether he and I-- He and I may have been approached at the same time; I'm not sure about that. We were in the same office at that time. I think we were still in the same office, yes.

Balter: Because the law firm stayed together until '47.

Margolis: Well, this was in '47.

Balter: I'm sorry, until '50--

Margolis: No, he was only in the law firm from '43 to-- Three or four years. And this was in '47. I think that maybe when we were first contacted, he was still in the firm and shortly thereafter he got out.

Balter: Now, forty-three people are subpoenaed. This may be somewhat of a naive question, but how did the-- What was the process by which the nineteen sort of found themselves in one group, with a group of lawyers?

Margolis: Well, the nineteen were left-wing and progressive activists. [telephone rings]

Balter: Maybe I'll take this off. [tape recorder off]

Margolis: Where was I?

Balter: You were saying that the nineteen were Leftists and activists.

Margolis: And they knew each other. They were friends. I know the way it started. They started calling each other. "I was served." We didn't know anything else. Pretty soon they found out that this was the group that was served, and they immediately got together. There were, I think, others--other than the nineteen who had been liberal or progressive, who decided not to join them. And the concept, I can tell you this, the idea that all of them were communists, is not so. Some of them certainly weren't, but they were all Left. That is true.

Balter: Well, was there anybody outside the group of the nineteen but still among the forty-three subpoenaed people, who was, or who were, essentially noncooperative that decided to go with other attorneys? Or did all of the noncooperative witnesses go with you?

Margolis: All of the original group of noncooperative witnesses came with us. Later on, various attorneys represented other noncooperative people. I represented a great many, but by no means all.

Balter: And we'll get into that then. Now, you mentioned some of the attorneys that were recruited to the effort. For example, Robert Kenny and Martin Popper, in particular, that you knew before. What was it that made you decide to ask them to come into the case?

Margolis: Well, let's take them one at a time, because the motivations were somewhat different. I want to backtrack a little.I'm not sure, by the way, whether I suggested Martin Popper, or whether somebody who knew one of the group who knew Martin Popper asked me, "How about bringing Martin Popper in?" The more I think of it, I think rather than my suggesting them, I was asked, "What do you think of bringing him in?" I said, "I thought it would be a good idea."I'm pretty sure I suggested Bob Kenny. Again, it might have happened the other way around. Bob Kenny had been the attorney general of the state of California. He had been in the state senate; he had been a judge; he had been a newspaper man; he was an important-- He had run for governor against Earl Warren and had been beaten. He was a very important political figure. He and I had been friends, starting with his attorney general days. After he left office there, after his defeat, he and I tried a couple of cases together to which I brought him in. I suggested him as being a kind of a spokesperson for the committee, a kind of a public figure who would be fine to have, whose judgment I respected, and who was a thousand percent in sympathy with the nineteen.Martin Popper, the more I think of it, I, yeah, I think that Ring Lardner, Jr., was a friend of his. Not sure whether he was a friend of his before or became friends afterwards--I think before. Anyways, Martin Popper had been the executive secretary for the National Lawyers Guild, full-time for a number of years, and had done-- He was a person that had traveled all over the world. Knew lots of people and was excellent in public relations, again, a person with excellent judgment. Marty had joined or later joined a firm in New York, a law firm in New York, and at that time was already representing, as I remember, a number of foreign countries. His practice became exclusively one of representing various foreign countries, including the Soviet Union and the various Eastern European countries. He also represented China later.I'm quite sure that he recommended Sam Rosenwein, who at that time lived in New York (Sam Rosenwein later moved to California). But he [Popper] remembered Sam Rosenwein had been the counsel--was it for the Civil Rights Congress? I think it was for the Civil Rights Congress, or if not them, for some other civil liberties organization for a number of years. Was a brilliant lawyer and had done a tremendous amount of work in the field of constitutional law, which was not true of either Marty or of Bob Kenny, although Bob knew a little about--knew a lot about everything.I, up to that point, had not-- I had done some constitutional law cases, but I was basically a labor lawyer and had been involved in First Amendment cases, particularly around picketing. My main forte was not that, so he was recommended as an outstanding lawyer, which indeed he was.

Balter: Okay. This would probably be a good place to stop for a minute. [tape recorder off]Ben, you mentioned Bartley Crum. As I said a moment ago, my information was that he was retained, or brought into the case, by Edward Dmytryk and Adrian Scott. Reportedly--I wonder if you could confirm this or not--Bartley Crum later turned out to be, or became, an informer himself on the matter of the National Lawyers Guild. Do you recall anything about that? Does that ring a bell?

Margolis: I don't think he became an informer on the National Lawyers Guild. I don't think he knew anything about that. I don't think he was ever a member of the National Lawyers Guild. I don't know. You know, he ultimately committed suicide.

Balter: I didn't know that.

Margolis: But I can go back on Bartley Crum's life, if you like, before that, because it's a very interesting story.

Balter: Please do.

Margolis: Bartley Crum was a San Francisco lawyer, at the time, who was an attorney for the Hearst press, and who himself, however, had many liberal friends, including, for example, Harry Bridges.Several years before that, when I was practicing law in San Francisco, there was a big strike in a company town. Westwood--the Westwood Lumber Company--that's a city up in Northern California, a company-owned town. During the strike, the employer attempted to evict all of the workers from the houses that they lived in. They lived in the company-owned houses. We represented the unions and the workers. Bartley Crum represented the employer. This must have been about '39, '40, before the war, before we got into the war. And he fought bitterly for the thing. And as I-- I think eventually it was settled. But we considered him an archenemy of labor. Attorney for the Hearst press, a very, very successful lawyer, a bright guy, a very handsome guy, and a social butterfly of considerable importance, at least from his own standpoint.And then Bartley began to become a kind of a liberal. I'm not sure what motivated him in that direction. As I said, he acquired a friendship with Harry Bridges. He began to know people in Hollywood, like Scott and Dmytryk. And he was brought into the case, largely as a public relations person. He was not the kind of a lawyer who lifted a lot of law books. He was the kind of a lawyer who was a front man. He later became-- He then later joined one of the very large law firms in New York City, after this was over.I remember on one of my trips to New York, I visited him at this law office. He asked me if I would like to have a cup of coffee. I said okay. I thought he was going to do what we do here, run out and get me a cup of coffee.He said, "Okay, let's go." We went over to the--which hotel was it? One of the very swank hotels in New York City. Sat down and each had a cup of coffee. He was well known. The waiters are bowing all over the place, "Mr. Crum and--" The bill was five dollars a cup for a cup of coffee, and that was probably about 1950 or 1951. Five dollars for a cup of coffee, which is considerable today, was like twenty-five dollars for a cup of coffee today. But that was his lifestyle. He was a man who was always in trouble financially. Made a lot of money and made connections. He had a wonderful personality of getting in with people. Finally--I don't know the exact cause of it--he committed suicide, but before that--You may have confused what you mentioned with this incident, and I was present when it happened. I was in Washington, D.C., with a client, Gus [O.] Brown, before a hearing of the [John L.] McClellan committee. (And that's another story we can cover later if you want.) But they were--the McClellan committee was interrogating the president of the [International Brotherhood of] Teamsters union, uh--

Balter: Jimmy [James R.] Hoffa.

Margolis: Jimmy Hoffa. And that--I will only at this point tell you the part relating to--that ties in with Bartley Crum and particularly-- Hoffa had a pretty good relationship with Harry Bridges. They worked together on some labor disputes and so forth. Hoffa's a very interesting man by the way. Hoffa refused to attack Harry Bridges.Hoffa said, "Yes, I'm anticommunist.""Was Bridges a communist?""I don't know and I don't care. He's a damn good trade unionist. We work together and that's all I care about. He's honest. He represents the workers."That kind of-- Just stood up--in every possible way--Hoffa for Harry Bridges! Imagine that!Then they called Bartley Crum, who had been a close personal friend of Harry Bridges. And Crum attacked Bridges. Maybe attacked isn't the right word. He said, "Bridges--" He thought Bridges was a communist and things of that kind. Red-baiting Bridges which was a real-- Well, it was like being an informer. It was worse than being an informer because-- Well, it's typical of an informer that some of the things said were made out of whole cloth. And that was the last time that I saw Crum. After he got off the stand, I walked over to him. I said, "Bart, I never--" Remember, he'd been one of the attorneys for the Hollywood Ten! I said, "Bart, I never thought I'd live to say--to see this sort of a shameful act on your part."Walked away from him. He didn't say anything. A few years later, he committed suicide.

Balter: My notes don't reflect what the original source of this was--some connection between Crum and the [National Lawyers] Guild. What I'll do is go back to that source, and the next time perhaps we can figure out what it meant, because I do want to get your--

Margolis: Remembrance? I distinctly remember his being what you might call an informer against Bridges.

Balter: Right. Perhaps the source is confusing it, but let-- Yeah, I'll check that and we'll see what we can figure out next time. While we're talking about the lawyers, Ring Lardner wrote recently, as a matter of fact in the Journal for the National Lawyers Guild dinner, which honored you a couple of years ago, that it was disconcerting sometimes to sit in front of the committee and have Robert Kennedy-- Excuse me--

Margolis: Robert Kenny.

Balter: [laughs] I'm doing the same thing you did. Robert Kenny says, "Take it easy", in one ear, and Ben Margolis saying, "Let them have it!" in the other ear. Which, besides being a funny story, raises some questions, and that is among-- And we'll get to the question of differences among the witnesses later. But among the attorneys, among you and Bob Kenny and the other attorneys, what sort of strategy discussions did you have to have among yourselves before you even began to have strategy discussions with your clients?

Margolis: I would say that the discussion among the lawyers alone related primarily to a legal analysis of what was the best legal position to take. There were two separate but interrelated questions: one was legally what should your position be, and the second was, public relations-wise what should your position be. As I say, there was a relationship between the two, but they were separate. I believe that most of the discussions on the second were jointly with some of the lawyers, or all of the lawyers, and the nineteen. Remember, all nineteen participated in that struggle, discussion, and went back to Washington.

Balter: Right. Well, let's take them maybe together, or separate them only briefly then. As far as the legal questions go, now I know that there were discussions certainly among the nineteen and, I assume, among the attorneys too about whether to take the First Amendment, the Fifth, [or] both: what the legal strategy should be. I assume that a lot of this centered around what you actually wanted to accomplish. Could you outline for me what types of discussions went on, and what the considerations were?

Margolis: Among the lawyers?

Balter: Either among the lawyers or if it's easier just in general.

Margolis: The lawyers I think were in agreement as to the state of the law, which, in virtually all respects, was not clearly settled. There was no way you could say to them, "We have authority directly in point or even close in point, which establishes what your rights are either under the Fifth Amendment or under the First Amendment." The attorneys were in agreement that whichever they relied on, the First or the Fifth, they would lose in the lower courts, but both of them thought that the chances of winning in the Supreme Court were anywhere from good to excellent. And we so told them.Also when the question was raised as to whether he should rely on one or the other or both, I think the advice--all of the lawyers agree--that simply from a clear legal standpoint, technical legal standpoint, you rely on both. It's appropriate if you have more than one defense of something, you have a-- You raise whatever you have. Although we also said that this-- Even legally there was a political fight here, and raising them both might affect the political character of the fight, which in turn would reflect on the legal impact on the Court and its thinking. But basically we thought that the question was one that was a policy question that had to be decided. And even when-- There were two considerations in deciding that policy question: One was how could you most effectively fight the committee? The other was what was the best chance of saving your job? And was there any relationship between the two? But to some extent they were separate questions.It was decided in the course of the discussions that, from both standpoints, the best kind of a fight could be made against the committee and to save the jobs by relying on the First Amendment and the First Amendment alone. In connection with that, it was pointed out that if we won on the First Amendment, the result would be that the committee's power would be shorn. It would be very easy for people, from that point on, when they were asked questions concerning their political affiliations to reply, "We stand, we just rely on the First Amendment." A very respectable position in the eyes of 95 percent of the American people. And the committee just couldn't do anything about it.It would destroy the committee, whereas the Fifth Amendment would not destroy the committee, if you succeeded, because of the impact of the Fifth Amendment itself from a public relations standpoint. The concept of "Fifth Amendment communists." That while the law was that the Fifth Amendment was for the protection of the innocent--not the guilty--and that relying on the Fifth Amendment was not in any way an admission of guilt, nevertheless, that's the way it would be deemed by many, if not most people from a public relations standpoint. And therefore the committee, if it was merely held that there was a Fifth Amendment right, could go on and flourish by making people claim the Fifth.So the decision was reached unanimously after lots of discussion, pro and con, with some of the nineteen placing greater emphasis on their jobs and some of them greater emphasis on the destruction of the committee. Although all of them had both objectives, it was just the question of where the greater concern or emphasis was. Finally, there was unanimous agreement to rely on the First--the First alone.

Balter: Now, without of course calling the roll of the nineteen and going down each of their positions, in the discussions with the nineteen, do any particular names stand out one way or the other in terms of those who most strongly argued for jobs and those who most strongly argued to fight the committee? Was there enough of a polarization, so perhaps certain people were clearly identified in either camp in the disagreement, in terms of what should be given priority?

Margolis: [pauses] I am quite sure that John Howard Lawson was one of the leaders, if not the leader for the proposition that the political position was the decisive thing. There were many that agreed with him. Well, everyone agreed that it was important, but many agreed that it was the determinative thing. I don't think anybody openly said, "Well, the decisive thing is can we save our jobs?" But you could draw that implication from the fact that they argued more along those lines than they did along the other. Although I do think everybody had both things in mind. I think Howard Koch was one of the ones who was very concerned about his job. Larry, the actor--

Balter: Larry Parks?

Margolis: Larry Parks. "Millie," Lewis Milestone.

Balter: Where did Albert Maltz stand on this issue?

Margolis: I think probably placing the greatest emphasis on the political, but I'm not sure.

Balter: And how about Dalton Trumbo, who was one of the people who suffered the greatest economic loss out of all of this?

Margolis: Well, I know, you see, my memory's clouded by subsequent events.

Balter: Of course, yes.

Margolis: And it's hard to separate subsequent events from what happened at that time. But for subsequent events, I would have said that Dalton Trumbo was the guy who would say, "We're gonna screw that committee. And goddammit, there's only one way to play it, you know: Fuck 'em." This is the way Dalton would have--as I would try to reconstruct it--would have talked at that time.And a later position at a later time, he and Ring Lardner, Jr., both contended that the main consideration was saving the jobs. I'm not positive. I don't think that was-- I'm not positive. I don't think that was Dalton's position originally, and I don't even think it was strongly Lardner's position either.

Balter: And this came out in correspondence, to a large extent, in correspondence between you, Albert Maltz, and Ring Lardner, Jr., I believe. Right?

Margolis: Well, what actually happened was that-- I don't remember how it started, but there were a series of letters back and forth between Albert and Ring. (I think Dalton may have been involved, but I'm not sure.) And they took diametrically opposite views in which they said that-- Ring said that it was jobs which was the decisive thing, and Albert said it was the political importance of destroying the committee. After some exchange of letters, they agreed to ask me what my recollection was. Then I wrote a letter giving them my recollection. Interestingly enough, both of them then said, "Well, that's probably right."

Balter: Well, one of the issues in the letters appeared to have been a disagreement between Ring Lardner, Jr., and Albert Maltz about the extent to which the ten or the nineteen, if you will, were heroic figures. With Lardner saying--baiting more or less, as I read it--the stand that they took was what would be expected of them at the time, and Maltz feeling that they didn't-- That if they had only been concerned about their jobs and that if they had not been somewhat more heroic, they could have just relied on the Fifth, and not gone with the First. They took the riskier road, I guess, is what Maltz's point was.

Margolis: I must tell you that my-- I can give you my impression when I read the letters. That the argument about the word heroic was in my opinion a lot of nonsense. That is somebody's evaluation of whether a particular kind of conduct is heroic or something else. What is heroic? Some people could say that fighting to save your job and standing up and risking jail is heroic. Others will say that only a political objective makes it heroic. But that's, you know, to me, that is not the important thing.The important thing was, I told them, that everybody took a principled position. And that everybody, and I'm positive of this, everybody expressed concern about both things. John Howard Lawson, for example, who was, you know, who was the most political of all of these people, he also expressed concern-- As a matter of fact, he said it was politically important to save the jobs.So there was no real disagreement. It was a question of emphasis. And it so happened that the decision was made that both objectives would be best served by the First Amendment position. If we had arrived at the conclusion that, one, different approaches were required to best serve the different objectives, it is my guess--and it's a guess--that the political considerations would have prevailed.

Balter: But, at any rate, the coinciding of these two things in one basic policy decision, I assume, helped to enhance the sense of unity in the group.

Margolis: Yes.

Balter: And the unanimity of the group and the attorneys.

Margolis: Yes. There was no disagreement about the policy, except during the discussion there were disagreements expressed. But once it was arrived at, I don't remember any disagreement on the issue of policy.

Balter: I think that's a good place to stop for today, and we'll pick up next time.

13. Tape Number: VII, Side One July 31, 1984

Balter: Ben, last time we started talking about some allegations concerning--that I had brought up--concerning Bartley [C.] Crum and the possibility that he might have been an informer at one point, and at the time you had no recollection of that. Because the accusation is such a serious one, I wanted to go back and look at what my source had been on that, and bring that into the record to see whether it refreshes your memory, but certainly at least to clarify things for the listener.

Margolis: I think I did tell you about the role he played before the [John L.] McClellan committee--

Balter: I believe so, yes.

Margolis: --which was that kind of an informer's role.

Balter: That's right, and I think that where we weren't connecting was on the question of whether he may have informed on the National Lawyers Guild specifically. So, it turns out that my source on that was the book by Larry Ceplair and Steven Englund, The Inquisition in Hollywood: [Politics in the Film Community, 1930-1940], one of the most detailed books written on the Hollywood Ten [and] on the blacklist years. In a footnote on page 263, it reads as follows:

In the fifties, according to FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] files secured by the National Lawyers Guild, Crum became an informer, furnishing the FBI with information about the San Francisco chapter, pronouncing himself "very happy to cooperate with the FBI" in its investigation of the NLG, promising to search his files for further information, and offering to be "a willing witness at any hearing concerning the NLG."

Then Ceplair [and] Englund as their sources, in parentheses, cite letters from Special-Agent-in-Charge, New York, to Director, FBI, October 1, 1953, and October 26, 1953, FBI National Lawyers Guild file, pp. 4,961 and 5,179; quoted in turn in Percival Robert Bailey's unpublished Ph.D. thesis, "Progressive Lawyers: A History of the National Lawyer's Guild, 1936 to 1958." And apparently Mr. Bailey's references are on page 505-6. I think I may have mentioned this was a thesis at Rutgers University in 1979. So, just hopefully that'll help clarify the record. Does that bring any mixture of recollection?

Margolis: No, I certainly didn't hear anything about it at the time. I imagine this was something that was uncovered fairly recently.

Balter: I would assume so, because my understanding is that the guild got its FBI files in the last several years.

Margolis: It would have been uncovered after Crum's death.

Balter: I see. Okay. While we're on the subject, of course, as you pointed out last time, sometimes these answers to these types of questions are colored by subsequent events. But I understand that Mr. Crum was hired by Adrian Scott and Edward Dmytryk to represent them at one point. And I was wondering, first of all, whether you could confirm that.

Margolis: That is not exactly accurate as to how the matter was handled.

Balter: Please help out.

Margolis: Different people and the original group of [the Hollywood] Nineteen were responsible for bringing in different attorneys. Once the attorneys were in, all of the attorneys represented all of the group.

Balter: I see. Okay. So, do you recall whether it is true that Mr. Crum was brought in by those two men? Does that sound right to you?

Margolis: It sounds right.

Balter: Now, the reason why I'm somewhat interested in this of course is because Mr. Dmytryk later named names before the committee [House Committee to Investigate Un-American Activities (HUAC)] after he got out of jail. And then we have this attorney, Mr. Crum, who apparently provided information to the FBI or at least was prepared to do so. Was there any hint, and again it may be [hind]sight, in Mr. Crum's positions that he took in the representation of the [Hollywood] Ten that might have indicated or been any sort of a foreshadowing of what was to come later?

Margolis: I would say there was none. He generally took a more conservative approach to many questions, as some of the other lawyers did, but that was not unexpected in the line of his background and position. I can't think of a single thing that even with hindsight would indicate that as of that time he was planning any kind of a role other than bona fide representation of the client. Remember that was 1947. He had nothing to do with the ten. After the hearings were completed in 1947, he was not involved in the litigation. He was not involved in any way, except preceding the Washington hearings and during the Washington hearings.

Balter: Okay, since you raised that, of the attorneys that we've talked about last time--yourself, Charlie [Charles J.] Katz, Robert [W.] Kenny, Bartley Crum, Sam [Samuel] Rosenwein and Martin Popper--which of those, in addition to yourself, did go on with the appeals to the higher courts? And representation in the trials?

Margolis: Robert Kenny and to some extent Charles Katz.

Balter: So, primarily the three of you, even at the trial level.

Margolis: Well, at the trial level, we brought in a black Washington lawyer, who participated--tried one of the cases--and who argued on appeal also. Very well known, prominent lawyer. For the life of me, I cannot think of his name now [Charles Houston]. An extraordinarily fine lawyer. I have very distinct memories of working with him in Washington. Particularly coming to his office and suggesting we go out and have some coffee.

Balter: Do you recall what law firm he was with?

Margolis: He had his own firm. He had one or two lawyers working with him. He was an individual practitioner. We went to one of the black little shops, where they serve coffee and things; and I was the only white person in there. Of course, at that time, he wouldn't have been admitted into the white coffee shops. This was just an accepted thing in Washington. This happened in '49, '50. This man, who was really one of the fine lawyers of the United States, was treated in this manner.

Balter: Since I'm sure we'll be able to remember or dig up his name at some point, let me ask you a couple of other things about him. How did he happen to become involved in this?

Margolis: Well, the trials took place in Washington. We felt that we needed a Washington lawyer to participate in the case. See, none of the lawyers, of the six lawyers who represented the witnesses, were from Washington. This man was known to, by reputation at least, to all of us and personally by some of the people. I don't remember just who. And in discussing, we just discussed who should we have and we kicked around the idea: so-and-so and so-and-so.Finally, it came up that if we could get him, he would be the best possible person. And we particularly wanted, at that point, without sacrificing in any way the quality of the work to be done, we would prefer if all things were equal a black lawyer or a minority lawyer. And he not only met that test, but was truly an outstanding lawyer.

Balter: Now, I understand--

Margolis: And was willing to do it, by the way. Which many lawyers were unwilling to do at that time.

Balter: Now, I understand that both before and during and after--I guess, perhaps you can confirm this for me--the hearings in Washington, that there were some discussions and even meetings with Eric [A.] Johnston, who had just become the head of the motion picture producers association [Motion Picture Producers Association of America, Inc.].

Margolis: Those took place before the first witness was called.

Balter: What do you recall about those meetings?

Margolis: Well, I recall that Johnston was very friendly. Said this was a terrible thing that the committee was doing; that he didn't agree with all that the committee was doing. The question was raised--I don't remember just how it was raised, but it was planned--that it would be taken up with him as to whether there would be a blacklist, whether the jobs would be protected. And he said that under no circumstances would the Hollywood motion picture industry engage in anything as un-American as a blacklist. Very stout on that. And at that time, by the way, the public statements he was issuing were also pretty good.

Balter: Now, Albert Maltz in his oral history says that at least speaking for himself, that the blacklist later came as pretty much of a surprise. He seemed to feel that it was not something really anticipated. What is your recollection about what people were thinking, and what people were anticipating at that time?

Margolis: Well, I don't know that surprise is the correct word. I know that in the motion picture industry in Hollywood, and that industry itself, there was widespread opposition to any blacklist. And not only among actors, actresses, writers, and the rank and file of workers, but among the top people.Of course from a money standpoint, among the original nineteen were some of the best money-producing artists in Hollywood. Blacklisting them meant a loss of money to the industry; serious loss of money. You know, the pictures that Dalton Trumbo wrote, that Lester Cole wrote, Albert Maltz wrote--virtually all made money, and lots of money. So they didn't want this. It was really, from everything I know and believe, pretty much forced on them.

Balter: By--

Margolis: Well, there was-- Let me go back. The industry was very dependent on banks. Banking was done primarily with several major banks located in New York City. The reason it was dependent on banks was because huge amounts of money were invested in pictures. And it would take maybe a year, two years, three years after the investment before the proceeds arrived. So they were constantly borrowing large sums of money from the bank and were dependent on that money in order to proceed with their business.There was a meeting at the Waldorf [Astoria] Hotel in New York City, and the date escapes me [November 24, 1947]. But in any event, from everything I heard, and I talked to people who attended that meeting, the-- It was made perfectly clear, to coin a phrase, that the banks would discontinue loaning money to the industry unless the industry agreed to a blacklist. By this, I don't mean to say, by the way, that there were no--that none of the producers wanted to blacklist. There were a couple that wanted it. And then there were others who were flag-wavers, who wanted to show how patriotic and loyal they were.For example, the story about the Warner brothers is that they were very much afraid of anti-Semitism spreading during this terrible period, and that they felt that they had to be holier than holy. They went along. They did not initiate that as far as I know, a blacklist, but they went along very quickly and very-- Or at least without any resistance and apparently quite willingly, although it may not underneath have been as willing as it appeared to be.So I suppose that it did not come as a surprise, completely, because there were rumors going around about this thing all of the time. But a lot of people in the industry were saying, "Don't worry, there won't be a blacklist."

Balter: Well, when Johnston met-- Now, my understanding is that Johnston met not only with the attorneys, but with the nineteen also? Or just with the attorneys?

Margolis: I think there were two meetings, if I remember correctly. One was with the attorneys alone. And one was with all or some of the nineteen and all or some of the attorneys. I think the attorneys' meeting came first if I remember correctly. It was a result of the attorneys' meeting and Johnston's expressed desire to reassure the nineteen that the second meeting occurred. And the second meeting was, as I remember, much shorter. Johnston just made a few statements about what their policy was, and that was all there was to it.

Balter: Do you recall the feelings of yourself, the other attorneys, or the nineteen? The extent to which people felt reassured and the extent to which they were skeptical?

Margolis: We felt very much reassured. Johnston would-- Conduct in the press-- Statements in the press were similar to this. We felt reassured because of several things. There was tremendous support in Hollywood. A whole planeload of the most prominent stars and writers came to watch and then to support the nineteen. And there was big publicity. Many of the biggest newspapers were supporting the nineteen. Newspapers were divided about fifty-fifty in this country. We knew that it meant money to the industry; that the blacklist would cost them money. If there's anything that you should rely on in the industry, it is that they weren't going to do anything that would cost them money unnecessarily. And I don't think they would have, if they hadn't been forced to. But they simply could not do business without financing.

Balter: Now, after the Waldorf statement came out and Johnston's position was changed in conformance with that, apparently, do you recall whether you or any other people had the opportunity to discuss the issue at that point with Johnston? Whether he made any explanations as to why he had taken back his promise?

Margolis: I only saw Johnston, to my recollection, on two occasions, and that was on the two occasions that I mentioned in Washington.

Balter: So, not afterwards.

Margolis: Not afterwards.

Balter: Now, going back to the hearings in Washington, what are your recollections about-- We've talked about some of the legal preparations that were made in legal discussions, last time, in getting ready for the hearings. What other types of preparations and what else do you recall about the trip to Washington?

Margolis: Well, I have to go back a little bit to deal with another policy question. The question was raised, how should the witnesses conduct themselves? One position was that they should answer just as briefly and as courteously and as quietly as possible. They were of course going to refuse to answer certain questions, that is on the grounds of the First Amendment: the Communist Party and the [Screen] Writers Guild or [Screen] Actors Guild questions. But that it would be done in a very gentlemanly, polite manner. That had, as I remember it, the support of Bart Crum, and I felt the honest support of Crum; that was his way to deal with something like this. Originally, if I remember correctly, it also had the support, to some extent, of Bob Kenny, but I think he changed his mind.The position that finally prevailed was an all-out-fighting position. We would fight back at the committee. Tell them what we thought. To attempt to use the committee hearings as a forum to attack the committee and to express the views of the witnesses. There's one exception. I'll discuss him separately. [Bertolt] Brecht was dealt separately. Everybody was persuaded at a fairly early stage, among the nineteen, that this was the way to do it. Some of them more reluctantly than the others. If I remember correctly, one of the ones who was reluctant was Lewis Milestone. He never got up to the-- He finally came around. He finally agreed. But to what extent he would have actually followed our course, I don't know.So we all came; we came across the country together. Let's see, I wonder if I'm confusing that trip with another trip. Yes, on that trip, we all came on the train together. And that was four days and five nights, or five days and four nights. We had large accommodations. You want to remember, we were dealing at that point with people who were very well-off. Making thousands of dollars a week when thousands of dollars was really thousands of dollars a week.So we spent most of our time practicing. What we would do is we'd put somebody on the witness stand, so to speak. Then the attorneys would pretend they were members of the committee or chairman of the committee counsel, and ask questions and practice answers. And then there would be criticism, and the person will do it again. That kind of thing went on continuously; ten, twelve hours a day for all of the time we were on the train.

Balter: Oh, just let me interject one question here. At that point, did you know what the order of the witnesses was going to be?

Margolis: No.

Balter: You didn't know that until you got to Washington?

Margolis: We didn't know that until, I think, the day before the hearing. We did not know about the order.

Balter: Please continue.

Margolis: And you know, we knew that they were going--we believed that they were going to try some underhanded questions, like, would you defend your country, and would you be in a war against the Soviet Union? And we were prepared. We were prepared to deal with all of those questions. Some of which they did ask; some of which they never got around to asking. So that everybody was really thoroughly prepared. You want to remember we were dealing with people who were very capable of handling the English language. That was their craft and their art.In addition to that, we had each witness prepare a written statement, which he was going to ask to leave [in] the file. And none of them were permitted, with one exception. Don't remember just how it happened, but by some twist one statement got into the record. Remember whose it was? Maybe Albert's? No.

Balter: I think, I seem to recall that the second day of testimony [telephone rings] that they-- [tape recorder off] I was starting to say that I recall possibly on the second day of testimony-- You mentioned Albert Maltz, that he might have been allowed to read his statement on the second day, and possibly one other person, whose name I don't recall at the moment. So it may well be that Maltz is the right person.

Margolis: But for the most part, they just would not permit the filing of statements.

Balter: Was that anticipated?

Margolis: Yes. What we did was prepare multiple copies of the statements and distributed them to the press, which gave a little publicity--a sentence here and there.

Balter: Was there any kind of a division of labor in what the statements would say? In other words-- Albert, you cover this; Ring [Lardner, Jr.], you cover that. Or were people left pretty much to what they wanted to say?

Margolis: The latter. Again, these were very creative people, and each one had a fairly unique statement, a fairly unique approach to the things. As far as political approach, it was the same for everybody.

Balter: Now, what do you recall about arriving in Washington? Where you stayed and so on?

Margolis: Oh, we arrived in Washington. You know, there were several days of hearings before our first witness was called. And we arrived in Washington a day or two before. We stayed at a hotel, the [Hotel] Shoreham, which was an old, but was then a very, very plush hotel with huge grounds. One of the reasons we stayed there was because we could go outside and talk under pleasant surroundings. We assumed that virtually anywhere we were, there would be some equipment to overhear what we said--wiretapping, etcetera. So that was another reason we stayed there. Very pleasant, I remember, a very lovely hotel.We carried on the work that we had done, that we started on the train. The lawyers reviewed the statements and made suggestions. There were two people brought in from New York to handle public relations, whose names I don't recall at the moment. We had meetings about public relations. We had meetings about approaching Johnston. There were meetings constantly going on. Somebody would testify; we'd meet and talk about what to do there. Again, the details I don't recall at this time. But there was constant activity going on.I remember for example-- One meeting that really I think will never be eliminated from my memory as long as I live was [with] Lee Pressman, who was then general counsel for the CIO [Congress of Industrial Organizations], Phil [Philip] Murray's general counsel. And he was someone who I knew very well, because our office in San Francisco had represented two or three international CIO unions. And for a period of two or three or four years, there were meetings of international counsel generally a couple of times a year in Lee Pressman's office in Washington, D.C.. I attended many of those meetings, so I knew him quite well. Brilliant guy. Kind of a withdrawn, standoffish guy.But he came to this, and in effect he said that he wanted to tell people how bad things were in this country. Oh, I remember. We had approached him in the first instance trying to get him to get Phil Murray to issue a statement of support.He said, "Well, I'd like to come and talk to you." And he said, "If you think that there's any possibility of getting a statement from Murray, you're daydreaming. He would just as soon see you hung from the highest trees."He [Pressman] says, "This country is headed for something close to fascism, and the future fate of this country lies in your hands." They've gone to him for help. [laughter] And he came and was in deep anguish. And he cried! He actually cried. I've never seen anything like that. He's a very strong person. A very important person--general counsel for the CIO. Later, of course, he became an informer, and then later apologized for it and so forth. That was one of the things that happened.I remember another incident that stays very firmly in my mind. Jack [John Howard] Lawson was the first witness who got called, and all of us went to the hearing, except Bertolt Brecht, who stayed in the hotel. There was no television, but it was on radio. And he was listening to it on radio. Said he preferred to stay at the hotel and listen to it there. It was a very confrontational day. Everybody was very excited and uptight and tense about the things that had happened during the day and the treatment that the committee had given to the witnesses. Although I must say the witnesses gave back as good as they got. We came in, I remember coming in and Brecht was sitting there in front of the radio with a great big smile on his mouth and just seeming delighted.I remember asking, "Bert, you know, the kind of a day we had, what are you laughing at? What do you see about the situation to laugh, or even smile about?"He said, "Nothing like this ever happened in Germany. The intellectuals folded and ran. And did not fight back." He says, "I'm smiling because with people like this, you will never have fascism in the United States."By the way, I told you originally that he was an exception to that. Brecht was a German citizen and from East Germany. He was over in the United States working in the motion picture industry. He had never written anything that was produced, but he had been brought over. He was considered one of the foremost writers in the world at that time, but the industry made a mistake. The kind of stuff he wrote was not the kind of stuff that motion pictures produced. But in any event, he was not a citizen. There was fear that if he didn't get out of the country pretty soon, some action might be taken against him.Brecht had never been a member of the Communist Party. He was very close to the communists. Had supported them. And appeared at their meetings; you know, spoken for them. But he never actually had been a member. And so it was decided, of course when I say it was decided-- It was his position, which everybody else thought was a correct position, that he should answer questions about himself and also to--just as soon as he finished testifying that he would leave--return to Germany while he's still able to do so.

Balter: So that decision had been made actually before he testified, that he would leave.

Margolis: Oh, yes. And he did answer questions and made a-- I don't know if you've ever seen that testimony, but the committee was simply ridiculed by him. They didn't know what was happening to them. They didn't understand what was happening to them.

Balter: I've heard the radio tape, which occasionally circulates. Yeah.

Margolis: He was brilliant.

Balter: Now, was there any thought-- He left essentially--what?--within a day or two of his testimony, as I recall, right? Very shortly afterwards?

Margolis: Immediately. Now, it may have taken a few days to make arrangements. But the plan was, and it was followed through, that as soon as possible after he finished testifying, he would leave.

Balter: Had there been any thought given to [his] leaving even beforehand? Was there some strategy around that that was discussed?

Margolis: It was discussed, but there was a problem. It was decided not to try it, because there was a problem as to whether he would be allowed even to board-- He might have been arrested and brought back for the committee. We didn't know what they would do. It was decided that it would, from a public relations standpoint also, that it would seem like he was trying to run away from something. And he didn't want to do that. He did want to go back to Germany, but he didn't want to do it that way.

Balter: And if I understand his-- The decision to have him answer questions was so that he could not be cited for contempt. He would leave essentially with a clean bill of health.

Margolis: That's right. If he had refused to answer questions, he might have had trouble leaving. Might have been on the grounds that he was in contempt of Congress and might have to stay here for a trial.

Balter: It may be safe to assume that the FBI knew what his plans were anyway at that point, given what we know now about--

Margolis: Well, let me put it this way. You used the word surprise before; I would be very much surprised if they didn't know, although I have no proof one way or the other.

Balter: Now, one of the reasons that I have, from time to time, asked you about possible differences or disagreements among the nineteen in terms of strategy is because Alvah Bessie in his book, Inquisition in Eden, claimed that three, the figure he uses, three of the unfriendly nineteen deposited, I guess, what you would call noncommunist affidavits with their producers. Just in case, as Bessie put it, paraphrasing, just in case the strategy didn't work that you all had developed. Are you aware of any of that? Does that ring a bell with you? What people might have--?

Margolis: I didn't know there were three. It was done by somebody. I must say to you that those for whom it was done, one or more persons, were not the ones who testified. You see, they called-- Out of the nineteen, there were eight they never called. They called the ten plus Brecht. And the people he's talking about, whether the three, I'm not sure, were among the eight. We really had very little contact with them once the hearings were over--with the eight.

Balter: Now, why was that? None of them continued to support the rest of the ten?

Margolis: No, they gave some money. They continued to support-- However, they were moving around to protect themselves. Several of them left the country shortly afterwards, including Millie, Lewis Milestone. They were trying to protect themselves in any way that they could. And the filing--I don't know who filed affidavits. As a matter of fact, I've simply heard that as a rumor. I don't know of firsthand knowledge that it actually happened.

Balter: That's what I'm wondering, since Bessie mentions it. I'm trying to figure out what that might have been based on.

Margolis: It was certainly going around Hollywood that that had happened. But there were a million rumors, you know, and this one may have been true.

Balter: By the way, speaking of this general area, one thing I'm interested in knowing your comments on is that when Howard-- It's been mentioned in many places, the fact that Howard Koch at one point took out an ad in the Hollywood Reporter saying that although he was not a communist, he was critical of what the committee had done. I'm curious about this because a lot of people have written somewhat critically about what he did as being kind of a defection, because the group had agreed not to distinguish among themselves publicly whether they were communist or not. And yet Albert Maltz in his oral history speaks somewhat commendably of Koch taking out that ad. I was wondering if you remember that episode, and what your own feelings were about it?

Margolis: It'll take a little history that there-- First of all, let me say that there was an agreement that people would not do what he did. And the reason for it was that if one person did it, in a way that pointed the finger at those who didn't. Not intentionally, but that would be the impact that it was felt that it would have. And there was such an understanding.I must also say, however, that this happened after the hearings were over. When I speak of that understanding, I think we were talking in terms of what we'd do through the hearings really. Anybody could say, quite honestly, that there was no such understanding about anything as to what would be done, once the hearings were over. I think that's important, because I think that Howard Koch is a very honorable and decent man.Howard Koch was not, never has been, a member of the Communist Party. It was a truthful statement. And he--you might criticize him for doing it. At the same time he was so principled that when he took out that ad, he knew it would hurt him. He also hoped it would help him, but he also knew it would hurt him.He refused simply to do what so many other famous people did and what the people who were supposed to file affidavits did: simply crawl over to the other side and join them in effect. He refused to do that. Never did, and his career suffered greatly as a result of that. He didn't get what-- He was blacklisted for a long time. I don't know if he ever really got back in.Incidentally, I lived in Santa Barbara. When I was in the state college there, I had a part in a production at the Lobero Theater in Santa Barbara of Caesar and Cleopatra, which Howard Koch produced.

Balter: Right, I remember you mentioning that before. [laughter]

Margolis: And I met him the next time-- He didn't, of course-- I carried a sword or something, you know, and he didn't-- And I met him the next time as his lawyer. [laughter]

Balter: Do you have, of course-- Well, of course, what we should do is turn over the tape before we go on.

Margolis: All right, time for coffee.

Balter: Okay.

14. Tape Number: VII, Side Two July 31, 1984

Balter: Ben, let me go back to pick up on something that you mentioned a little bit ago. You were talking about the train trip, and mentioned the fact that most of the nineteen were fairly well-off or even clearly wealthy. At the beginning, and I'm assuming that this may have changed later, but at the outset, were you, the attorneys, paid directly by your clients? At what point was there outside fund-raising begun to be done? I understand that that did happen, but I'm not clear on what point that might have been.

Margolis: Yes, we were paid. And it is the one time in my fifty plus years of practice that I can say that in a civil liberties, a civil rights case, not only were we paid, but we were well paid. I think they, you know, it was-- They wanted to pay a reasonable fee. The money raising started after the firings, after the Waldorf declaration, the firings, and the contempt citation. You said something about their being wealthy. There's a difference between making a lot of money and having a lot of money. And I don't think any one of them was really a very wealthy person. I think they might have had reserves enough to last two or three years, a couple of years, but they were--And there were several of them that weren't wealthy at all and had not ever made a lot of money. Alvah Bessie was in the process of trying to break into Hollywood. And he was-- He had no money to speak of. Let's see who else. Sam [Samuel] Ornitz was a man who only worked very occasionally in the industry and certainly was not anything more than modest middle class in his income.The ones that did very well were first of all Trumbo and Maltz; and then in the second group, who didn't make quite as much as Trumbo and Maltz, but did very well, were Cole, Lardner; Scott and Dmytryk were just coming up. They had just done a couple of things which had been very successful. And the road ahead looked very rosy for them, but they were new. They certainly hadn't had any time to accumulate anything to speak of. And the things that they had done while they were big successes had not made them a lot of money. See, who else can I think of? Herbert Biberman, modestly well-off, he and Gale Sondergaard. She was working a great deal; he was getting some work as a director. He had been a Broadway director. They certainly were comfortable.But for some of them, it was like making maybe $2,500 a week versus $5,000, or on occasion $10,000 a week. You want to remember these people didn't work all of the time either. But they did very well when they worked. Don't know whether I've covered all of the ten.

Balter: I believe so, except maybe for Lawson, whom you didn't mention.

Margolis: Oh, Jack Lawson was very modest in his inc-- For one thing, Jack didn't want to work all of the time. He was so busy politically, and he gave away, you know, so much of his money. So John, Jack, was a man who had yet a very modest home--lived very modestly.

Balter: Let's go on to the first day of the hearings themselves. Of course as you mentioned, as is well known, John Howard Lawson was the first witness. What do you recall, that comes to mind now, about that testimony? Of course in addition to what's already to--his words and so forth, which are already in the public record. But did you anticipate the degree to which the committee was going to refuse to allow him to speak? And did you have to do some strategizing on the spot, as it were?

Margolis: We did not have to do any strategizing on the spot, but that doesn't mean that we anticipated exactly what happened would happen. What we did was to prepare for the worst case. So that we had dealt with what turned out to be the worst case. We didn't necessarily assume that the worst case was what would happen, but we were prepared for it. Therefore, nothing that happened surprised us in the sense that we had not anticipated it at least as a possibility.

Balter: By the way, had you, or any of the other attorneys, had any contact with the HUAC staff beforehand on anything? Was there any attempt to come to some agreement as to how the whole thing was going to be done?

Margolis: We attempted to make such contact, but it was rejected.

Balter: On what grounds?

Margolis: Well, they just-- They said they would, well, they-- We wanted to make arrangements for who would appear and when. They said, "We'll let you know." They were unwilling to discuss any of it with us.

Balter: Was it [Frank S.] Tavenner himself who was talked to, or was it--?

Margolis: Tavenner. I believe it was Tavenner. I had a great deal to do with Tavenner over the years. I believe it was Tavenner at that time, but I'm not sure.

Balter: If you would share with us your recollections about that first day or hours of testimony, what comes to mind that strikes you?

Margolis: Well, there's always a difference between anticipating something rather frightening happening and actually experiencing it happening. No matter how much you may have said we expect that this may happen. The ruthlessness of the committee. The total willingness to just override every kind of a request that was made. For example, on the statements, every witness who was a friendly witness was allowed to read the statement, was encouraged to read one. The turndown was just flat, flat turned down.Another thing that was obvious--and again I don't remember the details how it became obvious--was that the committee had no interest in doing anything more than establishing that these people were members of the Communist Party. They weren't concerned about investigating what they did. They weren't concerned about the kind of pictures they made. In support of pictures-- Some of the statements, by the way, dealt with the ridiculous position that had been taken by some of the friendly witnesses that they [the Hollywood Ten] were able to control the content of motion pictures, which of course they were not able to do. Except in such insidious ways as, I think it was-- Who was it? Adolphe Menjou or one of them said that they showed Russians smiling and Russian children playing happily. That kind of propaganda they were able, I suppose, to get in, if you want to call it that. But in any event, that was all they were interested in. And that became so clear and so blatant. There was a question of--remember we discussed--how do you make that apparent? What do you do with that?Also, we talked to some of the friends who were there, and while nobody started to turn around and run, we found that there was some beginning of withdrawal--some. Some of the people were a little frightened by what they saw. And the criticism was made of course: "You were impolite; you should have been polite--after all, it's our Congress. You shouldn't act that way. You were rude."On the other hand, there were others who were very much moved by this. Said, "It's great! This is the way to lick the committee." It was sharply divided reaction, even among our friends.

Balter: Now, when you say your friends, do you mean the delegation that came from Hollywood?

Margolis: Yeah.

Balter: The Committee for the First Amendment, for example?

Margolis: There were people up from New York that we knew and various people. And you hear all kinds of comments from them.

Balter: How about within the nineteen? Now, I know that Jack Lawson's testimony, in order to be able to make himself heard, that he was quite vociferous or militant or however you might want to put it. Within the nineteen was there some--?

Margolis: I think everybody, at least, expressed and I think believed that he had done a great job. And were very pleased with that. As far as I can recall, I heard no criticism from within the group. And I've told you already about Brecht's reaction.

Balter: Now, do you recall, I guess, the evening or the time between the first and second day? Did you have any strategy discussions about what to do the next day? Any plans developed or stratagems for trying to get around what the committee was doing in between the two days?

Margolis: Oh, there were-- We felt that it was obvious by the end of the first day. We tried various legal things during the first day. Asked leave to file a motion to drop down-- The attorneys-- You see, it was decided that the ones who would sit with the witnesses were Bob Kenny and Bart Crum, because they were the two broadest, public relations-wise, people. And the people were actually so well prepared, they really didn't particularly need advice as to what was going on. Let's see, I forgot now, what question I was answering.

Balter: Whether there was strategizing between the two days.

Margolis: No. It was simply determined by the end of the first day that all that could be done was to continue to make up this kind of a fight, and that there were going to be contempt citations that would be fought off in that area. It was going to happen the way we pretty much anticipated it was going to happen anyway.During the first night, for example, I think there was some discussion with the witnesses the next day, of trying to find different ways of getting their statements in. As a matter of fact, one of the strategies that was devised worked. I don't remember what it was, but it worked. The statement got in almost before the committee [laughs] knew what had happened. There was that kind of discussion. But no, no real change. And no real feeling that there was anything much that could be done.

Balter: Now, what do you recall [about] the Committee for the First Amendment, the group that was organized by Philip Dunne, William Wyler--

Margolis: They're the ones who came in the plane.

Balter: Right. And [Humphrey] Bogart and Lauren Bacall and John Huston, so forth, came out. What do you recall about their role in all of this?

Margolis: I recall that we met them when they came in. There's a whole planeload of them. I don't remember the number, but there were a lot of them and very big names in the industry--very big--came. Some of them posed with some of the nineteen, shaking hands with them. Talked to them. They said they were here to support. And within the first two or three days thereafter, they disappeared. Well, if I say disappeared, they were going back to whatever they were doing, and they completely faded out of the picture almost immediately.

Balter: Why do you think that happened?

Margolis: I think in part it was the very breadth, broadness of the group, that had within it people who had no deep sense of conviction. Many of them who hadn't really-- Perhaps no deep understanding of what was going on, but came along: "Gee, you know, I've known Dalton Trumbo for ten years. He's a great writer, and look what they're trying to do with him." Much of it on a very personal level and also the concept, "Gee, the First Amendment." Everybody can support the First Amendment. And then you come there, and you find that it ain't quite that way. There's a knock-down-drag-out fight going on and you're taking on a committee of Congress! They're calling the people you're defending every which name. So, many individuals in that group continued to support the ten--various ways. But very few of them did so publicly thereafter.

Balter: What about the Screen Writers Guild? What kind of support did it give?

Margolis: At some stage, they passed a resolution. I don't remember the details of what was done about it. I believe they passed a resolution.Now, at a later stage the firm of Arnold and Fortas [Arnold, Fortas, and Porter] was hired to file a suit, an antiblacklisting suit on behalf of the Screen Writers Guild. I spent several days in Washington with Abe Fortas, who later became a justice of the Supreme Court and had to resign from it. Extraordinarily good lawyer, considered one of the best minds in Washington. I worked with him on drafting a complaint, although I did not represent the Screen Writers Guild. As a matter of fact, I don't remember how it happened that I got back there to do that. I think maybe somebody from that office called me for some facts, and then I said I'd be glad to come back and be of more help. Something like that happened. They filed a lawsuit, and eventually it was abandoned.

Balter: Why so?

Margolis: I don't really know. Whether it was money, or what it was, I don't know. I don't remember. But it was abandoned. They did not push it through. We were very high on this lawsuit. We thought this was the thing that could turn it around.

Balter: Now, the Arnold that you mentioned would be Thurman [W.] Arnold?

Margolis: Thurman Arnold.

Balter: Now, as I understand it, your firm handled-- After several of the ten were fired from the various studios in which they worked and were blacklisted, as I understand it, your firm prosecuted lawsuits against the studios on their behalf. Is that correct?

Margolis: Yes, there were three of us who were in these lawsuits--Charles Katz, Bob Kenny, and I--with Charles Katz and I doing the principal trial work at the early stages of that litigation. We won a couple of cases; lost one. They all went up on appeal. And then about that time, the indictment was returned in the Smith Act case [Yates v. United States] in Los Angeles, and I was called in on that. From that point on, for the next eighteen, twenty months did nothing else except work on the Smith Act case. And Charles Katz-- I think there was one other case tried by Katz and Kenny after I was already in the Smith Act case. And they handled the appeals, which we lost-- Some appeals which we lost, then others were settled.There was a settlement, and I remember I participated in the discussions as to whether we should settle. It was finally decided to settle. The cases that had not yet been decided in the appellate court would undoubtedly be lost, and we could get, I don't know, we got a couple of hundred thousand dollars, I think. Something like that.

Balter: I've asked this question essentially before, but let me, in a different context, ask it again. When you returned from Washington, of course, only ten of the nineteen, eleven counting Brecht, had been actually called to testify. And when the indictments came down for contempt of Congress, as I understand it, the disassociation of the other nine was somewhat-- Had it essentially come before that? Did the nine feel that they were going to be-- Were they still in touch with you, because there was a possibility that they would be called again before the committee, or was it clear that they were not now going to be called? I'm being clear at what I'm getting at?

Margolis: I understand. Everbody thought, and there was some indication from the committee, that it was going to proceed first of all with the contempt cases, get convictions, and then hold further hearings. As a matter of fact, it didn't hold further hearings for about three years, until the Supreme Court denied a hearing in the contempt cases. So that it did not appear probable that there were going to be any further hearings until after the contempt matters had been decided.And people spread out. Some people went to Europe. I think a couple of people went to Mexico. I think a couple tried to make peace. One of the persons involved was Robert Rossen. Why, I think it was later discovered that he had, as a matter of fact, he'd gone and cooperated with the committee, although it wasn't generally known. So they kind of dispersed.You want to remember there's another thing that is true. That the ones that they called first were, to use a word that is used often, were the hard core. They were the ones who were the center of the left-wing movement. Jack Lawson probably at the heart of it. Jack Lawson was the principal founder of the Writers Guild--organizer of it. So that when you got beyond these people, you were dealing with people who were liberals and Left and some Communist Party members, but who had not been as vigorous in their political activities as the first ten.

Balter: By the way, speaking of Communist Party membership, Maltz, in his oral history, mentions two things, which I wonder if you could comment on, in terms of your own recollections. One is that he recalls that those of the nineteen who were in fact members of the Communist Party had separate meetings, or at least had one or two separate meetings, to discuss what they as Communist Party members should do. That was [point] A. And secondly Maltz also recalls that the party really left the nineteen and then later the ten to decide their own political strategy. It was not something that was essentially run or guided from the party leadership itself. Do you have any recollections?

Margolis: Yes, I was involved. There were a couple of meetings of that kind, which I attended. As a matter of fact, at one point, I went to New York and talked. Went to the "ninth floor." Know what the "ninth floor" is?

Balter: I have a feeling I do.

Margolis: The headquarters of the Communist Party. And that's where the top people were. Acting only for the people who were communists and on their behalf, [I] simply reported what had happened, what they were going to do, and asked for support through the papers--things of that kind. My recollection is that they pretty much simply said, "Well, we think you're doing right, and we'll support you." The program-- This I want to make clear. The decision was not-- As to what they were going to do, [the decision] was made by the witnesses themselves together with their attorneys. Now, of course their political affiliations indicated what kind of people they were and pointed to the direction in which they would go. But no one, absolutely no one decided what they would do for them. Mainly, they went to try to get additional support in various ways from organizations. So you want to remember that the Communist Party at that time had a great deal of influence in many organizations. And one of the things that was hopeful to get-- This broad organizational support was possible, and the party headquarters got out the word this is a worthy cause and ought to be supported, it would have an impact. So that was the nature of our contact. I think I may--I know I went once, and I may have gone twice.

Balter: Now, I get the impression, perhaps you can correct this, from my research that despite the charges of HUAC and people associated with that campaign that the communists had taken over Hollywood-- (And this was the way, I guess they would put it, this was the way to the hearts and minds of America--through the motion pictures and subversion of people's ideals.) I get the impression that the Communist Party didn't really regard its presence in Hollywood as a particularly high priority compared to other things. Does that--?

Margolis: Well--

Balter: How would you view it?

Margolis: I think they placed great importance on it, but not from any idea that they could really influence the content of motion pictures. But there were-- You want to remember these people were public figures. They spoke out on public issues, and their names were known among the people. So when they spoke, their words were printed in the newspapers and in the press. They were important voices.Also, they had money. I remember there weren't very many Communist Party members that made $2,500 a week or $5,000 or $10,000. Not very many. And these people were generous and did give to the party. So they were important to the party, but not from the standpoint of controlling the content of motion pictures, nor was there ever even any idea that this could be done.As a matter of fact, the Communist Party branches did discuss things going on inside the motion picture industry, but not control of the content. They discussed such things, for example, as support of the trade unions, discrimination against blacks, and so forth. Those they were concerned with. No one among them even dreamed that they controlled the content of a motion picture.

Balter: Now, picking up again on the fates and fortunes of the ten, of course the House of Representatives some months later found them in contempt of Congress. Do you remember, was there any attempt before that vote came--? Which was overwhelmingly in favor of contempt. I don't have the figures exactly in front of me, but overwhelmingly in favor of finding the ten in contempt. Do you recall any efforts, the nature of any efforts to lobby the House of Representatives to build public support beforehand?

Margolis: Oh, yes, yes. As a matter of fact, I traveled around the country with-- Once around the country. Went to a number of major cities before that, with Herb Biberman. Various people of the ten would be in one place or another speaking about this, urging people to send telegrams and letters to their representatives in Congress. I spent some time in Washington with [Vito] Marcantonio, trying to talk to some people. But the hysteria was setting in; there wasn't very much you could do at that point.

Balter: Were you finding-- You talked for example about the group that had chartered the plane to Washington, the group that I am referring to as the Committee for the First Amendment, or at least that being one of the major forms that this took. At this point were those people, as you put it, fading out already?

Margolis: Oh, yes. It started almost immediately.

Balter: The lack of support?

Margolis: As a group. As a group they virtually disappeared, very, very quickly. Some individuals did continue to support.

Balter: By the way, there are a number of people who are not Hollywood people, but whose names come up in terms of the--as a matter of fact, this particular list is mentioned in the Ceplair-Englund book, which I have referred to already--people in other fields who supported the ten. And I'd like to briefly mention them and what you recall about the type of support, which they did give, and the extent of it. For example, Thomas Emerson at Yale Law School, Walter Gellhorn at the Columbia law school, Carey McWilliams.

Margolis: Well, they wrote law review articles. I think Tom wrote a law review article. He about that time was president of the National Lawyers Guild. Gellhorn I didn't know, but they spoke out on the issue. They were public figures who took a side.

Balter: May I assume at the time and under those circumstances that it was, I guess, a fairly risky thing for someone to do?

Margolis: Oh, yes. Yes. No one was really safe during that period. But Emerson survived. As a matter of fact, he continued to teach at Yale until he retired. Gellhorn-- Who else did you mention?

Balter: Well, other names that come up in this connection are I. F. Stone, Henry Steele Commager, Alexander Meiklejohn.

Margolis: I. F. Stone of course had his paper, or weekly letter, at that time. Was pretty independent of others. I don't know if you're familiar with--

Balter: Oh, yeah.

Margolis: --his letters from those days. And he of course wrote in the letters about--he was very vigorous on that. Who else did you mention?

Balter: I mentioned Henry Steele Commager. Alexander Meiklejohn.

Margolis: I know they spoke out on this, but I really know very little else.

Balter: What do you recall about the, of course the-- Let's back up a minute. The House did find the ten in contempt, and the indictments came down. What do you recall about preparing for the trials of the ten legally in terms of legal strategy? Which attorneys now at this point-- Well, you mentioned before which attorneys were involved. What type of discussions of legal strategy occurred around preparing for trial?

Margolis: Well, you have to go back. I left out one thing when I was talking about strategy and preparing for the hearings. We anticipated that there would be contempt and a contempt trial probably, and we wanted to have something that we could take to a jury. What we were afraid of is that you'd create a situation where what the judge would instruct the jury would virtually eliminate any question of fact for the jury to decide.So the ten, when I say, "They refuse to answer the question," they'd put it a different way; they said, "I am answering the question, and this is the only, this is the only way the question can be answered." Wanting to leave open the possibility of arguing to the jury that they should consider this in answer to the question.Actually, when we got to trial, the judge [Edward M. Kern] instructed the jury that they must find that the questions were not answered, as indeed they weren't. It was really a gimmick that we were trying somehow to get to the jury. There was nothing for the jury to decide, in that we first of all prepared a motion to dismiss. It was really a legal issue. Did extensive research.Argued in the trial court. Lost, of course, before every judge. Then when the case was tried, the trials were very short trials, a couple of days, because no defense was really permitted. The case consisted primarily of the record of the committee, fact that there had been the hearings, [and] the vote of Congress. That was basically the record. We looked for technical things--why the committee was fully authorized and so forth. None of the technical things really had any merit.What we had basically was a constitutional issue. They had--the government had done its work, so far as the technical handling of the case was [concerned], and left us with nothing much there. We tried some things out. I don't remember what they were, but they had very little hope of success--of possibility of success.Then we tried the case. And the main issue, we always felt that we would lose in the trial court; we would lose in the court of appeal; and we would win in the Supreme Court. Or at least that that's where we had a really fine chance of winning. We certainly lost in the trial court; lost in the appellate court; and then were denied a hearing. Didn't even get a hearing in the Supreme Court, on a case that presented the kind of fundamental constitutional questions that the Court was created to decide.

Balter: Now, as I understand it, shortly before the case referred your petition to the U.S. Supreme Court for hearing, there were some changes in the composition of the court. Tom [C.] Clark, I believe, became a justice, and one other--

Margolis: Well, what happened was, we lost-- We felt we had at least four jus-- In order to get a hearing in the Supreme Court, four justices out of nine have to vote for the hearing. In order to win the case, you have to get a majority of those participating in the decision. And we felt clearly that we had the four. Two of them, however, were [Frank] Murphy, former governor of Michigan, and [Wiley B.] Rutledge, who had only been on the Supreme Court a short time but was really on his way to becoming one of the great justices of the Supreme Court. He died. Both of them died.The matter was kept under submission by the-- Ordinarily whether or not a hearing is granted is decided within a matter of weeks or months. It was kept under submission for over a year, and then they denied a hearing. But in the meantime these two judges had died. So we knew we had two pretty sure votes left, and probably even a good chance of the third one. But it was clear by that time that our chances of having four were very slim. So that's what happened. And basides that, the political situation had become much worse. The Cold War was-- See, it was denied--Certiorari was denied in '50. Well, by 1950, the Cold War was really rolling.Well, there had been some very, very good First Amendment decisions, which had ruled that not only that the First Amendment protected the right to speak, but the right of association. And that the right to associate was an essential element of the right to speak. If you didn't have that right, the right to speak would be minimized and destroyed.Our theory was that you cannot anymore ask a man about his politics than you can about his religion, and compel him to answer. A person can voluntarily answer any question the person wants to answer, but you can't compel him to answer. And we wrote a very, very strong brief on that, which later on was largely followed by the Supreme Court in the Watkins case [Watkins v. United States], which was decided in [pauses] 1956, or '57. Six or seven years-- No. [Nineteen] fifty-six or '57, yeah, six or seven years later. And we felt we were going to win the case.

Balter: So was this somewhat of a rude awakening when they didn't grant us certiorari.

Margolis: I say we felt we were going to win the case. We felt that confidence at the time of the contempt hearings. Diminished somewhat when Murphy died, and diminished even further when Rutledge died. And their replacements were terrible. I think the replacements were Clark and [Harold H.] Burton, if I remember correctly. Terrible replacements because it meant not only good votes for us taken away, strong people, but very strong people added on the other side.We still thought our chances at least of getting a hearing were excellent. We didn't think that the Supreme Court was going to duck it, duck the thing. It was just too basic, too important a question, the Supreme Court would not do that. We weren't at that point nearly as confident about winning the case as we had been earlier. But it turned out that they solved the problem by ducking it.

Balter: Now, the decision to only go to trial with--that you reached with the prosecutor--to only go to trial with Lawson and Trumbo and then to abide by the decision, was that a decision that was arrived at easily, or was there a lot of debate around that among the group: the attorneys and the ten?

Margolis: There wasn't a great deal of debate about it. It was a practical question. Number one, the issue was identical. You had no more chance of winning one case than you did another. You had the same judges. They were going to rule alike. That's the first thing.The second thing is that the trials cost money and time. And by that time, the ten were having their individual financial problems. Whereas we had gotten well paid initially, there came a point when we contined to work without any pay for years. So that when it added up, the pay wasn't so good. But, so there was that financial consideration from the standpoint of the ten themselves, as well as from the standpoint of the attorney. You know, just paying the expenses of attorneys from California and the witnesses in California to go [and] the defendants to go was by then a lot of money for them to raise.

Balter: We're out of tape so-- Oh, no, we're not, I'm sorry.

Margolis: So that was the second reason. And the third was that the people were then blacklisted. Remember at this stage when that decision was made, we were very optimistic that we could go right up and win that case. And if we won that case, then we felt the [fight against the] blacklist would be helped. So this was a way of speeding it up. Very concerned. So for those three reasons, this decision was arrived at. And I can't-- There may have been some people who originally questioned it, but when the whole thing was explained, I can't remember any dissent.

Balter: I think that's a good stopping place. I'm ready to run out of tape anyway.

15. Tape Number: VIII, Side One September 13, 1984

Balter: Ben, we spent quite a bit of time talking about the Hollywood Ten. There's a few more things I'd like to ask you on that subject before we go on to other things. First of all, we may have talked about this a little bit before, but in the [1948] contempt-of-Congress trials of John Howard Lawson and Dalton Trumbo [Lawson v. United States, Trumbo v. United States], I wonder if you could give me some of your recollections about how those trials went, some of the problems that came out during those trials, and some of your strategizing beforehand on how you were going to handle those defenses.

Margolis: Our main problem was that we wanted to try the cases, we tried two of them, in such a way that the jury would have a basis--under the instructions of the court and the facts that were presented--on which it could acquit, because most of the facts were totally undisputed. For example, the fact that they had been properly subpoenaed, the fact that the committee [House Committee to Investigate Un-American Activities (HUAC)] was properly appointed, the fact that there had been summons or subpoenas had been served, the fact that they were asked questions and what their answers [were]. There were simply no issues really to be decided there. And it appeared that once you put in all of those facts, a conviction would automatically follow, because the questions that were asked about membership in the Communist Party and in the Screen Actors--Scrren Writers or Screen Actors Guild were never answered.We tried to develop a gimmick, which was to the effect that when the witnesses responded--the ones we represented--they did not refuse to answer. They answered by saying that under the Constitution they were not obligated to answer and that this was the only kind of an answer that was required. Or that at least if it wasn't the only kind of an answer that was required, at the very least the jury had a right to find, as a matter of fact, that it was an adequate answer. We tried that as a practical matter: it didn't work. The reason it didn't work is that the judge [Edward M. Kern] gave instructions to the effect that the only issue was whether or not there had been a deliberate failure to answer the question directly, responsibely. And that an answer which explained the reason for not answering responsibly was not a defense.We also tried to put in evidence about the history of the committee to show that it had no valid constitutional basis for existing. The trial judge held on that, and I think correctly, as a matter of law that that was an issue for the court to decide. It was a constitutional issue of the kind that should not go to a jury. It was a question of law, not of fact. And that all of the matters on which we relied were of the kind of which the court could take judicial notice. So we fought these things out and tried to make a record on the case. But when the jury was instructed as a practical matter, the only way that the jury could acquit was by going contrary to the instructions of the judge. The judge-- They left absolutely no opening. I must confess that the thing that we tried to do, so far as creating an issue of fact was concerned, was a pretty gimmicky kind of thing where we just tried to do anything that we could.In fact, when we went up on appeal, we didn't even argue directly that questions had been answered and that should have been so held. We argued on appeal that under the Constitution, there was no obligation to answer those questions, because the committee, for a large number of reasons, had no right to compel answers to the questions.Well, those things were questions of law and were not questions to be submitted to the jury. So we spent a lot of time trying to work out something. But the way the cases were tried and the way it eventually resolved itself, the jury did convict. And as a matter of fact they had no choice.

Balter: Now, your attempts to broaden the issues that the judge would allow the jury to consider and also to broaden what instructions he would give--did those attempts take place primarily in pretrial motions, or was there a lot of arguing during the trial out of the presence of the jury? What form did that take?

Margolis: Well, I would say that the major arguments were made in pretrial motions, which we lost. Then during the trial, for the most part, we raised the same points that we'd already lost in pretrial motions. There [were] not very extensive arguments. I think the cases-- There were two cases tried: the Lawson case, and the Trumbo case. And I think each of them from the time of the impaneling of the jury through the jury verdicts took two days.

Balter: So the jury-- The verdict came swiftly.

Margolis: It was a canned verdict.

Balter: Now, you mentioned some of the gimmicks that you tried to use. One, in the Los Angeles Times, April 16, 1948, during the Lawson trial-- The article mentions that you were denied permission to show a film that Mr. Lawson had been involved in writing. Apparently, according to the article, as an attempt to show that subversive ideas had not been injected into the film and so on. The article doesn't mention what film it was. Do you remember that episode?

Margolis: I think the film that we tried to show was Blockade. A film that Lawson wrote and was a big hit during the war--a war film.

Balter: It was about the Spanish Civil War, as I recall?

Margolis: Partially, and the Second World War. Remember this was after World War II. And you know these writers, all of them wrote or most of them wrote films, some of the most prominent films that related to the war and in support of the war effort.

Balter: Do you remember any of the others in addition to that example? Do you remember any of the other, as you refer to them, gimmicks, or things that you tried to get into the trial?

Margolis: Well, I think we also tried to get in some of Trumbo's films. He had one film--I don't remember the exact title of it--was it [Thirty] Seconds Over Tokyo? Or something like that, that we tried to get in. [tape recorder off]

Balter: Yeah, go ahead. Okay, we're back on tape now.

Margolis: I think I've finished my answer.

Balter: Okay. [laughs] That sounds like what you would say before the committee. [laughter] Now, I understand also that the judge-- Judge Edward M. Kern was the name of the judge I believe? Is that correct?

Margolis: Yes.

Balter: That you were threatened during the course of either one or both of the trials with contempt on a number of occasions. What do you recall about the interaction between the attorneys and the judge?

Margolis: It really didn't get terribly hot. What we were doing was trying to get things before the jury that the judge was indicating we shouldn't get before the jury. We were pushing it to the limits, and when we went what he felt was a little too far, he threatened us with contempt. I think only once; may have been twice. But it never got into a real donnybrook.We had decided in advance that, as a practical matter, the case was going to be decided on appeal, and, probably, in all probability, by the Supreme Court of the United States. And in any event, it was not going to be decided by the-- On the issues that we were trying to raise before the jury. We had also had another reason for--several more reasons for not pushing it to the point of contempt. One was that we thought it would be bad public relations for us to do that, because it would seem that here are a group of people who just simply defied all public authority. We didn't think that was a good climate in which to present the case. And the other was that even if we had been able to present all of the evidence we wanted to present, we did not have the kind of a jury that would be very likely to acquit under any circumstances. In the city of Washington, it was impossible to get a jury the great majority of whom were not either themselves in the government employ or didn't have a member of their family, or very close friend, that was in the government employ. That's what Washington is. Basically, it's a legislative and executive governmental city. We, as a matter of fact, had advanced the contention that government employees could not sit on this, because this was the government against these defendants, and in effect they had to be prejudiced. That argument in that form alone is really not a valid argument, because it could be made in every criminal case. It's the people versus us.

Balter: Sure.

Margolis: But we extended that argument. We said that we wanted to put in evidence that there was a tremendous amount of fear and intimidation. That this was not the ordinary sort of a situation, where a juror could feel free to vote for an acquittal in a criminal case and not feel that his position with the government was in danger.

Balter: Because of the witch-hunting atmosphere.

Margolis: But because of this, jurors could very well be frightened that they would loose their positions. We lost on that one, too.

Balter: By the way, speaking of that, do you recall, during the voir dire process, do you recall any particular things that you were looking for? Any particular criteria that you had in your mind when the jurors were being picked?

Margolis: Well, we wanted above all to get people who were as remote from the government as possible. And it was just not possible in Washington. It would have been if the trial had been somewhere else. Second, we tried to get the kind of people who we thought would have an understanding of the constitutional principles that were involved--the right of free speech--even though we couldn't argue them. We thought that people who-- The better educated, the more intellectual persons would probably in this particular case give us a better shot. But all of it was in the context of a realization that we were talking about things that were not perhaps totally impossible to achieve, but were next to impossible at best.

Balter: Now, when you lost at the appeals court level and then later when the Supreme Court refused to hear the case, how much of a surprise was that, if any, at the time? I have the impression that you were quite hopeful or optimistic originally about winning this.

Margolis: We had very little hope of winning the case in the court of appeals. They had a very conservative court of appeals. It required the making of new laws; courts of appeals do that far less frequently than the Supreme Court does. That's more or less the Supreme Court's business.We had a great deal of hope. As a matter of fact, we felt that certainly we were going to get a hearing and that the odds were very good that we would have at least five of the nine justices in our favor. But this is the hope that we had at the time that the petition for a hearing was filed in the Supreme Court. Then, I don't remember the order in which it happened, but either first Justice [Wiley B.] Rutledge died, or Justice [Frank] Murphy died. And whoever died first, we still felt at that time that we would get a hearing at least. Because we felt that we had four justices who would probably vote for a hearing, based upon their record and their position. Then when the second justice died, which was either--which was the other one--Rutledge or Murphy, our hopes went down a long way. Because at that time we realized that we had only three justices on whom we felt we could really depend. Now, that was one factor that decreased our expectations as time went on.But there was another factor that was equally instrumental in our hopes going down. And that is, that when we started the case-- While we were already in a period of Cold War and red-baiting, the Cold War was every day becoming colder and McCarthyism was every day becoming hotter. Fear was spreading; was on a rampage through our society. So that by the time the Supreme Court denied the hearing, the political situation was, as a whole, very much against our getting a hearing. We were realistic about the fact that political situations affect even the best of Supreme Court justices.

Balter: Okay. Now, when the Supreme Court did deny hearing, do you recall, well, do you recall where you were in the reaction of you and the other attorneys and the ten? I mean at this point everybody knows you're going to jail, and the only question is how long. Do you remember anything about having to share that knowledge with the rest of the ten?

Margolis: I don't remember where I was. I'm almost positive that I got a call from the clerk of the Supreme Court--they very commonly call you--and followed up by a notice that I talked the other lawyers into-- We split up contacting our clients.As I said, by the time this happened, you see, there was another very peculiar thing in this case. And that is, usually, when you file a petition for CERT [certiorari], while there is no deadline created by law on the Supreme Court ruling on whether it will grant a hearing, theoretically they could sit on it for five years, and then either grant or deny a hearing. Customarily, action was taken within a matter of weeks. There might be an exception where it took a month or two or three. But ours was over a year. And it went beyond the-- They didn't act. Almost always, invariably, before the end of a term, they will decide all of the petitions that had been filed during that term, other than perhaps some that might have been filed the last few days and they didn't have an opportunity to reach. We had filed before the beginning of the term, and here the term ended, and they didn't act on it. They decided it, as I remember, fairly early in the following term.

Balter: Was it, I believe, April of 1950?

Margolis: I don't remember. I'm very bad on dates.

Balter: Yes, April of 1950.

Margolis: From the Court's standpoint, I think they wanted a full court to pass on it. I don't remember how long it took to fill the vacancies that were created by the deaths of Murphy and Rutledge. So to some extent it was understandable that they would delay. But there was another reason also for our having lost our high optimism. And that is, we knew before the appointments were made that they would be very conservative. And, indeed, they turned out to be. We knew what had happened is that we had lost two of the strongest advocates for our position, and had them replaced by people who would fight strongly against our position--pretty high hurdle to overcome. Now, the way this ties into the whole thing is that by the time it happened, we were still somewhat hopeful of a hearing. But we expected anything to happen, and it came as no great surprise. It came as a shock, but no great surprise. Now, maybe that sounds inconsistent--

Balter: No, I know what you mean.

Margolis: --but it really isn't. When we talked to the individuals, I don't remember the specific reactions, but probably they differ with each one. Like I can imagine, I don't remember if I talked to Trumbo, for example, I can imagine Trumbo saying, "Fuck 'em. We'll lick 'em yet." And I can imagine somebody like [Edward] Dmytryk, who was one of the weak guys, sort of half crying about this, "My god, what's going to happen to us?" With all sorts of reactions in between. Most of the reactions I think were strong: we-have-just-begun-to-fight type of reactions.

Balter: Now, when the Supreme Court denies certiorari, what happened next in terms-- Of course, it was a question of what the sentences would be, and so on.

Margolis: No, we already had the sentences. They had already been handed down.

Balter: The sentence had already been handed down?

Margolis: First of all, we filed a petition for rehearing, which is granted about once in a hundred thousand cases. But we nevertheless were going to exhaust every, every possibility, and we did. And there we had-- We filed it, more because we felt that we couldn't have anybody say that we had failed to do everything possible, rather than any belief in the possibility that such a petition would be granted. And then following that, that was denied quite promptly. I imagine it took a month, six weeks--the whole thing. We then made arrangements to surrender the people in Washington and for them to travel there on their own. Although I'm trying to think, now, I may be wrong about that. I think that they came and picked up some of the defendants in California and took them in custody to Washington.

Balter: Well, I understand that in June of 1950, when they were supposed to surrender, that at least some of the ten went off at the Los Angeles airport. Went off, flew off, and there were rallies or some other type of send-off for them. Do you recall those events?

Margolis: Yes, yes. It was not quite as big and as enthusiastic as when they left to testify. But there was still a substantial turnout, a big send-off, and it was big news. You know, first page in the newspapers as I remember.

Balter: Well, one of the reasons I mentioned the thing about sentences is because in your FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] file, at one point, there's a mention of an attempt, and there's not really details other than stating it, an attempt to persuade the U.S. attorney to go along with more lenient sentences for the ten.

Margolis: Oh, yes.

Balter: Something along these lines was vaguely stated. What was done along those lines?

Margolis: We did make motions for reconsideration of the sentences. And they stood unchanged. Two of the defendants-- You see, they were not all before the same judge. Two of the defendants were given six months; everyone else was give the maximum of one year.

Balter: Do you recall who the two were that got six months?

Margolis: I think Dmytryk was one, and I think [Herbert] Biberman was the other one. I'm not positive.

Balter: Do you recall any particular reason why their sentences were lighter?

Margolis: No, there were just judges who were more--

Balter: Just the judges were different?

Margolis: --more lenient--different. That's all.

Balter: Okay. I was going to ask you if anybody ever speculated that Dmytryk made a deal before he went to jail, but then obviously Biberman did not do such a thing. So there wouldn't be any consistency. But I was wondering if it ever occurred to anybody?

Margolis: No, it certainly didn't. No, the sentence at the time-- You want to remember that when he was sentenced, that was before the appeals. And at that point, we were quite optimistic that we were going to win in the Supreme Court of the United States. All of us were optimistic about that. I would be very much surprised, I would be amazed if he had done it at that time. I think what happened was that Dmytryk, who was a weak character-- No, he didn't have the strength of some of the others, and also he had married--he had recently gotten married to a woman who was not very sympathetic to the whole deal, really, although she pretended to be. It was obvious that it wasn't--

Balter: Could you remind me who that was now?

Margolis: I can't remember her name [Jean Porter Dmytryk].

Balter: Because I--

Margolis: A very attractive woman.

Balter: An actress as I recall.

Margolis: An actress, yes, an actress.

Balter: Okay. We'll have to look that one up. I knew that at one time.

Margolis: I don't remember her name. I don't think she ever became exceedingly successful, but I think, you know, she did make a career out of the thing. I think she had a tremendous influence on Edward Dmytryk.My feeling is that he felt his whole future going to pot. You see, there was another factor that some of the people who tried to defend his position argued on his behalf. Most of the defendants were writers, and as events proved afterwards, while they were hard hit by the blacklist, etcetera, they were able to write on the black market. Most of them continued to make some kind of a living on a much lesser scale. Much, much lesser scale than before, but, nevertheless, were able, most of them, to survive economically. Eddie is a director. And a director, you can't operate in the black market as a director, so that he saw his whole career just terminate forever. Whereas at least the others, or most of the others, felt that one way or another they were at least going to make a living, and they would keep their craft fresh and skilled.You see, one of the things that happened is that many of the writers--the good, the best writers--made a comeback later on, and then did all right. That did not happen for the most part to the actors and actresses. The reason is that after being off the stage, off the screen for fifteen years, twenty years, styles changed. Their skills had tended to be lost and had not grown with the times. So that very few of them were able to make any kind of a comeback.

Balter: Now, what do you recall about the time that the ten spent in jail, the treatment that they got, any special problems that they had, the support that was organized for them?

Margolis: Well, there were certainly a lot of--they received heavy mail. People supported them. There were visits. I didn't visit any of them in jail; they were too far away. But the people in the East and the other people did visit them. They were not discriminated against in jail. They all functioned within the prison system very well; that is, they were able to survive, and they had no problems with fellow prisoners. As a matter of fact, many of the other prisoners liked to hear them talk and saw them as personalities, as heroes, or at least big public figures, for having prestige. So, while prison of course is prison, it wasn't certainly any worse for them than it was for others. By and large, while they were sent to different institutions--and some of them were tougher than others, but that was the nature of the institution--for the most part, they were sent to the easier institutions. None of them were sent to the real harsh ones.

Balter: Did some of them continue to write while they were in jail? Was that something that they were able to do?

Margolis: To some extent. That the problem of getting the stuff out of the jail-- I think Dalton wrote some stuff and was able to get it out. For the most part, they did not, but there were some.

Balter: There isn't a film that someday we will find out was actually written-- It seems like we are always finding out that a film was actually written by one of the blacklisted writers. [laughs]

Margolis: I would be amazed. You mean while they were in prison?

Balter: While they were in prison, right.

Margolis: I believe that I knew about the films that they wrote on the black market, and to my knowledge there was no such film. Now, there may have been some ideas that developed while they were in prison; some preliminary things they did that they really completed afterwards and that were made into pictures. But I'm not sure about that.

Balter: Now, we talked some, over the last couple of sessions, about the blacklist that followed all of this, and we've talked about that to some extent. The name Martin Gang--who is of course very well known as an attorney who helped people to avoid the blacklist, or to at least deal with it in one way or another--has come up before in our discussions. I wanted to ask you a few things about him. Not only your general recollections of him, but also whether it ever happened that people would go to you first and then go to him, or go to him first and then come to you. I know that you defended a lot of people who were before HUAC, or who were subject to the blacklist. What do you recall about the whole Martin Gang phenomenon and the blacklist as it related to him?

Margolis: There would be no person who would come to me and then go to Martin Gang, unless they completely changed their attitude between the time that they came to me and the time that they finally went to Gang. Now, there may have been a few people that came to me and ultimately went to Gang.Not everybody resisted to the same extent. There were some people who folded over a period of time. For example, [Larry] Parks, I think, went to Gang; I'm almost positive he went to Gang. But he didn't come to me after it was over. He was an actor, you see. Again, he had a more difficult role. For him, it was particularly difficult. He had had his one big success, The Jolson Story, and it looked like his career was just beginning. He was going to be a terrific star versus nothing. There was no black market for him. He was married to a wonderful woman, Betty, oh, I can't-- It'll come to me [Betty Garrett]. An actress who was very good politically, but who stayed with him when he turned--So I would say that people who had one political attitude went to me--and others, not only to me--and people who had an entirely different political attitude, or at least if not an entirely different political attitude, were ready to submerge their political views and to go contrary to them, went to Martin Gang.He tried to be friendly with me. I remember his coming up and talking to me and saying, "You know, Ben, we're both trying to do the same thing." My reaction as I remember, I said, "Martin," something along the lines of "Martin, you've got too much brains to really believe that," and walked away.But he always wanted to be on the side of the angels and to have himself treated as though he were. But actually what he was doing is he was saying to people, "I can arrange, if you completely fold and do everything the committee wants, I can arrange for you perhaps to get some work." That's what he was doing.

Balter: As I understand it, Gang arranged a lot of private sessions with HUAC. And there's a few-- Well, I think Larry Parks is an example of it. There were a few celebrated cases where people got double-crossed later, and their testimony became public.

Margolis: I think I mentioned one previously, Milton Tyre. I think there were private sessions that weren't disclosed, and I think they were basically of two kinds--the ones that weren't disclosed. One kind is where it wouldn't mean much from a publicity-- The person wasn't important enough, or they wouldn't gain a great deal, from their standpoint of their objectives, by doing that. And the other was that there were many people who were sort of "graylisted," which was very close, sometimes equal, to a blacklist, but who really had never been-- There was no claim that they had ever been members of the Communist Party, but they had been close friends with people who had been in the Communist Party. Gone to affairs with them, belonged to the antifascist refugee committee, had signed various petitions, and so forth. But who could sign affidavits truthfully saying, "I'm not now, I never have been a member of the Communist Party." And then they would have to sign statements saying, "But I was a stooge and they fooled me. Got me to join the antifascist refugee committee or to sign a petition for peace," or whatever. And some of those I think they did not disclose.

Balter: So I take it from what you said a minute ago that there were very few people who, perhaps to put it somewhat crudely, were sort of shopping around for the best way to go. Who would get sort of-- Get some advice from you, get some advice from Gang, try to figure out which way they were going to go. Most people were fairly well set in what it was that they were going to do when they were subpoenaed.

Margolis: Well, you see, I had no advice that I could give them [that] would keep them openly in the industry. I could give some advice to writers about the possibility of getting some work. But, you see, even there I couldn't be too much help, because by and large the writers who wrote on the black market were the best writers. Were the ones that the industry really desperately needed. Now, there were many other writers who were competent writers, but if they weren't available, another writer of relatively equal quality could be found without too much difficulty. But you didn't readily displace or replace a Trumbo or a [Albert] Maltz or a Lawson. They were, you know, they were top writers, and they were the ones who got black market jobs. Now, there were also some of the lesser writers, also got black market [jobs], but it was harder for them to do it.

Balter: Now, did you have much involvement in the black market phenomenon?

Margolis: No.

Balter: People who were using other writers to submit their work didn't have special legal problems in terms of contracts? Being sure that they didn't get--

Margolis: Well, I had to give them advice as a practical matter, you see. They were using the names of others; others were front people for them. And if that was ever revealed, then both the front and the person-fronted-for lost. Both parties had to and therefore you couldn't-- And the person who was a front wouldn't put anything in writing.

Balter: So everything was just a verbal agreement?

Margolis: Verbal agreement. And with the understanding that, "Look, you might get screwed in this deal. All I'm going to do is the best I can for you." And there were some instances, by the way, where advantage was taken of people.

Balter: Do you recall any of the details of some of them?

Margolis: Well, I know some claims were made, [pauses] and here because-- A little hesitant to mention names, because I'm not sure. You see, either these were people who were taking a risk, and either it was true that they were doing it to feather their own nest, or they were-- Or it was not true, and I wasn't sure.There were some situations, for example, where people didn't get paid. Something would come up and people didn't get paid. Indubitably, all persons say, "Where's my money?" "Well, I got much less, and I had to do it much cheaper." Or they get part of what they thought was coming, then they'd say, "Well, I couldn't get any more. They're threatening me, and I can't do anything." It became a very murky area because of that. It wasn't the kind of thing that could be worked out on a legal basis.

Balter: I assume you've probably seen the film The Front, starring Woody Allen. I think Martin Ritt made that movie with Woody.

Margolis: Yes.

Balter: That film portrays in a very humorous way a front writer becoming essentially a hero and a darling of the world. Obviously that's a somewhat exaggerated situation.

Margolis: Well, but it is an exaggeration of a truth.

Balter: Of a truth.

Margolis: Because very often the fronts gained, because they were able to have things done in their name that they themselves couldn't have written, [that] they didn't have the ability to write.

Balter: In other words, they were then able to get some of their own--have an easier time getting some of their own stuff presented.

Margolis: Well, they got more with their reputation enhanced. Now, I don't think there was ever a front like the one in The Front, who was totally, you know-- Because that kind of a front as a practical matter couldn't have been effected. That was taking a true situation and making a kind of a farce out of it, with the basic underlying truth.

Balter: Do you want to take a break at this point?

Margolis: I'll take a break. I'd like to get a cup of coffee.

16. Tape Number: VIII, Side Two September 13, 1984

Balter: Ben, earlier in this oral history the name Roy [M.] Brewer came up in connection with the Warner Brothers strike and a lot of things that were going on in the studios in the thirties. And we deferred a story concerning Roy Brewer and the film Salt of the Earth that you wanted to tell, which I think would be a good time to get into that. I know that in the early fifties some of the blacklisted writers and directors--people like Paul Jarrico, Herbert Biberman, Michael Wilson--began working on independent film projects, and Salt of the Earth was one of them. What do you recall about the events around Salt of the Earth?

Margolis: Well, I know that the three people that you have mentioned-- Two of them are dead now, by the way. Herb Biberman and Mike Wilson are both dead. Paul Jarrico lives in Los Angeles. The three of them got together, and I had some meetings with them. I don't remember whether business or social. But at any rate, they were trying to develop the concept that the blacklisted people ought to be able to do independent motion pictures. They had the talent [and] knowledge of every kind.About that time, there was a strike of miners in Silver City, New Mexico, which got a great deal of publicity, primarily because after an injunction was issued against any picketing by the men, the women took over the picket line. It was a very effective means of continuing the strike, which ultimately was won. It was decided that this would afford an excellent basis for a script. And Mike Wilson, who, I think, is one of the two or three finest screenwriters in the history of the industry, went to Silver City and lived there for about, as I remember, two or three months. Got to know the people and so forth and wrote a screenplay that was an absolutely beautiful, magnificent screenplay.I became involved at that point, perhaps a little earlier, because they wanted to go ahead with the motion picture, with Mike Wilson as the writer of the screenplay, Herbert Biberman as the director, and Paul Jarrico as the producer. The problem, of course, was money. I had at that time a very close personal friend and client by the name of Lazarus, Simon Lazarus, who was quite a wealthy man and who had himself taken the Fifth Amendment before the House Committee on Un-American Activities. He had operated some theaters and shown things that brought him into disrepute, so to speak, of a political nature. I got together with him and some other people. With him sort of-- The reason I mention him is because he was kind of a key figure in this thing.They'd prepared a budget, which, as I recall, was in the neighborhood of a hundred thousand dollars. This was on the basis of everybody participating on a minimum. They wanted to do it as a union picture, but everybody participating on the basis of the minimum scale, regardless of what they were worth.Also, they had the concept of using the miners themselves as characters in the play. And as a matter of fact, the president of the union [Juan Chacon] became one of the key principals. They couldn't find a woman who they thought could carry the female lead. They finally lined up a fine actress from Mexico, who obtained a permit to come into the country to make the picture.

Balter: Were there any problems with getting that work permit?

Margolis: Not originally. The problems developed later.

Balter: Okay, I'll be patient and wait.

Margolis: Her name was Rosaura Revueltas. Interesting enough, she came from a very famous family in Mexico. Are you interested in that?

Balter: Please.

Margolis: She had five brothers. One thing I'm not sure whether it was four brothers and she made up the fifth. I guess it was four brothers and she made up the fifth. Every one of them became a famous figure on the Mexican cultural level. The father of this family had been a miner in Mexico. Had moved his family to Mexico City, and had operated a stall in one of these open-air markets. I don't know if you've been in Mexico City or not.

Balter: Yes, I have.

Margolis: Have these selling peppers, I think it was, of one kind or another. This poor family had developed, number one, Rosaura, who was the leading actress and one of the leading dancers in Mexico; a brother, who was with the famous painters of that time, worked closely with the group consisting of--I'm so terrible on names--the famous muralist--

Balter: Diego Rivera.

Margolis: Diego Rivera and others. By the way, through them I had an opportunity to meet and spend some time with Rivera, quite a remarkable man. But that one died; was the youngest one to die. He died of alcoholism, I think, at the age of thirty-five, or something like that. Relatively young man, but he had already achieved fame as one of-- On an equal status up to that point with Rivera, of course, who went on for many years. One was a leading novelist. Another was a leading musician, recognized as such, and a leading poet. There were five of them. Each one of them was a nationally renowned figure in Mexico, coming out of this poor family. Anyway, Rosaura Revueltas was having great difficulty getting--she was a fine actress--getting work in Mexico, because the kind of films they made there were generally trash. So they were able to line her up.My part I played initially was in helping in setting up a corporation and helping to arrange the money for the budget, a lot of fairs and fund-raising. I think we raised the amount of the original budget by way of it as an investment. Of course, no one ever got their money back, but it was originally an investment. It was hoped at that time that people actually would make money out of it, although the people that put money in it knew the risk that they were taking.Anyway, the picture was shot in [Silver] City [New Mexico], using, as the leads, Rosaura Revueltas and the president of the union there. They had the whole union as their extras for their scenes. They used several of the women and several of the men in important subsidiary roles, also. But also they had a number of American actors who went down there, who were very good, very fine actors. Anyway, the picture--they went there and shot it in Silver City on location--I think stayed very close to being within budget. For a long time, they had no problems in shooting the picture. They'd gone down there; they'd established themselves in the community. And then they started--the redbaiting started.Someone made a speech in Congress--I can't remember who it was [Representative Donald Jackson of California]--about the picture: that the red forces were using these workers to prepare a communist film. And Howard Hughes, at that time was in the industry, issued a statement, saying that they would never be allowed to complete that film.The picture, as far as the shooting was concerned, was within two or three weeks of completion when Rosaura Revueltas was picked up to be deported. And they had worked out a theory. When you come in (she'd come in on a bus; she had a visa) you're supposed to have your visa stamped. But lots of times, particularly-- People in a car generally get it done. On a bus they sometimes just wait on the bus seats, look at the visas, [and] don't stamp them all. And she had not had her visa stamped. Technically, it was supposed to be stamped when she came in, but that was just a procedural requirement. No question that she came in legally, except that they said she couldn't come in legally without having her visa stamped, you know. They took her to--gee, was it Dallas? Where did they take her? I think it was Dallas; I'm not sure [El Paso]. I went there and filed a writ of habeas corpus to get her released. I was there for several weeks, and we never got a hearing. They kept stalling us. The judges just kept putting it over. Well, I say, we had some partial hearings. Then the government said it needed more time, more evidence.In the meantime, what happened was that the community around Silver City was being agitated. One day, a vigilante group was formed to drive the people out of the picture--out of Silver City.

Balter: Did the crew continue to film other scenes while she was in jail?

Margolis: Oh, yes. There were other scenes that could be filmed without her, although she was needed for a few scenes to complete the picture. So they went on. They were shooting these other things.When this vigilante group developed, they decided to pull up stakes and to leave. They were very, very close to completion on everything, except Rosaura's [scenes]. And I couldn't tell them when we would get a court order on Rosaura, 'cause it was obvious they were playing games with us. They really in my opinion-- Well, the case was just a made-up case. It was just one of those technical things that had no substance to it. So when they pulled up stakes, I arranged for her voluntary departure. There was no longer any purpose in continuing to fight this thing out. They could have continued it for months.We anyway had plans to shoot the final scenes in Mexico City, which was done. She went back to Mexico. We arranged for her release, and [she] got back to Mexico. Some of the final scenes were shot in Mexico City. A lot of technical problems because of location and so forth, and there were some problems just from, you know, a film standpoint of parts of the ending of the film.

Balter: Let me interject one question here. When she was picked up, was she picked up right off the set, or where she was staying?

Margolis: Right off the set.

Balter: In other words, the filming was going on; they just came right into the set and took her away?

Margolis: I wasn't there at the time. I'm now telling you what I was told.

Balter: Sure.

Margolis: I came to Dallas. I needed to get a telephone call to come. And I went to the city-- They found out where she was being taken. I'm just trying-- I'm almost positive it was Dallas, but-- I thought-- I'm not positive. [laughs]

Balter: Since you were seeking a writ of habeas corpus, was it--? There wasn't any way, the way this thing was structured, to go to a higher court, I guess.

Margolis: Well, I had to get a ruling in the trial courts. You see, I didn't lose it in the trial courts. It was never decided in the trial courts. They kept-- I don't remember all the de[tails]. The judge disqualified himself, as I remember it, and then they said they had to find another judge. Just continuance after-- And then the government needed more time for this and for that. It was one of those. And the judges, of course, knew what was going on all along, day to day.

Balter: Sure. Now, the film, I take it that they were able to--well, obviously they were able to complete the film.

Margolis: They completed the film, although completing the film was not easy. The shooting of the film was not easy. That was relatively the easiest part of completing the film, because after it, you have to have all of that film processed. You have to have it edited, and then you have to have the film processed. And there are all sorts of little things: sound put in and music put in, and various technical things done to the film.What had happened in the meanwhile was that Howard Hughes and others had notified all of the film laboratories throughout the United States that if they did any work on this film, they wouldn't get any work from any of the majors. It took, I think, close to two years to get the work completed. What they would do is they would sneak it in, under a portion of film under some other name, into a lab. And all over the country: some of them in New York, some of them in Chicago, some in Los Angeles, various other cities.

Balter: You mean just getting the film developed?

Margolis: Just getting it developed! Just getting it developed and the costs were going up enormously. We had to raise an amount that was greater than the original amount of the cost of shooting the film. But with all its side trips, it was finally completed. Herb Biberman has written a book dealing with the specifics of the problem.And Brewer, we get back to Brewer. Brewer was the local--was the Hollywood representative of the IATSE, the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees. They represented and controlled the workers in all of the film labs, which were almost a hundred percent unionized. And he was the one that gave instructions, or had the international give instructions through him, that union members were not to work on Salt of the Earth.As soon as it was discovered-- Now, there were many people who were sympathetic. And there were some labs who did as much as they could, knowing what they were doing, but feeling that they could say, "We didn't know about this, or we would never have done it." The workers in some instances knew. "And what was that?"The task of getting it done was an unbelievable one. The picture was finally completed. And then came the next phase of trying to get it distributed. Nobody would touch the film.By the way, the film is since recognized as a classic. It has more 16-mm distribution than virtually any other full-length motion picture. And it developed it would-- The film historically was completed. It related the union struggle and the struggle of women for their position in society. Beautiful, beautiful thing.So the next thing was [to] get a distributor. Nobody would distribute, so we had to do it ourselves. We opened in New York at a theater way out somewhere. In order to get the theater, we had to pay about ten times what the ordinary rental was for the theater. It ran there for a few weeks, and we were losing money on the thing, even though the attendance was very good. And then we had to get a theater in Los Angeles. We finally got a theater on Hollywood Boulevard that had been closed. It wasn't functioning as a theater, but it was a fully equipped theater.

Balter: Do you recall which one it was?

Margolis: Yes. I don't remember the name of it now, but it's now, I think, it's a porn house now. It's on the north side of the street, east of Hollywood Boulevard, close to--on the block preceding--Bronson [Avenue]. And it was six or seven--

Balter: Near the freeway.

Margolis: Yeah. It was terrible for us. Newspapers wouldn't take the ads for the paper. They wouldn't review the picture. A total, total fiasco.

Balter: It's perhaps difficult for someone of my generation to imagine a boycott so total. Was this just part and parcel of the times that it was possible to just lock something down so completely?

Margolis: It was done. It was done. They didn't do it a hundred percent because the picture was finally processed, but at a terrible cost and under terrible conditions. But, yes, oh, yes, people were scared to death.We later filed an antitrust action [Independent Productions Corp. and I.P.C. Distributors, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc.], which I participated in trying in New York. And we lost it. Brewer was one of the principal defendants. We tried to, we named Howard Hughes as a defendant, but we could never get him served. We could never even find out what his address was, what his residence was. You could serve by publication under California law, but you had to have an affidavit as to what his permanent place of residence was and that you'd attempted to serve it. He didn't have a permanent place. [laughs] He used to stay around, you know, and literally-- Not only did we have that problem. There were lots of actions filed against him; well, they couldn't serve him. Committees tried to get him; they couldn't serve him. He was just totally protected against us, so we were not able to have him as one of the defendants. The strongest evidence we had was against him.We also had very strong evidence against Brewer, but again, we tried it for a jury in New York, and we had a very decent judge in New York, who gave us a good trial. And we felt very badly about the result. The jury was just scared, just scared.

Balter: Now, were you able--Of course I realize laws of discovery may have been different then, but were you able to do very much discovery in that case?

Margolis: Oh, in the depositions and so forth. We were also limited in preparing the case by financial considerations. We couldn't do as much discovery as we wanted. Even raising money was a difficult task. Because in the first place we had raised money for the original film, and we said the film will be made for this, and then we had to raise almost twice as much again in order to get it processed. Then we had to raise money to exhibit the film, which was supposed to make money. And it lost money. And then we were trying to raise some money to litigate. People had had it by that time, understandably.

Balter: Now, just for the purposes of people who might want to try to look some of this up, the discovery that you did do in that antitrust case in New York the depositions, all the materials--where would those be found now?

Margolis: New York federal court.

Balter: New York federal court. In those days, or in New York in those days, a deposition would become part of the court record automatically, unlike now in California.

Margolis: We had a few depositions. As I say, we didn't do as much discovery as we really should have.

Balter: So all their--all the records are there?

Margolis: Yeah.

Balter: Now, after the unsuccessful attempts to distribute the film in the mainstream of film distribution, my understanding is that the film just became what you normally call an "underground classic," or something like that. It's been shown at political events for decades and so on.

Margolis: Yeah. We got distributors who distribute the 16-mm and 8-mm films. It started doing very well from day one in that area. But you were talking about royalties of $15,000 a year, $20,000 a year, which is a lot of money for, you know-- That's not the rentals, that was the royalties that were received. And that money, with the consent of the investors, went to Wilson, Biberman, and Jarrico over the years. I imagine over the years they have gotten a substantial amount of money. But all three of them not only gave three or four total years of their life to this, maybe five, but threw their own money into it. Spent their own time and money in it. So what they've gotten out of it is little enough. But it's now permanent; it brings in money every year, just automatically.

Balter: Do you know who owns it now?

Margolis: It's owned by Paul--Paul Jarrico runs it--and Gale Sondergaard, well, since Herbert Biberman's been dead. Gale was his wife. (She's now disabled. She's at the actors home, the screen actors home.) She has an interest and Mike Wilson's widow, Sylvia-- No, not-- Sylvia's Paul Jarrico's wife. [snaps fingers] I'll think of it in a minute [Zelma Gussom Wilson].

Balter: Okay. I knew it at one point and don't now.Let's go on to another subject in this same general time period, although actually a little earlier than what we've just been talking about, the Salt of the Earth, being back in 1947. The case of Hanns Eisler, who was eventually deported to Germany by the government for his involvement in the Communist Party years earlier. I know that you were his attorney during those proceedings, and I wonder if you could tell us that story and what you recall.

Margolis: Well, you know there were two Eisler brothers. Hanns and-- Curse on names!

Balter: I'm afraid I can't be much help on this one.

Margolis: [pauses] The name is a very important, prominent name [Gerhardt Eisler]. The brother, whom I knew but did not represent, was a very important political figure in the Communist Party of Germany. He, as a matter of fact, as I recall it, was charged here in the United States--I don't know whether it was Smith Act violations or what it was--[with] some crime. And who fled--

Balter: Could it have been Francis?

Margolis: No, it's not Francis. Eric? Just doesn't come to me.

Balter: We'll just have to look that one up.

Margolis: All right. Hanns Eisler was a musician. He came to the United States to work in motion pictures and originally got some work. And then started being red-baited and having a lot of trouble. He wanted to stay here. He was a very close personal friend of Charles Chaplin. As a matter of fact, the only time I ever met Chaplin was one afternoon at the beach, when Hanns took Valerie and me out to the place where Chaplin was staying. (The beach site itself is an interesting story.)But in any event, Hanns Eisler-- As I remember it, my memory isn't entirely clear on this, but they started deportation proceedings on the ground that he had misrepresented when he entered the country: that he had not disclosed his political affiliation. We fought it, although Hanns, like his brother was, no question about it, an official of a communist party. Hanns had been, I believe, in the Communist Party, but had dropped out, although there was no question where his sympathies and his political beliefs were. Anyway, we fought for some time. My best recollection is that rather than take and have him deported as he would have been, we took voluntary departure at a point.Hanns had played it very carefully all the time that he had been here, as far as any public activities are concerned. All he was doing was writing music. He wasn't even writing screenplays, or anything like that. He could have had a lot of work here as a musician, because he was very good. However, if I say he was very careful, he was not careful as to the company he kept. He moved in left-wing circles. He was a good friend of Dalton, and other people of that kind.And, as I say, also a good friend of Chaplin, however, who, when he [Eisler] needed-- One of the things I discovered about Chaplin is that while-- Aside from any other strange characteristics, this very, very, very rich man--and I mean he was very rich--was very tight with the bucks. And Hanns Eisler was a very, very close friend of Chaplin. Politically, they saw things very much alike, although Chaplin was much more eccentric than Hanns. Hanns was a much steadier, stable kind of a man.When Hanns came to him for help and connections, I don't remember what he got, but it was relatively a pittance. Chaplin did give him something, but it was just a fraction, a small fraction of what Chaplin should have and could have very easily given him.

Balter: By help, you mean help in this particular case?

Margolis: Financially, yes. Financially, yes.You see, one of the problems he had--he didn't have money to live on, among other things, because of the problem of getting work. As a matter of fact, we finally, as I remember, gave up the fight. Because we decided he wasn't going to get any work anyway, even if we managed to keep him here, and it didn't look like we were going to.

Balter: Now, were the issues-- We had discussed the Harry Bridges deportation situation earlier. Was this a trickier case because of the accusations of misstatements when he came in the country? Was that what made it difficult?

Margolis: Well, the government had real problems of proof. I get some cases mixed up at this point, but let me give you my present recollection. They were required at that time-- He got a visa. He said he was not a communist when he got that visa. The government had great difficulty proving that he was a communist at the time. As a matter of fact, I believe he was not at the time that he said that. I think it was a truthful statement. But the government did have evidence, as I remember it, of his activities in relation to the Communist Party [of Germany] prior to that time, or there were articles about his attending meetings.

Balter: Back in the 1920s, as I understand it.

Margolis: Again, well, I don't remember how. I know there was a period of time, immediately preceding his coming here, of several years, when they couldn't--they didn't have anything. Up to that period of time, they had a great deal of the kind of evidence which indicated-- It might even have established membership in the Communist Party. But from that time on-- So that's the nature of the legal fight. They were saying, "Well, you can draw the inference; there's no--" You know, "Once a communist, always a communist." And all the sort of stuff that they used at that time. But my recollection is that they just kept the proceedings hanging. Plus you know, proceedings of that kind are very slow anyway.

Balter: Now, the Times article, the Los Angeles Times, that is, discussing the case mentions that Eleanor Roosevelt wrote a letter in his support at one point to the State Department. Do you recall that, and how that came about?

Margolis: He knew Eleanor Roosevelt and had, matter of fact, I think had a letter to her when he came over here. He had seen her and met with her. You know, we got a number of letters from quite a few people. He was a very prominent--he was a very distinguished man in his field. He was internationally known as a top-rate musician. We got letters from a number of people. And he himself--I had nothing to do with obtaining that letter--he got it.

Balter: Now, you mentioned when you went to the beach with your wife and, I guess, the Eislers, you mentioned a story. Was the story about Chaplin that you were going to tell the one about his being tightfisted with the money? Or was there a different--?

Margolis: No, no.

Balter: There was a different story that you had mentioned.

Margolis: The thing was we got there, and they were sitting at the-- There was a group of people. For the life of me, I can't remember who it was, besides Chaplin and the Eislers, sitting out on a patio at a beach house. It was a lovely day.Chaplin, when we arrived there, was talking. Chaplin, when we left, was talking. Chaplin--every minute we were there--was talking and acting. I don't think anyone else got in ten words. I may be exaggerating a little bit, but not very much. This man was center stage from the minute we got there. And a very amusing, entertaining guy. Doing the kind-- Talking about his pictures, saying, "I did this," and then acting out the part. And talking about what he was going to do and acting out that part. It was, in a way, a delight, although he went on-- We were there for, I think, about four hours. And we began, we began to become-- Really, despite the brilliance of this guy and the uniqueness of this thing, it began to wear a little bit after this. But I just wondered about the people who had to be subjected to that everyday.

Balter: [laughs] Did you ever--did you talk with the Eislers about that experience after, do you recall? Sort of comparing notes with them, as it were?

Margolis: They said on a one-to-one relationship, like when Hanns would visit with him as a friend, that things were quite different. Or two or three very intimate friends were together, that while he might do some of this, he wouldn't be anything like that. But they also told me that whenever there was a group of people around, almost always, this was a Chaplin day.

Balter: Okay, I think this is probably a good place for us to stop today. When we continue next time, we'll be getting into the Los Angeles Ten and the [Jack B.] Tenney Committee [California Senate Committee on Un-American Activities] and some of those topics.

Margolis: I do have, if you want it now. [tape recorder off]

Balter: Okay, we're back again, before we conclude today. We've been deferring a discussion of the Abelleira case, and Ben, now I understand that you have some notes that are-- Refreshed your memory on that one.

Margolis: Yes, you asked me about the cases that I handled for the CIO [Congress of Industrial Organizations] and the AF of L [American Federation of Labor], involving unemployment insurance. The principal case was Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, decided by the supreme court of the state of California on February 7, 1941. What had happened was that there had been a strike of longshoremen. There was a question as to whether under the circumstances of this strike-- Well, no, no. There had been a labor dispute. The law read at that time--and I think still reads--that people who leave their work because of a labor dispute are disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance. We somehow got a holding that these men had not left their work because of a labor dispute, I don't remember just how we got that. That was not the real issue of this case; we really reached for one on that one.The question was whether they were entitled to receive their unemployment insurance benefits where you got a favourable ruling pending the appeal and until that ruling was reversed. And the supreme court of the state held that they got that. Actually, it lead-- The law later developed that the original ruling would no longer be sustained.But the importance of this decision was that if you could get a favorable decision, and it usually takes months and sometimes years to get it reversed, you got your unemployment insurance in the meantime, which was a very, very important point. That was what that case decided.

Balter: So you mean previous to that, no unemployment insurance would be paid until the whole case was resolved. Is that the way it worked previously?

Margolis: Yeah-- No, no. The matter had not been resolved. Remember this was a relatively new law at that time, and so we got the court to interpret it. That was the first [California] Supreme Court interpretation of that clause.

Balter: I see, okay.

Margolis: Now, the other cases I thought were decided at the same time, but I was wrong. I handled W. R. Grace [and Co.] v. California Employment Commission, which was decided by the supreme court on August 18, 1944, along with Matson Terminals [Inc.] v. California Employment Commission and Bunny Waffle Shop v. California Employment Commission, and then the Mark Hopkins case [Mark Hopkins, Inc. v. California Employment Commission] and a Whitcomb Motel case. Those were all AF of L cases.I remember it now. I had handled the Abelleira case. And I was called in by the AF of L after that--because I had handled the Abelleira case--to handle these other cases. My recollection had been that I handled them all together.

Balter: I see.

Margolis: Not true. I got into these other cases called in by Matt [Matthew O. Tobriner] to handle these other cases after I had won the Abelleira case.Okay, thanks very much, and we'll be back with you next time.

17. Tape Number: IX, Side One September 19, 1984

Balter: Ben, I wanted at the beginning of this session to go back for just a moment to the Hollywood Ten. In looking through some material, I came across some sort of hints about, after the Hollywood Ten had gone to jail, some attempts to try to get them out on parole before their sentences were completed. Is that correct? Were there some attempts to convince the parole board to parole them? What do you recall about those efforts?

Margolis: All that I can remember is that we wrote letters. First of all, two of the ten had only six-month sentences. And on sentences of that length, there is no parole. I think there was even a question about whether you had to have a year and a day in order to be eligible for parole. In any event, there was some technical question raised as to whether they were eligible. We wrote some letters, did some research. I think there was a real problem about applying parole where there's only a one-year sentence. In any event, the attempts were made, even though they were long shots and resulted in nothing. Each of them served their full sentences with time off for good behavior.

Balter: Okay.

Margolis: Incidentally, so far as the Hollywood Ten is concerned, I don't know whether you want to touch on it now, but there's much further history of the Hollywood Ten and the blacklist with respect to steps that were taken in that regard. They came at a later time. They came after the Smith Act trials, but they relate really to the blacklist. So I don't know how you really want to cover that.

Balter: Well, why don't, since you've brought it up, why don't we go into that now? It'll be fine.

Margolis: Well, there were several civil suits that were brought. I don't remember whether we discussed those civil suits.

Balter: We very briefly did, yes.

Margolis: All right. What happened so far as the civil suits were concerned and my participation in them is that I participated in the trial of two of them, along with Bob [Robert W.] Kenny and Charles [J.] Katz. We won those cases in the trial court, which was rather remarkable in the light of the times. And we got damages awarded of several hundred thousand dollars.I believe for, [pauses] on account of breach of contract, I believe for Lester Cole [Cole v. Loew's, Inc.] and Adrian [Scott]. I believe, Adrian-- I'm not positive, because the reason I'm not positive will become clear as I go on with the story. There was no question that the contracts had been terminated before their expiration, and that the persons involved had not been given further work and had not been paid. We sued for breach of contract.The defense was the so-called morals clause. I wish I could remember, but I don't, the exact language of that. This was a clause which was a standard clause in all Hollywood contracts. And which historically arose out of the Fatty Arbuckle incident when, I believe, Arbuckle was charged with murder of some woman with whom he had sexual relations. I'm not even--

Balter: I seem to recall something about an underage girl with lots of--

Margolis: An underage girl? In any event, it was a very serious thing. He had a contract with some of the studios, and people were blacklisting his pictures because [of] the morals charge.So it became [a] standard clause that there was a right to-- The persons during the life of the contract would act as persons of good moral character. And the defense, in the contract cases, was that by refusing to answer the questions [and] by being convicted for contempt of Congress that that made them persons of bad moral character. We convinced the jury that that was not so--with two juries that that was not so, and won damages on the contract.The studios appealed to the Ninth Circuit. These were federal cases. They appealed to the [United States] Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. I didn't have much to do with the appeals, because it was about that time that I became involved full-time in the Smith Act case. The appeals were handled primarily by Charles Katz and Bob Kenny.The Ninth Circuit reversed and held that as a matter of law, I believe they said, the refusal to answer questions and contempt of Congress made them persons of bad moral character, something that I'm sure would not have been held in any other political time. Because what the clause was really aimed at was not political activity, but morals in the sense of the Fatty Arbuckle case. I suppose it might apply to such things as use of drugs and sexual promiscuity--things of that kind. But, in any event, that was held, and we had several other cases pending.And then in order to get rid of the litigation, the studio settled all of the cases with us, all of the pending cases, including the ones that had been reversed. And I think--I don't remember the amount they paid, but I think it was something like $200,000 that they paid to settle all the cases, which is a fraction of what the people were entitled to if the contracts had been enforced. And then this was divided on some sort of a pro rata basis among all of the--well, among nine of the ten.By that time, Eddie [Edward] Dmytryk, of course, had gone over to the other side. That was the first legal thing that happened. While I mention Eddie Dmytryk, I might say he was one of the ones that had only a six-month sentence. I think it was he and Herb [Herbert] Biberman, if I remember correctly. It was announced on his getting out that he had had a change of heart, and that he was going to testify before the committee [House Committee to Investigate Un-American Activities (HUAC)]. And he did so. He named the others as members of the Communist Party, etcetera. Went whole hog, and immediately got contracts as a producer in the industry. And, I believe, has been in the industry ever since, maybe right up to the present time. However, he had been unusually successful, I'd say. He was a young man. He had been unusually successful and was supposed to have had a really important career ahead of him. The fact of the matter is that I don't believe he ever made an important picture after that, and never became the kind of success that was contemplated. He worked together with Adrian Scott, and they did particularly--What was the picture that dealt with anti-Semitism, I believe with Gregory Peck?

Balter: Gentlemen's Agreement.

Margolis: Gentleman's Agreement, I think it was [Crossfire].

Balter: Something like that.

Margolis: Something like-- I'm not sure it was that-- No, no, it wasn't that; it was another picture because it did not have a big star in it. And it made a lot of money despite the fact that it was the kind of a picture that ordinarily wasn't expected to make money. They made another picture that was quite successful called The Boy with the Green Hair, which also dealt with the discrimination concept, and was quite successful.

Balter: Now, these were films before?

Margolis: Before they were called as witnesses. They were considered the fair-haired boys of the industry, who were going to be the writers and producers of the future.

Balter: Why do you think that Dmytryk was not as successful afterwards?

Margolis: Well, I suppose it's just guesswork, but I think that his collaboration with Adrian Scott had a lot, a lot to do with his success. I think of the two, that Adrian Scott was far the more talented. Of course, he did not have that collaboration afterwards. Also, he and Adrian had done things that they really believed in. That they were totally committed to, not only as artists in the industry, but philosophically. It was something that-- It was just not another job for them, just not another way of making money. I don't think he ever again dared to do a picture with a progressive theme. I really can't tell you whether those were the things or whatever it was. Or was simply the fact that once a person does something like this, he isn't the same person again. But as I say, I'm not an expert, and I don't know.I might tell you that since then, I have seen him only once. I was on a train by myself, either going from Los Angeles to New York or from New York to Los Angeles; I don't remember which way the trip was. I was traveling alone. I had dinner one night and went into the parlor car to have a drink and relax for a while. And there was Edward Dmytryk with a group of four or five other people. As he saw me come in, he stood up and stretched out his hand, and started to walk towards me. I walked right past him and went on out of the car. I didn't sit down. It's the only time that I have seen him since that time. Another one of the original nineteen who became a witness and an informer was the actor who had had one successful thing. He had done the The Jolson Story.

Balter: Larry Parks.

Margolis: Larry Parks, who was married to Betty, [snaps fingers] starts with a G.

Balter: Last time you were trying to remember her name.

Margolis: Betty, not Grable. Betty--? [Garrett] All right. Anyway, he was just a very weak guy. I represented him later on, when he was again subpoenaed, and a group of us traveled from Los Angeles to Washington, D.C. He was called to testify in Washington, D.C., and in that group, if I remember, was Paul Jarrico, Mike [Michael] Wilson, and several others. Am I confusing--? Wait, turn it off for a minute. [tape recorder off]Yes, I want to correct what I just said about representing Larry Parks later on. I did represent a great many blacklisted people--Hollywood people as well as non-Hollywood people--perhaps several hundred before the committee over the next several years. I now believe that I confuse Larry Parks with someone whose name I can't recall, but who looked very much like Larry Parks.The thing that brought it to mind is that Larry Parks was a very insecure person. He had had this one big success. He saw the world opening up for him, and the world tumbled around his ears when this thing happened. Then he was blacklisted. He saw no future, and he tried to save his career by voluntarily testifying. I think he went to Martin Gang, if I remember correctly, who arranged for him to testify. But he would never--as far as I know, never got any work despite that, never got any work in the Hollywood industry.

Balter: Did he, when he was first called back or when the committee was making it clear that they wanted him to come back, did he talk to you at all, first, before he finally made his arrangements to give private testimony?

Margolis: I don't think so. I think I had him confused with somebody else. The person had characteristics so similar to Larry, but he was, I believe, a young writer. And he went, and I can't remember his name, and he went with a group of very important writers. You see, Michael Wilson was a very important writer. Paul Jarrico was important in the industry, and there were a number of others. I get mixed up, the ones who were on which trip.But in any event, he was in a group of fairly distinguished Hollywood people. He was a sort of-- How he got included in the group just didn't add up.He was very frightened about standing up, testifying. Now, these people were all people with a lot of experience, who did one hell of a job before the committee: standing up and telling the committee of their views and what they thought of the committee. He was very frightened before this happened. By god, he got on that stand, and he was excellent.All of his fears seemed to vanish, and he just did a-- He stood up comparably with the others, whom he so much admired and looked up to. I remember he was so elated. All of us were going for some reason from Washington to New York by train. There was something, I think, we were all going to attend a meeting, and some were going to speak at the meeting. We were going down to the railway station in Washington, D.C. There were a lot of pillars and posts, and he was walking jauntily along. And all of a sudden--he was so out of it--he ran squarely into a post, [laughs] not observing where he was going. It struck me 'cause it is the only time that I can remember of a person being quite as elated as he was immediately following an experience before the committee.But Larry, unfortunately, was a person who just didn't have a lot of strength. I saw a lot of him in preparation for the hearings. You see, he was with the nineteen. He just--they just didn't reach him. He was one of the people who at meetings kept constantly saying, "I'm ready to stand by everybody else, but I want it guaranteed that everybody else is going to stand by me." It wasn't just a question of stating a principle. It was a question of fear that was being expressed repeatedly over and over again, until some of the people got a little angry at him because of his constant repetition of this concern.All right, now going on with the fight against the blacklist. You know that quite a few of the writers were able to get black market jobs. Wrote screenplays for which they were paid on the average, I would say, somewhere between 10 and 25 percent of their regular salaries. And I helped some of them.The way it was done was that someone who was not blacklisted would present the material either as his own or sometimes under a fictitious name, such as Dalton Trumbo's, Robert Rich, who wrote as Robert Rich in The Brave One [1957], for which he won an Academy Award. I helped him on his legal problems. I don't think, even at this stage, that I want to mention the names of the people that were involved, because I don't know, even today, whether they would want it known. But people who got work were Jack [John Howard] Lawson, Dalton, Mike Wilson. [Lester] Cole got some work, not very much. Anyway, quite a few of the writers did get work, but they had to change their whole standard of living. Several of them went abroad. Others went to Mexico. For example, Dalton and Albert Maltz. Albert got quite a lot of blacklisted black market work. He wrote a screenplay, I think it was called The Robe, which I think was nominated for an Academy Award. I don't think it won.

Balter: Victor Mature.

Margolis: Yes, I think that was it. Anyway, it was a very, very successful picture. They wrote. They continued to write successful things, but to get very little money for them.Albert Maltz and Dalton Trumbo both lived in Mexico for several years, but eventually came back. They went to Mexico, because they thought it might be easier to get black market work there, not only for the United States, but for other places in the world. Also, the cost of living was so much lower, and they could come closer to maintaining the kind of standards they'd had in the past, with their reduced income. However, they were never very happy in Mexico. It was a practical matter. Were kept out of all political activity, and they lost their base. They lost their roots. Nevertheless they stayed there for several years.Mike Wilson lived in Europe for a number of years. Paul Jarrico moved to Europe. As a matter of fact, lived there for many, many years, and only came back, oh, about three years ago. He is now one of the writers on a new series, TV series. It's widely advertised, called Glory Days or Glory One.

Balter: Oh. [interruption] It's about an air force family during the fifties. Yeah, I don't remember the title, but you're very close to it.

Margolis: Yes, something--it has the word Glory in it; I know that. Now, we met from time to time--various groups met--and discussed the fight against the blacklist. There was broad disagreement as to how the matter would be accomplished--of breaking the blacklist.I would say that there were really two groups. One group wanted to use legal means--every possible means, legal means and every other means. And I would say that there were quite a number of people in that group, among whom was Mike Wilson. The other group--one group, was Dalton's--felt that they could do it by gradually working within the industry and finally bringing about the time when the industry would voluntarily break the blacklist.I represented the group who felt that legal methods should also be used. We filed an action in the state court called Wilson v. Loew's. That action was on the theory that there was an illegal conspiracy to deprive the people of the right to work, and arguing that was a constitutionally protected right. We lost in the state courts, which held that that complaint did not state a cause of action. Then, when we appealed and lost all the way up in the state court, I filed a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, on the theory that the state, by refusing to hear the matter, had denied due process to our people. To everyone's amazement, including to a considerable extent my own, the Supreme Court granted a hearing. In the meantime, the group led by Dalton Trumbo had refused--not only had refused to support the litigation, but it actually opposed it. It said that it ought to be dropped. That they were making progress in their way. However, when the Supreme Court granted a hearing, they came along and said they wanted to hire the attorney from the East Coast who was in the McCarthy hearings, who did such a job on [Joseph R.] McCarthy in the army hearings.

Balter: I don't remember the name.

Margolis: I've told you from the beginning that I have, I just have a problem on names. I know who he is, and I'd know the name if you said it. Very prominent name. As a matter of fact, he was the one who cross-examined McCarthy and did such an amazing job. It turned around--

Balter: You know, it's funny because I just heard a program, oh, just a month or two ago, in which that very cross-examination was played; and I can't remember the name either.

Margolis: He's the one, for example, [who] said something to McCarthy when McCarthy attacked his assistant because he had been a member of the [National] Lawyers Guild. And this man [Joseph Welch], who spoke in a rather high-pitched voice, and he said, "Mr. McCarthy, have you no shame?" It was a "Nay." [laughs] It was headlines, "Have you no shame?"

Balter: It was someone who was very politically prominent at the time, as I recall.

Margolis: No, I don't think so. He was a very prominent lawyer. I think from someplace in the East Coast, Massachusetts, I think. A very, very able guy.

Balter: We'll look that one up.

Margolis: In any event, I had done all of this work, not only not getting a penny, a fee, but even put some of my own money into the thing. And I spent maybe a half a year working on this case.They said, "Well, we want him to argue the case because, you know, he's got all of this distinction," and so forth. And they made arrangements, although they weren't in the case, for him to argue the case for $25,000, which they were going to raise. They came and told us about it. The only time in my life I ever saw Bob Kenny get furious on the-- Because Bob Kenny worked-- By the way, Bob Kenny was involved with me in this Wilson v. Loew's. I did 95 percent of the work.In any event, we didn't go through-- I argued the case there. We lost it on the ground, the court held, that it really did never-- It avoided the issue and said it didn't have jurisdiction.

Balter: Why?

Margolis: On the ground that the mere refusal to hear a matter by a state court does not raise the question of due process. It would have opened up a whole new area of constitutional law that had never been opened to that date. That was the main thing that I had argued in my brief, and, as I say, we were suprised to get a hearing. But it was a, I think, a six-to-three opinion with, or six-to-two, [William O.] Douglas writing the main dissent, an excellent dissent. In any event, that didn't work.In the meantime, Dalton was doing an excellent job in his area of trying to end the blacklist. And he would-- After he came back to the United States, he was getting himself some publicity. Again, there were some disputes that arose. He appeared on a television program with a parrot, as I remember it.While he didn't answer the question as to whether he had ever been a communist, a member of the Communist Party--which none of them ever answered directly--he answered questions in such a way that it was made, in effect, clear that he had been. And, in effect, by saying everyone makes mistakes. Something along those lines, I'm not quoting him exactly. But he ain't no-- Trumbo is one of the cleverest men I've ever known, who could take any situation and handle it in a brilliant manner. And he handled this brilliantly. But there was a great deal of criticism of the fact that he was doing [it] through the back door. In effect that he was--what he was doing was saying, "Okay, I want to get back to work" by saying, "Well, so I was a commu--" Without saying it, saying, "I was a communist, and I'm sorry." Trumbo, of course, denied always that that was his intent, or the effect of what he said.In any event, it was shortly after that that it was announced that he would be the screenwriter in--which one was first?--Spartacus?

Balter: Spartacus, I believe.

Margolis: It was either Spartacus or the Jewish, [snaps fingers] Exodus. What was it? Exodus? Have I got it right, the name, you know, the picture of the Jews in Palestine and so forth?

Balter: That would be Exodus.

Margolis: Exodus. It was one of those two. They came out very close together in time. That began the breakdown of the blacklist, so he did succeed in accomplishing the objective.I must say so that the record is clear that--leaving to one side your evaluation, on which there were differences, of what he did on this program--Dalton stuck by his principles, supported left-wing causes, associated with left-wing people, and never really backed away from any of these things.Another controversy, I don't remember whether we discussed this, developed around the speech that he made.

Balter: I don't think so.

Margolis: I thought that you got the letter that I wrote on that.

Balter: Oh, yes, if you're talking about the only--"there were only victims" speech.

Margolis: Yes. Did we discuss that?

Balter: Well, we discussed it some, but why don't we go ahead more fully.

Margolis: What happened was when he was honored, [pauses] I believe, by the Screen Writers Guild, he made a statement, and I'm not sure that I'm citing it ver[batim]: there were no heroes; there were only victims. And this led to a great deal of controversy among the ten, with people lining up on one side or the other. With Albert Maltz pretty much the leader of the other side. I don't remember just how they lined up.But in any event in supporting his position, Dalton Trumbo made the argument, "Why, hell," he said, "when we decided to take the First Amendment, all we were doing was trying to protect our jobs. And we're not entitled to be called heroes because of that." Maltz took the position that the main consideration was not protecting our job, but was a political one to destroy the committee. And there were letters exchanged, arguing.Ring Lardner, Jr., got into the act, and, I think if I remember correctly, lined up more or less with Dalton. Finally, it was Ring who wrote to me I believe, saying how there is this controversy. He didn't put it in the terms of heroes versus victims, but what were the motivations of the nineteen at the time that they decided to stand on the First Amendment?I wrote a letter--I think you have a copy of it--in which I stated in effect that both motivations were involved. Of course, they wanted to save their jobs and also had political motivations of wanting to destroy the committee. That I couldn't say to what extent, in the minds of each individual, which one was the stronger consideration. But that certainly in the long run, you couldn't say it was simply jobs, because all of the people had the same opportunity that Dmytryk had to go back on their principles and to protect their jobs. They made the choices, just as Dmytryk did, which indicated that, no matter, to me at least, that no matter to what extent they wanted to keep their jobs, certainly political motivation was a very strong one. Something along those lines is what I wrote.Interestingly enough--and this is an unusual thing among this group of people because these were all strong individuals who take strong positions and fight for them--there was general agreement that I was right.

Balter: Yeah. I think hopefully--as we discussed, I think, off tape--at one point we can include these letters as an appendix to this oral history.On the question of Dmytryk-- I know we've talked about him a couple of times already. You know, I may have asked this question before in a different way. Do you happen to recall who was in jail with Dmytryk or whether there was anyone who was incarcerated at the same location as Dmytryk who sort of saw the signs coming? Because the way you tell it, by the time he got out, he was ready to talk to the committee.

Margolis: As a matter of fact, there were indications that he had been talked to in jail, and actually the deal had been made prior to the time that he got out. He was not alone wherever he was first incarcerated, but I do not remember who else was there. But I do know this, that whoever was there had not--didn't have any inkling that Dmytryk was going to do this, and that apparently Dmytryk had initiated the contacts which lead to the making of these arrangements.

Balter: The indications that you mentioned that this had gone on while he was in jail, where do those indications come from?

Margolis: I don't remember all of it, but it happened very quickly after he got out. I think it happened so quickly and in such a planned way that it was just extremely unlikely that it would not have been planned before he got out. I don't say we have conclusive evidence of that, but there are all those indications that this was a planned thing. Of course, he never contacted any of the nineteen or the ten and discussed it with them. By the way, many of the others of the original nineteen, which included [Carl] Foreman and Lewis Milestone, went to Europe and lived in Europe. Some of them became very successful.

Balter: Let me ask you something. This again has come up a couple of times, and perhaps it's more on a personal or philosophical level. But so much has been written about the blacklist and the Hollywood Ten. I'm sure you're familiar with Victor Navasky's Naming Names, in which he attempted to examine the motivation of those who did name names: those who talked to the committee. Now, obviously, you have taken the position--as you mentioning the story of Dmytryk, and some other stories that you've mentioned--of simply not ever having anything to do again with those people who were turncoats. Is there something--in your own personal view--is what I'm really asking-- What is there in the combination of circumstances, the time, whatever it is, that has made this particular betrayal so difficult to have any forgiveness for, on the part of so many people? Is there anything special about this situation that has sort of-- Essentially, the die is cast in terms of which side people are on? I don't know if my question is exactly making sense, but--

Margolis: Well, I wouldn't place everyone in the same position on the question of forgiveness. Either on the forgiver or who is to be forgiven. For example, I can very well understand the position of those who say, "Okay, so they were wrong. They're trying to make it up, and they're trying to act decently now. We shouldn't hold it--"I was so personally involved and in such intimate contact with them that it was a personal betrayal as well as a betrayal of principles. Take, for example, Dmytryk. We had all of these meetings in which, you know, there was no blood oath, but everyone was going to stand side by side. Everyone knew the consequences they faced. They all depended upon each other. And he got this support. We went out, and people gave lots of money to help support them. There were meetings, you know.They turned not only against themselves, but against all of these people. Against everything to which they have committed themselves. Certainly, they couldn't claim that they didn't understand the principles that were involved. Not only understood them, they had a deep understanding. And then what they did is to turn around and turn on their best friends and people who had supported them all of their lives. It was not only a political betrayal; it was a personal betrayal.I felt--I feel, all right, I do not object if someone else wants to, I just can't deal with these people.On the other hand, I would take this case of Sterling Hayden, which is a somewhat different case. Sterling Hayden wasn't that heavily involved. He was pretty much of a loner, who had joined the Communist Party and so forth, but he had never worked with a group such as this. He was a sort of an eccentric guy, anyway, in many ways. And he had-- By the way, some of the others who got up and went before the committee and cleansed themselves said how mistaken they were. You know, they were lying. They knew that they had not done anything wrong, yet they were willing to crawl in the mud.Well, Sterling Hayden, when he got up, was asked why he had joined the Communist Party. He said, "There were girls. I enjoy--" You know, he made a joke out of it and so forth. He didn't demean himself to say that. But more importantly, very shortly after he testified, he turned around and said, "I made a mistake." He didn't wait for anybody to offer him anything. He didn't try to ingratiate himself [with] anybody. He turned around almost-- I don't remember how long it was, but it was a very short period of time in which he said, "It was wrong. What I did was wrong, and I wouldn't do it again."I feel differently towards him.

Balter: That raises another question, but we're just about to run out of tape, so let me turn it over, and I'll ask you that one.

18. Tape Number: IX, Side Two September 19, 1984

Balter: Ben, is there anyone that comes to mind--someone who talked to the committee or named names in this regard--who you later did have a conversation with, or reconciled with, or at least were able to talk this over with, explore motivations and so on? Or is that not something that ever happened?

Margolis: No, no.

Balter: Okay. A couple of questions came to mind while you were talking. First of all, in the original contract cases that you handled for the blacklisted writers, why were those brought in federal court? You mentioned that they were in federal court--the first ones that you won.

Margolis: [pauses] I'm just trying to recall why we brought them in federal court. I think we had our choice of the state and federal court, and there must have been some technical or other reasons. I can remember that that's a factor we considered, but I just can't recall why we chose the federal courts.

Balter: So you had a choice, you could have done it either way.

Margolis: I believe so. Yes.

Balter: On the question of the black market for writers, in your own personal experience, did it seem to you, or did you ever come across situations where the producers really knew who was really writing the screenplays? Or were the producers themselves, wanting to get good writers, perhaps part of the whole plot? How much of that went on?

Margolis: I think they knew nine times out of ten, if not ten times out of ten. Look, there were people turning in screenplays under their own names as though they had written them, who the producers knew could not write that kind of, that quality screenplay. They might not have been absolutely positive that it was Trumbo or Maltz. And I think most of the time-- I know that in certain instances they were told off the record, but officially the producer did not know.You see, there was a need for these scripts. They put a lot of money into the motion picture, and the foundation of the motion picture is the script. You don't have a good script, your chances of getting a profitable motion picture are pretty slim.The industry itself, by the way, originally opposed the blacklist. Really didn't want the blacklist, but was forced into it by the banking interests. There were one or two wild-eyed guys in the industry who wanted it, but the great majority did not want it.

Balter: So you think even the studio heads were aware about the blacklist?

Margolis: Oh, I think so. I don't know that, but it was just-- They just shut their eyes to it. You know, it was-- If I saw a brilliant brief written by a lawyer who I know has never been able to write anything more than an average brief, I might not know who wrote it, but I could say, "Look, that guy never wrote the brief." I think they knew. The fact that black market operations were going on was widely-- Everybody knew it was going on.

Balter: That's sort of what I expected, but-- Finally before we go on, one question comes to mind. One screenwriter who is very politically active, a member of the Communist Party, but, as I understand, was not called, was John Bright. Is there any particular reason that you are aware of why he-- He seems to have been such a logical candidate for having been called as the original group-- Now, of course later he was, but in the original nineteen--

Margolis: I really don't know why John wasn't called. At that time, John had not been doing too well. John started out like a ball of fire. Very able, you know, brilliant guy, but he had a drinking problem. I would say that they-- Well, there were a lot of people that they could have called the first time. For example, they called Alvah Bessie, who was just beginning as a screenwriter, and they didn't call Mike Wilson, who was a top screenwriter. Why did they take one and not the other? I don't know.

Balter: Okay. We're now about to launch into a maze of committees, hearings, prosecutions, and so on. Sort of have to slowly and patiently pick our way through a lot of this. One of the things that I did want to ask you for your recollections of because it was somewhat notorious locally, and there was a lot of press coverage of it, was that apparently in September of 1948, the [Jack B.] Tenney Committee [California Senate Committee on Un-American Activities], the California version of HUAC, began investigation of the California Labor School. According to press accounts at the time, you represented about ten people who were called before that committee. In one episode, you and another attorney, Richard L. Rykoff, were thrown out of the hearing room. I was wondering what you recall about the investigation of the California Labor School. According to the press accounts, its director at that time was a man named David Hedly. And what was involved in the--?

Margolis: David Hedly?

Balter: David Hedly is the name I have.

Margolis: I thought it was Sid [Sidney] Davison. Well, maybe he became director later.All I can really recall about the proceedings is that the Tenney Committee sought in every way to emulate the House Committee on Un-American Activities, including what they allowed attorneys to do and what they didn't allow attorneys to do. While I don't remember the exact details, I know that we tried to represent the witnesses more effectively.You see, whenever we represented witnesses before a committee, we had this kind of a problem. This applies to both the house committee and the Tenney Committee. And that is, the rules were that you could advise your client, whisper to them, advise them, or they can ask you questions and you could answer his questions. But that you could not say anything at all to the members of the committee. You couldn't say, "You're doing something illegal." You couldn't make a formal legal objection. You're not allowed to do anything. While we violated these rules from time to time, we did not persist in their violation.So the problem we had each time was, do we want to take the chance on getting thrown out--because you get physically thrown out, there isn't very much you can do about it--and leave our clients without counsel to represent them, or do we want to avoid getting thrown out and not risk doing anything which will get us thrown out?The answer to that question depended largely upon two things. One was how important we felt it was that counsel be by the side of the witness at all times, which varied. There were some people who understood the situation and could handle themselves perfectly. I sat alongside many people and hardly did anything, except sit. It wasn't called for. On the other hand, there are other people who did fall all apart, like they do with almost anything if they didn't have somebody alongside them. That was one factor on which we did-- On the other hand, the second factor was how the witness felt about it. Did the witness want us to make the kind of a fight which risked leaving them without counsel, or did they tell us, "We want you here"? That ought to be decisive.The first element I talked about would help us to advise the client whether or not we thought the client could act on his or her own. The second was the wish of the client. Generally speaking, clients wanted us to not get thrown out. They wanted us there, even clients who we thought could handle themselves very well. Position was, sure, we don't know what new thing they'll try if you're not here.As I remember it, the Tenney Committee in the first place was more stupid than the house committee people. Couldn't do as well in exploiting a situation. The clients were more willing to have us stand up and fight the [Tenney] Committee. And they had the risk of [our] getting thrown out. So that's why in one instance we got thrown out and the other we didn't.

Balter: Were people who appeared before the committee-- They did not have an absolute right to have an attorney there? This was something that was optional?

Margolis: They had an absolute right if they wanted to have an attorney. Many appeared without counsel; many people appeared without counsel.

Balter: I ask that question only because-- Let's say that you, Ben Margolis, are thrown out because you have opened your mouth once too often. Does the witness not then, or did at that time, the way the committees were run, did the witness not then have the right to say, "I'm not going to talk anymore because I don't have a lawyer"? Or was that not the situation?

Margolis: We were often asked that question, and that's a question that has never been tested in the courts. It was our opinion with the courts, as they were at that time, that probably they would have been held in contempt. We felt that that was not the best issue on which to fight. So, generally speaking, we didn't.You see, every time you take a case up, it means you didn't just say, I've decided to make an appeal. It usually involves thousands of dollars of expenditures and many, many hours of time on the part of the attorney. And it ties up the witness for various purposes. So you don't go into that sort of thing lightly, and you don't do it unless you feel that it's worth it.

Balter: Well, this particular case with the California Labor School where you and Mr. Rykoff were ejected, do you recall what the circumstances were that lead up to that?

Margolis: I don't recall anything specific. I recall that we pressed our right to make statements on behalf of our clients. That's what we-- Whether we wanted to make a motion or-- I just don't remember, except that we were aware of the fact that we were taking this risk, and we did it with the consent of our clients.

Balter: Now, the California Labor School, what do you recall about just what that was?

Margolis: The California Labor School was basically a Marxist school. It had the support of the CIO [Congress of Industrial Organizations]. It not only had classes on various aspects of Marxism and political economy, etcetera, but also had courses on shop stewards and the handling of grievances. I don't say those are the titles of the courses, but the courses which dealt with those matters. And it was a Left labor school.

Balter: Was it located in Los Angeles?

Margolis: Yes.

Balter: Was the Communist Party involved in it?

Margolis: The Communist Party supported it, yes, very heavily.

Balter: Was it something that was in existence when you came to Los Angeles? Do you recall about how long it was in existence?

Margolis: My best recollection is that it was formed after the end of World War II, but I'm not sure. I'm not sure whether it was a revival of something that had been dormant for a while or whether it was new. I think it was new, about '46 or so.

Balter: Who do you recall who was involved with it? You mentioned a Sid Davis.

Margolis: Davison. Oh, there were a lot of people involved with it. I myself did teach some classes there, or one class at least. I believe Dorothy Healey was involved. I really don't remember, except that there were quite a lot of people involved-- Left people.

Balter: One last question on this. Do you recall where the school was located?

Margolis: All I can remember is somewhere in Hollywood. I can't fix it beyond that.

Balter: Now, in 1948 and 1949 began a long series of events concerning a federal grand jury in Los Angeles, inquiring into communist activities. Apparently, it started out inquiring about communist activities among federal employees. As early as December of 1948, contempt citations had been issued against Henry Steinberg, Ben Dobbs, Samuel H. Kasinowitz--people who you represented. Eventually, this blossomed into a number of people who were held in contempt. Apparently they were eventually--became known as the Los Angeles Seventeen, or at least at one point. I know this was a very involved series of events, so I wonder if you could share with us what you recall about these developments.

Margolis: What was done by the U.S. attorney was to use this investigation as a means of attempting to imprison and keep in prison the most prominent leaders of the Communist Party. The people that they subpoenaed were--for the most part, maybe all, but I'm not sure--at least for the most part, were people who were publicly known as communists and who spoke publicly as communists. Had no reason for and did not attempt to conceal their membership and officership in that. As a matter of fact, their work was to spread that.They were subpoenaed and they came-- By the way, John [T.] McTernan and I jointly handled these cases. They came to us and said what were the problems. They were perfectly willing to testify about themselves, and, as I remember it, even about their activities. The problem was that they could not, and would not, name others. The question was, "What is the best way of placing them in a position to resist the committee without naming others?" At that time, Leo Gallagher, whom I think I've spoken of before, was a member of our firm. And there was a split within the firm, which led later on to Leo leaving the firm. At that time, the law was quite unclear about the use of the Fifth Amendment in political cases. Although, as a matter of principle, where communists were subject to prosecution under the Smith Act, it was in principle quite clear that the Fifth Amendment should apply, but it had never been decided by any of the courts. The advice that John and I gave was that if they admitted-- If the witnesses admitted their own membership and their own participation, and then they were asked the names of others, that in all, that the chance of using the Fifth Amendment as a defense was almost nil, if not actually nil. By the way, Leo Gallagher did not disagree with that as a legal proposition. We advised that they therefore should answer no questions, except their names. If they answered no questions, then, we thought that they had a good chance of winning under the Fifth Amendment, relying on the Fifth Amendment.Leo Gallagher's position was a political position, which was that communists should stand up proudly and say, "I'm a communist" and--whatever the consequences are--accept the consequences. If they have to go to jail, they go to jail. If they have to sit there indefinitely, they have to sit there indefinitely.You see, the problem with contempt proceedings is that there are two kinds of contempt proceedings. One kind is so-called criminal contempt; the other so-called civil contempt. Actually, the civil contempt, strange as that may appear off hand, is by far the most difficult to deal with. The criminal contempt--you can be put in jail for six months, a year, whatever it is. For a definite period, you're sentenced. In civil contempt, if you're asked a question and you're ordered to answer it and you refuse, you can be kept in jail until you answer it. So that it can become an indefinite term of imprisonment. So the U.S. attorney had come up with this device as a means of getting the leadership and putting them in jail.

Balter: Do you remember who the U.S. attorney involved there was? I have a name, Carter--

Margolis: Carter, yeah.

Balter: --in my notes, but I don't have a first name.

Margolis: He's now on the court of appeals. James, James [M.] Carter. No, he's not on the court-- He's not [a] federal district court judge. Vicious, vicious red-baiter, one of the worst.We, John and I, took the position that to follow Leo's advice would be to play right into the U.S. attorney's hand. Why should we give the U.S. attorney what he wanted: an ability to put the people in jail? There was nothing unprincipled about relying on the Fifth Amendment. It's a constitutional right, and that they should do so. Well, our clients, of course, decided to follow the advice that John and I had given. Then started a whole series of proceedings, contempt proceedings, involving in the long run about seventeen people. But in each stage there were different people involved. Some in two or three sets of proceedings; others in one. It was a very complex ongoing sort of thing.The procedures [were] as follows: The witnesses are called before the grand jury, and they have to go into the grand jury room without counsel. The U.S. attorney is in the grand jury room, but the witness cannot have counsel. However, the witness can have counsel outside of the grand jury room, and have a right to say, "I want to go out and talk to my counsel before responding to any questions." And so John and I appeared outside of the room originally, and we advised them of course to claim the Fifth Amendment. There were a lot of technical things, a lot of ways, that they tried to entrap the people, and that was avoided.So after they refused to answer, the next procedure is witnesses are brought before a judge, in what is a public hearing. The record is presented to the judge: the witness was asked the following question, and took the following position. The U.S. attorney asks for an order, directing the witness to answer the question. We, of course, appeared at that stage of the proceedings. It was a public hearing. Our argument of course was that they had a right to claim the Fifth Amendment. And we wanted to put in a lot of evidence about what had happened to people who were in the Communist Party.By the way, the Fifth Amendment is not intended to protect the guilty ones; it is intended to protect the innocent ones. What it protects you against is not against being found guilty, but against being prosecuted. By using your own testimony to prosecute you.We appeared before a judge, Pierson M. Hall, now dead, with whom I had many experiences of various kinds subsequent to this, which you may be interested in. But in any event, this judge was, as far as red-baiting and riding roughshod over people he believed were communists was concerned, was on a par with Carter. So he [Hall] gave us short shrift. He ordered the witnesses to go back to the grand jury and answer the questions. Went back to the grand jury room; again, refused to answer. And then that's followed by a second public court hearing. Brought back before the judge. Asked that they be cited for contempt for having-- The reason you need the order first is that you cannot be cited for this kind of contempt unless you have refused to obey a court order. Originally, there was no court order. They were just asked a question, and the court ordered them to answer.I remember we started these proceedings about two o'clock in the afternoon--the first hearing, you know, on should they answer the question. They went back up, took an hour or two, came back at four o'clock or so, and were cited for contempt. We asked for a continuance, for an opportunity to make a showing. Wanted to represent them, authorities and briefs, present evidence. And he of course refused a continuance. The government put on evidence, not only the record. We put on evidence. The evidence we put on was to show the fear of prosecution, that it was a justified fear, not a farce. The hearing went on, and we kept asking. It went on eight o'clock, nine o'clock, ten o'clock. I think he adjourned for a half hour for dinner or something like that. And we kept asking him. Nine o'clock, ask go over till tomorrow? Ten o'clock, go over until tomorrow? No. Finally, close to midnight we had put on all of the evidence we could at that time.The judge ordered the case submitted, found them guilty of contempt, and ordered them-- Sentenced them to, I guess he sentenced them, to go to jail until they answered the questions. There were different stages of which they were given specific sentences, and other stages in which they were ordered to jail until they answered the questions. The sequence of these, my recollection doesn't give me--

Balter: Is this sort of something that happened more than once?

Margolis: Oh, no-- Oh, yes, a series of them.

Balter: With different witnesses?

Margolis: Different witnesses. Some were the same. So, at that time, we made a motion for--to file notice of appeal, made a motion for bail, pending appeal.The judge said, "Oh, it's too late. I'll hear that tomorrow." No, I think he said--I'm not sure whether he said tomorrow or he put it over a couple of days or over three days. And nothing, you know. The fact that when we asked for time, that was fine, but as long as-- Once he got them in jail, it was too late.Anyway, he was able to drag out the proceedings. We had to apply for bail in the trial court and get denied, before we could apply for bail in the appellate court. He dragged it out, for, I don't remember the details, but dragged it out, I remember, for days, and finally denied our application for bail, pending appeal.We went up to the Ninth Circuit, got a hearing on the bail there, and got bail granted. As I remember it, you see, my problem is that there were so many of these, and certain things happen in some stages. I don't remember whether this was the first one or later on. There came a point at which they heard the motion on bail and the matter on its merits at the same time. I believe initially it was just bail.But anyway we got an order releasing them. Picked up the order. The hearings are in San Francisco; the Ninth Circuit sat in San Francisco at that time. Got the certified copy of the order, came back, couldn't find Judge Hall. He was nowhere to be found. The time we saw him down the hall, tried to find him, then his clerk said he didn't know where he had gone.The order had to be entered in the court below. And the order of the appellate court is to the trial court, for the trial court to order the release on bail. See, the court of appeals doesn't itself order release; it tells the trial court to order release. So that we had to get this order entered at the appellate court and have a new order issued. We couldn't. He wasn't around.We went to other judges. Ordinarily in a matter like this, it's a pro forma matter, and any judge will handle it. Went to various judges. None of them would touch it. They said, "This is Judge Hall's matter. We're not going to-- You have to find Judge Hall." I don't remember how long the delays were, but he played us around for quite a while.

Balter: More than a day?

Margolis: Oh, several days.

Balter: People were in jail.

Margolis: People were in jail. And Judge Hall can't be found for several days. Judge Hall couldn't be found, couldn't be found. Finally, he appeared. Finally, we found him. And he had no choice, except to enter the order. Then we had further proceedings, and he did the same thing again on the further proceedings, even though it was clear that the appelate court had held that they were identical proceedings. He did the identical thing. We had to go up, again, to the court of appeal in order to get bail. Again, trouble finding him and so forth.We finally prevailed in all of the cases. It was held that they had a right to claim the Fifth Amendment, and they therefore were not in the contempt of court. That all of this had been done improperly. But this went on for months.An interesting thing-- I must tell you one very, very, I think it is, very funny thing. One of the witnesses called, who was not one of the original ones, but called to later say-- Was a man by the name of Newman, Milt Newman. And he did a stupid thing. He had been one of the ones that they had tried to serve in the first instance, but they hadn't been able to find him to serve him, to bring him before the grand jury. They finally found him and served him. They had witnesses to the fact that he was served. And he didn't appear. Now that is a cold contempt, and he had no excuse for not appearing. So he came up and he was cited for contempt for not appearing. We made a-- We had nothing to fight with, but we made what fight we could. And he sentenced that man to-- See, that was under a statute. He sentenced him to a fine of $2,500, and, I think it was, 90 days in jail, or six months. I guess six months in jail. I'm not sure, but it was either 90 days, 120 days, or six months.Newman--after he told us, we had really chewed him out, because it was a crazy thing that he had done. He told us, afterwards he went up to the jail, and people started talking to him. They told him that he was one of those people who had been brought up before the grand jury like the others. And it's been like a revolving door: they'd been going in and out of jail, in and out of jail. He tried to tell the people there, he said, "I'm stuck. I'm really one of those people, but I have a different case. And I'm stuck."Well, it so happened that the statute provided that the penalty was $2,500. The ordinary penalty is a maximum fine and the maximum sentence. This statute, however, read $2,500 or six months in jail. It had used the word or. A quick check [of] the law, and the law is if one part of the sentence is satisfied, the other side, part, becomes invalid. We rushed in, we paid the $2,500, and we made an application for his release. Again, Hall could not be found. He's not around. And the local guy wouldn't hear it--the argument. Finally there happened to be, I think it was in Arizona, a judge from Arizona or New Mexico, someplace, who was sitting pro tem. We got him to hear the matter, and he released the man.Newman told us afterwards that all prisoners [said], "Oh, we told you." All the prisoners said, all said to him, "You're going to be out before you know it." They really had him it turned out. [laughs]Hall was so anxious to just give him everything he could, and he was so mad that he didn't. And Hall's a pretty good lawyer. He was just so mad and so vicious that he didn't notice the or. So, he was absolutely stuck with that. I think I gave you the main heart of this.I'll tell you a little bit, some interesting things, about Hall. We had some curious experiences with some of these judges who treated us as viciously as it was possible to be treated on political cases. We later came up before [them] in civil cases, ordinary cases; they embarrassed us sometimes on how well they treated us, because deep down they respected the kind of fight we made and so forth.Well, I was an attorney in an air crash case [Wiener v. United Air Lines], along with a lot of other attorneys. There were about twenty attorneys, and there were two of us selected to handle the matter on behalf of all of the attorneys. I was one, and a former president of the state bar, a fellow by the name of Frank Belcher, was the other one. We tried a five-month case before Hall. And he just--you couldn't have asked for a-- He was really very angry at the-- He felt strongly about whatever he was involved in. He sympathized very much with the plaintiffs, whose husbands or wives or children had been killed. They were trying to collect damages and were being resisted. He gave us about as good a trial as we could get.Then there were some cases being transferred from out-of-state courts about the same air crash accident, where he had the opportunity to appoint counsel to represent those out-of-state people. He appointed me, and I got one of the nicest fees I've ever made.

Balter: How much?

Margolis: Oh, this must have been--let's see, the others were '48, '4-, let's see, no. About '48, '49. When were the grand jury cases?

Balter: 'Forty-eight, '49.

Margolis: 'Forty-eight, '49? This was about '62, '63. This is considerably later. We were trying to change some laws to get a national-system amendment. Air crash cases are very complicated, because you might have different laws of different states applying to them: according to where the people lived, where the ticket was purchased, where the airplane was landing. He was pushing good national legislation to deal with these complicated questions: to simplify them and to have a common approach. He was writing me letters, saying what do you think of this idea and what do you do with that?I tried some other cases before him. I tried one tax case; found it a difficult case. Without a jury, decided it from the bench in my favor. That's the way it was with Pierson Hall. And I am equally sure that had I been in another series of political cases brought before him, it would have been exactly the same thing that we had before.

Balter: Now, I understand-- Of course, we'll be talking about the Smith Act cases in a little while. No, I'm sorry, I'm confusing-- There was a judge that you got disqualified, but it was not Pierson Hall, but--

Margolis: Carter.

Balter: Carter became a judge later.

Margolis: That's right.

Balter: Yeah. He later became a district judge, and he was the first judge assigned to hear the Smith Act case. Okay, we'll talk about that in a little bit. While we're still on the grand jury cases, before we catch up for today, there was one episode that happened in June of 1949, as a matter of fact June 9, 1949, where you were held in contempt by Judge Hall. Apparently, the prosecutor, at this point not Mr. Carter, but a Max Goldschein, called you to the stand.

Margolis: Max Goldschein was an attorney who was sent out from Washington to handle these cases. After we'd won a few, they sent him out to handle these cases, and he fared no better than the others did.No, here's what was involved in that case. In that case I represented Dorothy Healey. Dorothy Healey was an officer of the Communist Party and had the title, I think, of secretary. She was ordered to produce the books and records of the Communist Party. Now, the law--the Fifth Amendment does not apply to production of the books and records of a corporation or an unincorporated association. Defense is not available.Dorothy Healey, however, filed an affidavit: that at the time that she was served and all times since then, she did not have possession of any of the books and records, and therefore was unable to comply with the court order to produce the books and records. That made it very difficult for them, because you can't hold a person in contempt for failing to do something which is not within their power to do. And no one can turn over records of which they do not have possession or control. So they were stuck. They were trying by various means to establish that Dorothy was lying and that she, in fact, did have possession of the books and records.

Balter: Ben, let me have you hold that thought while we slip in another tape.

19. Tape Number: X, Side One September 19, 1984

Margolis: So, he [Pierson M. Hall] did something virtually unheard of. I was Dorothy Healey's counsel, and any information she gave me was privileged. An attorney not only has the right, he has the duty not to disclose privileged information. The prosecution nevertheless called me to the witness stand and started asking me questions about what I knew: about the possession of the books and records. I told them that all of the knowledge that I had was obtained as a result of privileged communication from my client Dorothy Healey. And I was duty bound not to reveal it. This is ABC by the way. It's so crystal clear that it's like my saying, "That's a cup over there," and you say, "Oh, no, that's a glass." You know, the law is just absolutely clear.Nevertheless, the judge ordered me to answer the questions. I refused. And he held me in contempt. This was one afternoon. However, I had told him that I didn't have counsel. That I wanted an opportunity to get counsel to represent me in this matter. And I wanted a further hearing on the contempt. So he continued the matter until the next morning. I'd say ten o'clock. I immediately got in contact with my office, and I appeared the next morning at ten o'clock with John [T.] McTernan as my principal counsel. I believe it was John.But, in addition, my office had made telephone calls around town. There were approximately fifty lawyers. All kinds of lawyers, not necessarily Left-- Some left-wing and some right-wing lawyers appearing as my counsel, entered their appearance as my counsel. They filled the courtroom.Now, you see, this is a principle among lawyers. I don't care where you stand politically. A lawyer, unless he's an absolute crackpot, you know, is going to defend this principle. It's like a priest, like making a confession to a priest, and then you ask the priest, "Tell us about the confession he made to you." You just are not allowed to do it. Because otherwise you can't represent your clients if you can't keep confidential what your client tells you.So this was really a broad, representative group. Appeared at ten o'clock, and the judge did not come out. We saw prosecuting counsel going into the judge's chambers and coming out of the judge's chambers. We sat and waited. Everybody sat and waited. Finally at eleven fifteen, eleven thirty, the judge came out and announced that he was dismissing the contempt proceedings. That was the end of it.

Balter: I'm struck by what almost seems like a collaboration here between the U.S. attorney and the judge. Was it typical at this time? In other words, from the way you tell the story, it seems as though the judge has made a series of rulings in which he knows he can't-- Are not going to be upheld, but simply for the purpose of-- During that period of time, were judges so fully involved in the witch-hunting and the harassment of communists?

Margolis: Well, I don't-- The judges were fully involved, and you certainly couldn't get a fair trial or a fair hearing. How many judges would have gone as far as Hall did, I don't know. I think that probably only a small minority of the judges would have carried it to the extreme that he did. They would always try to find some way of ruling against you and would rule against you. But there aren't many judges who would have run away from you--avoided you. As a matter of fact, one time when we sought Hall, he practically ran down the court when we called him. He just ran away; now, there aren't many judges who would. There aren't many judges who would have done--would have gone along with calling an attorney to testify. There are some, and I would say that he was one of the few.But the general inability to get a fair hearing in which the legal and factual considerations weren't given any kind of real honest consideration-- There probably weren't a half a dozen judges in the United States that would have given a fair hearing. Of course there were some. I don't know of anyone in Los Angeles who would have done that kind of thing that we're talking about.

Balter: Now, at the time that this was taking place, '48, '49, what was the nature of the federal grand jury? Is this something that is similar to, for example, our county grand jury, where people are nominated, ordinary citizens?

Margolis: The county grand jury plays two roles. One is as a sort of an investigating body for the manner in which a county functions. The federal grand jury doesn't have that function. The federal grand jury merely sits to consider indictments and to return indictments if the jurors find sufficient evidence. In the federal court, they're merely an instrument for starting a criminal proceeding.

Balter: So was there ever any indication given as to what criminal charges these U.S. attorneys were pursuing in this long series of grand jury hearings?

Margolis: Yes. Well, they're certainly-- You want to remember that there was the Smith Act [Alien Registration Act, 1940]. There were acts under which they had the right to conduct an investigation. No question about that.

Balter: Were they required at that time, or are they required now to tell you what they're up to, more or less?

Margolis: They're supposed to tell you if you are a person under investigation. Or just a witness. And I think they did tell them they were persons under investigation.

Balter: Okay. I understand that one of the organizations that was involved in helping with the defense--in other words, providing defense work and raising funds and so on--of the Los Angeles Seventeen (people who were being called before this grand jury) was the Civil Rights Congress, which is probably one of the best-known political organizations of the time. And yet, on the other hand, very little has really been said or written about it. I wonder what you recall about the Civil Rights Congress and that organization.

Margolis: Well, if I were to give you a shorthand description of the Civil Rights Congress, I would say it was the Left wing of the civil liberties movement, which was primarily engaged in defending the rights of political people, left-wing political people. The ACLU [American Civil Liberties Union] did that also, but it was only a part of these activitiesAlso, the approach, I would say, was quite different. The ACLU would approach a case like this as a purely First Amendment, civil liberties issue. One of the problems we had sometimes with the ACLU in these cases was that--this is a statement I'm sure you've heard--if you have a friend like that, you don't need an enemy. Sometimes applied, not always. It sometimes applied because-- Particularly in San Francisco, there was an ACLU there. If they wrote a brief in favor of the Communist Party, it was a fifty-page brief. Forty-nine pages would be an attack on the Communist Party, and then the fiftieth page would say, "But nevertheless, reluctantly, we have to say that they're entitled to the protection of the First Amendment." And even here in Los Angeles, where it was much better than San Francisco, you'd have, for example, the attorney for the ACLU standing up and saying, "I want to make it clear that I'm not a communist. I don't agree with them, but--" Now, if they wouldn't carry it to the lengths that-- I'm really not exaggerating what they did in San Francisco, except instead of forty-nine pages in fifty, it might be twenty pages and five pages. [laughter] But I mean, they really wrote the greater part of the brief attacking the Communist Party.Whereas the Civil Rights Congress and their attorneys would never take that pose. They were much more a left-wing political organization, which would never take on the kind of a protective and disassociation posture that the ACLU would take on.

Balter: Well, you mentioned the attorneys down here in Los Angeles. Now, of course, at that time there was A. L. [Abraham Lincoln] Wirin. And I believe that Fred Okrand had come back from the army and was back with the ACLU.

Margolis: Now, A. L. Wirin was the principal attorney, and he appeared all the time. He and I have been very good friends. We had a falling-out about his insistence on--even when he said he wouldn't do it--standing up and starting argument by a disavowal. I told him if you're defending a murderer, you wouldn't have to stand [and] say, "I want the court to know I'm not a murderer, and I don't agree with murder." Why do you have to say this with the Communist Party?But of course there was a difference. My argument, in principle, was correct. As a practical matter, he needed a protective covering, or felt he needed protection. You want to remember that the ACLU had removed Elizabeth Gurley Flynn from their board because she was a communist. They had engaged in some pretty good red-baiting on their own. They had later-- Later years said they regretted it, and it was a mistake. But nevertheless we're talking about what they were like during that period.

Balter: Right.

Margolis: And I don't want to overstate the sort of thing that Wirin did. Because he would also do a lot of work, and he was not one of those who would do the equivalent of writing a twenty-page brief with most of it being an attack. But he did make it a practice to sort of place himself above the fray and to disavow. I felt a principled lawyer shouldn't do that. And we had, for example-- We got a lawyer in the Smith Act case [Yates v. United States] that appeared before the Supreme Court, a very conservative lawyer; he didn't do it.

Balter: Do you recall who that was?

Margolis: Yeah, [Augustin] Donovan was his name. He's dead now. That's a long story and it's all involved with the Smith Act.

Balter: We'll get to it the next time. Right? Back to the Civil Rights Congress for a moment. Again, to what extent was it affiliated or associated with the Communist Party and other organizations like that?

Margolis: There was no formal relationship, but I think that there was no doubt that the Communist Party helped establish and supported the Civil Rights Congress. On the other hand, not all Civil Rights Congress members or supporters were communists. It was certainly an organization that was sympathetic to and influenced by the Communist Party.

Balter: And what were-- What special role did the Civil Rights Congress assign itself as compared to, say, other organizations such as the National Lawyers Guild or--?

Margolis: Well, it concentrated on political cases. You want to remember that the attack was very widespread. There were ordinances being adopted. There were contempt proceedings and the Smith Act prosecutions. There were loyalty oaths. There were all kinds of things going on. The attack took many forms. For example, the ACLU eventually did come out against the loyalty oaths. But it took them time. So the Civil Rights Congress was against them from day one, or before day one. They, I say, they were a left-wing ACLU and were consistently out in the forefront of all of the fights. Largely protecting those who were communists or accused of being communists or treated along with communists, they were primarily fighting the red scare.

Balter: Now, your FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] files mention, at least at one point--

Margolis: Let me-- I don't want to understate. They also-- I don't want to overstate that. They also, to a considerable extent, engaged in racial discrimination cases, a considerable extent. Excuse me for--

Balter: No, thank you for that. In terms of some of the leadership of the Civil Rights Congress, one name that is mentioned actually in your FBI files, if it's accurate, as being an executive secretary apparently around the time of these grand jury cases, was Anne Shore. Do you recall her?

Margolis: Yes, I do.

Balter: What do you recall about her? Is she still alive?

Margolis: Oh, yes. Anne Shore was a very active person, executive secretary. She moved to Michigan, I believe, shortly after that. She's back in California and has been for quite a number of years. I'm not too up-to-date on what she's doing.

Balter: Okay. Any other of the leaders of the Civil Rights Congress come to mind?

Margolis: Well, the executive secretary, David Brown, was the one I worked with most closely, and he turned out to be a hired informer for the FBI.

Balter: Oh, really.

Margolis: Yes. That's a longer story than I think we have time for today.

Balter: Okay. Well, why don't we stop--

Margolis: Why don't we start with that if you don't mind.

Balter: Why don't we stop here, and we'll start with that next time then, okay?

20. Tape Number: X, Side Two September 27, 1984

Balter: Ben, last time you mentioned the story of David Brown, who was apparently director of the Civil Rights Congress for a time, and the fact that he had become an informer for the FBI at some point. We didn't have time for that story. I wonder if you could tell it today.

Margolis: I believe that Dave's title was executive secretary of the Los Angeles Civil Rights Congress. In any event, that's the kind of position he occupied. It was a full-time job. He and his wife were very devoted people, both of whom worked day and night on behalf of the Civil Rights Congress and the things for which it stood.I think I've indicated earlier the Civil Rights Congress was involved in many civil liberty fights. But a large proportion of them [were] related to the Left and were the defense of Communist Party people and other Left organizations. David, as I said, was a very hard worker. He, among other things, carried on a very heavy speaking agenda--going out to various organizations and speaking.I very frequently spoke with him at meetings, so that we spent a lot of time together. In addition, I spent time with him on cases that I handled for the Civil Rights Congress, cases involving various statutes. I remember a statute requiring--or an ordinance requiring communists to register. I remember some local loyalty-oath ordinances. There were all kinds of local litigation and local ordinances and laws which were, for the most part, successfully attacked as being unconstitutional.Dave, of course, worked for a very low salary. I don't remember what it was, but no one got rich working for the Civil Rights Congress. It developed that although most of us were not aware of it, that he developed a drinking problem. Was doing a lot of drinking, although I never did see him drunk. But there was no doubt that he drank heavily.From what we learned later, it appears that he was originally a bona fide member and official of the Civil Rights Congress, totally devoted to its cause. And he, like many other people on the Left, was approached by the FBI and asked to cooperate with them: to give them names and activities and so forth. It appears also that he initially refused. As a matter of fact, stood fast for some time. But, eventually, his need for money in order to meet his need for alcohol caused him to initially give in, on a limited basis, furnishing a little bit of information, which he thought would not harm anybody. And then he became a totally full-fledged informer.What then happened is that the House Committee to Investigate Un-American Activities was planning hearings out on the West Coast. I believe those hearings were scheduled for Seattle, but I'm not sure. They were scheduled somewhere in the West Coast. As we learned later, Dave Brown was approached and was told that he was expected to testify before the house committee. This was a policy followed by the FBI and other government agencies. They would use an informer. And then at a certain point where they thought the informer's greatest value was by having him go public--after which he could obviously no longer be an informer--they would require the informer to do that.Dave resisted. Said that he didn't want to do it; it'd destroy his marriage and so forth.

Balter: Who is he married to?

Margolis: I can't think of the woman's name, but a very, very fine woman. I just can't remember her first name.

Balter: She was active in the congress or--

Margolis: She was active in the congress and active in-- Generally, politically on the Left.Now, all of this that I'm telling you was unknown to any of us until later. What happened is one day I got a call at home, I believe it was, from his wife or someone from the family, saying that Dave had disappeared. That he had left no word. He had gone with the car. He had taken a substantial amount of his clothing, so it wasn't-- It was obvious that he hadn't just simply gotten into an accident or something. It was obvious that he had taken with him things that he wouldn't--one would not ordinarily have taken unless they were going somewhere. He had never said anything about going anywhere--wasn't scheduled to go anywhere--and that appeared to be great cause for alarm.No one at that time suspected that Dave was an informer. Because he had been such a devoted and excellent worker, who worked fourteen, fifteen hours a day for the things which I'm sure he continued to believe in while he was acting as an informer. We put out--reported it to the police--a missing person report. Sent out feelers to various parts of the cities where we thought he might be.No one had heard anything from him. And then one day he turned up, somewhere up north. May have been Seattle, but I'm not sure. We read in the newspaper-- No, I think he telephoned his wife. I'm not sure of the exact details, but by some form, he advised either his wife or someone else, but I think it was his wife, of what had happened. He did it by telephone. And had said that under no circumstances was he going to testify against the people with whom he'd been working. He was urged to come back to Los Angeles.He came back. I met with him for several hours and took a long, detailed statement from him, which set forth the facts that I have related, but which I did not know until the time of the statement. He was a crushed man. There was no question about it. His wife left him. All of his friends obviously would have nothing to do with him. He was fired from his CRC [Civil Rights Congress] job. And then I heard that he became a taxicab driver somewhere else; I think San Francisco or somewhere other than Los Angeles, I believe.I heard also from time to time, over the years, that he was trying to get back into the Left--in some way to work in the Left--and that he consistently rejected by everyone. I think that the last that I heard--of even of this kind or anything about him--was maybe twenty, twenty-five years ago.

Balter: So he's been-- You haven't heard anything of him at all since then?

Margolis: I don't know what ultimately happened to him.

Balter: Yeah. You mentioned that you thought that he probably continued to actually believe in what he was doing, at the same time that he was an informer. Given your knowledge of the many different informers that were uncovered during this period of time, was that a fairly common thing? That people would have that almost schizophrenic approach to it?

Margolis: No, it was not. There were many people who, under duress, folded, particularly testifying before the house committee; many people because their whole careers rested on it.But I know of-- Maybe a flat no was not correct. I know of no one who had the kind of commitment, had really made the kind of sacrifices, and had had the kind of devotion that he had. Most of these other people were people who, for the most part, were either on the periphery of the movement and not very greatly involved, who it was not surprising would do this kind of thing. For the most part, the deeply committed people did not act that way.I can give you an example of a person I knew who was a deeply committed person at one time, although the way he goes-- Howard Fast. Howard was very active on the Left and totally committed. When he decided to become an informer, as he did, he turned against everything that he had believed in. That is true of most of the Communist Party officials that--and there were several of them--that left and became informers. Now, there are others who left and went on to other activities, but did not become informers, like Dorothy Healey, for example.So, I think he [David Brown] was a rather unique case. I worked with him so closely, and I know how hard he worked. I just can't believe that he really wasn't trying to do his best to promote the things he was talking about. Also, at the last moment, he knew what he was doing to his life when he refused to testify. It was a little late, but, nevertheless, I'm sure he could have gotten a good deal of money. And, you know, these people who, like him-- He [could] have become a part of the stable of informers, who went around testifying in various cases and who made a great deal of money. He could have gotten himself well fixed if he had done this. And he did not; he refused to. So here you have a man who had this weakness and yielded to it.

Balter: Now, we're on the subject of this informing and undercover operations by the FBI. In the last, oh, ten years especially, since the revelations under the Freedom of Information Act and through various congressional committees, there have been a lot of lawsuits. The National Lawyers Guild of course has one going; Frank Wilkinson; many lawsuits challenging decades of surveillance and undercover work by the FBI. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I get the impression that there was very little legal challenge to the undercover work of the FBI going on at that time, in the forties and fifties, even when cases such as you've described would be uncovered. Is my impression correct? If so, why do you think that was, that there was not a legal challenge back then when so much of it was going on?

Margolis: Well, the problem during that period of time was that the immediate problem-- The immediate attacks and the Supreme Court and the rulings of the Court were of such a nature-- First of all, we were losing much clearer and much more important cases. There would have been no chance. To have devoted energy to that, when there were other more immediate cases, would not have made much sense. It wasn't on the order of the day.We did, in a way, tackle this. As a matter of fact, John McTernan in this office tried the case of Jencks v. United States and handled that in the Supreme Court. [Clinton] Jencks was indicted for, I believe, for an allegedly false, anticommunist--that's hardly it--noncommunist affidavit. He was tried and convicted. During the trial, there were several informers who testified; they were part of the stable [of informers] that I referred to. During the trial, John demanded copies of the statements or reports that the informers had furnished the government with. The trial judges refused to order those produced in the Jencks case, but that was reversed.The rule was laid down, and I believe, in a five to four decision. And by the way, on a very important legal point we have that we're entitled to see those reports and to use them for cross-examination. The trial court had said you can't-- You're not entitled to those statements unless you can make a preliminary showing that the statements are inconsistent with the testimony. [laughter] Of course, there was no way, not having access to the statements. There was absolutely no way of making that kind of a showing of such inconsistency. Still, only five--it was only a five to four vote. But this was a real blow against the use of informers and a great help, for example, in the Smith Act case, where we got the benefit of this because-- Well, take for example Jencks. Jencks was retried. The statements were furnished, and he was acquitted. Because these informers lied, and invariably there were contradictions between their reports and their testimony. So this was, in a way, an attack upon informers. But if you're talking about the legality of using informers, that has not been attacked. Now, that was attacked recently here in the case against the [Los Angeles City] Police Department [Coalition Against Police Abuse v. Board of Police Commissioners].

Balter: Okay. So I take it-- Well, perhaps the five to four decision in the Jencks case-- As I understand what you're saying is that a challenge to the use of informers probably would have swung the Court somewhat the other way. Otherwise, the Court--

Margolis: No, I never--

Balter: The Court barely--

Margolis: I don't think even today you could get an across-the-board ruling on the use of informers. All that you reasonably could hope to get them, and would get in litigation today, is that there has to be good cause for putting informers into our organization, and that you cannot put informers in an organization unless you have some good basis to believe that there is or is about to be a violation of some criminal law. Of course, in those days, there were all sorts of things that they could have justified going into using these informers for: Smith Act prosecutions, perjury prosecution, and so forth.

Balter: Okay. Now, what effect did the--especially in terms of the Communist Party--what effect did the discovery of these informers during the McCarthy period have on the way that the party conducted its business and the party operated, both on the morale as well as precautions that were taken? And did the attorneys in the party or who worked with the party develop any particular guidelines, dos and don'ts and so forth?

Margolis: Well, people tried to be as careful--about things that they thought should be confidential--as they could. The main problem, during this period, was one of protecting names.You want to remember that the Communist Party has never been convicted of engaging in any unlawful acts. Never. It has never even been charged with engaging in unlawful acts. And in the Smith Act prosecution, it was members of the Communist Party who were charged, and ultimately acquittals were obtained there. And the government had to stop those prosecutions.The real problem was that a person whose name was revealed as a member of the Communist Party could lose his job, could get kicked out of school. All sorts of things could happen to that person merely on such revealing. And that was the important thing to try to protect--the most important thing. As a practical matter, it was very difficult--impossible--because the Communist Party was just filled with informers: either informers who had gone in as informers, and in many instances, people who were in the party and who became informers while they were in the party. Many of them [were] threatened, or many of them had opportunities to make money, etcetera, and became informers. As a matter of fact, it's often been said that during that period the Communist Party's finances were perhaps in large part sustained by the dues of informers paid by the government.So there were precautions taken. You were careful not to say anything over the phone that could be avoided. You were careful about talking in your own home or in your offices or about what you wrote in letters, because we knew letters were opened. You did that, but I don't think that they had--As a matter of fact, I think that the FBI probably knew more about what was going on in the Communist Party than any single Communist Party member--anyone. You know, because they had it from all over the country. They had hundreds of informers. And as a practical matter, I don't think it was possible keeping quiet. Today, it's even less possible.

Balter: Now, what about the effect on morale, if there were so many informers at this time?

Margolis: Well, you see, it's very difficult, for me at least, to say that what happened was the effect of morale on the discovery of the informers. The reason is that so many other things were going on that had an effect on morale: the prosecutions that were going on, the firing of people, the whole McCarthyism business. The whole thing certainly affected the morale. But I would be very disinclined to select any one thing, like the informers, to say that was the cause of it. It certainly contributed. Now, what happened of course was that the size of the Communist Party greatly diminished. People dropped out; very few new ones joined.Again, I would say that up until the disclosures about [Joseph] Stalin, there were some people who left the Communist Party because they disagreed with it and some of the positions that were taken. They took the position that it was too close to the Soviet Union: ideologically that the Soviet Union could do no wrong. I'm talking about an ideological thing. But there were very few.But beginning with the [Nikita] Khrushchev revelations, there were a lot of people who dropped out of the party because of the disagreements. There were some as-- Particularly about Czechoslovakia, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and a lot of people who had believed that the Soviet Union was a different kind of a country than it was indicated. Its leadership was different than was later more fairly, clearly established. And [they] simply disagreed and dropped out.I, myself, for many, many, many years tended to disbelieve anything bad that was said about the Soviet Union. The reason for it was that so much of what was said was, in fact, lies, and we had no way of distinguishing the lies from the truth. We know, for example, that if you go back to the beginning of World War II--well, the invasion of the Soviet Union, you know, you got our press. And it was true the Soviet Union took a beating in the early days, but our press painted it as though the Soviet Union would be finished in six weeks--that morale had died. Well, they told all kinds of lies. Those were lies. It turned out that the Soviet Union was really-- Well, it made a lot of mistakes in the beginning of the war. It was really very strong, and the people supported it overwhelmingly.So, when you hear those lies and know that they're lies--they're revealed to be lies--then somebody else says something like the trials that occurred afterwards. We were told, in our papers, a lot of things that turned out to be true about those trials. But I, for one, didn't believe them, because I'd heard so many other lies. That was the problem.

Balter: Let me-- Let's go off tape for just a second. [tape recorder off] Ben, you mentioned Howard Fast. Did you know him very well when he was in the Communist Party and active?

Margolis: Oh, I knew him. No, not very well. He lived in New York; that was his home. I met him maybe half a dozen times, eight or ten times, either when I was in New York or when he was out in California [at] parties, social gatherings. Had some conversations with him.I can remember one particular event that sticks in my mind because it was such an unusual evening. This was I guess about 1954, summer of ['5]3, ['5]4, just when the Hollywood Ten were getting out of jail. And I was in New York or something; I don't remember what. I went to an antifascist refugee dinner with friends of mine, Abe [Abraham J.] Isserman and his wife Joan. He was one of the attorneys in the Hollywood Ten--I mean in the first Smith Act case, the Dennis case [Dennis v. United States]. We were planning--Martin Popper, who was one of the attorneys in the Hollywood Ten case and had been executive secretary of the [National Lawyers] Guild for many years, was having a welcome home party for Dalton Trumbo, who had just gotten out of jail a day or two before. At this dinner, Howard Fast came over to our table; Howard was at that dinner also. Came over to our table and suggested that afterwards we go out and have a drink or something. We told him we were going to Martin Popper's house. And why didn't he come along, because the Poppers are very hospitable people. We thought that there'd be no question. It turned out that, well, the Poppers weren't particularly friendly with Fast. They weren't particularly friendly with him, and Dalton Trumbo had a deep and abiding hate for Howard Fast, whom he considered an egocentric fraud. Anyway, we went over to this party at the Poppers. I think there were twenty-five, thirty people there. Dalton, as usual on these things, was pretty much the center of attention. Dalton Trumbo is, I think, of all the people I have ever known, the wittiest conversationalist. Just like this, [snaps fingers] it comes one after another. And the stories he tells! And I don't mean jokes. Events--and his ability to describe things and his use of language: absolutely extraordinary. He tends to capture, take over, unless there was-- And this was particularly true that night, because he was the guest of honor. He had just come out of jail. He was talking about his jail experiences, what it was like in jail, and Howard Fast broke in. Howard Fast by the way-- Dalton had served a year. And Howard Fast had done ninety days previously. He'd been in contempt for ninety days. Howard Fast had no sense of humor. None. He couldn't, he didn't, just didn't know what was funny. He was a very good writer on certain kinds of writing, you know, but he just had-- But whereas Dalton has an enormous sense of humor. Anyway, Howard Fast broke in and started telling about how, during his ninety days in jail, he had built up a class in Marxism, and about the prison and what he had accomplished during these ninety days. The point he was making-- That in all circumstances, wherever you are, if you are a true Leftist, you can, you can do things. Dalton had been talking about baseball games, and you know, talking entirely different kinds of things, not that he was anything of this kind. And then Dalton took over, and for about two hours engaged comically with Fast, in which he absolutely destroyed him. I wish I could remember. Fast wasn't aware of what was happening to him. He [Trumbo] ridiculed him. And I remember how he was saying, he said, "Our jail, too, we had people who we'd call ninety-day wonders." He was referring to people who had a ninety-day sentence. In any event, Howard looked like such a schmuck, you know. It was just unbelievable. I think that was the last time I saw him. I may have seen him afterwards, but it is the last time that I can remember seeing him. He's a very egotistical man, who did have a flair for and an ability to write certain kinds of things. He wrote some excellent books.Oh, I know, there was something. I almost had a connection with him. Later on, after he became an informer, one of his books was purchased for a motion picture. Which one was it? I don't remember. And somebody approached me--it's all very vague in my memory--someone came to me and, I think, indicated that Howard would be interested in talking to me about some legal problems that he had. I didn't see Howard in connection with that. And I said I wasn't interested. I can't remember the name. I think a movie was made out of it.

Balter: Well, didn't, I may be totally-- My memory may be totally wrong here, but didn't, because this would be awfully ironic, didn't Howard Fast write the book version of Spartacus that the screenplay was based on?

Margolis: Yes.

Balter: And then Dalton Trumbo did the screenplay. So the irony is there.

Margolis: Yes, yes, that's right. Yes.

Balter: That's amazing. You said that Dalton Trumbo--just to pick up on this for a second--considered Howard Fast an egocentric fraud. That raises two questions. One is, had the two of them had some previous dealings with each other that had caused bitterness?

Margolis: I had not known that at the time we went to this party. I never learned much about it afterwards, but it was evident by references that Dalton made. And I just can't remember it. You just, unless you spend an evening with Dalton, you just wouldn't know whether or not-- He is so fast that one thing piles on top of another. But it was obvious that they had contact and that Dalton Trumbo thought very little of Fast. And he was, you know, saying that in his own way and then playing with it. And Howard Fast didn't know what was happening to him. He didn't understand him.

Balter: Now, after--

Margolis: As a matter of fact, Dalton called me the next morning. And he said, you know, he said, "After the end of the evening--" I was staying in some hotel and he called me and he said, "Somebody afterwards told me that I had behaved very badly. I shouldn't have done what I did, and that I should call the people and apologize for having done what I did." And he said, "I'm calling you to find out if you agree."I said, "I didn't think--" I said, "I don't think it was necessary to apologize, because I didn't think Howard Fast knew what was happening." It was devastating.

Balter: When Howard Fast turned out to be an informer, do you recall Trumbo's reaction at that point?

Margolis: No, I don't. Well, from what, I had talked-- I remember when I talked to him about Fast. Trumbo expressed his deep distrust of Fast, saying, he wouldn't depend on him for a second. He didn't trust anybody who was a phony, and didn't say he thought he had become an informer. But he was certainly prescient of what would later happen.

Balter: Well, to sort of change gears here for a while, during the McCarthy period-- We haven't talked about the National Lawyers Guild for a while. What were the main activities of the National Lawyers Guild during the McCarthy period? What types of things, what role did the guild play?

Margolis: Well, it so happens that I have a file on that that I could get, if you want to get any details. I'd have to refer to the files. But I want to tell you an interesting problem of recollection that I have. I have, two or three instances, participated in seminars at guild conferences and conventions on the history of the guild. I have talked about that period. When I was asked the first time to talk--that was seven years ago, eight or ten years ago--my initial impression was well, gee, we didn't do much. We were just trying to remain alive, stay in existence. We, of course, did carry on a vigorous fight against being placed on the attorney general's list. I don't know if that will mean anything to anybody, but there was then-- The attorney general kept a list of subversive organizations. And there was a procedure whereby he gave organizations notice that he intended them to be placed--that he intended to place an organization on the list. And then ordinarily what would happen is that he would just place them on the list. Well, the guild filed a lawsuit and got a temporary, preliminary injunction against his placing the guild on the list. And then there was extensive litigation that went on for a number of years; I don't remember how many. But in the end, there was never a final decision, as I remember the litigation, but finally the attorney general simply withdrew his notice and the litigation was dropped. While people were always saying the guild was on the attorney general's list, it was in a way true, because he said he was going to place it. But it was technically not true; he had never placed it on the list. And so a large part of our energies, no doubt, was devoted to that fight in that litigation.So when I first started to review that period, it seemed to me that, well, we did a little--some little things here and there. Our membership dropped down to the very, very few. I think in Los Angeles here, for example, we may have had five or ten active members, maybe fifty, sixty who paid their dues. It dropped way down. It was just trouble to keep it alive. But then I went to the library. I had not saved back issues of the guild publications; they're in the library. I found that we had really carried on an enormous amount of activity during that period, all kinds of various-- We had written articles on the House Committee to Investigate Un-American Activities, on the Mundt-Nixon bill. But in addition to that, in many areas we did work. We did work on social security. We had people testifying before Congress on those issues. As a matter of fact, if I got my report--my notes--out, I could tell you in great detail what we did. But all I know, all I can remember now, because it's several years since I've last talked about it, is that we've had a very, very broad scope of activities. And there were just a few of us carrying it out.

Balter: Was a lot of it carried out on a national level? Perhaps some of the activities [were] not your local here in Los Angeles?

Margolis: It was both national and local. And remember that not only did the membership drop out, but no new members-- Well, maybe "no" is an exaggeration, but almost no new members came into the guild. We had had guild chapters in law schools, which were a source when people graduated. Many of the students who were in the guild chapters became guild members. During this period, particularly after the attorney general gave the notice, the point was raised that students became afraid that if they belonged to guild chapters, they'd have trouble getting admitted to the bar in various states. So the guild chapters were disbanded. I remember also, during that period, it was not just the guild, the guild was just part of it. My law firm during that period needed-- We lost some of the people, one or two of the people, who were with our firm. We were looking for young people who were with our firm. We were looking for young people to go to work for us. There were a lot of lawyers looking for jobs. We couldn't get anybody to go to work for us.

Balter: Where were your offices located during this period of time, during the early period?

Margolis: We were located at 112 West Ninth Street, downtown near Main [Street] in an area that has now become part of the garment district. As a matter of fact, we moved out of the building there where we had our law offices, because it was being converted into totally a garment building.

Balter: Well, maybe what we'll do, since you do have this file available, is in another session or two, we'll put that out and return to the topic.

Margolis: I didn't know whether-- Wasn't that file among the-- Shall we go off the--?

Balter: Sure. [tape recorder off] We're back on tape.Ben, one thing I wanted to ask you about, and you have already mentioned it in passing, was this proliferation of county/city loyalty ordinances, or registration requirements. At one point, for example, there was an L.A. county ordinance requiring communists to register with the county sheriff. The records show that you represented [knock on the door] at least a couple of people who didn't register.

Margolis: Could you hold it for just a second? Saul? [tape recorder turned off]

Balter: That you represented at least a couple of people who either refused or failed to register, as a result of this county ordinance in 1950. Henry Steinberg, who I believe later, if I'm not mistaken, went on-- He has to be one of the Smith Act defendants. And LaRue McCormick.

Margolis: That's true.

Balter: Those are the two names that my research shows. What do you recall about these ordinances? For one thing, who were the local, if you recall, legislators--people on the board of supervisors or the city council--who were most active in pushing for these communist-registration ordinances and loyalty oath and so forth?

Margolis: Me and my memory for names. If you mentioned them, I'd probably know them, but I can't remember their names.

Balter: For example, after Fletcher Bowron was deposed, there was-- Say 1950, who was the--? Well, we'll have to look up who the mayor was before Fletcher Bowron, I guess.

Margolis: I think it was members of the board of supervisors, primarily. I think it was the county rather than the city.

Balter: Yes, this ordinance was a county ordinance.

Margolis: The mayor, of course, was mayor only of the city. I don't remember any city ordinances. There may have been, but I don't remember any. But there were ordinances in other areas, too. As I remember, I think I handled a case in Bakersfield; confused Bakersfield with San Bernardino, one of those two places. There were several others. There were a number of very similar ordinances, and we had-- This was during the--

Balter: Ben, let me interrupt you, because we're just about to run out of tape, and I don't want to lose that thought.

21. Tape Number: XI, Side One September 27, 1984

Margolis: Well, to go on, it's rather interesting. This was a period during which if the word "communist" was mentioned in court, generally speaking, that was enough: you lost your case. It really was that bad. Now, there was an exception. The exception-- We won most if not all of our cases on these local ordinances. But we did so, we succeeded in doing so because of several reasons: One was that they were almost universally very badly drawn and wide open to attack on all kinds of technical grounds. The main argument that we had was that these were matters of national policy, and that the localities had no authority to legislate locally. So we were quite, quite successful on that. The result was that the litigation lasted over a period of a year, or a year and a half, something like that. There was a proliferation of attempts to get these ordinances. My recollection is that there was an attempt to get one or more of them in Los Angeles. Was a fight against it, and then when similar ordinances were declared unconstitutional for the reasons I've given, it was abandoned. Now, whether it would have otherwise passed, I don't know. But I do think that the victory in some of the cases, although they were on strictly technical grounds, it was not-- Or that the federal government had exclusive jurisidiction. Whether or not they would have passed otherwise, I'm not sure. Probably would have.

Balter: Do you recall the specific case involving Henry Steinberg and LaRue McCormick, in 1950, on the registration? Do you recall that specifically?

Margolis: Yes, I recall that specific case. I recall that we won it on these technical grounds, and the ordinance was declared unconstitutional.

Balter: It was out of that specific case?

Margolis: Well, there were several cases in which ordinances were declared unconstitutional. That was one of them. I don't remember the names of the other ones. As a matter of fact, I wouldn't have remembered that name if you hadn't told me.

Balter: Why don't we take a quick break at this point. [tape recorder off] Ben, one thing that-- Well, excuse me, before we go on to that, we've mentioned LaRue McCormick. She strikes me, from a number of different angles, as someone who is just about everywhere during these days. She was involved in Sleepy Lagoon, setting up the Sleepy Lagoon Defense Committee way back in the beginning, and so on. Did you know her very well, and she's still--?

Margolis: Quite well.

Balter: Tell me about LaRue and her activities during that time.

Margolis: Well, LaRue, I don't know whether she was a full-time official of the Communist Party or not. I don't remember, but she was certainly an active spokesperson or representative of the party. An indefatigable worker who, as you said a moment ago, was everywhere. She was an interesting person in this regard. I sort of have the impression that she was some sort of an official in the party. Very often people like that would sort of pontificate and then not do any of the legwork themselves, or see to that. Well, she was very able politically, and had lots of ideas and expressed them. She also did--yes, take tickets. Everything, whatever there was to do. But she spread herself very thin, because she was just in everything that was going on.

Balter: There was something that comes up in your FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] file that caught my eye. I don't know if it's something that you were aware of at the time or that you noticed in going through your own FBI files. But in April of 1951, there appears, in the FBI record, some discussion of a memo by a Mr. Nichols from the American Bar Association [ABA], requesting information from the FBI on communist attorneys. Apparently, this information, the implication of the FBI report is that the information was supplied to the American Bar Association and that there was a list which you were on--I guess, a [list of] local Los Angeles attorneys at that time. Is this something that you became aware of at the time? Are you familiar with this particular episode?

Margolis: No, I was not aware of it at the time, of this specific thing. The ABA was a very anticommunist organization. I can tell you some very interesting things about the ABA, if you want to know. [laughs]

Balter: Yeah, I would because I think the next question was the extent to which attorneys were threatened or felt harassed or felt in fear of losing their bar cards and so on because of their political activities.

Margolis: Well, you know, the ABA is the powerful, influential, recognized bar association of the United States, with all of the big firms having their people be members. Oh, they were engaged in hundreds of activities. They're a big organization.Back in the days of the guild, they had a rule that no one who was-- Well, first of all, I think they always had a rule that no one who was a communist could be a member. Then they adopted a rule that no one who was a member of the National Lawyers Guild could belong to the American Bar Association. They also at that time didn't permit--they were lily-white--they didn't permit any black or Asian members at all. As a matter of fact, the National Lawyers Guild was the first national nondiscriminatory bar association that there was. It was one of the things that it prided itself on.Of course, in due course, I don't remember when, but during the civil rights movement, the ABA withdrew its restriction. I don't know whether it was ever actually written into the bylaws of the ABA or just recognized. They began to admit black lawyers, and they admitted-- And now, of course, they not only don't discriminate, they actively seek members of all ethnic groups. And at times they have done some pretty good work in the civil rights and civil liberties cases. They've had civil liberties committees, some of which have taken very good positions. For example, when it comes to the Smith Act case, one of the people who was active on this civil liberties committee was [Zechariah] Chafee, who was considered the expert First Amendment person. They conducted a lot of very good activities.But the interesting thing is that about five or six years ago, I got a request, or I got a form that was sent out to a lot of lawyers, asking me to join the ABA and telling what a great organization it was, etcetera. So, I wrote a letter to the president of the ABA and said that I'd never joined the ABA because it discriminated. I noticed that it no longer discriminated against blacks, but that it had discriminated against members of the guild. And I was still a member of the guild and assumed I was, therefore, not eligible to join the ABA. Very, very promptly, I got back a response, in which they said, "Yes, it's true that there was such a time. That that was one of the errors, great errors we made. And we not only will accept you, but we urge you and desire you to become a member of the ABA and to participate in its activities."I have never really wanted to join the organization, but I'd gotten myself into a box, because I had written a letter which in effect said the only reason I didn't join the ABA was for the reasons I stated. And they wrote me this letter and placed me in a box. So I joined the ABA and continued my membership for a couple of years. And then dropped my membership for only one reason really. And that was that I just didn't have any time to spend on ABA matters-- or energy--at that point in my life; and it was just a question of giving them money, and I thought there were better places to give my money.Then at our last National Lawyers Guild national executive board meeting, which was held in Portland a few months ago, they had a speaker from it at the guild, coming from the ABA, from a section of the ABA: civil liberties, civil rights. And, who was gung ho for everything on guild policy! Who came there saying that he was now made head of that section and, by god, he needed help. He wanted members of the guild to come in and join his section of the ABA. Well, in order to join his section, you had to first join the ABA, and then you join the section, like it's a suborganization. So I have again joined, simply because he did such a good selling job and because I think it's wonderful that the ABA now has a section with that kind of leadership. It shows you that the world does change.

Balter: Does that section have a title, or a particular focus?

Margolis: I think it's-- If Ruby [L. Pope], my secretary, were here, she could get out the file. I don't know where to lay hands on it. If you make a note, we'll get the file, and I'll have the name of the section, because I did join. I've got the records, which will show what section I joined.

Balter: During the McCarthy period, or even a period of time more broadly than that, what was the situation with the California bar and the county bar in terms of guild members, communists, Leftists?

Margolis: All right. That also is an interesting story, which could almost be a session in itself, but let me at least give you some highlights. You know that every lawyer must be a member of the state bar, which is a state corporation. The state bar is totally governed by its board of governors. The board of governors are elected by the membership--by the members of the bar, everybody being eligible to vote--and they're elected from sections. For example, I think Los Angeles has either two or three members of the board of governors, San Francisco perhaps one, according to the population.In addition it has what is known--and it's had ever since I have been a member of the bar--a thing called the [California] State Bar Conference [of Barristers]. The State Bar Conference is composed of private bar associations. You see, the state bar itself is a public bar association. Private associations, like the guild, and there are many of them: Los Angeles County Bar Association, the Los Angeles lawyers club [Lawyers Club of Los Angeles], and there are various black lawyers clubs, there's a women's lawyers club--all kinds. There are, well, at this last-- I've just returned from a conference at which there were I think 576 delegates--get delegates according to your membership--and I think 68 organizations, or something like that, in which the guild is one and has been one all along. It's a very interesting organization.Back in the McCarthy days, and I don't remember just what year it started, there were, in many states, laws passed regarding loyalty oaths and membership in the bar. There was introduced, in California, proposed legislation, which would declare members of the Communist Party ineligible for membership in the state bar and separate legislation requiring a noncommunist affidavit for membership in the state bar. Now, the State Bar Conference meets once a year, the same time as the state bar convention. It's three days, generally. The various organization members of the bar, and even individuals also, can offer resolutions. There's a whole procedure; they offer a certain period of time in advance and so forth.We were members at that time. My recollection is that, initially, the first resolutions on the subject, and I don't remember the year, were resolutions offered by other bar associations to the effect of supporting this legislation, the two bills that I have mentioned. We carried on-- The National Lawyers Guild really did a job of writing pieces, circulating them among the lawyers, and got a lot of publicity and, at that State Bar Conference, defeated both resolutions by a fairly narrow margin. I don't remember their numbers, but it would be something like 200 to 175, you know, somewhere in that area where it wasn't one or two votes. There was a very substantial vote against us.At the following-- For several following conferences (they are once a year), there were similar resolutions, and the guild itself offered resolutions against these things. We carried that--every time, we carried our resolution, and the others were defeated. In about two or three years, the organizations stopped introducing such resolutions.There was one member, whose name I don't remember, a real-- He was considered a kook by everybody, one of the real far-out-Right guys, who had offered a resolution calling for the disbarment of all communist lawyers. The first year he introduced it-- See, there's debate. There was quite a debate on it, but it was decisively defeated. The second year and third year, the debate was less, and it was even more decisively defeated. After about the third year, he would get up, make his speech for this. Nobody else would speak. And it was just turned down overwhelmingly. It just became something that they wouldn't buy.The guild, interestingly enough, has played an influential role in the conference, which is remarkable for the size of the guild. We're generally in the center of the most controversial resolutions--I'll give you an example--and with varying degrees of success, but generally over a period of time, a high degree of success. At this last conference-- First of all, we generally introduce the only social reso-- Most of the resolutions, most of them, deal with technical things, amendments to the code, and so forth, but some of them, policy matters, but policy matters in the legal, ordinary business, legal, and criminal area.We had the following resolutions this time: First, we had a resolution calling for a constitutional amendment to abolish the death penalty. It was placed on as the first order of business for unlimited debate (sometimes they limit debate). It started in the morning, and there was a terrific discussion on that. Our resolution carried by a vote of 375 to 212. Next, for many years, six years ago, we introduced our first resolution calling for some kind of state action against South Africa as long as it maintained apartheid. We were defeated five years in a row, although we kept getting stronger on the thing. We modified the resolutions in different ways. This year, the sixth year, we got the support of the two major bar associations--two biggest bar associations--and won it quite overwhelmingy, after losing it for five years.We had a resolution urging each state bar association--each private bar association to establish a committee to work on the issue of arms control. Quite a debate on that. The president of the Beverly Hills Bar Association stood up and said, "I want to thank the guild for putting in this resolution. I am ashamed of the fact that I've been president for a year and haven't thought of it myself. We should be doing it." By the way, on the argument on apartheid, several persons got up and said it was to the state bar's shame that they hadn't done it earlier. This resolution on the arms, the committee passed by a large vote.Let's see, what else? We had several other similar--We had two or three other similar resolutions. We lost only one of our resolutions, and that I think largely because of the political campaign. We had a resolution on Nicaragua, against the American policy in Nicaragua, saying, "We should follow the rule of law, and obey the treaties." We had the support. We got quite a lot of support. Then somebody made a speech saying this was merely a political maneuver to attack the Reagan administration and we shouldn't be getting mixed up in partisan politics. In any event, the motion was tabled. I don't think they could have defeated it, but it was tabled with about a 60 percent vote in favor of tabling it and a 40 percent vote against it.

Balter: Now, all of this was just a week or two ago, wasn't it?

Margolis: I came back this Monday. It was last-- No, it was Monday night. It was last Saturday, Sunday, and Monday, last week.

Balter: To what would you attribute the degree of influence that the guild [has], which still, I think it's fair to say, is perceived as a Left organization?

Margolis: Oh, no question about it.

Balter: At this point in time.

Margolis: Well, several things. The state bar, it is true, is made up of a very conservative profession, because so many lawyers represent big business and their interests are largely oriented in that direction. However, there are many lawyers who defend criminal cases, and developing concepts in that direction. There are other lawyers who handle--a lot of lawyers who handle personal injury cases, domestic relations cases, where the predominant conservative thing does not control, because they're dealing in personal relations. They're as often on one side as on the other, and they tend to want to be fair. So there are those areas.Now, in the area of civil liberties, civil rights, number one, there's been a tremendous growth of women lawyers, and they're just terrific on the subject. There is growth of black lawyers and some Chicano lawyers, although they haven't played much of a role. But more basic than that, lawyers learn the Constitution while they're in law college. And by and large, they believe in the Bill of Rights, particularly where it doesn't come into conflict with their own financial interests. When it does, then it may be a different story. But where it doesn't they tend-- They're split, but they tend to be pretty good on those issues.Then why is the Lawyers Guild so often-- The Lawyers Guild is respected for several reasons: the other bar associations, while they have these tendencies that I've described, nevertheless don't have a deep concern about the issues that we're concerned with. In other words, the very lawyers who will vote with us on an apartheid resolution because they think that's the right thing to do in this sort of thing, it isn't central to their interest. Therefore, they tend not to introduce resolutions on the subject, but will often support resolutions on the subject introduced by others, and those others are the guild. Now, in addition to that, the guild generally prepares very carefully. They're very concerned. If somebody gets up and does a poor job in support of our resolution, does an unprofessional, unworkmanlike job, even on issues they agree with, they look down on those people. If you do a good job, they respect you, even if they disagree with you. And the guild, not always but most of the time, does a very good job. So for all of these reasons we got support. On the other hand, if we were to introduce a resolution, let us say, on the antitrust laws, that we think would be very good, we very likely wouldn't be supported. But that is not our main concern.

Balter: Okay, I think what we're due to go on to next would be the Smith Act case, and I suggest what we do is start it at the beginning of the next session.

22. Tape Number: XI, Side Two October 11, 1984

Balter: Ben, we're about to embark on a pretty lengthy discussion of the Smith Act cases. Perhaps the best thing for me to ask you to do would be to give an overview of what had happened in this area, before the cases that you were personally involved in began.

Margolis: Well, the first Smith Act case against the Communist Party and its members was the so-called Dennis case, Dennis v. United States, in which the top fifteen, I believe, I'm not sure of the precise number, national Communist Party leaders were indicted and tried in New York City. I did not directly play any part in that case, although I sat in on a number of conferences concerning various matters relating to the case. I was back in New York on several occasions and sat in two or three times at various sessions of the case. I had nothing to do with the handling of the Dennis case.I think there are a number of significant points about that case that should be noted. Perhaps the most significant one is that the defendants there took a position that is unusual in a case, in any criminal case. That is, they were all-- The defendants' position was we're all in the same boat. We're all communist, and we're all innocent or we're all guilty. Of course, they took the position that they were all innocent, but they did not-- Not only did they not take the position that the guilt of each individual had to be proved, they took exactly the contrary position: that they were all together; they all stood for the same things; they'd all done the same things; and that therefore it followed that they were all innocent or guilty. I think that was one of the major factors that led to the result in which all of the defendants were [convicted].I have read parts of the records. There were some differences, some substantial differences in testimony, with respect to some of the defendants. It is conceivable, although I certainly don't know, but it is conceivable that the court might have made a distinction among the defendants, and found some innocent and others guilty.The second factor is that there was a relationship between the attorneys and their clients, in that case, of this kind: The clients said, "This is a political case, and we're going to make all of the decisions. Because the decisions really are not legal decisions, even though they may take a legal form. They are political decisions." The attorneys primarily were following the tactics and the procedures and the policies that had been outlined by their clients. And to a major extent had little to say about what those were, although from time to time they were consulted. Also, there was a deliberate decision to give as good as they got from the judge.They had a judge who was terribly biased and sometimes very crude in the way he handled the matter. The attorneys stood up and reacted to it, as I believe they had a right to react. Did so, and one of the principal issues in the case was--permitted to become--how the attorneys were conducting themselves in handling the trial. In other words, they were being tried not only-- The defendants were being tried not only for what they allegedly did, but also for the manner in which they defended themselves. This of course hit upon the attorneys and resulted in contempt convictions of all of the attorneys. I participated in the writing of one of the briefs, the brief for Richard Gladstein. I read all of the other contempt briefs, and I think helped in some of them.Let me say that the conduct of the attorneys there was much, much more defensible and not subject to contempt than was, let's say, the conduct of the attorneys in the Chicago Seven case, where I also worked on their contempt brief and read major portions of the record. But the Chicago-- But the political conditions were different and the Chicago Seven attorneys were all finally acquitted on appeal of their contempt, whereas all of the contempt charges for the Smith Act attorneys stood up; that is, stood up so far as the holdings of the court were concerned. I think these two factors had a major impact upon the result. I'm not at all sure. Well, if I were to make a guess, I would say that no matter how the case was handled--how well it was handled and how correctly it was handled--and how much attention was given to public relations, in the political situation that existed at that time, a conviction at least of some, and probably of all, of the defendants was a certainty. However, I do feel that the matter was handled in such a way as to make it easiest for the government to accomplish its objectives and as to, I think, be somewhat harmful in the field of public opinion, which in the long run is very important in these cases, precisely because they are political cases.

Balter: Now, do you recall the judge and the attorneys in that case?

Margolis: Yes, the attorneys were all friends of mine. The judge was [Harold R.] Medina, who was a very able man, a vicious man, who simply rode the attorneys to an extent that is almost unbelievable. And I've never seen anything to equal it, except, again, in the Chicago Seven case, where the judge did very similar things. He really started the things that were called contempt, and the attorneys stood up and fought back. What they were doing by and large-- And some of it was perhaps almost politically necessary from the standpoint of the people involved. For example, the attorneys noticed that every day about three thirty, I think it was, whatever the hour was, the judge would make some remark that was bound to find its way into the press. He would wait until that precise hour to make a remark. It was obvious that it was planned and timed for purposes of the press, at least obvious to counsel. And one of the counsel stood up and said so to the judge. That was one of the bases for his conviction of contempt.

Balter: Which attorney was that, do you recall?

Margolis: From Philadelphia, what's his name? I can't think of it at the moment, but it will come to me. The other attorneys were Richard Gladstein from California, who was a former law partner of mine when I practiced law in San Francisco; Abe [Abraham J.] Isserman, who was a New Jersey and New York attorney, who was the only attorney disbarred as a result of this contempt proceedings.Interestingly enough, he acquired a unique position in legal relationship to the courts. You have to be a member of the lower courts in order to be a member of the Supreme Court of the United States. Abe had been a member of the Supreme Court of the United States for a long time and admitted to practice there. He was then disbarred from all of the lower courts, and a motion was made to disbar him from the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, which had sustained his contempt conviction, nevertheless refused to disbar him. I think he's the only attorney in American history who has been a member of the U.S. Supreme Court and no other court. Let's see, others were-- Abe had been an attorney for the [American] Newspaper Guild. All of the attorneys were guild members, that is Lawyers Guild members. He had been the attorney for the Newspaper Guild and a lot of left-wing things.There was David Scribner, also a very, very able attorney, who had been an attorney for the United Electrical [Radio and Machine] Workers [of America (UE)], national counsel for the United Electrical Workers. Let's see, how many is that? Oh, George [William] Crockett [Jr.], who was a black, young black lawyer; he was by far the youngest member of that team. He was later elected as a judge in Detroit and is now a member of Congress from Detroit. But he went to jail for contempt also. I think I've mentioned everybody.

Balter: The Dennis case was the first case, as I understand it. Right?

Margolis: Right.

Balter: Okay. Let me ask you sort of two questions really, which maybe make sense to be answered together, which is when the indictment first came down in the Dennis case, first of all, how seriously did the-- In the midst of everything else that was going on with HUAC [House Committee to Investigate Un-American Activities] and so forth, I realize, how seriously did the Communist Party take this? Also, on what levels of the party was the strategy to deal with this new assault on the organization discussed and what types of discussions went on?

Margolis: Well, as far as the Dennis case was concerned and all of the other Smith Act cases are concerned, they were all taken with the utmost seriousness as an attempt to destroy the Communist Party, which indeed it was. It was discussed everywhere--top levels, everywhere. But the policies for the Dennis cases were made by the defendants in that case, who were of course the top leaders of the Communist Party.I should mention one other thing of significance about that case. The case was defended as it should have been, indeed, basically upon the theory that the Smith Act [Alien Registration Act, 1940] on its face, and as applied in that case, violated the First Amendment. The evidence against the defendants consisted entirely of elements of speech: it included writings of course, which also fall under the First Amendment--teaching and advocacy.The law, as it stood prior to the decision in the Dennis case, was that you could not declare speech illegal, unless it was so closely connected to action that there was no time to reply and that there was an immediate evil that the law had a right to prevent that was flowing from, would flow from the speech, directly from the speech. Like, you know, the classical example of somebody hollering "fire" in a theater, or when you have a lynch mob and somebody gets up, they pick up the black there, and somebody says, "Let's lynch him!" That kind of speech was considered so closely related to action as not to be protected by the First Amendment.But anything short of that, no matter how illegal even the objectives were, could not be punished. For example, it had been held by the Supreme Court, in a leading case, that the advocacy of bigamy by Mormons, that the advocacy of multiple marriages and of bigamy by Mormons was not a violation of the First Amendment, unless it was shown that it was part of the process of accomplishing that objective. Well, there was no such showing, of course.The charge here was the defendants conspired to advocate the overthrow of the government of the United States by force and violence, as speedily as circumstances would permit. Well, no showing could be made--nor was there an attempt to make a showing--that the country was on the verge of revolution and there was an immediate danger that the speech would result in violent overthrow or an attempt to violently overthrow the government.So, the courts were faced with this dilemma. How do you deal with this question? They devised a new rule, which modified the First Amendment. As a matter of fact, took the heart out of it, in which they said that if the ultimate objective was illegal--overthrow of the government by force and violence--then you would have to consider the question of immediacy in relationship to the seriousness of the violation of the law. In other words, the more serious the violation, the more remote the impact of the language could be. And here, of course, you had a situation where there was no showing that at any time there was any such danger. Nevertheless, the Court by fashioning that rule was able-- The Supreme Court was able to sustain the convictions. Otherwise, it could not have done so. It's an indication of what I said before, that almost regardless of what anyone did, there was going to be a conviction in that case.

Balter: Now, just to catch the flow of the history of the Court for a moment-- And obviously we'll be talking about the Yates decision later [Yates v. United States] that finally came out of the Smith Act cases. I take it that the state of the law before the Dennis case was that the advocacy had to be immediately tied to an illegal action in order for it to be outlawed. The Dennis case would then represent--

Margolis: To at least the danger--the immediate danger. It's often referred to as "the clear and present danger" rule. Both it's clear and present, the danger has to be. It doesn't mean that the illegal act has to have occurred. For example, if you shout "fire" in a crowded theater and there isn't a mass rush to the exits, nevertheless, the shouting of the "fire" would be illegal, because it would create that clear and present danger.

Balter: Now, it almost seems as though the Dennis case represented a somewhat short-lived reversal, then, of the Court's views on these things, until the Yates case.

Margolis: No, that is, the Dennis case has never been--the principles laid down in the Dennis case have never been abandoned by the Supreme Court. The Court did what it usually does when it wants to reach a different result and be consistent with their prior opinion. It seeks, and most of the time finds, a way of differentiating a case from the other one. And that's what it ultimately did in the Los Angeles case, which by the way was tried in a very--not only in a very different political time, but was tried in a very different, a very different way.

Balter: I take it that later when the Brandenburg case came along, that would be a further example of-- The Brandenburg case and the Dennis case do not contradict each other in other words, except in perhaps--

Margolis: Well, the question of what you mean by the word "contradiction." If you want to look to the essence of the thing, I think there is a contradiction. But if you want to look to the language and to the facile manner in which the two were reconciled, then they're not inconsistent.

Balter: Okay. Well, I think we'll be sort of exploring this theme as we go along. To continue then with the narrative on the Dennis case and developments that came out of that, what happened next basically?

Margolis: There were no second indictments until the Dennis case. It was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States. Shortly thereafter, the second New York case was started. That case involved the secondary echelon of the top national leaders of the Communist Party, located in New York. And, by the way, John [T.] McTernan, my partner, was asked to, and went back and handled the defense of that case. Shortly after the New York-case indictment was handed down, the Los Angeles case was handed down--indictments were handed down. It made sense, because out here in California was the largest segment nationally of the Communist Party--New York of course was the center--and the Los Angeles case included the top California leadership. Not just the Los Angeles top leadership, but basically Los Angeles and the Bay Area, San Francisco and Oakland.

Balter: Is it safe to assume that you knew this was coming here, in California?

Margolis: Well, it's safe to say that we would have been surprised if it hadn't come. We didn't know exactly when it was going to come, but we certainly anticipated that. Well, it wasn't all simply a question of anticipation; statements were made by the government that they were going to proceed with additional cases. It just made absolute sense that an early case would be the Los Angeles case.

Balter: Do you recall how you happened to be notified that this would happen? Do you recall sort of the events that took place?

Margolis: Well, I recall receiving a call at home. Was on a weekday; I don't remember what day of the week. Early in the morning, I don't remember the hour, but it was before I'd left for the office. I think I may even have been awakened while I was still asleep, or may have been in the process of getting up. As I recall, the people were arrested, all arrested in their homes very early in the morning. Simultaneously, people were sent out. I got a call, I'm not sure from whom, but I believe from Dorothy Healey, saying that the people had been arrested and could I come right down and see what could be done.

Balter: She was calling you from jail?

Margolis: Yes, she was given the right, as usually given, of one telephone call, or sometimes two.

Balter: Now, how many of the defendants were not from Los Angeles? Or approximately?

Margolis: Well, let me see. Not from Los Angeles, four? [Albert Jason] Lima, [Al] Richmond, [Oleta O'Connor] Yates--three. [Ernest Otto] Fox is four, [Carl Rude] Lambert, five. I believe five.

Balter: Ben, would you mind, you're holding what is essentially a list of names there, would you mind reading off the ones that were not from L.A.

Margolis: Lima, Richmond, Yates, Fox, and Lambert.

Balter: Now, when those individuals were arrested, I assume some of them were in the Bay Area and elsewhere.

Margolis: I think they were all in the Bay Area, and they were brought down to Los Angeles several days later, as I remember it.

Balter: I see. So you got a call from Dorothy, what happened next?

Margolis: Well, I went to the jail and consulted with several of the defendants. As I recall, I had to see them individually; they wouldn't let me see them as a group at that time. Of course, I was immediately retained, if you want to call it retained, I was immediately engaged to be the lawyer for the group, to obtain additional help. But the first thing to be done, of course, was to make an application for bail. Immediately, I remember, I went to the U.S. attorney's office and got a copy of the indictment, or was able to read it if I didn't get one. And then I went back to the office and began to work on a bail application--get a motion for release on bail.I also called around to a number of lawyers, trying to get someone to associate with me, at least on the bail application at that time. I was looking particularly for some lawyer or lawyers who were less labeled than I and the people in my office were, to try to give the defense some breadth, particularly the application for bail. I remember I called a number of lawyers. With one exception, at the moment I don't even recall who they were, but for very good reasons I will always remember the one whose name I do recall. His name is Dan [Daniel G.] Marshall.Dan Marshall was a guild member. He and his wife, Dorothy Marshall, were very devout Catholics. He was a member of the guild, and they were active in various progessive causes. I don't think I would define him as Left, although maybe a lot of people would. But he certainly associated himself-- and Dorothy, his wife, had associated herself--with various kinds of particularly civil liberties and civil rights causes. He was with a moderate-sized law firm, whose practice consisted primarily of representing various governmental bodies. But, you know, there are many, many communities around, small communities, many of which do not have their own city attorney and who hire private counsel to perform the kind of functions that a city attorney peforms in Los Angeles. Of course, much less is done in those small cities. His firm had a very good practice, and he had a very good position in the legal community and, I think, was not a rich man, but was doing reasonably well in that kind of practice. I called him. He said that he just didn't see how he could do it. He didn't think that the members of his firm would stand for it. That he really wanted to help, but he was going to think about it, and he would get back to me.As I say, I got no indication of even a possibility from several other attorneys that I called, that they might be willing to participate. The fear was just pervasive. So, I went to work to prepare the motion. Did some research, prepared a memorandum of points and authorities, and either the next-- Well, the arraignment came up, I think it was a couple of days later, and I had a written application for the bail.I remember coming down to court, I had no one with me. I was going to appear by myself, and as I-- The federal courts were then in what was the old post office building, between Spring and Main [streets]. As I walked into the building, I saw Dan Marshall. I said, "Gee, Dan, I'm glad I got to see you. I guess you're coming to watch."He said, "No, I've decided to join you."And while he didn't--he had not participated in the preparation, he did stand up as I recall and say a few words. But basically because of the fact that I had done all of the work, the ball was carried by me.

Balter: Did you ever have a chance to have a conversation with him about what made him change his mind?

Margolis: Oh, yes. If you want to talk about that now. After that session was over, I asked him, "I assumed you cleared this with your firm."He said, "No, I didn't." He said, "I just decided that I just couldn't refuse to do this. That I have the obligation to do it, and that I was going to do it, regardless of the consequences."The result was that he was ousted from the firm and, for the rest of his life, had a relatively difficult time making a living, because he had been practicing in a very highly specialized field, in which there was no chance for him as an individual to get business. And he didn't have a backlog of clients; you know, you build a certain kind of practice. But he did practice and, I guess, he managed to get by. But he took a really terrible economic beating because of what he had done.

Balter: He's deceased now, I take it?

Margolis: Many, many years ago, he died of emphysema.

Balter: How about his wife Dorothy? Is she still alive?

Margolis: I don't know. I haven't heard from or about her for several years. But she lived for many years--may be still alive. Following his death, she was--He continued to be active for the rest of his life. He did not become an attorney in the Smith Act case itself, because he felt that he had no experience or background as a trial lawyer. So he did not come into the case, but he was very supportive and very active in many other things for the rest of his life. And we became very close friends. It's an example of tremendous courage and the kind of-- I suppose if he were alive today, he would be engaged in the theology of liberation, I'm sure. That's the way he treated his religion.You want me to go back to the motion?

Balter: Please, yeah. I've detoured us a little bit, but now we're back.

Margolis: A problem of recollection at this point is that I can't remember whether things happened on the motion for bail all in that one day, or whether it took place over a series of days, with the court's ruling coming afterwards. I think the court did take some evidence, and the government took the position that there should be no bail. But if there was bail, it should be very high. They had some arguments. There had been, following the Dennis affirmance on appeal, a number of members of the Communist Party, leaders of the Communist Party, including at least one of the Dennis convicted defendants, went "underground"; that is, they disappeared. Because as the Communist Party saw it at that time, this was the beginning of perhaps the establishment of fascism in this country. They wanted to have an underground movement to resist fascism. And, by the way, Ben Dobbs had been one of those who'd been underground, but had come out during this thing. So they had the fact that there had been-- Thompson had not responded. They said that the defendants are so close to San Diego and to the border that it's easy for them to escape into another country--there's a high risk of their escape--and that they are not trustworthy.One of the very aggravating and strange things happened in connection with those proceedings. I don't remember whether they have them at that time, or on a motion to reconsider the bail ruling. But I think it was at that time that the government called Leo Gallagher, who had been a former partner of the firm (I think, if you may remember, when we first came down here). And had him testify about democratic centralism, what it meant, and that the party adhered to democratic centralism: that democratic centralism meant that while the people at the bottom could discuss, make suggestions and arguments, that the final decisions were made at the top, and were binding upon all members of the party. At the same time that he testified to this, he also said that these arrests were an outrage and a violation of the Constitution. This is perfectly consistent with Leo Gallagher's thinking. The kind of thinking that caused us to break with him, when he took the position that the Communist Party members should testify before the grand jury that they were members, and just refuse to give names and go to jail. Except you stand up and tell the truth under all circumstances, and that's the best way to fight. So that he actually became a weapon for the prosecution, which argued that they were subject to top-level-- Their commitment to return could not be believed, because they would be more bound by orders that they received from above than they would be by any commitment to the courts.

Balter: When he was subpoenaed, did you have an opportunity to talk to him before he testified?

Margolis: We saw him in court. We were shocked.

Balter: Oh, you didn't even know that he was going to be there?

Margolis: No.

Balter: Was he subpoenaed, or did he appear voluntarily?

Margolis: I'm not sure. I think he appeared voluntarily. I think he did so voluntarily, but I'm not sure. My recollection isn't clear on that. But he would have. This was his position. It was a sincere position and consistent with the way he lived his own life. In any event, he talked to us afterwards and defended his position. Said he was doing the right thing, that all he was doing was telling the truth. And by god the Communist Party ought to not only tell the truth, but they had a right to do what it was doing and it ought to be proud of what it was doing. To hell with the government on this. We're not going to hide our-- You know, we hide nothing. We're revolutionaries. That was his approach.In any event, I'm inclined to think the thing went on for several days. Things tend to telescope themselves that far back. In any event, the judge finally set bail at $100,000 apiece, which at that time meant $1,400,000. A lot more money in 1950, '51 than it is now. Probably like $14,000,000 today. There was just no way that that amount of money could be raised, or that they could be gotten out on bail. So I immediately filed an appeal on the refusal to-- It's not an appeal we got. It's equivalent to an appeal. We got it, so the technical procedure is to go to the court of appeals on the issue of bail. Wrote briefs and argued it in the court of appeals. It was denied; they affirmed. Judge [William C.] Mathes was the trial judge. I then filed a petition with the Supreme Court. This is a rather interesting part of the case. By the way, by the time we got up to the Supreme Court, about five months, four or five months had elapsed.

Balter: I have an argument, Stack v. Boyle, we're talking about, of course, argued October 18, 1951.

Margolis: I don't remember when they were arrested. Do you have the date of the arrest?

Balter: I don't--

Margolis: I don't remember when they were arrested.

Balter: Well, I do. I think it was in the fall of '51. I don't have the exact date.

Margolis: Between the time of their arrest and the time of their release, which meant after the-- Well, several things happened. I got up to the Supreme Court in just a couple of months, two or three months, I believe. And I had been trying-- Our policies were to try to get breadth to our defense and to try to get breadth in participation. So when I filed this petition, I went back. Sometimes you get a chance-- You file it with one Supreme Court justice, and sometimes you get a chance to talk to that Supreme Court justice.

Balter: Ben, this is a bad time to have to stop, but we've got to go to another tape. So let's hold that thought, and we'll be right back.

23. Tape Number: XII, Side One October 11, 1984

Balter: Ben, we were just talking about the approach to the Supreme Court.

Margolis: Yes. I went to Washington, D.C. Filed a petition and told the clerk that I would wait in my hotel for a call if I could see, I believe, Justice [William O.] Douglas. I hung around for, I believe, a day or so. Finally, received a call from the clerk, who said, "The justice will not see you. You might as well go home." So I immediately got a plane. I went immediately to Chicago. It so happened that there was a National Lawyers Guild convention going on in Chicago at that time. I stopped over there for a day, I believe. Couldn't stay for the whole convention because of too much to do, and then I flew home.I remember walking into the house--I believe it was late in the afternoon-- my wife was greeting me, saying, "There's a telegram here for you. They want you back in Washington." The telegram had come in that morning, but I had been in Chicago. Well, that evening I was on the plane. I immediately turned around, went back to the airport to catch the first plane out for Washington, and was up all night.They had set the matter for argument-- No, the telegram said that the matter was set for argument before the entire Court. What had happened is that Douglas had referred it to the entire Court, and the entire Court had set it for argument. I think it was two or three days away, but when-- I had not anticipated that there would be argument before the entire Court. That occurs sometimes, but most of the time motions of this kind are decided without such argument.But I wanted to get back early, because I wanted to, again, get someone who wasn't as identified with the Left as I was to argue the matter. I had never argued a case before the Supreme Court. I wasn't worried about being able to argue it, but I didn't know how I would be treated by the Court. So I came back, was on the plane all night. Next morning, started going around [to] the various Washington lawyers to try to get them to participate. I got the thing "I can't do it, it's-- I would lose my practice." Some of them said, "I wouldn't do it as a matter of principle"; others, "I would lose my practice," and so forth.I finally got to-- Someone suggested that I see the retired secretary of the interior. [pauses] I'll have to fill in his name. Just my block to it. My God, I know his name. Anyway, he's an attorney, but he was retired.

Balter: Do you remember what administration he was in?

Margolis: He had been in the Roosevelt administration.

Balter: Now, it's on the tip of my tongue, too.

Margolis: He was an elderly man at that time. He had married a young wife, and he had two young children. [Harold L. Ickes]

Balter: With that description, we'll be sure to be able to figure it out. [laughter]

Margolis: He was, I found out where he'd-- He at that time was writing some books. I called and told the secretary what I wanted, and was told that he would see me. I went up to see him, and he greeted me very nicely, a very nice man.He told me that he was very sympathetic to me. He thought that it was outrageous what was happening in the country and that he would like very much to help out. He said, "I'm an old man. I've got a wife and two young children, and I'm trying to make enough money so that they'll be secure when I die. I've got some contracts for books. I think if I appeared, I might lose those contracts. I can't do it." And he almost cried. "But I just can't do it."Well, the end result was that when the time came for the hearing, I was still by myself. So I can tell you an interesting thing--

Balter: Let me before you go on, I just want to ask you something about that because on the-- In looking at Stack v. Boyle, I noticed A. L. [Abraham Lincoln] Wirin on the decision.

Margolis: It was not he. No, but he didn't argue. He was on the brief.

Balter: On the brief. Okay, so that's where his name comes from.

Margolis: He didn't argue. Let me finish that now. I'd like to get a cup of coffee.

Balter: Okay.

Margolis: I had to get admitted; I had never been admitted to the Supreme Court. I got a Washington lawyer to move my admission. When they open the Court, the first thing that they do is they admit attorneys. There were a group of them in, and then I was called up and admitted. Stood up, you know. You stand at the podium and then you walk over to the left twenty feet, twenty-five feet, where the clerk is, and you take the oath. I was the last one admitted, and I walked over to take the oath. As I was taking the oath, my case was called! [knock on door]My case was called. I was the first one on the agenda. So I turned right around and came back and started arguing. I was very well prepared. As a matter of fact, I was, I think I was-- I generally am not nervous in court, never have been. But on this occasion, I was nervous, because I felt the responsibility and didn't think the Court would really listen to me. So I started out and had hardly gotten a sentence out of my mouth, when [Felix] Frankfurter asked me a question. He said, "What is the application of section so-and-so to this case?" I'd never heard of this section. I thought I was completely, totally prepared. And I noticed that the solicitor general, who was arguing--

Balter: Mr. [Philip B.] Perlman?

Margolis: Yeah, he was arguing on the other side. Was running, running through books and he apparently didn't-- No, no one-- The government had filed response of papers, and they hadn't mentioned this section.I said to the-- I think I said, "I don't remember that by number." [laughter]So he sent a page out. He brought me the book, and they looked at it. There was a section that had nothing to do with our case. And I said, "I don't think it has any bearing on our case." And it was never mentioned again, [laughter] the decision or anywhere. But I had such a sinking feeling, for here I was where all of this is-- And all of a sudden, my god, I'm not even prepared! [laughter]

Balter: It sounds like the solicitor general was having the same sinking feeling as you.

Margolis: Same problem. [laughter] But I had a different responsibility than his. Anyway, I argued it. And to my amazement, I was treated very sympathetically by the Court. Got a very good reaction, and, by god, I left the argument feeling we could have a chance. I had really thought we had no chance. And oh, surely enough, in two, three weeks-- It was a very short period of time. I don't remember exactly how long, but for a decision from the Supreme Court, it was very quick.We got a decision which said bail is excessive, and that the only consideration that should be given is the likelihood that they will flee. And there has to be direct evidence of the danger of fleeing and so forth. Couldn't have asked for more. This was from the [Frederick M.] Vinson court, you know. This is from a bad court.

Balter: Now, the opinion was written by Chief Justice Vinson apparently.

Margolis: Yeah. And Vinson is one of the most reactionary we've ever had. Anyway, it was amazing. I was amazed. This was in the depths of the McCarthy period. So anyway I went back home. We got the decision. Then starts the whole sequence of events, which will take a little while to relay.

Balter: So we'll have some coffee and go off tape for a little bit. [tape recorder off]All right, we're back on tape. Ben, I've got a few questions to ask you, but we did remember--the walk down the hall juggled our brains, and we remembered who the secretary of the interior--

Margolis: Harold Ickes. I kept thinking of Eccles. You know there was an Eccles, but I knew it wasn't that. Harold Ickes, yeah.

Balter: Now, let me ask you a few things. With the Leo Gallagher situation, you indicated that he may have been on the stand for more than one day or even several days.

Margolis: No, no, I didn't intend to indicate that. What I meant to indicate was that I didn't remember whether he testified the first day or whether it was several days later. That's what I meant. No, he was only on the stand for maybe an hour, maybe two hours.

Balter: Okay, I misunderstood. Now, of course the transcript of the hearing would reflect, at least in words, this, but do you recall the cross-examination, the situation of you cross-examining Gallagher? Did you cross-examine him?

Margolis: Yes, I did cross-examine Gallagher. I don't remember that cross-examination very clearly. Let me think a moment. I think that, you see, he was not-- The last thing in the world Leo Gallagher would do would be to deliberately lie. None of this stuff he was testifying to was any belligerent lie on his part. But I think I had-- He's [an] attorney for the [Communist] Party and known of many instances himself where decisions were made by the individuals involved, without going back to New York or any other place. And I think I questioned him about that.And he admitted, "Yes, that's so, but there is what the constitution says. It's that." He pushed for his position.I think he admitted he couldn't know, he didn't know for sure. Well, then I think I told him that he thought some of the people had not been very good communists. He had thought that because they had refused to testify. He said, "Yeah, I think they have sometimes abandoned the party principles."I said, "Well, then you think they might abandon them this time, as you understand them."He said, "It's possible."You know, that sort of thing, but it didn't mean much.

Balter: Was the prosecutor trying to establish that all it would take was one order from party central, and everybody would go to Mexico?

Margolis: Yes. That's right. That's what he argued.

Balter: You mentioned that A. L. Wirin wrote a brief for the Stack v. Boyle decision. Of course, that's also in the record, but we had talked earlier about your objections to some of the briefs that Wirin wrote, to the effect of "I hate communism" being some percentage of--

Margolis: I don't remember whether he wrote a separate brief. I don't think he on this occasion-- I don't think he wrote a separate brief. I think he simply joined me on the brief that I wrote. Of course, that didn't have any of that material.Most of the things that Al did-- By the way, Al was not particularly a brief writer himself. Others wrote the briefs. He was in the courts. And did a very good job in court. The things I was talking about that he did were, as far as I can recall, the oral statements that he made to the court, whenever he would stand up to argue. He did it again and again and again. Did it in the Smith Act case, too.

Balter: Now, in your earlier attempts, when you were looking in the very first instance--you told the Dan [Daniel G.] Marshall story--for someone to get involved with you on the bail hearing, did you approach the ACLU [American Civil Liberties Union], or did you not approach the ACLU, at that point? And why, if so?

Margolis: I don't think I approached the ACLU. I was looking, as I recall, for someone broader. Later on, when I was unable to, then I got Al Wirin, among others. He became one of the attorneys in the case, by the way.

Balter: Right. I believe Fred Okrand was involved also to some extent?

Margolis: No. No, he was not.

Balter: Fred was not. Okay. One last thing, there's a name that comes up in a Los Angeles Times article, September 11, 1951, about the case. It says that at that point there were fifteen Smith Act defendants. That you were representing twelve before Judge [William C.] Mathes, and that three of the defendants were being represented by Paul Major. I haven't seen that name come up in any of my--

Margolis: Oh, yes, yes, yes, yes. I'd forgotten about that. At what stage was that? He was in for a very short period of time.

Balter: Very early. And according to the account, he represented Frank Carlson, Frank Spector, and Ben Dobbs.

Margolis: Yes, I brought him into the case. He, however, was pretty much identified with the Left also. I did not consider him one of the kind of broad lawyers that I wanted to get. I also was looking for somebody who had prestige. While Paul was an able lawyer and so forth, he wasn't-- I wouldn't consider him in that class.

Balter: Who was he?

Margolis: He was a progressive lawyer, a member of the guild, who, you know, did a lot of good things. Had a regular, ordinary practice. I believe his office was out in the Valley, San Fernando Valley.

Balter: Now, did he part with the case, or he did not continue on with the case after the bail hearing?

Margolis: No, we didn't ask him to.

Balter: One final thing--my reading of the Stack v. Boyle decision, if I read it correctly, seems to indicate that there was not any dissent at all in the case.

Margolis: No dissent.

Balter: Justice [Sherman] Minton did not participate. Otherwise, there was no dissent.

Margolis: No dissent.

Balter: That's correct. Okay. Well, then back to the narrative.

Margolis: If you've read the order, it did not set bail. It simply said [to] reverse the order setting bail at $100,000 and laid down some ground rules as to how the amount of bail should be determined. This order went back to the Ninth Circuit [Court of Appeals]. The Ninth Circuit in turn sent it down to the trial court--Judge Mathes--and another bail hearing was set before Mathes. Because under the Supreme Court's order, it was up to him to set bail in accordance with the decision.You know, come to think of it, Leo Gallagher may have testified at the second-- Yes. I was wrong. Leo Gallagher did not testify until the second bail hearing, when they were trying to bolster the case that they had made originally. So I need to correct what I had said before, and that's why I was having so much trouble. That bail hearing lasted for two or three days, and he was there for two or three hours during that bail hearing. Yes, that, that now I definitely remember.

Balter: This was one that happened around November 13, 1951, according to my records.

Margolis: The hearing itself?

Balter: The second hearing, yeah.

Margolis: Well, it was a week or so or two after the Supreme Court decision. I don't remember the exact dates. The government repeated its request for $100,000 bail apiece. And sure enough, Mathes said, "I've reconsidered, and the bail is $100,000 each. I've followed the rulings of the Supreme Court." And so I filed another petition to the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit considered the matter. Ruled that Mathes had not followed the order of the Supreme Court and sent it back to him again. And we had another hearing before him. And for a third time he set it at $100,000 apiece.We went up again to the Ninth Circuit and said, "For god's sake, set the bail yourselves." The Ninth Circuit finally set the bail at $5,000 apiece. And then that was followed by a lengthy session of hearings that went day and night for, I don't know, a week, two weeks. I don't remember how long on problems relating to the bail, which if you want to hear, I'll tell you about it.

Balter: Sure.

Margolis: All right. What was needed at that time, I guess, was $70,000 (and $70,000 was still a lot of money), but we didn't have any cash, $70,000 in cash available to put up. So, people were contacted. I didn't do it, but the party had contacted a lot of people to get them to put up bail. Some people wanted to put up property. Some people put up cash and so forth. We submitted that to the court.The court then did a very unusual thing. It ordered a hearing and said, "I want all of the people who are contributing this bail to attend. I want them to testify." He called the people, and he said, "Got to establish that they're the ones, and that they're willingly and without directions from anybody putting up this money."They so testified. Then the court would cross-examine them. Would say, "You know these people are charged with being communists? You know that there's a danger that they'll go to Mexico? You know that you'll lose your bail if they do?" And that kind of thing, go on and on and on.Without exception, they all said, "We don't believe that they will disappear. We have confidence that they will appear, and we want our bail to stand."After several days of hearings, as I recall, he finally approved the bail. And then they were finally released after approximately five months in jail. But, again, serving their time under very unusual conditions. Because while Mathes was, as I've indicated, just totally arbitrary and unforgiving, you know, just totally unwilling to modify his position at all on the issue of reducing the bail, he in certain other respects acted not too badly.Let's see, there are two incidents, I think. One is-- Well, let's stick to the bail. No, the bail-- I think the bail is behind us. Well, one of the arguments that we made, when we were asking for bail, was that we had the fourteen defendants, that they were charged with a conspiracy, and that it was necessary for the attorneys to work with them collectively. You know, when you go to visit them in jail--attorneys, of course, visit--it's a one-on-one proposition. Also that the defendants had to have access to various books, a big library of Marxist works and things. And that it was just impossible, we were being deprived of the opportunity to prepare the case. We really made a very, very strong showing in that regard.So Judge Mathes made an order. He ordered that each morning the defendants would all be taken across the street from the county jail to a cell in the federal building, which was quite a large cell. In which all fourteen and their attorneys could be a little crowded, but there was room for them all, for tables and so forth. Be equipped--that they be given the things that they needed there. That they be allowed to remain there all day until dinnertime and then be taken back. That their attorneys would have open access to them, to come and go as they please, and this is five days a week.One of the problems that arose immediately was that they couldn't serve them lunch over there. So the judge said-- We said we were willing to have food brought in from the outside. The judge said fine. Ordered that they permit food for lunch to be brought in every day. And this is-- Committees of women were set up. The Communist Party, women or friends of the Communist Party took turns preparing the lunches. For about five months, five days a week, every day, lunch was served. I tried to be there as often as possible for that lunch. I'd never seen such food in my life. [laughter] These women just absolutely broke their necks with the greatest kind [of] delicacies and meats and salads and desserts. None of the defendants had ever eaten like that in their lives! [laughter]

Balter: Do you remember-- Oh, I'm sorry. Do you remember the names of any of the people who were involved in the support group?

Margolis: No, I don't remember them, but who would remember? Dorothy Healey might. I don't remember. But there were groups of them. They were vying with each other for the opportunity to bring the lunches up. I spent a lot of time in that cell working with them and also eating lunches.So that we were able really to-- In a way, from the standpoint of preparation, it worked out awfully well. Because the defendants, who all would have been doing twenty thousand other things-- If they had been out, there would have been a problem always to get to them. They were there. There was no place they could go. [laughter] There was nothing else they could do. They're people who were accustomed to working and producing work, and so it was from a--In a way, Mathes, from a standpoint of preparation, Mathes did us a favor. It really worked out that way. Also, the time served was not that terrible then. Of course, they had the weekends which they had to spend in the [jail] and eat the lousy jail food. But some of them said that by the time Saturday arrived, they were so full of food, they couldn't eat anyway. [laughter]In fact, now there was another interesting factor in that. There was one deputy marshal who was placed in charge of it, every day, when we're there. Big hulk of a man. When we first went over there, he was kind of brusque and, you know, sort of an attitude, "These goddamned communists." Kind of a thing that you would expect from a marshal. [knock on door, tape recorder off]The defendants had talked to him in a nice, friendly way, and he gradually changed. We reached a point where, within a month or so, anything we wanted he would break his neck to get for us. We were honored guests as far as he was concerned. When the defendants were released and left, he virtually cried. He said he was not going to work any more as a marshal. He was resigning. I think that he probably-- He was an older man. I think he was probably eligible for retirement. But I never saw anything like this happen in my life. He just became so fond of the defendants; he would do anything in the world for them.

Balter: Was there any contact with him after that, or was it--?

Margolis: Not that I know of. It's the sort of thing that under different circumstances one might have followed up on. But we were so harassed and so busy with the problems that we did not follow up with it.

Balter: Now, I did have one question from back to the second bail hearing. According to a Los Angeles Times article, you were threatened with contempt at one point by Judge Mathes. Do you recall the circumstances?

Margolis: Yes. The question was when the case should be set for trial. I was making a motion for more time. I told the judge that I was trying to get additional counsel, had not yet succeeded in getting them, what the problems were, and also that we were short of money. That I had received a small amount of money, which had been utilized for costs, but we needed to get some money for attorneys' fees and other things. And that I needed the time in order to be able to present an adequate defense.He said, "You say your office has received certain funds. How much have you received?"I said, "I don't recall, but it's in our books. In any event, that's privileged information." He said, "No, it's not privileged. You produce your books. I want to see what funds you've received and what you've spent the money on."I said, "We've spent most of it." And I said, "Well, this will reveal the nature of our defense, what we're doing to prepare. And it's privileged; you have no right to go into that."He got very angry, and he said, "You will produce those records, or you will be in contempt."At that point, I was about-- He was absolutely wrong. He had no right to see these things.One of the defendants, I think it was Al Richmond, stood up and said, "Your honor, may we talk to Mr. Margolis before this goes any further?" The judge said yes. Gave him permission to talk.They gathered around--we gathered around, and they said, "Why are you refusing to give them to him?"I said, "They have got no right to them"."Is there anything in there that really we're too concerned about him seeing?"I said, "Not really, I don't think--" You know, there was this, and what I said was the truth. "No problem."They said, "Look, we've got enough to fight about. We don't want our attorney fighting for his own contempt. Let him have the books."So I got up and I said to the judge that while I believed he had no right to the records, my clients insisted that I make them available, and accordingly I would. The interesting thing that happened is I brought them in the next day. Brought them in to him and said it's on pages so-and-so. He opened the book, must have looked at them ten seconds, closed them up. That was it! No contempt. He was looking for a way at that point of getting me held in contempt.

Balter: Is that something that happened on other occasions also?

Margolis: Not with him. There was another proceed-- I think I told you about other contempt proceedings. No, he never-- As a matter of fact, although his rulings on the law were terrible and he was very gruff and sometimes arbitrary, he gradually got less so. During the jury trial, as far as his conduct towards counsel was concerned, talking about the correctness of his rulings, he was pretty good with most people. He threatened Leo Branton [Jr.] once for contempt. I forget what the circumstances were. Leo Branton talked back to him a couple of times, and he didn't like that. But, by and large on relationships, personal, they weren't that bad.As a matter of fact at the conclusion of the trial, he did a rather strange and deliberate thing. Very often, a trial judge will congratulate counsel on both sides for how well they conducted the trial and so forth. At the end of our case, he congratulated counsel for the defendants on how well and ably they had represented the defendants. Didn't mention the prosecutor. Did-- They had done a stinking job, and he was really making a point of it.He was a reactionary. He was an anticommunist. He loved the law though. As he perceived the law, he loved it. And he loved arguments. He enjoyed himself when a good legal argument was being made. You could see that he relished it. He liked to engage in exchanges, and I'm talking about the kind of exchanges that are normal: the questions, without, you know, riding the attorney, but arguing with him. He loved that, and he did a lot of that. He felt that we were very well prepared and did our job very well, as indeed we did. He respected us for that, and it showed in his conduct.

Balter: Okay, what I think we should do is stop at this point, and when we pick up next time, we'll begin with the trial.

24. Tape Number: XII, Side Two October 25, 1984

Balter: Ben, when we left off last time, we were just about to start talking about the preparations for the trial in the Smith Act cases. One thing I wanted to ask you about was, as we begin to get closer to trial, how were Leo Branton, Jr., and the other attorneys who worked with you on the case recruited into the proceedings?

Margolis: Right at a very early stage, it was decided that we needed a staff of trial lawyers. We aimed at and ultimately secured six, with the object, a twofold object: One, it was too much work for any one lawyer to do by himself. And two, we wanted to get as broad and as representative a group as possible. So, one of the things that was raised was whether there should be a Northern California lawyer included, in as much as a number of the defendants were from San Francisco and Oakland. It was decided on asking a lawyer from my old firm in San Francisco, Norman Leonard, and he agreed to participate in the trial. With respect to Leo Branton--Let me first say this--I don't remember the exact order in which these things happened. I'm just telling you as I recall them. Leo Branton was a young black lawyer, who had only I think two or three years of experience behind him, but who had handled successfully, as I remember, a rather difficult case involving a black soldier. I don't remember the details of that case. I don't remember how we contacted, but I sat down and had a long talk with him. And was very much impressed by his really extraordinary ability, particularly with the little experience that he'd had. He's a brilliant speaker, and also he was very willing to go in. You want to remember in these times, it was, for many attorneys, it was considered a kiss of death to their profession if they were employed here. Well, he wasn't frightened, and he wanted to come in.Then, I think Al Wirin of the ACLU volunteered, as I recall. Came along and said he would like to be one of the trial counsel. So an agreement was reached that he would be.We had tried several other counsels. Our main idea originally was to get as much breadth as possible. You understand that at that time there was so much hysteria. You start out with not two strikes against you, but three strikes against you. Just an almost impossible situation. We therefore deemed it as important to try to lift that curse from the case. So we got-- We lined up a very prominent Oakland attorney, originally, by the name of Sullivan, who was a-- Got a lot of publicity. [coughs] I went up to Oakland to talk to him, and he was anxious to come on. He's sure; this was just his kind of challenge. Then he came to one or two preliminary hearings and then just disappeared. Never showed up again, wouldn't return calls--nothing.

Balter: Had he entered an appearance?

Margolis: Yes, he'd entered an appearance, and he just never showed up. I don't remember how we worked that aspect of it out, but obviously we didn't want to have anybody forced to be on it. There was another difficulty in getting counsel, and that is that there was very little money available. While money was being raised--and ultimately each of the attorneys got, I think, $10,000 total--the lack of money was also a problem, but not nearly as serious a problem as the political scene. We had several other turndowns. There were a lot of people that wouldn't even talk to me; they didn't even want to discuss it. We discussed it with Bob [Robert W.] Kenny, as I recall, who had been attorney general and was in private practice at that time. Bob said, well, he would be willing to do it, but he really wasn't a trial attorney. He would prefer not to do it, although he supported us fully. We finally decided against that.We got a fellow by the name of Alex [Alexander] Schullman. We wanted some labor participation. Alex Schullman was the attorney for the retail clerks and had a very substantial practice. A very odd kind of a guy, who turned out to be a nice guy. Courageous. I'll tell you a little bit more about him later, but who turned out to be [laughter] the strangest guy as a lawyer that I have ever run into. He used to stand up and make an argument before Judge Mathes. Judge Mathes would look at him quizzically, and all of us would look at him. We didn't understand what the hell he was saying most of the time. And he, he was an orator, you know, on that kind of thing. But he was devoted and he-- When it came to preparation, he said he didn't need preparation, that he was able to go in and play it off the cuff. So it ended up with our trying to minimize the role that he played, but he did stay.I want to give him credit for, you know, standing up [for] us. He lost his job. He lost his retainer with the retail clerks and, I think, some other smaller unions that he represented. He never got them back. As a matter of fact, he was destroyed by the case. Whether he would not have had problems anyway, I have no way of knowing. I was amazed as to how he could represent the retail clerks. It's a big, big union. Anyway, he did and was in very solid there. Afterwards, he never got back into the labor movement. He was a guy who didn't drive a car, and he went everywhere in taxis. He must have spent fifty dollars a day on taxis, and he lived high. He always made a lot of money and used it up as fast as he made it.After the case was over, he once came over and borrowed two or three thousand dollars from us. And then we never saw him again. I think he was finally disbarred for taking a client's money. He was actually, actually destroyed by this case. And it's a pity because he really made no substantial contributions to the case. And inasmuch as he was fired by his union, the idea that we had any breadth was hardly enhanced by that. So those were the attorneys that we had.The way we proceeded is that each attorney represented a different, theoretically represented different defendants; they were divided. The practical matter was all tried together. We worked together and did that. The preparation-- Oh, I must mention one other thing.At an early stage, I don't remember just when, it was decided that we needed an outside attorney. By that I mean an attorney working outside the courtroom on legal research and all kinds of related problems. We were fortunate enough to get Sam [Samuel] Rosenwein, who was not admitted in California, but who is an extraordinarily fine lawyer. He worked on the case from the beginning right up to the Supreme Court. From an early time at least right up to the Supreme Court, and was of a-- Made a tremendous contribution to the case.I, at an early stage, had some difficulties with Al [Wirin], but by and all we worked fairly well together. I just resented the frequency with which he had to repeat that he didn't agree with the defendants, but that he defended their right to speak, and their right to speak was violated.

Balter: Did John [T.] McTernan work on this?

Margolis: No.

Balter: Did not.

Margolis: John was back East at the time, on the second New York Smith Act case. No, I was the only one from our office on the case. We set up a separate office, however, for the handling of the case. It was quite an operation. If you want to ask me a question about that, I'll tell you. [laughter]

Balter: Why don't you tell me a little bit about that.

Margolis: Well, first of all, the defendants set up a committee to work with the attorneys--and that turned out to be during the pretrial stage at least. Primarily me, because the other attorneys did not participate in pretrial preparation to the same extent that I did. As I remember, Norman Leonard just came to Los Angeles shortly before the trial began. Now, he may have made two or three trips for a day or two before that. Al Wirin was doing, for the most part, other things. Schullman, as I said, felt he didn't need any preparation, and he was busy on other work. Who else? Did I mention everybody?Well, in any event, I carried the main ball, working primarily with this small committee. And there were lots and lots of what I would call political-legal problems to be worked out. There was a very close working relationship between the attorneys and the defendants. In this connection, I might mention a very substantial difference between the way the New York cases were handled and the Los Angeles case was handled, so far as the role of the attorneys was concerned.In New York, the defendants decided virtually every, every question, and determined how it should be done. In some instances, they even insisted that the attorneys write out questions that they were going to ask on cross-examination, and approved them. The attorneys worked under-- And the decisions were made very often without even any participation from the attorneys. It was deeply resented by many of the attorneys. They felt that they couldn't--and indeed they couldn't--do their very best work under those circumstances.The situation in Los Angeles was the direct opposite. Decisions were made jointly. Many of the decisions had both-- Virtually all of the decisions of major import had both political and legal connotations. We used to discuss them and work them out and agree on how they should be handled. As a result of that, I think that we, the lawyers, were in a much better position to try the case well than were the New York attorneys.

Balter: Why did the situation in New York develop the way it did, do you suppose?

Margolis: Well, I think it reflected a difference in the method of work, generally, of the top leadership of the Communist Party and of the leadership of the Communist Party in Los Angeles. The top leadership operated that way. They ran the organization that way. They were the last word. They theoretically followed the principles of democratic centralism, but as a matter of fact the centralism was overwhelming. And they were accustomed to simply making decisions. They also, in accordance with their past practices, said that they were the defendants; they had the right to make the decisions.They considered, they looked at the case--and this is one of the differences between us--solely from a political standpoint. They would say, "This is what we want done, and you find a legal way to do it," instead of discussing whether or not what they wanted done presented legal problems, how those legal problems should be resolved, and how they would affect what they wanted politically. It resulted, in my opinion, in some very, very bad decisions that were made in New York.By the way, I'm not saying that the result would have been any different, because in those times the court, and everyone else, was simply determined to get them. I don't know if there's anything that they could have done that may have changed the result. But certainly the case could have been tried a lot better, and the Supreme Court put in a much more difficult position than it was when it decided the case. Again, we're going into some of those questions later if you want to.The other lawyer who was active in the case was Barney Dreyfus. Benjamin Dreyfus from San Francisco was a sort of liaison, who related outside political activity to what was happening in the case. And I think Dobby [Dors Brin] Walker did some of that too. The trial of the case was handled by the lawyers that I have mentioned.

Balter: Now, you said that there were a number of political-legal decisions that had to be made concerning the cases here, in conjunction with the defendants. What comes to mind in terms of some of the major decisions of that type you had to make?

Margolis: Well, the absolute major one where there was violent--not physically violent--very strong differences of opinion between the West Coast and the East related to the question of whether guilt should be treated on an individual basis or whether the defendants should go in and say, "We're all innocent, but we're all in the same boat. And if you find one of us guilty, you'll have to find all of us guilty." That was the position they took in the Dennis case. [phone rings]

Balter: Go out for a second? [tape recorder off]

Margolis: Yes, in New York they took that approach. The result of that was that any bit of evidence introduced against any single defendant, which it could be argued was not admissible against the group as a whole, was rendered admissible as to all of the defendants. So that while you might have had a little bit of evidence against one defendant and a little for another one and a lot for another one, everybody had the sum total of everything against them that piled up.And we argued. And what New York said, "This is a political decision. We stand this way because, by god, it's the party," they said, "that is being attacked, and we are going to defend it as the party. We're not going to permit them to separate us from the party. And we are going to say, `You're going after the party, and we are the party, and this is the way it is.' "The argument from the West Coast was, number one, that was a sure way to make the worst kind of a record for the testing of the questions; and number two, we didn't agree with it politically.By the way, I didn't-- I had forgotten one thing now that I wanted to say. I had mentioned how the East Coast functioned in the political arena. The West Coast, which was under the leadership of Dorothy Healey, functioned very, very differently. Although there was some of the business of final decisions being made by her, it was still very, very much more democratic and very much more participation. So again, the approach to the case in the West reflected the difference in method of work. And, you know, it was one of the basic things that ultimately led to Dorothy leaving the Communist Party.In any event, going back to the position that we took, we took that you don't play into the hands of the opposition, the government, by making it easier for them to get a conviction. You make it as tough as possible. In addition, we said we didn't think it was right. What the government was contending was that the Communist Party was a single entity. Everybody in the party had the same views, and everybody in the party did the same things and stood for the same things. We said, "Number one, it isn't true. There are differences, as reflected, for example, [by] the differences in this discussion. From a political standpoint, it isn't good to say that there are people on high who hand down a decision, and everybody's bound by it. We say the political fight has to be made in the context that this is a democratic organization fighting for democracy. Also," we said, "it gives us an opportunity to present the case. Each individual can talk about--" At the outset, we thought several might testify, but they did not; only one testified. But at the outset, each one could testify about his or her own beliefs, and they needn't necessarily be the same. In other words, we wanted to show that this was an organization that had a certain set of principles, but like every other organization that has a set of principles, there were in it differences of opinion and of views and of approach, although there was general adherence to the same basic concepts. We decided on this rather early in the preparation for the case. It was communicated to some of the people in the East, and there were meetings in the East. They tried to change the position that this was all wrong and we shouldn't do this. But we did stick to our guns, and the case was tried on an individual basis. And it was this, by the way, it was this very thing that led to the acquittal of all the defendants. Otherwise, there would not have been an acquittal.

Balter: When you say that there were meetings between the West Coast and New York and so on, did the executive committee of the--the main executive committee of the Communist Party--get involved in the discussion? Did Dorothy go back for another--?

Margolis: Well, there were top people. I was back, at one or two meetings, in the discussion. I don't remember for sure who participated. But some of the very top people--they were hot and heavy. It arose again on the appeal. John McTernan tried the New York case, which was finished before our case was up, and was going up on appeal. John was not handling the appeal. He had tried the case. I was handling the appeal in our case, but he was not handling the appeal there. But John, who had been more or less forced to try the case the way they wanted to try it back there, agreed with our approach. And to the extent possible, he wanted to take that approach on appeal, to argue that this was-- You know, that each defendant's evidence was separate. And he had managed to make some kind of a record along those lines. We went back there. At least one meeting that I remember got very hot, in which we felt that we didn't want to see an affirmance in that case. Because we thought it would just solidify the case against us, and we wouldn't have a chance. Went hot and heavy, but they decided that they were going to follow the same theory on appeal. The Supreme Court didn't even grant a hearing to them. The case was simply affirmed in the court of appeal, and then they petitioned for a hearing. The Supreme Court denied the hearing, which was inevitable the way they--and we said inevitable--the way they tried the case.

Balter: Was it a situation where they felt that the political position of all together, you know, all together, unity among the defendants, in that case in their minds outweighed the legal advantages of-- In other words, what was--

Margolis: Let me--

Balter: --behind their thinking, in other words?

Margolis: Let me put it this way. They said they didn't weigh one against the other. They said political is determinative. It's the way I put it to you first: Here's the political decision. Now, you try it according to that political decision and adjust your legal tactics to that. They didn't, also, however, didn't, necessarily agree with our position as to the different effect on the courts. Because they were taking the position [that] the decision is one hundred percent political, and it doesn't make any difference what sort of a record you have. What you're doing, they said, is giving up a political position, and it's not going to change what the courts do anyway. You only change that by changing the climate and the country and so forth.We disagreed. We said that while it is true that in some cases--in many cases--the political might be determinative, also history showed that it wasn't that cast in steel. There were opportunities. There were good decisions, and there were breakthroughs. And that at least you had to present it to the court in a way which would make it more difficult for them to have the political totally decisive. And what they were doing was making it very easy for the court to do that. That was the nature. But on the question of weighing, they weren't willing to weigh, you know. Even while they didn't agree with us on the legal, they took the position that even if they did, the political was decisive.

Balter: Now, finally, in this whole very heated dispute that went on, do the names of some of the people in New York who fought so hard against your position come to mind?

Margolis: I am so bad on names, as I've told you before. And they are people that I've met over a period of time, many times, and I just don't remember. I can't remember. Dorothy probably had a much better memory than I have of this, and we can probably get that information from her.

Balter: Okay.

Margolis: That was one of the problems. I'll give you another one. At that time, the line of the Communist Party was that in the South there was a right to secede and establish an independent black nation. They supported the idea of the establishment of such a nation. Here out on the West Coast, the question was one on which people differed. Some of the people disagreed with the position of the party on the grounds basically that this theory really imposed something on the black people that they themselves didn't want. What the black people wanted was to stay a part of this nation and to get equality. That they didn't want to be a separate nation, and that a separate nation might very well turn out to be a disaster for them, assuming it could be accomplished. And the other was a question of self-determination. So it was a question of how that should be dealt with.We finally, as I remember, resolved that by trying to stay away from it as much as possible. But if it arose, of saying, "Well, that was what the final party line was, but there were differences, many differences within the party. And the position might change." Sure enough, it did change, not very long after that. But that one got quite hot and heavy, too. You want to remember that at that time people felt quite deeply about many of these questions. There were other things, many of them of much lesser importance.I worked out with--how did we do it?--Oleta O'Connor Yates. It was decided that she would be the witness for the defense who would present the political outline of the political positions of the party. I worked with her for weeks, just putting together political theory and experience, things that had happened, and exhibits as to what the party had done. We ultimately did put her on for-- I think I had her on a direct examination for seven or eight days. And I think it was quite a job. Now, during the course of that preparation, many times questions arose as to just how to handle a particular thing. Most of them escape my mind now, but we often, Oleta and I, would discuss it. If we felt we needed some more input or we didn't agree, we'd go back and discuss it with the committee. That happened a few times. At this moment I don't remember what the issues were.There was quite a discussion on how to present the party's position on force and violence, which of course is a key element in that. And there were-- The precise formulation involved a lot of discussion and a lot of struggle, because when you started looking at the party literature and the theoretical works--not so much Marx, but Lenin and Stalin--you found many different formulations of the question. Of course, the formulations [were] very much related to time, place, and circumstances, as to what the position was on violence, and that became our principal approach. That the question of violence-- For example, that the party would favor violence to overthrow an undemocratic government, like fascism, because there was no other way to do it. But that it opposed violence as a method to change the system as long as there were democratic processes open and available. If they were closed, that then people had the right to revolution and to overthrow the government of which they disapproved.Question of do you get a majority? You have to get a majority, and you have to get-- I think we used the term "political majority." How do you count people under these circumstances? Well, through the democratic processes, you count them at the ballot box and things like that. But when you don't have them open, you can't make a count, so you try to do what you think most of the people would like or want. Have to make that judgment. Questions like that were--you know, that I'm discussing in two or three minutes here--were discussed for hours. Not because there was really much basic difference, but because preciseness of formulation was felt to be so important. People very often tended to talk loosely about the things they believed in. So there was really a great deal of detailed work on that.

Balter: Before we go on to the trial proper, let me ask you a couple of things. You mentioned that the defendants formed a committee to--

Margolis: I haven't finished the preparation. Just certain aspects of it I've talked about.

Balter: Oh, okay, good. Let me ask you this one question while I'm raising it. And then please do, let's go back to more on the preparation. To what extent was there an attempt--and if so, how successful was it--trying to involve the noncommunist or liberal or civil libertarian community, in a mass way, in defending the Smith Act defendants?

Margolis: At the time and during the trial, I don't think there was any substantial success. That was the--that was '51--depth of the McCarthy period. There was support, but it came from the Left. There were a few civil libertarians that supported us. The ACLU supported us, but the ACLU at that time was a much smaller and much less influential organization than it is today. No, there was no mass support for us. We tried to build a movement. I didn't have very much to do with that of course, but I spoke at some rallies and things of that kind. There was support. There were meetings with a couple of thousand people here in Los Angeles, but that was about squeezing as much support as you could get here.

Balter: Please do go on with the trial preparations.

Margolis: Well, one thing was who were the witnesses against us going to be? There were two-- They were divided into two basic groups. The government had a stable of informers that went from trial to trial testifying and who had already testified. So, one thing we did was we got the records, all of the material we could get, about those who we were almost certain would be testifying in our case. We were right: they did come and testify. So we gathered all the material, outlined it, and prepared it for cross-examination of all those witnesses. Now, that was a time-consuming task, but it didn't involve the kind of problems that the other group did.The question was who new are we going to see, who have not testified? What local people are we likely to see? There were discussions about people who, it was thought, might be witnesses, both people still within the party and people who had left the party. And then the decisions were made. Well, here are the most probable ones, and then there were attempts to gain information about them: What were they doing now? Any signs that they have a lot of money? That was one of the indicia of informers, they usually had extra money. And to find out as much about them as possible. So that was quite a time-consuming thing. I was much less involved in those discussions. That was primarily the committee, but I was involved in some of them when it came to reaching certain conclusions.Then a third phase of the preparation, that was done very intensively, was a preparation of the law. We made, for example-- There were pretrial motions, a motion to dismiss the indictment and so forth. I worked closely with Sam Rosenwein on that, and I argued the pretrial motions. We lost everything, but we got some decisions, opinions, from the court that were useful later on appeal.Now, another phase of it, which involved a lot of work, is you prepare [and] propose the instructions that you ask the judge to give. We worked very intensively on trying to formulate instructions, frankly, which we thought that the judge would refuse to give, but would increase our chances of getting a reversal. We did a lot of work on that.I would say that those were the main areas of preparation: the theoretical preparation, the witnesses--two phases of that, the law and-- Well, I suppose related to the first phase that I talked about, because this was a trial of books--and we knew from other trials what books were going to be put into evidence--there was a lot of work of preparation for quotes which we knew that they would probably cite, of how to handle them and how to deal with them. However, I don't list that too separately, because most of it was involved in my preparation of Oleta for her testimony, although not all of it. I think that covers the heart of the preparation. There are a hundred and one little things, of course, constantly going on.

Balter: Now, back at that point, what was the state of criminal discovery procedures in federal court? Were you able to do much discovery?

Margolis: Virtually none.

Balter: Is it very different than it is today, as I understand it?

Margolis: Very different, very different.

Balter: Did the stable of informers that you mentioned--the ones that you expected and the ones that were going from Smith Act trial to Smith Act trial--were at least some of those some of the same people who were the stable that were going around HUAC [House Committee to Investigate Un-American Activities], testifying at HUAC hearings also?

Margolis: Yes. HUAC and--

Balter: Very similar to the same community of--

Margolis: Yes, same community.

Balter: Another thing, too, I think I heard you say that Sam Rosenwein had not been admitted to practice in California?

Margolis: No, when Sam came out here, he was admitted to practice in New York. He was afraid that there would be problems if he tried to get admitted here. So he worked as a lawyer, but doing the things that were legal for him to do, like the research and the work there. But he did not appear in court.

Balter: Problems of what type?

Margolis: During this period of time, lawyers with political backgrounds were-- There were actually disbarment proceedings against them. It's much easier to keep an attorney out than it is to disbar him. There are a number of cases that went to the Supreme Court on disbarment on political problems, including one here, the Koenigsberg case.So Sam felt, number one, he would certainly be asked whether he was or ever had been a member of the Communist Party, etcetera, questions that he was not prepared to answer. So rather than do that-- As a matter of fact, Sam has never gotten admitted. What happened is that he got so involved in various kinds of work that really didn't much require for him-- He worked for many years with Stanley Fleishman, and he argued many cases in the U.S. Supreme Court. See, he stayed admitted in New York; he kept up his good standing in New York. He was admitted to appellate courts in the East and to the U.S. Supreme Court. So he carried on his practice without ever getting admitted.

25. Tape Number: XIII, Side One October 25, 1984

Margolis: When we finally had the defendants released, as a result of the granting of bail, for, I don't remember how long, a week or two, the defendants were followed around openly by carloads of FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] people--everywhere. No attempt to conceal it, and so forth. It was if [we] went anywhere, there were just several carloads where we'd go. We'd go to a restaurant. We got talking to them, and they were not unfriendly. They were just [laughs] doing a job. And we threatened-- Again, my memory, it's not clear. I know we started to prepare papers asking for relief against their following us around all of the time. It was interfering with our preparation. It was annoying. And we either-- They stopped it, at least the open, apparent stuff. I'm sure that they kept a quiet surveillance on. But I don't remember whether we ever filed a motion or whether we told them we were going to file it, and they stopped this procedure, which went on at least for several days. It might have been a couple of weeks. It was a very annoying kind of thing. I don't know if I told you-- We had a separate office for the trial counsel, which was in the same building, but on a different floor from where our offices were. I found out afterwards that our phone had been tapped.

Balter: Found out through FBI enforcement?

Margolis: Well, I'll tell you how I found out. This leads me to another phase of the preparation that I left out. Initially, we thought that we might put on some witnesses who might be able to testify in a way that would help us with respect to the activities of the Communist Party. We ended up not doing that, not putting on any such witnesses, but we explored that and we called a number of people.I called a man by the name of [Paul] Jacobs in San Francisco. He was an anticommunist guy who had been in the Communist Party [Note: Actually, he was never a member, but he was close to the organization at one time. --Ed.] and who, we thought despite his anticommunism, might on the force and violence issue be a useful witness. I talked to him on the phone and asked him whether he would be willing to testify and just generally what his approach was. Got a favorable answer from him.Later on, we decided-- The reason we decided not to use any witnesses was because we knew that the judge [William C. Mathes] was going to permit the asking of names of others. And if there were no responses to the names, people were going to go to jail for contempt. And we didn't see-- We couldn't ask people to subject themselves to that. So for that reason, we didn't put on several witnesses who we might otherwise have put on.Long after these events, I applied for my FBI file, and I got part of it at least. What it covered [was] part of the period when I was counsel for the communists here on the Smith Act case [Yates v. United States]. There was nothing in those, then, which indicated in any way that my phone had been tapped.I got a call from Jacobs one day. This is many years, many years later, maybe fifteen years ago. (Jacobs is dead now, by the way.) He called me and he said, "You know that your phone was tapped when we did that?"I said, "How do you know that?"And he said, "Well, they've got a report of my conversation with you, when I agreed to be a witness, in my FBI report. But they don't say it was over the telephone, and you and I never met in person."The fact is that we had never seen each other in person. Never met. And the only conversation we had, both of us knew it, was taken over the phone. And they had this in his report. The only way they could have gotten it was by wiretap. And so, I at least have that evidence. As a matter of fact, I would have been surprised if-- We assumed our lines were tapped.

Balter: Did Mr. Jacobs send you a copy of the FBI report at any point?

Margolis: You know what happened was-- I remember now what happened. That I said to him, "I'm going to be in San Francisco soon. I'll come up and see you and get a copy." And it just never happened. It was just postponed from time to time. It wasn't any urgent thing. It was just a matter of curiosity and interest. I was very busy, very busy during those years, and finding out, period, I never did.

Balter: Before we go on, I'd like to take this, at this point, to go over the Smith Act defendants with you and just discuss a little bit about who they were. Some of them, of course, people like Dorothy Healey, Phil [Philip] Connelly, and others, are very well known in their careers in the Communist Party, very well documented. But for others that's less so, and I think perhaps it might be useful to simply go down and ask you to briefly describe the people. Not only who they were, but also, in relationship to the Communist Party, anything else that comes immediately to mind about them, including the role that they played during the trial, and so forth. So, I'm going to be going through them in just very arbitrary order. Let me just put the tape off for a second. [tape recorder off]Now, of course, originally fifteen people were arrested. Why don't we start off talking about the one whose case was dismissed, Mary Bernadette Doyle.

Margolis: We called her Bernadette Doyle. I thought she generally was known. I had not known her. I think I might have met her before the indictment, but I didn't really know her. She was a member of the party, of course. They had what they-- The Los Angeles County Communist Party committee or Southern California Communist Party committee--I forget what they called it, but it was the committee for either Los Angeles or Southern California, similar to the national committee of the party. All of the Los Angeles people were on that committee. She was on that. I don't know-- She's still alive, by the way. She became, during the thing, very ill, and the doctor said that sitting through a trial would kill her. We went through a bad time with her, because she insisted on going to trial. When we raised the question with the judge, the government offered to dismiss her out of the case in order not to delay the trial. The judge said that he was not going to delay the trial; that he would grant a dismissal, but if she chose to ignore her doctor's orders and sit through the trial, that was up to her. And we had long arguments with her about that, and she finally agreed. To go through, she felt-- She very much wanted to be a part of this trial, but I think it would have killed her if she sat through it.

Balter: You say she still is alive now?

Margolis: Yes.

Balter: Frank Carlson.

Margolis: I don't remember whether Frank at that time was a full-time Communist Party official. I think he was. He was from Southern California. A short man, oh, I'd say, five six, something like that, maybe five seven. A witty guy and very nice, very nice man, who, I would say, was respected by all of the other people. He was listened to, but who I don't think had a very strong voice and who is not a commanding person. I don't mean in the sense that he didn't give orders, but he was not the kind of a person that commanded attention and control. But a bright, industrious man.

Balter: Frank Spector, a little bit more well known.

Margolis: Yeah, well, Frank Spector had a long history in the Communist Party, probably the longest-- Well, I don't know the longest of any of the defendants, but a very long one. He was under a deportation order and had been for many years. He was from Soviet Russia. He had come here from Russia, and he was under an order of deportation. The Soviet Union wouldn't take him. It wouldn't take anyone who was ordered deported, and so he was here and functioned here. I don't think he was a full-time official of the Communist Party either. For a period of time, he ran the Communist Party bookstore. But I think that was later. I don't think it was at that time.

Balter: Ben Dobbs?

Margolis: Ben Dobbs was a full-time official of the Communist Party, and I think a second in authority, second in line to Dorothy. Was a kind of a guy who attends--and still is--kind of a guy who attends every imaginable meeting everywhere and just constantly working; he's an organizational man, was then and is now.

Balter: Now, William Schneiderman, at the time the case was beginning, is described in a Los Angeles Times article as the acting head of the Communist Party, USA, at that point. Does that sound right to you?

Margolis: I think he had that as a kind of honorary title. He was the chairman of the Communist Party of the state of California. [Eugene] Dennis and the others in the first trial were in jail, and the second level of authority were also. I think he had that title. I don't think he ever really, I'm not sure, but I doubt if he ever actually exercised that position.

Balter: What sort of role did Schneiderman play during the Smith Act case?

Margolis: Well, he was designated to represent himself. And he did act as one of the counsel, sat with counsel at counsel table. Bill--quiet-mannered man, very intelligent, not a terribly strong personality. For example, I would say between him and Dorothy or Slim [Philip Connelly], there is just no comparison. They're much stronger personalities in my opinion. His influence was not nearly that of Dorothy and Oleta. I think that Dorothy [Healey] and Oleta O'Connor Yates were the two most influential people. Not by virtue of their position of authority, but by virtue of their ability and the strength of their position. Bill, to a considerable extent, sort of took a back position, not all of the time, but a great deal of the time. He was, during the trial, quite severely criticized by other defendants, on the grounds that he didn't adequately play the kind of independent role that he should have. He didn't make the kind of presentations that he should have. And he wasn't really a strong guy, did not play a strong role during the trial.

Balter: Was he the only one of the defendants who acted in his own defense?

Margolis: Yes.

Balter: What was the thinking behind doing that in his case?

Margolis: Well, it was felt that there ought to be one defendant who would be able, in a way, to speak more politically than lawyers could. It was our-- When I said that we looked at this as a legal case, we recognized it also as a political case; it was a political-legal case. While decisions, we thought, had to be made taking the defendant's political views into consideration, they also had to take the legal views into consideration. But there ought to be someone at the trial in a better position to present political viewpoints at appropriate times than the attorneys were in a position to do. And he, being the chairman, he was the logical person. I think he did hold the position of titular head of the Communist Party, and he was certainly the chairman of the Communist Party of California.

Balter: Now, you began speaking about Oleta Yates. Why don't we continue with her.

Margolis: I think she was the San Francisco chairperson.

Balter: Let's see, again, according to the-- Using the Times as a source of possibly dubious accuracy, she's identified as a Northern California secretary at that particular time.

Margolis: Well, all right. Secretary, that's applied-- I think that's the title that Dorothy had too, wasn't it?

Balter: Southern California secretary.

Margolis: Yeah, secretary, when I keep using the word-- The secretary in the Communist Party was the leading, the leading person. For example, [Earl] Browder was the secretary of the Communist--national secretary of the Communist Party. Gus Hall was the secretary. So I really misspoke myself. As I said, she was a San Francisco equivalent of Dorothy in Los Angeles.

Balter: You spoke of her being a much stronger character. Were some of your-- Is she still alive by the way?

Margolis: No, she's dead. She died a few years after the case ended. She was not a very well person. When I say strong, I don't mean-- Physically, she was not a very strong person, but she was a brilliant theorist, just a wonderful mind. I don't think she would match Dorothy as an organizer, as a person to, you know, to hold people together and to organize, although she was no slouch at that either. But Dorothy is remarkable in that area. I think she [Yates] was considered by most of the people as the leading theoretician in the group. There's no question that she was well versed fundamentally in Marxism and in the history of the Communist Party. She was an extraordinary person. She was, by the way, she was selected by the defendants to play the role that I say that she played. I think that was because she was considered as being the strongest person in that area.

Balter: Now, we've talked a lot in the past about Philip Connelly and Dorothy Healey, who I understand were married at this particular time. So we've talked about them in terms of the type of people that they worked for. To what extent did they play a role in the case itself?

Margolis: Oh, very differently between the two of them. As I said before, I think the leading people-- Everybody participated to one extent or another. I think everyone participated, but I think definitely the leading people were Dorothy and Oleta.Phil, Philip Connelly, at that time, was a Southern California editor of the People's World; I don't know if that was his title. He was a Southern California representative of the Daily People's World. [Note: Connelly was the Los Angeles bureau editor. --Ed.] He's primarily a newspaperman, a labor man, and a man that didn't have much patience with detail. He wasn't a great theoretician. He played a rather limited-- He did some things just like everybody did, but he played a rather limited role. I don't think he was considered by anybody as being a key person in this kind of a situation. In other situations, he certainly was a key person and a very strong personality.

Balter: Now, Henry Steinberg we've talked a little bit about before.

Margolis: What does the Times say? I don't think he held a full-time position with the party. He was from Southern California.

Balter: He's not identified with any particular town.

Margolis: I think, oh, they were just people who were on the committee. I would say that Henry and Frank in many ways, aside from physical appearance, were very similar.

Balter: Frank Spector?

Margolis: Frank Carlson. Played similar roles. He was respected and listened to, but not one of the stronger people in the group.

Balter: And Rose Chernin?

Margolis: Rose Chernin, of course, was the head of-- The organization's undergone so many different name changes. Foreign Born? Was it the Committee for the Protection of Foreign Born at that time?

Balter: Yeah, I'm pretty sure that's correct, yeah.

Margolis: You know, it's undergone other names. She's still active; she's still alive and active. She also was not a theoretician. She was an organizer of the-- You know, when I said Slim wasn't much on detail, she was the opposite. She was great on detail, taking care of things and seeing that they were done, and I think that's largely the kind of a role she played in this. A very hardworking person, who was always busy and involved.

Balter: Loretta S. Stack, who the bail case, of course, was named after.

Margolis: Yeah. I don't remember how it got to be; somehow her name got up in front. Loretta, again, was on the committee. I would place her pretty much in the same category as Frank Carlson and Henry Steinberg. Frank and Henry are both dead now.

Balter: Is Loretta Stack still alive?

Margolis: Yes, she's still alive.

Balter: Where does she live?

Margolis: Here in Los Angeles. I saw her not long ago.

Balter: Is she still politically active?

Margolis: I think so, yes. If you mean that, mean the Communist Party, that I don't know, but I don't think so. But she's politically active.

Balter: Al Richmond.

Margolis: Al Richmond at the time was the editor of the People's World. I would say that if there was anyone who was the equal of or brighter than Oleta was--I change it to the equal of, in the theoretical field--it was Al Richmond. A fine writer, a man of great judgment and poise, quiet, unassuming. I would place him in almost the same leadership position as Dorothy and Oleta, except he was more diffident, I think, than they were. A very strong person, very bright. He's alive, but very sick.

Balter: Here, still in Los Angeles?

Margolis: San Francisco. He's from San Francisco. He was from San Francisco at that time. The People's World was published in San Francisco.

Balter: And then we have maybe, perhaps, at least in my understanding, people who might be somewhat lesser lights. Ernest Otto Fox.

Margolis: I never knew him very well. I knew he was on the committee. He was very quiet, and I don't think I can say very much about him.

Balter: Carl R. [Rude] Lambert?

Margolis: Well, Lambert was from the Bay Area. He was an old-timer. I think he was maybe of the same vintage as Spector. Both Spector and he played a role. They participated actively in a lot of things, and I would say they more or less fell into the same category. Spector and Lambert.

Balter: And, last but not least in this odyssey through the defendants, Albert J. [Jason] Lima.

Margolis: Albert J. Lima, I think, was the Oakland-- He stayed party secretary or organizer. What does the Times have on that?

Balter: No specific title.

Margolis: I think he was in Oakland, if I remember correctly. Either that or later on, I think when Oleta, maybe I'm wrong, when Oleta died, he took over her position. He was a full-time official, as I remember it, in Northern California. I believe worked primarily in Oakland. I really considered him a pretty pedestrian kind of guy, but he worked hard. He was kind of mechanical in his thinking, not a creative personality like some of the others I've mentioned.

Balter: Were there any people in the leadership of the Communist Party out here who you or others were sort of surprised that they missed, or that were missed? Or did they pretty much slice off the top of the leadership and get everybody?

Margolis: No, I think that they got the lot.

Balter: Go off tape for a second. [tape recorder off]Ben, since we're going to begin talking about the trial itself next session, I'd like to finish off by asking you about a very controversial episode in the history of the Communist Party, and that is concerning the prosecution under the Smith Act [Alien Registration Act, 1940], apparently the first Smith Act prosecutions, which were against members of the Socialist Workers Party, some point in the late forties. I don't have all of the details at hand here, but it's an episode in which, over the years, the Communist Party has been often accused of supporting those prosecutions and siding with the government in the prosecutions because of the political differences and Trotskyist political opinions of that group. What is your memory of that whole episode?

Margolis: Well, I would say that the accusation is at least partially justified, if not completely, because part of it-- My memory is vague. I do know this for sure, that the Communist Party was asked to support the group and refused to do so. Whether or not-- I have doubt that the Communist Party actually called for their prosecution and conviction, but I may be wrong on that. My recollection is that the Communist Party position was that they weren't going to help a group like this Trotskyite group. In effect, it was what people said it was, but I don't think it was that clear and unambiguous. What was clear is, "We will not support them," and this, of course, in my opinion was a reflection of the mechanical thinking. And, again, the decision was made at the top level without any real discussion. And was a serious mistake, because it supported a flagrant violation of the First Amendment. The Trotskyites, that's what they were called at that time, had not done anything. They were charged entirely with speech. Entirely from the standpoint of self-interest, the Communist Party should have opposed this.Now, let me, however, set this in context, again, as I recall it. After all these years I could be wrong, but as I recall it, this group was violently opposed--again I use the word "violently" not talking about physical violence--to the war effort [for World War II], because they hated the Soviet Union so. They opposed the war effort, and of course the Communist Party fully supported the war effort. This built up the tension between the two groups, and I think the position at that time was everything-- I don't remember whether it was while the war was still going on, or shortly after the war was over. It was around in that period when at least either the war was on, or it was so on the edges of the war that it practically was going on.And you must remember, the Communist Party took a position: Everything for the war effort. For example, it supported the Japanese internment. Everything. No matter what, they were prepared to do anything. So really, it isn't anything surprising that they did this, and I think this was largely a reflection of that attitude. It rose out of that particular time and circumstances. And I think that maybe, and perhaps even probably, under a different time and circumstances, a different position would have been taken. But I don't mean by that that it wasn't wrong. I'm just trying to explain what lead, what I think lead to that.

Balter: Was there any dissension that you recall over that stance? For example, say, from the attorneys in the party, who might have been in a position to see where that was going to lead.

Margolis: I don't recall any. Out here in California, there was very little news about it. It was reported, and it wasn't a big deal. And we were all involved in so many other things. I don't think, you know, I wasn't even familiar, personally, with the Smith Act at that time. I don't think I ever read the Smith Act until the Dennis indictment [Dennis v. United States].You know that there's another thing that ties into what I have just told you. The Smith Act was passed, purportedly, as a war measure. Its purpose, when it was passed, was to be directed against the enemies of the war, to undermine sabotage of the war. And the Communist Party was in favor of anything that did that, but without really giving consideration to this language, which at the time it was passed, was not thought of by anybody as being used in this manner. Of course, anyone with a little perception and study should have known that that was going to be so.But I want to remind you of another thing. That there was a period of time when the Communist Party of the United States, under [Earl] Browder, took the position in the postwar period that there would be harmony between the Left and the Right, and the labor movement would continue to prosper, and the class struggle would diminish. All of those things were accepted by large segments of the Communist Party. There were some differences, but, for the most part, it was such a nice outlook that everybody loved it.

Balter: Until the McCarthy period came along. [laughter]

Margolis: Yes.

Balter: Okay.

Margolis: With that, we'll finish for today and pick up next time.

26. Tape Number: XIII, Side Two November 5, 1984

Balter: Ben, we've talked a great deal about the preparations for the Smith Act trial. I wonder if at this point we could pick up entering into the trial phase proper.

Margolis: Yes, I think perhaps it would be interesting to discuss the kind of a judge Mathes was. Mathes was as dedicated an anticommunist as anyone would hope to find, or fear to find, anywhere in the world, who believed fervently in the position that he took. Among other things, he was determined to try this case in a way that would--he believed and hoped--would make it even easier to convict communists than the Dennis case had made possible.Well, I can give you perhaps the primary example of this. The Dennis case had held or had approved instructions which stated that the First Amendment problems were met by requiring that there be proved advocacy of the overthrow of the government of the United States by force and violence, calling for action rather than discussing abstract doctrine of the desire or ability of that, and with the intent of accomplishing such overthrow as speedily as circumstances would permit.The government, as well as us, submitted instructions to this judge, which required the jury to find advocacy not only of abstract doctrine, but of action to accomplish the violent overthrow of the government of the United States. He refused to give our instructions, or in fact the government's instructions, which were offered by the government because he wanted to try the case consistently with what the United States Supreme Court had held in the Dennis case.Judge Mathes took the position that when it came to advocacy of overthorw of the government by force and violence, it was not necessary to advocate action. It was enough if there was an intent to accomplish that end, and that, therefore, he was going to instruct the jury accordingly. This is a very, very unusual sort of a position for a judge to take, where you have a set of instructions that have been approved, word for word, by the Supreme Court of the United States, and where he himself insisted on saying that the Supreme Court required more proof than was actually necessary. Of course, he was afraid-- He was quite an able man. He had this absolute blind spot of anticommunism, which just was irrational, but he was a pretty good lawyer. As the evidence went in, he saw that there was very little that could be construed to be advocacy of action, as distinct from advocacy of an abstract doctrine. He wanted to get a conviction that would stand up with even an inadequate record, and which would make-- Which will lay the basis for getting convictions easier and easier, virtually by proving membership in the Communist Party.There was another question on which he took an extreme position in order to keep it in the case. The Smith Act not only forbade-- Correction, Smith Act forbade not only advocacy of the kind I've mentioned, but organizing a party in order to advocate, for the purpose of advocating, with all of the other additions. The question was what organizing meant. We asserted that organizing meant organizing the-- Forming, bringing into being. He ruled that it covered all, any kind of organizing activity. The importance of that, among other things, was that there was a three-year statute of limitations. The Communist Party had been organized much more than three years before the indictment, and therefore the organizing section of the indictment couldn't stand, unless organizing was construed to mean carrying on organizational activities.I cite these things at the beginning, although these things were really resolved at the end. You settled your instructions just before the case went to the jury. But I cite them at the beginning of our discussion because of the fact that he-- To indicate the kind of an all-out guy that he was. On the other hand, he was very careful, or tried to be very careful, to make a record, so far as admission of evidence was concerned, where we couldn't argue that we were not allowed to introduce evidence or to conduct cross-examination that we were entitled, we had the right, to have. So that on the introduction of evidence, he really gave us, and on cross-examination, he really let us have a fairly free hand, probably as free as any judge would have given us, so that we were able to make a record of the kind that we otherwise would not have been able to make, and which helped us when we got up to the Supreme Court. In the pretrial proceedings, Mathes had been tough and rough, and really had ridden counsel, sometimes pretty badly. When the trial started, he completely changed. And again it was his determination-- [interruption, tape recorder off] It was his determination to make the kind of a record which he believed would stand up on appeal, so that during most of the trial, he was really-- With one or two exceptions when he lost his temper, particularly with Leo Branton [Jr.] on a couple of occasions, he really acted quite decently and was fairly courteous to counsel. I think there was another factor that affected him. The attorneys for the government were really pretty second-rate and did a very poor job. The U.S. attorney at that time was a man by the name of [Walter S.] Binns, who later became a municipal court judge and never rose above that. I think he still is a municipal court judge. And a fellow who became a bankruptcy judge later on, his name starts with a K, I can't think of his-- But what they did really-- Really, they did a pretty poor job, pretty poor job, and that made him angry at them. While he recognized the fact that the defense was doing a good lawyerlike job, he had that peculiar situation: He loved a good argument, and he really appreciated the quality of the work that we did, while at the same time he was determined that we should lose the case. That was a peculiar kind of a dichotomy. I think as a judge, he would have liked nothing better than to sit, in case after case, with good lawyers arguing difficult points. In many other types of cases, he was a pretty good judge.

Balter: That brings me to a question I wanted to ask you, if I can just interrupt you for a moment. Had you appeared before him on any significant cases? Or what was his reputation before this?

Margolis: Well, I had not appeared before him, as far as I can remember, on anything of any consequence. He had a reputation of being a very able guy, but very rough, very tough. Maximum sentences in criminal cases for everybody, not just political cases, but virtually any kind of case.He, I think it was he, yes, I had had him before in a case in which I represented a postal worker, who had opened up some letters and taken out some small amount of money, ten, fifteen, something less than fifty dollars. Taken it out and-- This was a postal worker of long-standing, maybe twenty-five, thirty years of employment. His wife had gotten cancer and needed surgery. And he had been desperate and had stolen this money. He pleaded guilty. He was caught. There was no question about it, he was caught. The probation department recommended that he be given probation. That there was no danger that he would do this again, that he had a-- This wasn't a criminal type. The U.S. attorney said he should have a short jail sentence. He shouldn't get away without any jail, but that was the most that they recommended. Judge Mathes gave him the maximum sentence, which I think was ten years or something like that, and later on-- [telephone rings, tape recorder off]

Balter: You were saying he got the maximum and then later something happened.

Margolis: Later--I don't remember how we accomplished it--we made a motion. Waited until he was out of town and with the connivance of the U.S. attorney's office, who went along with us. They were as much upset about it as we were, which is unusual for them, but this was such an unusual case. We went before a judge, an out-of-town judge, and got it reduced to thirty days or something like that. But this is the kind of a guy he was. But, nevertheless, a good lawyer from the standpoint of just dealing with, in most cases, with legal principles.

Balter: Now, did you ever get any indication that Judge Mathes might have remembered that you undercut his sentence later? In other words, do you have any reason to think that he might have known that you pulled that one on him?

Margolis: He probably knew. I don't know whether he knew or not. He might not have. But, well, if we're getting into that, it's sort of jumping ahead of the story. After the trial was over, he sat as a judge for a number of years, and I had quite a few cases before him. He used to embarrass me, he treated me so well.I remember one occasion that-- He was very tough on continuances. Anybody wanted time; you just don't get any time unless you're dead or dying. You know, he just was totally inconsiderate of counsel. I remember going there one day. Several attorneys had asked for some time on some things--one because of a Jewish holiday, for example--and he refused them. I needed some time. And I got up, I thought-- Wondered what the hell is going on. I thought I'd try. I got up and I said, "Your honor, I need a little more time."He said, "How much do you need, Mr. Margolis?" [laughter]And he gave me what I asked for. It really embarrassed me, as if I had become someone who he was favoring. I've often thought that this was sort of his way of saying that he respected the defense's lawyers, and trying to show that. At the end of the case, he very pointedly congratulated defense counsel without mentioning the prosecution counsel, which is a very unusual thing, again, for a judge to do. What a judge always does is if he wants to congratulate one side, he'll at least say something nice about the other side. But he didn't. A very stern guy. He'd had a lot of domestic problems. He lived in a big apartment house on Franklin Street, pretty much by himself.On one occasion-- And this I was told, just no one had ever heard of it happening before. Most judges you can make an appointment to see them, in chambers, with the other side, and take up something before them. He, no. Anything you wanted had to be in open court. Not just with us in the Smith Act case, this was in everything. Another thing that happened was, on one occasion, I raised a matter before him. I don't remember what it was about. He said, "This is a matter I think we can discuss in chambers." We sat down and discussed it. He was very personally friendly. You know, this is the peculiar kind of guy he was. But his hatred for communism and communists was-- It was almost on the verge of insanity. It was so great, he was willing to do, just do anything. And he lost all perspective.

Balter: Now, Ben, we had talked about the process that led up to the way that he gave jury instructions, which raises a question. Had you defense attorneys at any point considered not trying the case before a jury? Or was there ever any question as to whether you were going to have a jury in this case?

Margolis: Never any question. No, it wasn't even a matter-- I don't think we even talked about it. As a matter of fact, criminal cases generally, of any kind, you go for a jury. With almost any judge, even the best of them.In this kind of a case, there are two reasons why you go for a jury: One reason is whatever hope there is in a case like this, it exists only with a jury. We knew with him that it would be a foregone conclusion. But much more important than that was the fact that you can get grounds for reversal with a jury that do not exist if you have a court problem. Let me give you an example. He gave us erroneous instructions, and those erroneous instructions were grounds for reversal. If we had tried the case before him and he had simply given wrong grounds for his decision, then the court could say, "Well, we say his grounds were wrong, but his decision was right." But to do that when you have a jury would be to deprive you of a jury trial. So you always ask for a jury trial. There was never a-- I can't even remember any discussion on the subject. It was so obvious. As far as the selection of the jury was concerned, that took a very short period of time. [pauses] He allowed us to present questions to be asked of the jurors in writing. As I remember, he did all of the questioning himself. Asked very, very few of the questions that we put, although he did ask some. That's an area in which, at that time, the law was very, very bad. What he was doing-- The voir dire of the jury was very restricted, and you had very few rights. Besides that, we knew it didn't make a hell of a lot of difference with the kind of panels you have there. Most jurors would be subject to the anticommunist bug, and we would be in-- That's a problem we had to face.

Balter: In drafting those questions, even though so few of them got used, in drafting them, do you remember, and it was a long time ago, but do you remember some of the types of ways that you were trying to get at that kind of bias?

Margolis: Yeah, we were trying to find out what organizations the jurors themselves belonged to, whether he would ask a question like that. Like this one, which I'm sure was asked: "Have you decided in advance that if these people are communists, that means that they're guilty?" Some such questions we asked, but-- We spent a lot of time on it, on questions which we hoped would throw some light on how the jurors thought. I just at this moment don't remember just how we did it then.

Balter: Do you remember, did Judge Mathes dismiss very many of the jurors for cause? In other words, did he take that process seriously and dismiss jurors who would have been clearly biased one way or the other?

Margolis: Well, I just don't remember what happened on that. I don't remember. I don't remember that any juror ever answered questions in such a way that we had a valid basis for an excuse for cause. We had a certain number of peremptory challenges. I do remember this. We had a certain number of peremptory challenges, and he had authority to give us more. We asked for more, and he gave us a few more. We utilized all of our peremptory challenges. But it turned out to be a rather unimportant part of the trial as it went.Many of the details of the trial I now have trouble recalling. I do remember that there were six attorneys and Schneiderman, representing himself, for the defense. Each attorney represented, for the purposes of the record, several defendants that were named. On the cross-examination, one attorney would be assigned, and most of the time it was me, to handle the overall general cross-examination. Each of the attorneys otherwise would handle the cross-examination on matters relating to his client or clients. If a client was mentioned-- Let's assume that I was conducting the initial cross-examination and I was not representing, let us say, [Rose Chernin] Kusnitz. The attorney who represented her would ask any questions directly related to her, so that there was participation by all of the attorneys in this.We also divided up, to some extent, the cross-examination of the stable, what we called the stable of informers. You know, there were people who traveled the circuit, and we had a lot of their testimony. We had intensive preparation done by various attorneys on members of this stable, so that one attorney would concentrate on a particular witness.The issues that arose-- There really weren't many issues on the presentation of the evidence, because the court was pretty good, as I say, on allowing us to cross-examine and to present evidence. Let's see, the evidence that was introduced, that they introduced, consisted to a large extent of books and pamphlets. At the time, there were certain passages, particularly in Lenin's and Stalin's works that you would find. If you had a dozen pamphlets, you'd find those same passages in eight out of the dozen, if not all of the twelve. And these were some of the most violent-sounding kind of language. I remember, for example, what they would do is pick up a pamphlet and read that language from the pamphlet. I'll tell you another thing about it in a minute, but they'd read the language from the pamphlet. Then they'd pick up another pamphlet, quoting that same language, and they'd read it again from that pamphlet: the same language. We offered to stipulate that it was the same language that they had read before.There was one passage that probably [was] read, and I don't think I'm exaggerating, read fifteen or twenty times. It happened to be a passage about violent revolution. They started in the middle of a paragraph and ended in the middle of a paragraph. This was in one of Lenin's works. It talked about the necessity of overthrowing the government, a government, a capitalist government, by force and violence. There was another part of the same paragraph, which they kept reading over and over again, which said, "However, in democratic countries where democratic channels are open, it is possible to achieve a revolution without these things." Then it goes on, "But where it isn't there--" And then it was thunder and lightning and, you know, and-- They kept reading that over, and we would read the other language over each time. [laughter]

Balter: Down with the books!

Margolis: But what would happen was that sometimes, some of the pamphlets would only quote the violent portion and not the other portion. [laughter] So, this was the thing. There were days when, I would say, out of a five-hour day, four-and-a-half-hour day, three hours were spent just reading passages. They had books that would-- We had a cabinet full of books that they read. The rest of their evidence consisted primarily of-- They'd have outlines for example. The way they'd get in this is they'd have a witness, and they would say, "I attended a Communist Party branch meeting, and we had an educational. And here is the outline of the educational." And they'd have an outline. Usually the points on the outline didn't prove anything, but they would have on the outline-- They would cite sources and Lenin's State and Revolution and, you know, all of these books were cited, which were talking about specific times and specific things. Then they would, on the basis of what was in the pamphlet, they would then read from the book. And the witness would testify, "Well, Ben Dobbs was there, and he led the educational." They only-- Rarely did they put into mouths of any of the defendants words indicating an intention to overthrow the government by force and violence. Usually when they did, on cross-examination it was virtually destroyed. So go ahead.

Balter: Now, what I was going to ask you, this was about a six-month-long trial.

Margolis: It was six months to the day--

Balter: To the day, okay.

Margolis: --before the jury went on. And then there was a week of jury deliberations.

Balter: Now, I keep trying to imagine myself as a juror, sitting and listening to all of this. How did I, as a juror, if the instructions did not come until the end, know what it was that I was supposed to be trying to pick out or figure out in all of this? Did that come from the opening statements? Or were there any preinstructions given by the judge?

Margolis: Well, the judge recited, read the indictment to them, which says, "They are charged with a conspiracy to advocate the violent overthrow of the government of the United States by force and violence, as speedily as circumstances would permit, and to organize the Communist Party as a vehicle for accomplishing that purpose." That was not exactly the language, basically that. So he read that, and that was the charge. So the whole thing was advocacy of force and violence, and what the Communist Party did.

Balter: Now, did you as defense attorneys and because you-- An awful lot of this relied upon, I assume, upon First Amendment grounds, the right to advocate certain things. To what extent, in the course of the trial, did you weigh it towards trying to show that these people did not advocate force and violence in the way that you were just talking about--the pamphlets and so on? And to what extent was there a concentration on the issue of whether it was okay to advocate force and violence, under some circumstances, as long as it was more in the abstract rather than, you know, that you were going to throw a bomb the next day or something like that?

Margolis: In order to answer that question, I have to explain to you how a trial goes. You do not, during the course of a trial, argue questions of law to the jury. A question of whether something is protected by the First Amendment is a question of law, not a question for the jury. On the other hand, once an objection is overruled, then the facts go in. So, in the arguments that occurred before the court--and there were frequent arguments about the admissibility of evidence--we would argue other points too, but the basic point was always the First Amendment point. The court would overrule the objection, and then they would put in the evidence. And on the evidence, we could not cross-examine on whether the First Amendment applied or didn't apply, we could only cross-examine on what they said and what was meant by it. So, as far as the evidence is concerned, we had no alternative, except to show that what was being advocated was-- The position that was taken was that-- [door opens] Hold it for a minute. Would you hold it? [tape recorder off] We tried to show that what was being advocated was that the word "revolution" did not imply the use of force and violence, although it might involve force and violence. And that, as a matter of fact, as long as democratic channels were open, that the Communist Party and these defendants did not advocate the use of force and violence against the democratic government; but only against a government where the democratic channels weren't opened, and where the only avenue for change was by overthrowing the government by force and violence. That was the-- And what we did in the cross-examination was to attempt throughout to show that what they introduced as evidence was perfectly consistent with this position of the defendants. And I think to a very, very considerable measure, we succeeded in doing that. Now, where do you want to go from here?

Balter: Okay. Well, there was, I guess, onward and upward. But there was one question that I did have for you, something you referred to before. You said that Mathes would occasionally lose his temper with Leo Branton, Jr. What was that about?

Margolis: I don't remember exactly what it was, but I think that in addition to his other characteristics, that Mathes was a racist. He was from the South. He tried very hard to conceal it, and most of the time was not overtly a racist. But I think when other counsel stood up and argued with him, he was able to take it better than when Leo Branton stood up and argued with him. That's my feeling of what happened, although I think there may have been a couple of occasions when Leo got more vigorous on some things than he thought was proper. But I think basically it was this racism, which was there. Which he was trying not to show and which he didn't think he was showing, but which I think caused him to do these things. He never-- He threatened Leo with contempt once, I believe. It never got very extreme during the trial. Before the trial, it was hot and heavy, not only-- With everybody, but it was primarily me because I was primarily the one in the pretrial proceedings.

Balter: It sounds as though Mathes was determined to be on his best behavior while the trial was going on.

Margolis: I think there is no question about that. Actually, you would have to say that from the standpoint of admissibility of evidence and, for the most part, courteous treatment of counsel, you couldn't have asked for much more. We'd make an objection if we wanted to argue. Most of the time, he would excuse the jury, and he would let us argue, sometimes very extensively. It really was, from that standpoint, a pretty fair trial, conducted within a contest in which, in effect, he was taking the position that if you were a member of the Communist Party, you were guilty of violation of the Smith Act. That was basically the position he was trying to sustain.

Balter: Now, when Mr. Schneiderman would make his arguments, how was he treated by the judge?

Margolis: Not badly, as I remember. One of the complaints that other defendants made of Scheniderman was that he didn't participate enough, and that he wasn't vigorous enough when he did participate. So I don't know how Mathes would have reacted if Schneiderman had been more vigorous and fought a little harder, but Schneiderman was rather withdrawn in his approach. You didn't get a feeling that he was coming out there fighting, that he was angry about this. You just didn't get that feeling. It was afterwards thought by many of the defendants that it was a mistake to have had him be the one, to be the one who would appear in propria persona.

Balter: I remember your mentioning that earlier. By the way, did all of the defendants, or almost all of the defendants, appear in court just about everyday?

Margolis: Oh, they had to; they had no choice.

Balter: They had no choice.

Margolis: Oh, no. You had to.

Balter: They were out on bail, but they had to be there for the trial.

Margolis: They were out on bail, but they had to be there every day. And they were on time. I don't remember anybody being late. Oh, well, we had the problem as far as Bernadette Dorn was concerned, but she was finally dismissed from the case.

Balter: You mean to say Bernadette Doyle.

Margolis: Doyle, yeah. Bernadette Doyle.

Balter: Bernadette Dorn was a--

Margolis: Did I say Dorn? [laughter] Bernadette, that's right--

Balter: Came a little later.

Margolis: As far as Bernadette Doyle was concerned. Yeah.

Balter: This is an aside, but I think an important one. Of course, we'll get back to the trial in a minute. It suddenly occurs to me that here you have the entire top leadership of the Communist Party on the West Coast stuck in this trial all day, every day for six months. What effect did this have (a) on the functioning of the Communist Party and (b) on these persons' ability to make a living and support their families? What was the toll that this took on them, politically and personally?

Margolis: Well, I think that during this six-month period, the Communist Party on the West Coast concentrated most of its activities around this case. Many of the other activities that it would have ordinarily carried on were carried on only to a very limited extent.One of the things that happened was that the very ongoing nature of the case caused a lot of people coming in--support. When I say "a lot," the Communist Party obviously was a very small party, but there were hundreds of people, many of them spending a large part of their time, some full-time, around the case. Considerable money was raised, and I think money was raised sufficient to keep things going for everyone. The attorneys were each paid; they were paid for the six months. Each attorney got $10,000, except I worked twelve months for it, [laughter] because I had been going ahead six months before that. But each attorney got $10,000, and that alone, $60,000, at that time, was a lot of money.The organizational effort around the case was really quite a remarkable effort. We had a daily transcript. In other words, each day we got, by about six o'clock, we had a copy of the day's proceedings. And we got one copy. The problem was that each attorney really needed a copy in order to be able to work effectively. The defense set up an office, a separate office, [and] a crew of volunteers. Each night, there would be 250, 300 pages of transcript during the day. Each night, the thing was retyped, with copies for each attorney and a couple of copies for various other purposes. So that the next morning at eight o'clock in the morning, when we would generally meet before the trial, we'd each have a volume of the transcript, which is very useful in conducting cross-examination and carrying on the case. That was a tremendous organizational effort. Done entirely-- I believe, if I remember correctly, I don't think anyone got paid anything for that. It was just people who work all day and come in and type for two or three hours at night.

Balter: Do you remember if there were one or two people, or more, who sort of coordinated that whole civilian effort? Do you remember who they were?

Margolis: Oh, yes. Well, of course some of the defendants were responsible for that too, because they were putting in-- They didn't start with the court. I think the court session started everyday at-- It went from ten to twelve. And I think we had a two-hour lunch break; it went from two to four thirty. We had about four and a half hours in court, so there was time in between. I really don't remember who was in charge. I think it varied from time to time during the six months, but it was a tremendous organizational act. In addition, there were meetings, money-raising affairs. I must have talked during the trial ten or fifteen times at various affairs. Other attorneys spoke too, so that it was--I suppose that during that period the Communist Party, its members, and its friends were more active. Did more than they would have done if there hadn't been the case; although there were many things that would have been done if the case wasn't going on, that weren't done. But there was a tremendous amount of energy put into the thing. And the attorneys-- Of course, it was a very hard thing. We were working seven days a week, including preparation of our defense, while the case was going on.By the way, I have gotten-- Dorothy Healey sent me, and you might be interested in seeing, this. We put on only one witness, and I'll get to that. This is a summary of, I would say, 15 or 20 percent of her testimony. Not summary, it's actually verbatim, selected portions of her testimony on direct and cross-examination. I don't know if you are interested in seeing [it].

Balter: I certainly am. Perhaps what I could do is borrow this from you, and I might have some questions on it for you next time.

Margolis: Sure, sure. This is one of the most interesting things I've ever done in my life. Oleta O'Connor Yates and I must have spent the equivalent of what would be a month's full-time work, the two of us, preparing for her testimony.

Balter: Yes, I remember that last time.

Margolis: We spent weekends and nights, and some of it was even done before the trial started. But what we did is we took--

Balter: Ben, let me, I'm sorry, let me interrupt you, because we're about to run out of tape. I want to be sure we get the whole story, so I'm going to stop right now.

27. Tape Number: XIV, Side One November 5, 1984

Balter: Ben, of course the court transcript of the trial exists. So many, I can't imagine how many thousands of pages long that must be, which researchers can of course go to.

Margolis: I think it's about ten thousand pages.

Balter: About ten thousand pages?

Margolis: I think that was it.

Balter: Of course, that is, at least in written form, is a definitive record of the trial. But I was wondering if there are any high points--or low points, for that matter--that come to mind over the course of the trial that you'd like to share with us?

Margolis: Well, I suppose there were patterns that went to the trial-- The relationship of what went on in a trial and what went into the press was very interesting. The informers, without exception--and I mean without exception--were shown to be liars and persons that just couldn't be trusted. Like, I remember one, who was not part of the stable, who was brought in. Was a young person, who had gone into the party at the instance of the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] and who had been taken in by a Communist Party family. He'd been sick and cared for by them, and been treated like a son. And all the time, he was reporting on them. That kind of thing had appeared again and again during the trial. That one was the most striking example of the kind of double-dealing that these people did.But as far as the press was concerned, the interesting thing was this kind of thing would happen: Put on a witness in the morning, and the witness would give testimony that was, that sounded devastating. Just, you know, such and such a thing happened, and this was, and he said this, and that the only way of accomplishing the overthrow is by force and violence. And then you'd take the witness in the afternoon, and in a number of cases the witnesses admitted that they had lied. We got from the government their reports, which they had furnished, as to what had happened at these meetings. There was no resemblance between the reports that they gave to the government and the testimony that they gave. They finally would admit that they had exaggerated or lied and so forth.What would happen in the press was that their direct testimony, in all its awfulness from the standpoint of the public, was printed. Not a word about the cross-examination. And this happened not just once, but time after time after time. It was a rarity when there would be word in the press about anything that the defendants did that was favorable to them.One of the interesting things was there [was] a group of about, oh, I think, twelve or fifteen newspaper reporters who sat all through the trial. We got to be quite friendly with some of them. And they would tell us, "We wrote the story. We wrote everything that happened. We don't decide what's published." They said, "The city desk did that." And they'd be apologetic about what was happening.It wasn't just an occasional thing. It was a day-in-and-day-out thing. And it's such a reflection, in my opinion, on our so-called freedom of press and the right of people to know. It's difficult to equate the First Amendment and that as meaning the same thing. And by the way, we were first-page news most of the time during that six-month period. Sometimes with headlines on the first page, and if you had read just those headlines-- And what they would do, the headlines would be worse than the stories. You know, they'd take a story, and then they'd make a headline that wasn't even in the story. Of course, they do that with lots of stories now in order to attract attention, and not only this. Of course we had to suffer it for over a six-month period.I suppose the most interesting part of the trial was the argument that was made. I was assigned the task of arguing theory, and it was a thankless task. I must say I don't think it was one that the jury really accepted or even understood. I think the most brilliant argument that was made was made by Leo Branton [Jr.], who spoke about the relationship of the Communist Party to blacks, and who talked about the things that the Communist Party had done for the people, the black people. And he would say, he would say such things as, "This is what they did. Who else was willing to do that? And that's why they're in court here today." He made a brilliant argument.

Balter: What was the racial composition of the jury?

Margolis: All white. Of course, we didn't have any black defendants. We had one black lawyer, but the defendants were all white. So we were not even in the position to raise that question, and we didn't. Of course, we had lengthy discussions about the instructions that went on, I think, for almost a week. And then the jury went out. It was off for a week. I remember they gave us a room to sit in and wait. We played pinochle, several of us, while we were waiting. I remember that.On the fifth day of deliberations, just before noon, the jury came in with a verdict of guilty for everyone. It was obvious that several of them, I think there were four or five women on the jury, several of them had been crying. It was obvious, you know, you could see that. The fact that they stayed out for a week, we thought was rather remarkable in those times. It came as no great surprise. As soon as the verdict was returned, guess what Judge [William C.] Mathes did? He remanded everyone to jail. We announced we're going to take it on appeal. We asked for a bail on appeal, and he postponed it to a hearing. He remanded them all.Oh, I'm going ahead too fast. I've got to go back to Oleta O'Connor Yates.

Balter: Yes, which I would have asked you about.

Margolis: She was the only defendant we put on. We would have put on one or two others, but for [the fact that] what we anticipated would happen, did happen. And that the first-- The cross-examination consisted almost entirely of asking her to give names. Immediately she refused. She took the position that she would talk about herself and about her codefendants, all of whom had admitted they were communists and published--and functioned publicly. She said she would talk about other public communists, like the national board and things of that kind, but that she would not give them the names of others who might be injured by having their names mentioned. And the judge immediately held her in contempt repeatedly and-- I'm just trying to remember how his sentence went. Hang on for a minute. Hold it for a minute.

Balter: Shall we turn off the tape for a second? [tape recorder off]

Margolis: Just want to check. There were a series of eleven questions in which she was asked to name others. They all were substantially the same question, and she refused to answer any of them. She was judged guilty of eleven criminal contempts. He sentenced her, Mathes sentenced her to eleven one-year terms, which was six years longer than the maximum sentence he could give on the Smith Act [Alien Registration Act, 1940] itself. And of course he remanded her immediately. How did we get bail on her? [pauses]Wait a minute, I was wrong. There were two Yates decisions. No, there were two Yates contempt decisions. In the first one, which was decided in November '57, it was sent back for sentencing. It was found that there was only one contempt, and it was sent back for sentencing, and then--

Balter: According to my notes from the case, the Supreme Court reversed ten of the eleven citations.

Margolis: That's right, that's what they did first.

Balter: Remanded it back to district court.

Margolis: Remanded it for sentence--

Balter: District court resentenced her to one year in jail, which was affirmed by the court of appeals.

Margolis: Yes. Then it came back, and they reduced the sentence to the seven months that she had already been confined to jail in the course of the several proceedings against her, which included the pretrial time that she spent and so forth. So that actually she was held-- I think we got bail from the [United States Court of Appeals for the] Ninth Circuit for her. I think he refused her bail, and we got bail from the Ninth Circuit, pending the appeal. And then that took about a month or two months. So that she was in jail twice. She was in jail once--I think that lasted about five months--along with all of the other defendants, until we got bail granted. I think we discussed that. Then, immediately after the trial was over, she was in jail for close to two months, and then she was granted bail by the Ninth Circuit, and then she never served any more time. Because, first of all, it was remanded for a new sentence, and then he gave her one year on the new sentence. The court, by the way, as I remember it now, when they sent her back for resentencing indicated that these one-year sentences [were] harsh. But Mathes didn't pay any attention to that anymore than he paid attention before that. So that she was finally cleared in May of 1958 by the Supreme Court decision.

Balter: Now, just so we don't confuse the reader, or listener, my understanding or impression was that-- Of course, first we have the Yates v. United States, which is the basic throwing out of the conviction. Then we have Yates v. United States, which deals with the Yates contempt matter. My impression was that the second Yates v. United States carried all of the issues. That it went under that name the whole time, before and after it was remanded. Or would there actually be-- Are you saying that there was another?

Margolis: No, the contempt cases are also called Yates v. United States.

Balter: We have two different Yates v. United States.

Margolis: We have a Yates v. United States, which is the Smith Act case. And we have two Supreme Court decisions on Yates v. United States, the contempt case. Two separate ones. And then we have-- There were actually four Supreme Court decisions in the case.

Balter: Including Stack v. Boyle.

Margolis: Stack v. Boyle, which is the bail one.

Balter: To your knowledge, that's a lot of decisions, does that-- Just in your personal knowledge, does that set any kind of a record for the number of Supreme Court decisions on one criminal case? Or do you know--?

Margolis: I don't know. No one has ever asked me that question before, and I've never given it any thought particularly. I imagine it's an awful lot. It's very unusual, but whether or not there were others before, I just don't know. I've never heard of anyone with even that many, but there were these four here.Another interesting thing that I might tell you, on the day that the jury was sent out for deliberation, as we went-- The jury was taken out to lunch, and there was a-- There were newspapers being sold right at the door of the courthouse, which was then the old post office building, where the post office building still is. The headline was something like the following, "Herbert Hoover Finds Communist Conspiracy to Overthrow Government." Or something like that, or something even more flagrant than that. We immediately raised that point, along with a lot of other points about an unfair trial. But the Supreme Court never reached those points, because they didn't have to.

Balter: You're referring to J. Edgar Hoover, I assume.

Margolis: Yes, there was a headline that came out on the very day the case was submitted to the jury. We argued that that was no accident. But, as I say, of course Mathes says, I remember when we argued, Mathes said, "Well, you expect J. Edgar Hoover to hold up such an important finding simply because of these defendants?" [laughter] That was the kind of approach he took to this sort of question.

Balter: When the jury came back with this guilty verdict, did you have any opportunity to talk to any of the jurors?

Margolis: No, as a matter of fact, he made an order, which we didn't challenge at the time--we had too many other things to do--but which is an illegal order, that no one could talk to the jury.

Balter: No one, you mean either defense or prosecution?

Margolis: Or prosecution. No one could talk to the jury. We never fought that. We didn't feel that there was anything to be gained by talking to them anyway.

Balter: Ben, while Oleta O'Connor Yates was in jail, some issues came up concerning ill-treatment of her while she was in jail. Do you recall what that was about?

Margolis: Yes. I think it was related to visiting rights, if I remember correctly, and books, denial of books. I don't remember the details, but I remember that there were those complaints. And there was a struggle that went on around them.You see, the first five months that all of them spent in jail was really not such terrible time that they spent. Because, as a practical matter, they were working on their case, and they were, as I-- You know, they had one wonderful meal each day. But then the two months or so that Oleta was in jail, she was all by herself. The others were out, and the conditions were bad. Oleta O'Connor Yates was really not, was not a strong person; she was not well. She died just a few years after the case ended. And I'm sure the burden of the case and of her time in jail-- You can't prove it, but I'm sure that it had some contribution to her health and her dying.I don't remember the details of the jail problem, but I know there was a campaign around that. I did not have very much to do with that, because we were very busy working on the appeal. When the case was over, Sam [Samuel] Rosenwein and I went immediately to work on the appeal to be filed in the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit. Before that-- You want to go into that now?

Balter: Sure.

Margolis: One of-- No, it was after that. No, in the circuit court appeals, the briefs were written, as I remember it, entirely by Sam Rosenwein and myself. And argued in the court of appeals, however, by several counsel, including Leo Branton and Al [Abraham Lincoln] Wirin. I don't know whether anyone else argued it or not, but we never had any hope of anything, except the worst possible result, in the Ninth Circuit. And we got what we expected.All the way through, the Ninth Circuit was as bad as Mathes, except that on the bail thing the circuit was prepared to follow the Supreme Court, whereas Mathes was not. And you remember, I've already discussed that. But otherwise they affirmed Mathes on everything. They affirmed him on the original eleven contempts; they affirmed him on the one-year sentence for the one contempt. And so it's not only Mathes who was overruled, but the Ninth Circuit in [counts] one, two, three, four unanimous opinions of the circuit.By the way, there was only one dissent in the Supreme Court when the case was reversed, and that was [Tom C.] Clark, which is very interesting because his son later became [United States] Attorney General Ramsey Clark. [Tom] Clark resigned from the Supreme Court so that his son could become attorney general. Of course Ramsey Clark is now a really remarkable, leading liberal figure in so many areas today, whereas his father was the most reactionary guy on the Supreme Court--and really vicious. So that's an interesting factor. Once the cases were decided in the court of appeals, we prepared a petition for hearing in the Supreme Court. Again, it was Sam and me who did, as I recall it, all of the work, or if not all, virtually all of the work on that. I don't remember exactly at what stage, but we-- The counsel that had tried the cases and been so blasted by the papers. For six months, we were in the papers every day, and we were baited right along with our clients. We felt that it was very important to get one or two people to participate in the argument before the Supreme Court that would not be-- Have I discussed this before?

Balter: Well, we've talked about it in another context. I know that Bob [Robert W.] Kenny was one of the people who figured. But not in this specific context we haven't, I don't believe.

Margolis: They would not be smeared as we had been. And of course, we went to see Bob. Bob had been quite friendly with Earl Warren, who was the chief justice, and we thought that he [Kenny] would be very good. Of course, there was no problem in getting him, but we wanted to get-- Even Bob, to some extent, had been labeled by that time, and we had to get someone else. I went around, and I must have talked to a half-dozen or so leading attorneys, trying to get them to come in. Without exception--

Balter: Oh, you're talking about-- I was thinking in terms of the Supreme Court. You're talking about it in terms of the case from the beginning.

Margolis: No, no. I'm talking now about the Supreme Court.

Balter: Oh, please go on then, because this we have not talked about.

Margolis: Well, I talked about bringing Sullivan into the case-- No, no, about bringing in [Augustin] Donovan into the case. No, I guess I didn't. I didn't talk about that.

Balter: I don't think so. What we talked about was your attempt to get attorneys into the case to do the trial. I don't think we talked about the Supreme Court.

Margolis: We thought it would be easier to get attorneys before the Supreme Court, because attorneys generally like to appear, you know, it's a distinction to argue a case before the Supreme Court. We didn't go to so many attorneys, because we wanted somebody with a reputation, not just somebody who couldn't be smeared. And we were turned down by everyone on the ground that they couldn't afford to do it. No matter what we paid them, they couldn't afford to do it. I think there was one attorney who said, "If you pay me a hundred thousand dollars, I'll do it." And he knew, you know--

Balter: Would you care to divulge that person's name?

Margolis: Let's see, which one was that? I'm not sure. I'm not sure which one that was. But in any event, we sought out, and we couldn't get anybody. So finally we arranged--Barney [Benjamin] Dreyfus and I arranged--to meet with the board of governors of the state bar. We presented the facts of what our problem was, of the fear that there was among the bar, and saying that this was a terrible thing that was going down. And we got a very, very sympathetic hearing from the board of governors. Two things happened as a result of that.One was that they adopted a resolution in which they referred to the fact that people were--attorneys were--afraid to handle cases of this kind. In the resolution, they said two things: One, attorneys have the duty of representing causes no matter how unpopular they are. And two, that attorneys should not be smeared because of the cases that they handle. That resolution was passed.At the same time, there was an Oakland attorney--an older man, now dead--by the name of Donovan, [Augustin] Donovan, member of the board of governors and an important California lawyer. He said, "I volunteer to handle it." He said, "I have two conditions. One condition--" I say three. He said, "One condition is that I will not accept a fee. Second condition is I want to, the only thing I want is for you to-- I want to select a young law graduate or senior law student to work with me and you are to pay him. And three, you have no control over my arguments."We accepted him, and he came into the case. We decided that he should represent Al Richmond. Al Richmond was the editor of the Daily People's World. The evidence against him consisted almost entirely of issues-- Of the fact that he was editor, and of issues of the Daily People's World, which had nothing in it, of course, about [laughter] overthrowing the government by force and violence. And of course his membership in the Communist Party, alongside that, and that he had attended some meetings, so forth. So, I sent him all of the exhibits and portions of the transcript that related to Al Richmond. Oh, I sent it to the law student; he selected a Stanford [University] law student. And the Stanford law student prepared a summary of the facts for him and sent him some of the exhibits to read.I remember, this is one thing I remember so vividly. A month or so later, he calls me on the phone. And he is in a dudgeon! He says, "I cannot understand this. If there was ever a violation of the First Amendment! What does the First Amendment mean? I've read everything they've got against him." He was absolutely outraged. He said, "I am going to tell the Supreme Court what I think of this kind of prosecution." [laughter]The interesting thing is that-- Oh, first of all, the Supreme Court--you usually have an hour on each side to argue a case before the Supreme Court. In this case, the court gave us two hours, which is done maybe once in several hundred cases. Maybe once a year, twice a year that they do that. They gave us two hours. I carried the main burden; I argued an hour. Bob Kenny argued for half an hour and Donovan argued for half an hour.And Donovan made the most unlawyerlike argument that I've ever heard in my life. It was just an argument in which he said very much the same thing that he said to me over the phone. That this was absolutely outrageous! That you didn't have to know anything about the First Amendment to know how outrageous this was. And god, it was just a thing of beauty as far as I was concerned. He really didn't argue any law as such, except these statements of broad principle. He said it-- I don't mean that he said it as badly as I'm saying it now. He had prepared his argument, but it was really just an expression of total outrage.He read some examples. He'd say, "Now, this is what a man can be sent to jail for five years for!" [laughs heartily] "Doing this thing!" He said, "Here he wrote this. I don't agree with this, but my god, you mean he doesn't have a right to say it?" Or he'd say, "Now, this I agree with. You would send me to jail!" [laughter] It was that kind. I don't remember if these were the exact [words], but it had that quality about it. As a matter of fact, it was probably one of the most unlawyerlike arguments that has ever been made before the Supreme Court.It was just-- He was absolutely outraged. So that we did have a very, very good balance before the Supreme Court. Bob, who was a good friend of Earl Warren, he was a broad lawyer. Donovan would never have been connected with anything Left of-- I don't think he had been as far Left as the Democratic party. He was a Republican, but an honest man, who believed in the First Amendment, which was enough. [laughter]The argument was a very interesting argument. Bob and Donovan argued first. And I argued--took the last hour and also the rebuttal. There was no question from minute one that they were going to reverse. And they were going to reverse on the basis of what Judge Mathes had done to it: on the saying the abstract doctrine was enough, that you didn't have to advocate action, and on his definition of the word "organize" in which they [the defense] said that that was barred by the statute of limitations, because "organize" obviously meant to organize in the sense of to form, to bring into being, and didn't mean just general organizational work. The debate really went on.There was a debate that went on on the bench, largely between [William O.] Douglas, [Hugo L.] Black on the one side; and [Felix] Frankfurter on the other. Frankfurter took the position-- He asked me a question very early. He said, "Mr. Margolis, if we are going to reverse on the grounds that the instructions were incorrect, why should we reach any other point?"I gave the argument that we were entitled not only to a new trial, but we were entitled to have no new trial at all. And that even trying a case like this, the first time, and a second time, was itself a violation of the First Amendment, was itself damaging. And Black and Douglas, mostly Douglas, were asking me questions. They were throwing questions to me to get me to make my points on this side, and he was throwing questions to me to get me to make points on the other side. They were arguing back and forth in this position. And [Robert H.] Jackson, by the way, was on my side on this, too. So, it's interesting the way-- The Supreme Court justices often carry on debates by the questions that they ask, indicating how they think. But in the end, the result was that-- Let me give you from the case what the Court decided.

Balter: Let me just stop you for one second. You said Jackson, is that who you meant?

Margolis: No, no, no, no. Let's see, who was it? Who was it?

Balter: [John M.] Harlan? Warren?

Margolis: Harlan wrote the opinion. [flips through papers] Harlan wrote the opinion. Let's see. [pauses]

Balter: Harlan was joined by Warren, Frankfurter, Black, and Douglas.

Margolis: Yeah. I guess it was--

Balter: [William J.] Brennan? And [Charles E.] Whitaker did not participate in the decision.

Margolis: Yeah, maybe, it was, I guess it was Black and Douglas. No, it was during the-- Jackson was on the Court during the, I think during the--

Balter: Stack v. Boyle.

Margolis: Yeah. And they were carrying out a debate at that time, too. Then it was Jackson who was on the other. This time it was Black and Douglas who were carrying it on. And Frankfurter, even though he was arguing all the way through--in effect arguing, by asking questions--that they shouldn't reach this, went along with the majority. In which the majority decided, a rather unusual sort of a decision, that the case should be dismissed as to [Philip] Connelly, [Rose Chernin] Kusnitz, [Al] Richmond, [Frank] Spector, and [Henry] Steinberg. And they said that there simply wasn't even enough evidence to retry them. On the others, they said that while they raised serious questions about the adequacy of the evidence, they said that there was enough evidence so that they should be subjected to a second trial. Of course, what happened within a matter of several weeks after they handed down the decision, the government came in and asked for a dismissal as to everyone on the grounds that they couldn't meet the standards that the Supreme Court had set. And what followed, of course, then, was the dismissal of all of the other Smith Act conspiracy cases. There were five or six pending at the time: the Honolulu case, the Denver case, Boston-- I think-- I don't remember for sure.

Balter: Patricia Blau's case was also-- Wasn't that pending, too, at the time?

Margolis: No, the Blau case was a Fifth Amendment case, I remember. Blau wasn't a-- That wasn't a Smith Act case, if I remember right.

Balter: Oh, it wasn't? According to my notes, she was arraigned on Smith Act charges in '54, August of '54, and you defended her. Is that perhaps incorrect?

Margolis: And I defended her?

Balter: That's what my notes say. I may be wrong.

Margolis: What happened was-- This is what did happen. After we finished the trial in the Los Angeles case, there were a number of these other cases pending. Up until that point, the attorneys who had acted for the defendants had all been attorneys associated with the Left--the trade union movement and generally with the Left. But there were so many of these cases going on, and the attorneys just couldn't continue to do it. So that what happened was that in a number of cases, the court appointed counsel, special counsel to represent them. And I traveled around the country to the cities where the cases were pending, and talked to those special counsel.

Balter: I see.

Margolis: Where was Blau? In Denver?

Balter: Well, I'm not sure. My notes aren't clear on that. Let me check that, and perhaps next time we can clarify that.

Margolis: Yeah, maybe you can. In any event, I went around and talked to these attorneys. For example, I keep saying Denver because I had the most interesting experience in Denver, which was not altogether different, but to some extent different from experiences anywhere else. What the court had done there was to go to the biggest firms in town and said to the biggest firms in town, four, five of them, or six, "I want each of you to designate one lawyer to act in this case, because we need several lawyers, and I want them. We just can't pick anybody; they've got to have good representation." And so the court-- These firms had designated lawyers to work without compensation at the request of the court. They had set up an office, and they were working full-time on preparing the defense in the Smith Act case in Denver.I don't remember how many lawyers there were, but there were five or six of them. I went and met them. Found that they were working very hard; they were taking the case very seriously. And they were outraged. They told me, when I sat down and talked to them, that when they came into the case, they came into it very reluctantly. They felt that they would have to put on a defense in something that they didn't believe in. And it was just very difficult for them to come in on the case. But now, not only were they glad they were in it, by god, they were going to tell this court. And they were going to do a job. Well, the case was never tried, because it was dismissed as a result of our victory. But similarly with other lawyers who had been appointed.That was the only place where there wasn't a single Left lawyer associated with the other lawyers. In the other cities, it was more expected that this would happen, because there was at least one Left lawyer who was working with other lawyers that weren't Left. And in each case, the lawyers were totally devoted to the defendants in the case. It was a very interesting thing that happened. And it was significant, because lawyers are trained to believe in the First Amendment. The case that the government had was so much nonsense that any good lawyer had to perceive it as such, unless he was as blind an anticommunist as Mathes was. Otherwise, a good lawyer just couldn't live with the case.

Balter: Now, Ben, we're just about ready to conclude for today, but let me ask you at least, briefly, to comment on one thing before we conclude, which is that-- And not at all taking away from the victory that you won from the Supreme Court on this case. As I read the decision, as a layperson, I read it as the Court not wanting to make a ringing defense of the First Amendment where communists were concerned, but sort of arriving at that conclusion more, perhaps, on a technical ground than on very strong constitutional grounds. Now, that is sort of the way I read it, and I was wondering if you would comment on that?

Margolis: Well, it was a mixed bag. There was something in for everybody. If you'll hold that for a moment. [tape recorder off]It's true, but let me, for example, read you a little language from the decision: [reading]

But when it comes to party advocacy or teaching in the sense of a call to forcible action at some future time, we cannot but regard this record as strikingly deficient. At best, this voluminous record shows but a half-dozen or so scattered incidents which, even under the loosest standards, could be deemed to show such advocacy. Most of these were not connected with any of the petitioners, or occurred many years before the period covered by the indictment. We are unable to regard this sporadic showing as sufficient to justify viewing the Communist Party as a nexus between these petitioners and the conspiracy charge.

Now, that may not seen like very much today, but when you compare it with what preceded this, and when you compare it with the decision in the Dennis case [Dennis v. United States] it was really a very forward-looking and progressive statement. On the other hand, they didn't go as far as they should have gone. They should have thrown out the case against everybody. It was a compromise obviously, which often happens in these cases. And they wanted to go on to say the specific saying: You cannot say, you cannot hold that because a person is a member of the Communist Party, he is guilty of violation of the Smith Act. That was the whole-- Really, the government's theory in the whole case was the basis on which they were proceeding.It was a good First Amendment statement for that period of time, even when they leave in-- Though as they say, [reading]

In short, while the record contains evidence of little more than a general program of educational activity by the Communist Party, which included advocacy of violence as a theoretical matter, we are not prepared to say at this stage of the case that it would be impossible for a jury resolving all conflicts in favor of the government, and giving the evidence of those San Francisco and Los Angeles episodes its utmost sweep, to find that advocacy of action was also engaged in.

But then, you see, why did the government drop this? The government knew that the Supreme Court was saying, "Look, even if you come back here again, you're not very likely to have it sustained." But they were just not prepared to go as far as they should have gone.

Balter: Thank you, Ben.

28. Tape Number: XV, Side One May 3, 1985

Balter: Ben, what I'd like to do with this session, first off, is-- What will be obvious to people following these sessions along is that it's been about five, six months since November. Since our last session, you've been involved in an important trial. As a matter of fact, in today's, May 3's, Metropolitan section of the Los Angeles Times, the news is broken about your victory in that case. That accounts for the long time in between sessions. But I thought it might also be appropriate if you could give us just a brief synopsis of what that case was about that you've been involved in the last several months.

Margolis: Yes, our office represented a group of fifteen Hispanic families against a slumlord by the name of [Rudolph] Stabach. The name of the case was Hernandez v. Stabach. The case was not uncommon in certain respects, but was quite unusual in other respects. Does set a precedent, and a practical precedent that is very important.First of all, for me, I was involved in this in a way that was somewhat different than I think I'd ever been involved in litigation before, and that was that I played a secondary role in the handling of the case. A young woman attorney in our office, Barbara Hadsell, was lead counsel. Though I worked with her and assisted her, she carried the principal burden of the case. We were brought into the case by the Legal Aid [Foundation] of Los Angeles.The Legal Aid had gotten into litigation with this fellow Stabach, because he had attempted to evict a number of tenants for nonpayment of rent. These tenants-- [telephone rings, tape recorder off] --had withheld rent because of the refusal and failure of the landlord to make repairs. In the case, the Legal Aid society had gotten certain injunctive relief against the landlord, prevented the evictions, and, in fact, had used some money that was held to make a small part of the repairs. They were seeking injunctive relief. Also had filed an action for damages, for living in these slum conditions, some of them for a couple of years and some for six or seven years.There had been many cases-- Many may be an exaggeration, but it was not uncommon to have cases in which injunctive relief was obtained against slumlords, requiring them to bring their buildings up to code, so that they would comply with the law. And there had been in hotels, there had even been some actions for damages arising out of slum conditions.This, however, was the first case, so far as I know and so far as I have been able to find out from anybody, in which there was a vigorous case that went to trial--a case that went to trial and was handled vigorously--seeking damages for these families who suffered from the effects of the slum conditions. We filed a case on behalf of approximately ninety individuals, who together made up fifteen families. Most of the families were quite large: six, seven. There was one family of eleven, I believe, living in one room. All living, each of them living-- Each family living in one fairly large room, with a kitchen and a bathroom, under abysmal, absolutely abysmal conditions: rat infested, roach infested, terrible plumbing, water coming from the ceilings, ceilings falling--every kind of deplorable condition.What we did was we brought the case to trial for damages. As a basis for damages, we had very little by way of physical injury. We did have a few rat bites of children--it was always children who were bitten--but in none of the cases did the rat bites result in more than pain and having to be taken to a doctor once. In each case, it cleared up in a week, two weeks, three weeks. So, there were no serious physical injuries. The main basis for our case was emotional distress: what this did to the people who had to live under these conditions.Because there were fifteen families and it was such a complex case, with so much evidence to be put in on each family, there were vigorous attempts to settle the case. Before trial, we had an offer of $100,000 for all of the families. Although the judges tried to make us take it, we refused to take it.We agreed upon trying the case on liability first--was this a bad building?--and for damages for two of the families. We selected one family that we thought was our best family. The other side selected one family, which they thought was our weakest family. We thought if we got a judgment on those two-- First of all, if we lost the case, it would be over. If we won the case, the damages that we got might help us to settle the case for the other thirteen families.So, we did try the case for the two families, simply for emotional distress. For Hispanic families who did not speak English, most of whom were here without papers, we got for the two families $92,000 from a jury. And it did lead to a settlement of the case overall. The paper said $500,000; it was actually a $545,000 settlement for the case, including attorney's fees.This is the first time that there has been a recovery of anyplace near that magnitude, and the first one of these cases that, on the issue of damages, has been fought out the way we fought it out. The impact of this, we hope, will be twofold: One, it will encourage attorneys to take more cases of this kind and to go after the slumlords. We intend to be involved in some additional litigation, but there's only a certain amount of it that we're in a position--

Balter: By "we," you mean--

Margolis: The office.

Balter: --your firm?

Margolis: The firm. In a position to handle. So we hope other lawyers will. In addition, we hope it will put a scare into the slumlords, so that they will be scared. Because there's only one thing they're concerned with, and that is dollars. And we hit them hard on dollars! You don't frighten them otherwise.The problem in this city and, I think, in most cities is that the health department, the building and safety department, the plumbing department are all totally understaffed. For example, in the worst area in town, there are eight inspectors who have to inspect about fifteen hundred buildings, almost a thousand of which are slum buildings. It's just impossible. In addition to that, whatever the reasons may be, they do a lousy job. There is some indication, at least in some instances--we can't prove it--that there are payoffs in this. And there is another thing: because they can't do a good job, they very often try to conceal how bad a job they're doing.As a matter of fact, during the trial of this case, we did not call to the stand any of these inspectors. The defense called them. In direct examination, they were very favorable to the defendant's case. They said, "It was a fair building. He tried hard; he was doing a decent job."By the time we finished with them on cross-examination, they had become our witnesses. Because we had the photographs, we had the material, we had the reports showing the conditions, and so forth. They simply had to admit that they might say a building was fair if it had thousands of rats in it and was just filled with roaches, and in every apartment, there was water leaking from the ceiling, plaster falling, and mice and rats moving about.So, one of the things that happened by the way-- This litigation lasted for five years, and during the course of the five years, there were very considerable improvements in the building. [telephone rings, tape recorder off]

Balter: Go ahead.

Margolis: Well, while it is still far from perfect, the differences are between day and night. Rats have been virtually completely eliminated. There are still mice; they've been very substantially reduced. Cockroach problem is the most difficult. The plumbing has been very much improved, as well as the plaster, so that the condition is very improved. In addition, as a result of our judgment, they're going to make some additional repairs, because the settlement included an agreement that they were to make certain additional repairs. So that by the time we get through, the building will be in, you know, for an old building, in fairly decent shape, at least livable.Anyway, the important, as I say, the important thing about this case is it sets a practical precedent, which, I think, particularly if a number of other lawyers start lawsuits and if we push some additional ones, may begin to bring about a change. Which the official government, which has the task of seeing to it that the housing complies to code, will never do.

Balter: Well, given all that, I think you can be excused for your absence from this oral history for the last five months. [laughter]Ben, before we go forward in time--from 1952, in the Smith Act cases where we left off last time-- I'd like to go back a little bit and just, fairly briefly, ask you to talk about some cases. Different cases involving different matters, but all centering on fishing and fishermen, starting with a case back in 1949, Local 36 of International Fishermen [and Allied Workers of America] v. United States, which was 177 F. 2d 320. And also another case, which was in the sixties, Biazevich v. National Labor Relations Board, 374 F. 2d 974. If you could briefly tell us about those cases involving the small fishermen.

Margolis: Yes, there were two fishermen locals here that we represented, Local 33 and Local 36. Local 33 was composed of the commercial fishermen, who fished at that time for sardines, during the sardine season--we were a major, we were the major sardine port, sardine area in the world--and for tuna during the rest of the year. Local 36 were market fishermen. The market fishermen had small boats, one- or two-, maybe sometimes three-person operations, wholly owned by the working fishermen. They were really workers. And they would bring in their fish and sell it to the wholesalers, who in turn would sell it to restaurants, to markets, etcetera.The individual fisherman had absolutely no bargaining power, because when they came in with their fish, their small boats had no adequate icing facilities. They couldn't keep the fish long, so they had to sell it for what they could get or throw it overboard. And they sold it for what they could get. So they combined to bargain collectively for a price for the fish. Believe it or not, there were, I think, oh, maybe 150 of them, somewhere in that number, a relatively small number of people. All of them poor people, really workers. And the government charged them with violating the antitrust laws for price fixing.Our argument, our contention was that, in effect, this was in their instance like wages, or we could say agricultural cooperatives. We had organized something like a cooperative--agricultural cooperatives are allowed to combine and fix prices, or negotiate for prices collectively--and for the very same reason. An agricultural commodity is one that you harvest; you have to sell it or else.So we tried the case, and we lost it. I tried it-- I was then the attorney for Local 36 and Local 33; the firm was, but I did most of their work. We brought in Robert [W.] Kenny, who had just left the post of attorney general at that time, and he tried the case with me, but we lost it, in any event. Ever since then, the local fishermen have been unorganized and have had a very, very tough, tough time making a living.The other case involved the commercial fishing boats, which were then small, as compared to the boats today. A large boat was 300-, 350-ton carrying capacity. Today, it's 1,500, 2,000 tons, but in those days, those were the big boats. They had combined for collective bargaining. What they had done, what they had been able to do was to bargain collectively and reach a standard form of agreement. But the standard form of agreement had to be signed separately by each boat. And so it was possible to divide the boats and to have some of them vary from the standard agreement, and thereby weaken the union.The Biazevich case was a case which took six months to try before the NLRB [National Labor Relations Board], in which we asked for a collective bargaining unit, consisting of all of these large boats that fish part of the year for tuna and part of the year for sardines. So that the bargain that was reached would be a bargain that would be binding upon all of the members of the union.Actually, we had a price-fixing problem there too, and this was one of the elements in the case. Fishermen fish on the basis of a share of the catch. A share of the catch means your agreement will provide that the boat will get-- First of all, you deduct certain expenses from the amount received from the sale of the fish. Then the boat will, say, get 50 percent and the remaining 50 percent is the crew's share. And that's divided among the crew in certain proportions: one share, two shares, a share and a half, so that the-- Actually, the price is one of the determining factors in the amount that is received. One of the things that the canneries were claiming is that we were-- They are controlling the price. Well, we worked out a device, where we said, "We don't give a darn what you sell the price for--what you sell the fish for--but we want to be paid on a certain price in computing this. You can collect more or less. We want to get paid on a certain price." And that stood up. We got a unit composed of the large fishing boats certified by the court. Since then, of course, there have been numerous changes. First of all, the fleet moved largely to San Diego. Now there's virtually no fishing fleet that fishes out of U.S. ports; they now fish out of Guam, Puerto Rico, and so forth. So at the present time, what we accomplished then has little value, but it did have a great deal of value for many years at that time.We had another case [Local 33 v. American Tuna Committee] about that time which arose in connection--a little later--rose in connection with one of those contracts. What happened was when the contract was negotiated, toward the end of the season there was an oversupply, a big supply of fish that year, and the boat owners had always negotiated with the canners for the price, which was fixed in the union contract. And it really worked in a way where the fishermen were involved, but indirectly. What happened in this case-- There was a contract, a boat contract, which fixed the price: a union contract which said that percentage of the catch should be based upon such and such a price. Toward the end of the season the-- See, there were no contracts between--no binding contracts, as I recall--between the boats and the canners. There were between the boats and the union. So, toward the end of the season, the canners said to the boats, "We're cutting the price if you want to fish. You don't have to fish, but if you want to fish, we cut it a hundred dollars a ton." Or two hundred dollars a ton. I don't remember the details.The fishermen's union said, "Go fishing--we want to, but you're going to pay us if we go fishing on the basis of this price."So, some of the boats tied up, went to the members, and said, "Unless you fish at this lower price, we're just not going to go."So a number of the members-- Oh, these boats withdrew from the contract and formed the committee called the American Tuna Committee. They went out fishing at lower prices, breaching their contract with the union and also violating the National Labor Relations Act by firing their old crews and hiring new crews, who would fish for the smaller amount. We had to-- It's another case where the hearing was almost six months. So, the fishing industry is [a] very complex industry. We finally, in that, prevailed and got an order, which reinstated the crew, got them back wages, and so forth.In the long run, that one didn't do very much good, because what happened was that the individual fishermen began-- The price of tuna went up: high, higher and higher and higher. An individual fisherman began making $25,000, $35,000, $40,000 a year at a time when an average workingman, if he made $15,000 a year, had a very good job. Or $12,000 a year was not bad at all. And the boats were able-- The jobs were so much in demand that the boats were able to chisel one way or another. The unions were only partially effective in enforcing their contracts, and that happened entirely because there was so much money available. Again, that union is virtually destroyed. The sardine industry disappeared entirely from California, because the fish disappeared. Just overnight, they disappeared.

Balter: Moving on to a-- Well, actually several different topics. Although before we leave the forties, where we've gone back to a little bit, I don't believe that we've talked about your involvement in restrictive covenant cases, and I wanted to ask you to briefly go over that also.

Margolis: Yes, that activity in restrictive covenant cases was largely through the Los Angeles chapter of the National Lawyers Guild, although our office also had a number of these cases. The principal one was handled primarily by John [T.] McTernan. Let's think if I can think of the name of the case. May come to me. That was a case in which John won in the California Supreme Court, where--In re Laws--where there was an attempt to evict a black family from a home that they owned, because there was a restrictive covenant on that. But I worked primarily with a black lawyer by the name of Loren Miller, a very prominent black lawyer, who later became a judge and who handled the--

Balter: This is Loren Miller, Sr., I assume.

Margolis: Loren Miller, Sr., yeah. He wasn't called Senior, but it was Loren Miller. And there is a Loren Miller, Jr., who's now a judge. Loren Miller, Sr., is dead, been dead for a number of years. We worked with him on the briefs and on the theory. I think I might tell you one rather interesting thing that happened in the course of this trial. At one point I thought I had a brilliant idea. I had been reading on the question what is-- The term used at that time was "Negro." By the way, "black" at that time was considered a degrading term. You were a racist if you used the term "black". Now it's almost the other way around. So, "Negro" was the term used, and the restrictive covenant spoke of Negroes. I started raising the question: What is a Negro? Who is a Negro? It said nothing about what percentage of blood. How do you determine a person is a Negro? I ran across a study by an anthropologist, who said that as far as Negroes are concerned, there are almost no Negroes who've lived in the United States for several generations who don't have white blood in them--almost none, if any--and that there is no way of telling whether they did or didn't have, or how much. That a person could have 1 percent Negro blood and produce a child that was black, and you could have 99 percent and produce a child that was white. There's just no way of knowing. So I went-- I remember going to a meeting of lawyers, black and white lawyers, and saying-- You know, at that time the restrictive covenants were being upheld. We were attacking them on the fundamental grounds of denial of due process, which was of course the basic form of attack.I said, "Why don't we attack this on the ground that it's unenforceable, because you can't tell what a Negro is?" And I was met with a storm from the black people there, because I had not been sensitive.They said, "What you're expecting us to do is to get up and disavow the fact that we're Negroes. And we're not going to do that. We're fighting for our rights, not to disavow our position."So I recognized quickly [laughs] that my clever legal tactic was not one they were buying. They were, of course, right. That the fight on that kind of an issue was the wrong way to fight. But it shows how lawyers sometimes get engrossed in trying to win a case and forget the basic principle of what is involved.

Balter: Apparently, very soon after the Smith Act trials ended, November, in your case, November -- I'm sorry, excuse me, September 30, 1952. You appeared before HUAC [House Committee to Investigate Un-American Activities], and in the sort of scope-- That's not the word I'm looking for. But in the midst of a large number-- Dozens, or over a hundred people, apparently were called. Apparently, somewhat fewer people actually ended up testifying before HUAC while they were here in Los Angeles. And what I wanted to ask you about-- Your testimony before HUAC, or portions of it, are recorded and certainly in the transcript, and there was a lot of coverage of what was going on. But I'm interested in asking you specifically about two things that might not be as well documented in the public record. One would be the strategy discussions and preparations that were made for HUAC's visit to Los Angeles--that would be sort of part A of my question. Part B, because a lot of attorneys and other professionals were called during that particular period, it apparently led to a debate within both the state and local bars over what should be the attitude of attorneys toward HUAC and other congressional committees. And you were even-- Came in for some chastisement for your militant testimony before HUAC. So, it's kind of a two-part question, but I'd like to deal with both of those things.

Margolis: All right. Can we stop for a minute?

Balter: Yeah. [tape recorder off]

Margolis: Actually, the struggle within the bar began at an earlier date. Sometime in the fifties, there was legislation being passed in various states, anticommunist legislation, to the effect that people who were communists couldn't be lawyers or doctors or-- You had to take an anticommunist oath and so forth. Such legislation was introduced in the assembly and senate of the state of California. The [National] Lawyers Guild formed an independent committee against loyalty oaths. It did statewide mailing and statewide-- Carried on a really big campaign against this legislation. The guild, for many, many years before that and at that time, was active in what's called the [California] State Bar Conference [of Barristers], which is an annual meeting of various bar associations of the state bar which passed resolutions and which is influential in determining state bar positions. There was introduced at one of these sessions of the conference, at several of them, but the first one, a resolution, several resolutions-- One resolution would support the legislation-- I don't remember. There were a number of different bills, and I don't remember exactly what the form of the particular bill was. Also, resolutions that all persons who were members of the Communist Party should be disbarred, or who refused to take an anticommunist oath should be disbarred. And this was in the height of the McCarthy period. We fought against this at the conference, and from the very first, defeated it. Our first year we defeated it; it was quite close, maybe five to four, or something like that. There were about 500 delegates, and I think we beat it, maybe 275 to 225, somewhere in that area. But year after year, the resolutions, or similar resolutions, were introduced, until it finally became a laughingstock. Each year, it was more decisively defeated, and it got to a point where no one would even argue the thing. The resolution would come up, but-- And there was one crackpot who'd get up and argue in favor of it. Nobody would attempt to answer him, and it was routinely defeated. So we had laid a basis within the legal profession to fight against these loyalty oaths and so forth.I was served with a subpoena to appear before HUAC. As I walked out of --the last day of the Smith Act trial--out of the court, I was served with a subpoena. Apparently, they had been waiting for the completion of the trial.

Balter: Do you think they thought that if they served you during the trial, that would be considered prejudicial in some way?

Margolis: Yes, I think that. I think they thought that it might give us a ground for arguing error, and so forth, and it might have. I'm sure that the U.S. attorney advised them not to do anything like that. It would have been foolish. But, they didn't wait as I walked out. [laughter] There were, I think, altogether, twenty-five lawyers served. And the lawyers testified over a period of three days, I think something like that, three or four days. I was the first of the lawyers, first person called at the hearing. My testimony consisted primarily of an attack upon the committee--a refusal to answer questions. As to the question of the constitutional-- What position we took, that has a history, too. We had, by that time, of course, lost the [John Howard] Lawson [Lawson v. United States] and [Dalton] Trumbo [Trumbo v. United States] cases of the [Hollywood] Ten, so that the First Amendment--at least as far as the courts at that point were concerned--could not be relied on to keep you out of jail. But the Fifth Amendment we had participated in establishing as being something that could be claimed. Generally speaking, most people did rely on the Fifth, along with everything else. We relied on the entire Constitution: First, Fifth, Ninth, Tenth--all of them. But included the Fifth in our claim; and this, of course, protected us from going to jail.There were a few people at the time-- There was quite an argument that went around. There were a few people who said that it was unprincipled to claim the Fifth. You shouldn't claim the privilege of self-incrimination; that that would be construed as admitting that being a member of the Communist Party was a crime. The others on the other side argued that those who took that position just didn't know our history or our Constitution. Because the Fifth Amendment, while it will protect the guilty, was not intended for the protection of the guilty; it was for the protection of the innocent. And not to allow the government to ensnare you, as had been allowed previously, and that had a long history behind it.It's the great, great majority-- I would say 98, 99 percent of the people who were called before the committee, after that, relied on the Fifth Amend-- On the Fifth Amendment, including the First. There were a few who relied on the First alone. It think it was including Frank Wilkinson. [They] went to jail. And I respected them. They took a position which they believed was principled. My own position was that it was playing into the hands of the enemy. Why do that for them? Anyway, the lawyers put up, I think, a terrific fight. Every lawyer, even the ones we had thought would be weak, just stood up and were very strong. And they were followed by other professionals, by doctors, and by trade union people. After I had testified myself, I represented many of the people in the subsequent states of that same hearing. I had, as I say, attacked the committee, saying, among other things-- They threatened me with contempt, and I said I had nothing but contempt for the committee. It was not exactly-- It was kind of a brawl on an intellectual level, but with the constitutional points raised.After the hearing was over, there was a man by the name of Frank Belcher, a very prestigious lawyer, who was then a-- He's now dead. Was then a former president of the State Bar of California, who was no longer in office, who wrote a letter to the board of governors of the state bar, calling upon the state bar to punish all of the lawyers who had refused to answer questions, and calling for my disbarment because I had been so impolite to the committee. I wrote a letter to the state bar, which was published in the bar journal, published in a book of letters by Harvard [University Press]. It was a letter in which I said, in effect, that while I was a lawyer, I appeared before them as a citizen; as a citizen, I had a right to tell the committee what I thought of it, just like anybody else did, and this is what I thought of the committee. I said it in many, many more words than that. [laughs] And the board of governors voted unanimously not to attempt to penalize anybody, including me.Interestingly enough, about ten years later, I had a case, I had a single case. There was an air crash over Las Vegas in which a military plane had collided with a passenger plane, a United Airlines passenger plane. Everybody on both planes was killed, and I had one of the passengers and filed the first action. It got in the papers, but not our firm name. The [Los Angeles] Times had a policy [of] never using our firm name, except on political things. Otherwise, if we did newsworthy things, stories would be told, but not our firm name, or using our name. So, the next day after we filed ours, again, there was a story. Frank Belcher, this man who wrote this letter, had one case, and he filed it. Of course, given big publicity, his name all over the paper [laughs] as having filed this. Nine additional clients walked into his office, meant almost a million dollars in fees to him, because they had published his name. Altogether, there were forty-two-- Forty-four people were killed, and there were about nineteen lawyers. You can't try a case with nineteen lawyers. It's impossible. The court got all the lawyers together and said that the lawyers-- The lawyers agreed that they would select three lawyers to try the case on behalf of everybody so far as liability was concerned. Then the individual lawyers would try their own cases on damages, and it was up to the lawyers to select whoever they wanted to.We had a meeting in Frank Belcher's office. He had the biggest number of cases. He represented Douglas Aircraft, he owned his own plane, and he knew a great deal about aircraft and aircraft accidents. He was really a top-rate trial lawyer. The first thing that happened--it was a natural--Frank Belcher was selected as the first counsel. And then someone nominated me to be second lawyer, and I waited for Frank Belcher to say something. He didn't say a word. Nothing. I was approved unanimously. Then they voted-- Then two or three people were nominated for the third person, and they couldn't agree on the third person, so it was left-- The final decision was that Frank and I would decide who the third person was, to work with us.We engaged in a five-month trial. We never once discussed the letter he had written, my appearance before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, but we talked about politics. He took his positions and I took mine. And he was a nice guy. Ignorant as hell about things, just didn't, really didn't know. And it's amazing how many of these conservative people just believe certain things that are so, so untrue. Like the case I told you about this fellow [Augustin] Donovan, who was so startled that-- Or the lawyers who started representing communists all of a sudden discovered they were [laughs] real people.We tried, the two of us, tried the case [Wiener v. United Airlines] alone. We had a third lawyer, sat in, but Frank and I examined all the witnesses, did all of the arguing. It was a two-person trial. It was a five-month trial against the government and against the United Airlines. We had lunch together every day. We became very, very good friends. As a matter of fact, we won on both; we beat both the government and United Airlines. They took it up on appeal. He and I argued it in the [federal] court of appeals and won in the court of appeals. As a matter of fact, although we didn't see much of each other after that, he-- A couple of weeks after the trial was over, he called me up, and he says, "Ben, I miss you. Come down and have lunch with me." [laughter]It sort of faded out; our interests were entirely different. But I don't, still to this day, don't know why I didn't discuss it with him. I guess the reason was I didn't want to start anything that might ruffle our ability--interfere with our ability--to work together on the case. We worked together magnificently. I had a great respect for him as a top-rate trial lawyer.

Balter: Okay. Let's fast forward the tape at this point and go to the other side.

29. Tape Number: XV, Side Two May 3, 1985

Balter: Ben, I understand that, well, two things, I understand two things. One is that during the long appeals and so forth, unsuccessful, before the Rosenbergs [Ethel G. and Julius] were executed for alleged espionage, that there was a great deal of activity here in Los Angeles around that case. I also understand that you were involved in that and also were part of the delegation that went to Washington--even at one point, from the record, made an unsuccessful attempt to see President [Dwight D.] Eisenhower while all this was going on. I wonder if you could touch on both the activities here in Los Angeles, as you recall them around that case, and also your own personal involvement--the delegation, the things that you experienced around the Rosenberg case.

Margolis: All right. I knew [Emanuel] Manny Bloch, the attorney for the Rosenbergs. Didn't have anything really to do with the case during the trial itself, but spoke to him about the case a number of times on the appellate level, both in person when I was East and, I think, several times over the phone. Just discussing some of the problems and ideas on the case. And we worked on an amicus [curiae] brief in the case--I and several people. The leading lawyer here, however, who participated in that and made the biggest contribution, was Dan [Daniel G.] Marshall! You may remember that I mentioned Dan Marshall as the one who--the Catholic lawyer who came forward under great stress in the Smith Act case. One of the really most principled men I've ever known. Well, he developed a theory that Bloch had not followed, which was ingenious and interesting. The kind of a theory that, if you had a friend in court, might have been bought by the court, and he at the last moment filed a-- He worked with somebody from the East. Let me see, who did he work with? I can't remember the name of the person he worked with. But he prepared a writ. I talked with him and did a little bit of the work, but my contribution to it was very minor. He was the one who did 95 percent of the work, if not more. And he was the one who developed the idea. When the time came for-- This was presented just before the execution date, four or five days. There was a hearing scheduled in the Supreme Court, a last-minute hearing, which included this new theory and various other things. A group of people, it wasn't really a form-- You said it was-- "Delegate" isn't quite the right word.

Balter: Okay.

Margolis: A group of us got together and decided we were going to go. We weren't formally designated by anybody to represent them. There was nothing of that kind going on at that time. So we went and primarily attended the Court. While there, a committee was organized--I volunteered to work with it--to try to see Eisenhower to get a last-minute clemency. This guy, [Felix] Frankfurter, during the course-- No, there were two or three arguments before the Supreme Court. They heard argument, adjourned, heard argument again, and finally rendered their decision refusing to stop the execution. Frankfurter said, "Never." He is, for me, one of the most despicable men that ever lived, who really knew how wrong it was and who said so in his opinion: that said the place to go was to go to the president for clemency, and he ought to-- In effect, [Frankfurter] said he [Eisenhower] ought to grant clemency.

Balter: Did he mean that he should, or that he would be likely to?

Margolis: No, that he should.

Balter: That he should.

Margolis: That he should, and that that was the place to go. And we never got to see him. Eisenhower wouldn't see the committee. Wouldn't see anybody and, of course, did nothing. And we left.They were executed just before sunset. The reason was that the next day was a Jewish holiday, I believe. The Jewish holiday starts at sunset, and they didn't want to execute them on a Jewish holiday. As a matter of fact, I was on a train. I had to go to New York for certain other matters, and I was on a train going from Washington to New York at the time that they were executed. It was a very sad occasion.Why don't I tell you one, perhaps interesting, little tidbit. We were hanging around the Court at the last minute, hoping, you know, for something further to happen, which didn't happen. And there was a big reception room, where most of us were, away from the Court. I was talking to [I. F.] "Izzy" Stone, who was then publishing his newsletter, and was expressing my anger at and disgust with Eisenhower. And Izzy agreed. He said, "But, you know, we're going to end up thanking god that Eisenhower is the president. He's going to keep us out of war." And he turned out to be right. When [Richard M.] Nixon tried to involve us thereafter in--what is the name of the place in Vietnam?

Balter: Dien Bien Phu.

Margolis: Dien Bien Phu. You know, Nixon was the vice president then. Wanted to send American planes, and Eisenhower refused. As a matter of fact, Izzy said, "You know, really deep down, Eisenhower doesn't want war. He's against the military establishment, and as long as he's president, we're going to stay out of war." Of course, you remember that Eisenhower, when he retired, gave a really fine speech on the industrial-military complex, which is one of the straight, straight speeches, which ought to be read again and again to the Congress when they're voting on the budget.But I didn't personally know the Rosenbergs. I did know Manny fairly well, Gloria [Agrin], who worked with him, and some of the others. Of course, the Rosenberg case killed Manny. He was-- This was a kind of a shameful period for the Left--that trial--although I suppose it can be rationalized and was rationalized at that time. Manny Bloch was not the lawyer to represent the Rosenbergs. He was not a criminal lawyer; he had no experience. He was a civil lawyer, an entirely different field. He was not particularly a trial lawyer. He went in only because there was nobody else who would take the case. They had tried to get some Left lawyers. Not me, but they had tried to get others, and they'd all refused. The reason for the refusal, that was given at least on confidential levels, was that they thought that it was a mistake for the Rosenbergs to be represented by a Left lawyer, that that would tend to make their position more difficult. And, of course, they ended up being represented by an unqualified Left lawyer, who did it. Of course, he wasn't so prominently known as a Left lawyer as the ones that had been asked to do this. But as I look back at it, I think it was a cop-out. They should never have been convicted, and I think-- Well, no one knows.Things were so tough and so difficult that I don't have-- But for example, Manny stipulated that the document which was supposed to be the secret that he [Julius Rosenberg] had stolen need not be put into evidence, because it would reveal a military secret. The document was, of course, seen afterwards, and it had no secret. It was nothing. A good criminal lawyer would have said, "No. Either you show the document, or you dismiss the case. We want our scientists to examine it to see whether a secret was known." Well, he was isolated. He was alone. He thought if he sort of played along and played the patriotic part that it would work. But it was a-- I don't blame him, because I think he did-- He was a courageous, dedicated man, who wrecked his life over the case.

Balter: Let me ask you a couple of things. One, is it possible for you to tell me who some of these Left lawyers were who refused to take the case?

Margolis: Yeah, well, all right. My understanding is that John [H.] Abt was asked. I'm not-- I have no direct, immediate knowledge, as far as I can recall. See, I was out here in California. Mostly eastern lawyers were asked. I'm trying to remember who else. I remember John Abt was asked. [pauses] I don't remember. I know there were several asked, but I don't remember who they were.

Balter: Okay. Another question--

Margolis: But I'm not attacking them either, because that was, you know, that was-- Because these were lawyers who had stuck their neck out all over the place. But there was another-- There was a political thought, too. These lawyers were known as communist lawyers, and from the standpoint of the Communist Party, they wanted to separate themselves from anything having anything to do with claimed espionage. Again, I think a cop-out.

Balter: Okay. Also, as I'm sure you're aware, there is--of course, it has been going on ever since that time, but it's been resurrected once again--a raging debate over what is usually posed as the question of whether they were, quote unquote, "guilty" or not of what as-- Guilty as charged. Whether they had engaged in espionage or not, and that the [Walter and Miriam] Schneirs versus Joyce Milton and [Ronald] Radosh-- I forget Radosh's first name. I assume you are at least familiar with some of this.

Margolis: I know [John] Wexley very well and read-- No, he wrote the book --what was the name of the book? [The Judgment of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg] Wexley died recently, about six, eight months ago.

Balter: Invitation to an Inquest? [by Walter and Miriam Schneir]

Margolis: Invitation to an Inquest, yeah. I've read all the books on the subject. I really don't know whether they engaged in any-- There was evidence pointing to their having engaged in some aspect, and there was evidence countering it. All I do know is there was not enough evidence to convict them.

Balter: Right.

Margolis: That I do know. They should never have been convicted of this crime. Just never. And even if they were guilty of espionage, it was on a minor, unimportant matter, not like [Judge Irving R.] Kaufman said, "Something which threatens the future existence of the world." That was just, just nonsense. So, it's possible that they were so engaged. I don't know. I found myself like this: If I'd been on a jury, I'd have voted innocent. Entirely aside from any political beliefs, I would have voted innocent, because there simply wasn't enough definite evidence to convict them in my opinion.

Balter: Now, the question I was going to pose to you is in light of this, do you remember at the time that this was going on, in the Communist Party itself, whether there was discussion or debate over this question of their guilt or innocence? Whether that was something that people talked about?

Margolis: The only discussion I remember was on the issue of whether or not--whether there should be a campaign; that the Communist Party should lead a campaign for them; whether or not Left lawyers should get involved in their thing. And the consensus was-- And I must admit I was part of it, although I never was directly asked to do anything that I refused to do. Consensus was that it would be bad for the party, bad for the lawyers, and bad for them--that they ought to have someone else representing them. As I look back on it, I think it was dead wrong, absolutely wrong, and should not have been the course followed.

Balter: One last question on the Rosenbergs' situation. According to one of your FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] reports, there's a mention of a Sophie Davidson as being in charge of the L.A. committee in defense of the Rosenbergs. I'm not saying the exact name of it properly, but generically, the committee that was doing defense work for the Rosenbergs. Do you remember her?

Margolis: Oh, by the way, what I've been talking about up to this point is during the trial, up to their conviction and the imposition of the death penalty [April 5, 1951]. After that, the Left did become active, very active, in the Rosenberg case--and the party, the Communist Party did also--around the issue, primarily, of the death penalty. Of course, that was a worldwide movement. So, I was active in the defense committee, but that defense committee was after the convictions. I don't think it even existed-- Well, I'm not sure. [National Committee to Secure Justice in the Rosenberg Case] At least, my activity was after their conviction, and I believe, although I'm not positive, that it was formed after their conviction.

Balter: I see. Okay. And is it correct that Sophie Davidson was--

Margolis: Yes.

Balter: --the leader of that?

Margolis: Well, she was executive secretary or something.

Balter: Right.

Margolis: Yeah.

Balter: Whatever. Do you remember some of the activities here in Los Angeles that you were engaged in?

Margolis: Yeah. There were meetings, leaflets put out, letter-writing campaigns, petitions, you know, the usual. It was an active committee--it did a lot. The times-- You know, there was a tremendous campaign around the Rosenbergs. I think I've never been involved in a campaign that was as successful, from the standpoint of arousing just reaction all over. The pleas were from everyone. Including the pope. "Don't, don't kill them." We didn't think they'd get that: that they'd kill them. We didn't think so. But I think they had to. The whole thing was so-- As I look back, it was such a raw deal. See, the issue that is fought out in the books, in my opinion, is the wrong issue. The question of their guilt or innocence is-- Who really knows for sure on that? But it is possible to, in my opinion, for any rational person--no matter what, lawyer, let's say, or person--whatever his political views are, to say that there was not enough evidence to convict them. On that issue, I think they shouldn't have been. That was the issue. In other words, they were-- For everyone else, you're not convicted unless you have proof beyond a reasonable doubt, to a moral certainty. There was no such evidence in their case.

Balter: Another case that I understand you were involved in involved a professor at Caltech [California Institute of Technology] in the early fifties, Mr. Sidney Weinbaum.

Margolis: That's right.

Balter: And concerned a perjury conviction over the question of whether he lied about having signed a Communist Party membership card. What was your involvement?The question really was whether he had-- I think he had signed an affidavit that he'd never been a member of the Communist Party.

Margolis: I see.

Balter: And the evidence that the government had was a Communist Party card purporting to bear his signature. He had been friendly with the Oppenheimers [J. Robert and Katherine P.H.] and that group up in Berkeley, and had known these people. He had, in order to stay on his job, he had signed a noncommunist affidavit saying that he was not, and had not been, a member of the Communist Party. There were several witnesses. There was a-- The only witnesses they had against him--and I don't remember the names for sure, because I was in so many of these things--were some among the stable, you know, the witnesses that rode the circuit.You've referred to them before as "the stable."

Margolis: Yeah, yeah. They had two or three or four of those witnesses. [tape recorder off] They had some of those witnesses, but they could never have convicted him without the card that they had. They produced the card, which they said bore his signature. And they had a handwriting expert, who said that it clearly and certainly and definitely was his signature. I'm just-- You know, I'm a little confused about something between this and the [Harry] Bridges case [Bridges v. California], because I was involved in cross-examining an expert.

Balter: Yeah. We talked about that in the Bridges case before.

Margolis: I think, [pauses] I think we tried to get an expert, and the expert said, "Well, I don't think it's his signature, but I'm not certain enough to testify that it's not his signature." Or we did get an expert--that's where I'm confused --and he testified very weakly. And the defense said, "Yes, he didn't think, but it might be." That kind of thing. Now, I'm just trying to remember whether that happened in court or outside of court. It was one or the other.

Balter: My understanding is that the prosecution had a --

Margolis: Oh, their expert was solid. Yeah, no question about it. Anyway, he was convicted. Went to jail for several years. He-- Wonderful, wonderfully nice, mild man. And we were very good friends. The only thing I have against him is that he was a chess master, and I play a little bit--terrible chess player-- but a little bit, and I enjoy it. And he said, "I'll teach you how to play better." I played him a couple of games. I didn't understand what the hell he was doing [laughs] or why he did it. No, he's a fine man.

Balter: I understand he might still be alive?

Margolis: Yes, he's still alive. At least, the last I heard, he was alive and, I believe, living in Long Beach, or somewhere in the harbor area.

Balter: Was Linus [C.] Pauling involved in some of the work around this case?

Margolis: Linus Pauling. As a matter of fact, I had not known Sidney before that case, but I was a friend of Linus Pauling. Linus Pauling formed a committee to defend-- Whether he formed it, or was part of it, he was on the committee to defend Weinbaum, and he recommended to the committee that I be retained. So, it was through him that I was retained on that case. We first met [through] him. And, you know, what Linus [and] the committee did was to get out publicity, raise some money, those things.

Balter: How did you first come to know Pauling? How long had you known him at this point?

Margolis: I think that we had been on some meeting where he spoke, and I spoke. We'd been invited to speak. I don't even remember the issue at this point. In those days, I used to do a lot of speaking.

Balter: I can-- From your FBI reports, it sounds like almost every other day. [laughs]

Margolis: Yeah. And Pauling was very active and did a lot of speaking. So I met him once, maybe two or three times, and we got to know each other, went out for coffee afterwards, or something, and became friends. My recollection-- I may have met him before that somehow, but the first time I really got to, you know, on a personal level, to talk to him and deal with him, was a result of one or more of these meetings, where we were on the same platform.

Balter: Okay. Ben, in looking through your FBI files, which I must say is a treasure trove of some things, [of] dates-- Probably the dates are correct. Whether anything else is correct or not, I'll have to leave to you to say, but one report in particular, April 8, 1953, mentions-- It's one of these typical summary reports, I'm sure. I've been through your life. Of course, there are many reports where just the last two pages have anything new. Otherwise, it's just sort of a repeat of what went before.There's a section talking about the fact that at the time of this report, at least, that you had been identified as a Communist Party member by nine witnesses. Nine different people had fingered you before HUAC. Later, there would apparently be more. I thought it might be interesting, given that that's in the record--some of the names are familiar to us, but many are not familiar to me--to go through, literally, name by name, and just ask you to briefly just tell me who these people were, if you remember. If you knew them. I know sometimes there were cases where they knew you, and you didn't know them. Two that I believe we've already talked about, we can dispense with quickly. Edward Dmytryk is on the list, and also Milton Tyre, who I believe we talked about. He had been with your firm for a while. But going down the rest of the list, there's a George Glass, for example.

Margolis: George Glass, as I remember, was a Hollywood writer. I knew him, not very well. And I may have been at-- I don't think I was ever at a Communist Party meeting with him, but it's possible that I was. I knew him very little, but I did know him. I had met him, and whether I even knew he was a communist, I don't know.

Balter: Okay. Charles Daggett?

Margolis: Chuck Daggett--we called him Chuck. Let me get-- Sometimes I confuse-- Chuck Daggett, I believe, was a screen publicist, if I remember correctly. Big, husky guy who was a Communist Party member. I attended some trade union/communist caucuses with him--several, particularly during the '45-'46 Hollywood [Conference of Studio Unions] strikes. And knew him quite well.

Balter: Would he be a person--

Margolis: And also a client.

Balter: Would he be in the category of a person that caused you some surprise, when he turned out to be a witness against you?

Margolis: Well, I, you know, I, I-- It's very difficult to say, because he was not, you know, a paid informer. He was one of the ones who folded under pressure. It's very hard to say in advance who was going to fold or not. If, for example, it had turned out that he had come in as a paid informer to infiltrate, I would have been very much surprised. But when you look back, you know that some people are going to break under the pressure and some people are not. We don't have any way of knowing.

Balter: Okay. Next would be Paul Marion. Is that M-A-R-I-O-N?

Margolis: I don't remember him.

Balter: Okay. He evidently remembered you. [laughs] Okay.

Margolis: I don't remember him.

Balter: Harold Ashe.

Margolis: Oh, again, I think he's a Hollywood writer. I don't remember much about him. As far as I can recall, I met him very casually. Maybe I was in some meetings with him. I went to so many meetings of all kinds. I went-- I did go to Communist Party meetings, but many meetings were labeled by these people as Communist Party meetings which were not Communist Party meetings. So I was probably in meetings with all of these people that you mentioned.

Balter: This is one I think we might have mentioned before, but just in case-- David Aaron?

Margolis: Yeah, David Aaron is a lawyer, a member of the lawyers-- There was a lawyers branch of the Communist Party; he was a member of that. Very nice guy. His brother, Ben [Benjamin] Aaron, I think he's still at UCLA.

Balter: Oh, yeah. I think so.

Margolis: In labor relations. He is very well known--that name--nationally as an arbitrator in labor relations, a professor in that field. A decent guy, but by no means a Leftist. David Aaron was his small, inferior brother, who had, as I remember, a kind of inferiority complex. He had a very successful brother; he was not, himself. You know, he made a living, but just barely. Nice guy who never-- Who was, I think, devoted to the Left cause, but never very strong in anything that he did. And I think just one of the people for whom it was too tough.

Balter: Marburg-- I believe this is another attorney, Marburg Yerkes?

Margolis: Marburg, or Martha Yerkes? Don't they name Martha, also?

Balter: They don't. No, not in this report at least.

Margolis: Martha is his wife. They're both lawyers, both in our office. He worked for us as a lawyer for several years, and we finally-- We kept him long beyond the period when we should have kept him and her, because they just weren't really producing. Not a stupid, not, you know-- Not a brilliant guy, not a stupid guy, but not a very effective worker. She was better than he, but not very much. And so they were in our office for, I don't remember, two, three years. We finally let them go. Again--

Balter: Now, do these appear to be the people who folded, as you put it, or people--

Margolis: Oh, yes.

Balter: Not paid informers?

Margolis: Oh, yes.

Balter: Okay. William G. Israel?

Margolis: Same, except he was not in our office; a lawyer. Nice guy, weak, not very successful. I think sincere, at least that was always my impression. Not very effective.

Balter: And then another name pops up later, in a June 5, 1956, FBI report, Anita Edith Bell Schneider. That's a lot of names, isn't it? Did any of them sound familiar? Maybe to jog your memory, I believe that she testified while HUAC was in San Diego for some reason.

Margolis: I don't remember her.

Balter: Don't remember her. Okay. Finally, maybe I think we'll close on this today. In a way, this has an amusing side to it, but I wanted to just-- We'll just close on this. In an October 1, 1953, FBI report, which has a number of different sections, there's a section entitled "Status of Health." And it reproduces a section out of the L.A. Examiner, saying that Ben Margolis has "undergone major surgery and is recovering." [laughs] Do you remember that, and do you----

Margolis: Yeah, that was-- I didn't remember that was the year, but in that period I underwent surgery for a kidney stone, which is major surgery. I don't remember that even-- Of course, my name was very well known in Hollywood at that time. Wasn't it the-- And I was mentioned other times in her column, but usually with a blast. There was no blast?

Balter: Not apparently in this section.

Margolis: I guess, maybe, because I was in the hospital, [laughs] recovering from surgery, she didn't blast me.

Balter: Well, it's reassuring to know that the FBI was relying on such a reliable source as Louella Parsons [laughter] for its information about you, Ben.

Margolis: Well, I think, you know, I don't remember the date, but it is true that I did have major surgery about that time. I think she's probably accurate on that one.

Balter: Well, maybe, since she was always blasting you, maybe she was glad to see you in the hospital. [laughter]

Margolis: No. [laughs] I don't say I was-- Two or three times I was mentioned in her column in connection with the Hollywood thing. She was a redbaiter deluxe.

Balter: Right, right. Okay, I think that we'll conclude for today, and pick it up next time.

Margolis: All right. Very good. Now, we're meeting again? When?

30. Tape Number: XVI, Side One May 10, 1985

Balter: Ben, last time when we were talking I was asking you some questions based on your FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] file, which, as I think I said last time, are kind of a treasure trove of, at least, dates, names, and places. Their accuracy, I'll leave it to you to verify or not. But I was quite interested in one entry, a report, April 12, 1954. It indicated that you were involved in some way or other in the campaign against attempts by the immigration service to deport David Hyun. Am I safe in assuming that that's the same Mr. Hyun who still lives in Los Angeles, the architect?

Margolis: That is correct.

Balter: I wonder if you could tell me about that?

Margolis: Well, I really wasn't the principal attorney in that case. As a matter of fact, I don't know if [I] was even an attorney of record, although I did help on some of the legal work. And I think my main connection with the David Hyun case was political, where I spoke at some meetings to raise funds for Hyun, in support of Hyun. And I do remember having some consultation on some of the constitutional legal points, but I really-- It was not my case.

Balter: What were the basic facts of the situation? Why was the INS [Immigration and Naturalization Service] trying to get rid of him?

Margolis: Because of his alleged membership in the Communist Party.

Balter: Did this happen during the period of time when there were a lot of attempted deportations?

Margolis: Oh, yes. That was one of quite a few.

Balter: Okay. Do any details of the campaign--how it eventually turned out --any of the details come to mind at this point?

Margolis: No, I don't recall. It was eventually dropped. Either dropped or we won, but I think it was dropped by the immigration department, an event that resulted in a victory. But I don't remember the details, because I wasn't that much involved in the case.

Balter: Did you say that you might know the name of the main attorney on that case?

Margolis: It may have been John Porter, but I'm not sure.

Balter: All right. Also, and this was a new one on me, since we had talked about George Shibley in connection with the Sleepy Lagoon case-- But I learned in reading the FBI reports that in the early fifties, Mr. Shibley was convicted and apparently drew jail time on an accusation of stealing U.S. military court transcripts, or some other documents. The FBI report refers to the Shibley defense committee and to activities by yourself and other people on behalf of George Shibley. I wonder if you could tell me that story and what that was all about.

Margolis: Yes. George defended a man in the military, who was stationed at the-- What is that fort on the way here, going towards San Diego, near Santa Ana?

Balter: Camp Pendleton, perhaps?

Margolis: No, no, Camp-- That's not Camp Pendleton.

Balter: El Toro?

Margolis: El Toro. That's it. El Toro, yes. There was a rule that persons could not-- Military men could not charge other military men for driving them into Los Angeles. The rule was violated all over the place. George Shibley was representing one of the men on a court-martial case, which would have been a very insignificant case that wouldn't have gotten much notice, except for the defense that George Shibley put on, which was that the commanding general of the base was doing that himself. That, was, of course, an attack, lèse-majesté, and that then became an all-out case on the part of the general to get this man convicted.During the hearing, one of the hearings--there were a number of them--George Shibley was entitled to receive, in due course, a copy of the transcript. But there was some reason why he shouldn't receive it until some later date. But according to his testimony, he received a copy of it in the mail from an unknown source, and then used it. The government claimed that he had taken it off the desk of the prosecuting attorney. I may not have all the details exactly right, but that was the essence of the thing. A really silly kind of a prosecution, and one that wouldn't have happened but for the nature of the times and for the kind of defense he put up. It would have been a very minor thing. He was prosecuted. Represented by one of the best trial attorneys in Los Angeles, [Joseph] Ball, who'd been president of the state bar [1956-57]. And he tried him [Shibley] before a judge, a very reactionary district court federal judge [William Harrison]. [Ball], who was a fine lawyer and eminently successful, had not been in the habit of trying political cases, which have these political overtones. George, of course, was a "Lefty," and they were after him for that reason, too. And so when they tried the case, he [Ball] was so confident that he would get an acquittal before the jury that he didn't protect his record; that is, he didn't make objections when there were all kinds of error committed by the trial court. Joe Ball did not make the objections.I worked on the appeal. He [Shibley] was convicted. Given three years, I think, and served almost two, the maximum, you know; got time off for good behavior, but otherwise, the maximum time. I worked on the appeal brief for George and was also active on his defense committee, raising money and so forth. This was a felony that he was convicted of. We lost the appeal despite the fact that there was just-- Replete with errors. The objections hadn't been made. At least it's my opinion of what happened. I think most of the attorneys who are familiar with the case would tend to agree.Then, to show how petty the thing is-- Ordinarily, when an attorney is convicted of a felony, there is a disbarment. Well, the state bar had to take some action, so they suspended George for part of the period of time he was in jail, and couldn't have practiced anyway. That's what the state bar thought of this case. So that, as far as any effect on him as a lawyer, which ordinarily that kind of a conviction would be the end of you as a lawyer, for him, it didn't affect him, except that he lost a couple of years of his life and his practice.

Balter: Do you remember the name of the judge you mentioned, who tried the case?

Margolis: God, I can't think of it. I am so bad on names. I'd know it if somebody mentions it, like El Toro, you know. If somebody mentions it, I would know it immediately. It was an older judge, very reactionary, one of the worst, and not a very bright judge. I can't think of his name.

Balter: Okay. Oh, we can look that one up later. Do you remember what type of evidence the prosecution put on, that allowed them to convince the jury?

Margolis: I don't remember the details. I think that they claimed-- I don't think anybody said that they saw him take it. But I think the evidence was something like this, that the prosecutor said, "It was in court, we had a recess, and I had it on the desk. It was lying there on the desk and I went out of the court and George stayed in. And he was the only one who was in there at the time, and we went to the end of the day without a further recess. And then when I started putting my stuff together, the transcript wasn't there. And then George shows up with a transcript within a day or two."And they said, "Who? He must have stolen it."

Balter: Two years in jail.

Margolis: Again, I'm not accurate to the details, but along those lines.

Balter: Okay. Ben, one last sort of issue in the fifties, which was, I know, a problem for many people. In looking through both your [United States] State Department and FBI materials, apparently you had an ill-fated attempt to get a passport in the early fifties, around 1952, and then later were able to get one in 1959. Do I read those documents correctly?

Margolis: Yes, yes. I don't remember-- I was going to make, I think, a trip for business in '52, and I didn't get the passport. I don't think I appealed it at that time, because by that time, the time that I wanted to go had passed. And then in '59, as I recall, I had no trouble getting a passport.

Balter: Well, I think what the records seem to indicate was that they considered withholding it, but finally decided they didn't have sustainable grounds, or something like that. [Note: In a 1958 case, Kent v. Dulles, the Supreme Court held that travel is a right, not a privilege that can be revoked by the government. --Ed.]

Margolis: Yes. But I, at that time, I applied considerably in advance of the time that I was planning to make the trip. And I remember that I got it without any particular hearings or anything, in time to make the trip as planned.

Balter: Now, I understand that during the fifties and during the McCarthy days, that a lot of people in the Communist Party, or who were accused of being associated with the Communist Party, were denied passports. Do you remember if there was any particular case that you were involved in, people that you represented, who had that problem?

Margolis: No, we, our office for the most part did not handle those. What we did was refer them to attorneys in Washington, D.C., mostly to Joe [Joseph] Forer and David Ryan. Our office did handle one case that went to the Supreme Court later, that John [T.] McTernan handled, which involved the use of a passport to go to Cuba. I didn't handle that.

Balter: Now, we've talked about on tape, in the past, your activities with [the] Communist Party, both as a member and as an attorney. Obviously, since you're no longer a member, at one point you've had a break with the party. I wonder if you could tell me about the process of your leaving the party.

Margolis: Well, as I recall it, I was, as were many other people, very disturbed by the [Nikita] Khrushchev disclosures concerning [Joseph] Stalin. You see, there had been many stories about Stalin going around before, but we didn't believe them. And one of the reasons we didn't believe them: there were so many lies, that we knew were lies, being told about the Soviet Union, so we didn't believe even the true things that were being said. And when this disclosure was made, it affected us in many ways. One, what we believed in. But also in the peculiar way, with the way you have said, "This couldn't have happened," and said it to lots of people. And "The press is lying." All of a sudden, these things, which we just didn't believe, turn out to be true. And some of them even worse than what we said we didn't believe. It also indicated the bureaucratic nature of the Communist Party and the arbitrariness. We were very disturbed.At that time, discussion started among many of us about the question of the Communist Party position, which was pretty much that the great theorists (and these people were always right) were the people in the Soviet Union. And because they were always right, because they knew so much more than anybody else did, they laid down what was the correct line. It was simply a question of following them. But, you know, if you, like-- You go to somebody who knows a lot more than you do, and they tell you what they think, you're inclined to follow what they did. And that was sort of the position of the Communist Party, which I, among many, many others, accepted. And following that, we began to talk: "You know, you can't, you just can't do that anymore. It just, it just ain't so. And we have to make more independent determinations." But the general line of the party, with the exception of some people like Dorothy Healey out here, continued to be, you know, adhering to the comm-- Pretty closely to the Russian line.And I, over a period of time-- My memory's very vague as to how it happened and how long it took, but I gradually dropped out. I think there may have come a time when I said I'm no longer going to be a member. But at the same time I was very supportive of all, I think virtually all, perhaps all, of the domestic things that the party was doing; I was completely in agreement with them independently of anything else. The party was effective in those areas and doing a good job. So I continued to be active, if not directly as a party member, in communist-- In activities which I knew were Communist Party activities. So the break is a very vague one for me, but after two, three years, something like that, I simply did not-- I no longer attended Communist Party meetings and didn't pay dues. Now, just when my break [was] made, I don't remember. And I continued in that fashion until the latter part of 1968. For a number of years, there had been an annual banquet for the People's World. I, year after year, was the chairperson of that banquet, maybe five or six years running. In 1968, I was the chairperson. That year I had been to Czechoslovakia, to Prague. As a matter of fact, I was there two weeks before the [Soviet] Red Army moved in [on the night of August 20-21, 1968].

Balter: Oh, really?

Margolis: And I had come back to the United States, just glowing about Czechoslovakia, and saying that there was social--there was the beginning of the kind of socialism that I believed in. So, at this banquet, the principal speaker was Al Richmond, who was then the editor of People's World, and Al had just come back from Czechoslovakia. Al said many of the things, virtually all of the things, that I had experienced. And [he] criticized the Red Army for having moved in. And he was one of the most respected people in the party. He was booed by a large section of the-- There was a real disorder, and I got very angry at the crowd. I don't remember just what I said, but I think I indicated my agreement with Richmond. And may have said at that time, or immediately after, that I would never chair a People's World meeting again. I canceled my subscription to People's World. Of course, Al was kicked out of the-- I think he was kicked out; I'm pretty sure he was. It was Dorothy who resigned; he was kicked out of the party.

Balter: Wasn't there some-- [telephone rings, tape recorder off] As I recall, there was a connection there. Wasn't Dorothy's resignation in part prompted by the treatment of Al Richmond?

Margolis: I think so, I think-- Well, but it had many, many other facets.

Balter: Yes. Okay.

Margolis: And after that, while I may have attended some functions that I knew the Communist Party was behind, I really had no further relationship of any kind with the party. Party officials who used to come to me for legal advice, for example, stopped doing that. I think that probably if they'd come [to] me for advice, I probably would have given it to them, although I was just furious at what they had done.

Balter: Let me ask you this: What was the occasion of your trip to Czechoslovakia, and what did you see and experience while you were there?

Margolis: The trip to Czechoslovakia was entirely a pleasure trip. My wife and I spent six weeks in Europe: a week in Dubrovnik, a week in Budapest, a week in Prague, London, a week [in] Paris, and Rome, and made trips from each of those places. The week spent in Prague was the week that there was the meeting in a boxcar. There was this tension between Czechoslovakia-- What was his name?

Balter: [Alexander] Dubcek?

Margolis: Dubcek and the Communist Party. And there was a meeting in the boxcar. That was the week-- I'll tell you a little more about that.

Balter: Okay.

Margolis: Well, while we were in Prague, a great many people spoke English. We, my wife and I, have a habit, when [we] go places, to ride on streetcars and buses, and try to talk to people. People were just anxious to talk. And we went to-- Everywhere we went, people were talking. And there were meetings going on, street meetings. People who had just been released from prison were speaking. There was an air of freedom about it, and people were just saying whatever they wanted to say about what was going on. They were-- One of their main things--they wanted to be left alone by the Soviet Union. And I was in agreement that they should be. But there was a feeling of-- You could talk to people; they would answer your questions. If they were critical of something the government had done, they would say so. There appeared to be no fear.We had just been to Budapest for a week before that. We had tried the same thing, and we found an entirely different atmosphere. People wouldn't answer your questions. The guides that took us, you'd ask them any political thing--how's this going? what they thought about that?--and they'd simply avoid it. They wouldn't answer you, and it was obvious that they weren't answering either because of some policy or fear. In any event, there wasn't the same sense of freedom.In addition to that, in Czechoslovakia, you know, it was a relatively prosperous place. People seemed to be living reasonably well. It just looked like a free country of socialism, whereas the other places we'd been did not give us anything of that attitude. So, I came back completely in love with what had happened there. And we met-- Dorothy Healey had a friend, who was a professor of philosophy [sociology], I think, but who was an advisor to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslavakia. [Note: Klein was part of the interdisciplinary team created by the Czechoslovakian Academy of Sciences, which set up what later came to be called the "Prague Spring." --Ed.] [Ota] Klein was his name, I believe. And he was later killed. After the Red Army moved in, he went to Paris, and he was killed in an automobile accident. But we saw him several times and learned a great deal about it. What was the name of that conference? The conference at Bratisla-- My god, the curse of--

Balter: Bratislava [Czechoslovakia], I guess?

Margolis: Something like that, the name. Anyway, Dubcek came back and made a speech on the radio on a Friday night. He announced a complete-- Everything had been settled to their satisfaction. Everything had been worked out. They were going to be let alone. He had made one promise to the Russians: that their press would stop criticizing the Russian government. And he got on the--people interpreted for us--he got on the radio. He pleaded with the people to say, "Now, this is the only thing we're being asked to give up. And I promise that for all of the other things we can go on, so we can live in freedom and in peace, and so forth, with our good friend, the Soviet Union." The next morning-- The leading paper in Prague at that time was a student paper, put out by the students. That had the biggest circulation.

Balter: Really?

Margolis: It came out next morning with headlines blasting the Soviet Union. That was a Saturday morning. We were leaving that afternoon, I think, for London. We had breakfast with Klein at our hotel. It had been prearranged, and he came-- People were dancing in the street. There was such joy, and everywhere you went people were celebrating. And he came, very, very sad face.We asked him, "What's the matter? What, what's, what's going on? Don't you feel happy about what's happening?"He said, "We have just destroyed ourselves as a nation. The Soviet Union will never accept what we did."And so I asked him, I said, "If it's that important, then Dubcek must have known."And he said, "Of course, he knew it."I said, "Why didn't he issue an order, under these circumstances, that it shouldn't be done?"He said, "We've just adopted a constitution; he has no power to issue such an order. He did all that he could by getting up and pleading for this." And he said, "And these hotheads, who are right in what they're saying, but who are crazy from the standpoint of the welfare of this country, are destroying us."He was the only one of the people we talked to that day who took that kind of an attitude. And we left, we went to London, and then home. We'd been home a week, and the Red Army moved in. And then a sequence followed of the Richmond thing and so forth.

Balter: You said that Mr. Klein was later killed. What was the circumstance?

Margolis: In an automobile accident. It was not, as far as I know, anything political.

Balter: Let me [ask] one more thing, actually, on this sort of final break with the party that occurred over the Czechoslovakin events: Was it very uniform? Did all of your former friends and colleagues who had been active with the Communist Party have this falling-out with you and you with them? Or were you able to maintain relationships with some of them?

Margolis: Well, by that time, most of my close personal friends were not in the party, except for Dorothy. Of course, I continued to maintain personal relations with a number of people, but as far as-- Not with any of the officials of the party. There was-- The head of the party at that time was a big black man--what was his name?--Taylor, Taylor. He used to come see me quite frequently.

Balter: Bill [William] Taylor?

Margolis: Bill Taylor. He used to come see me every two or three months. When he had problems, he'd talk to me or he'd call me. He never, never saw me again. I don't think I ever saw him again during his lifetime.

Balter: Now, one little thing, too, on something you said a little bit earlier. You said that after the 1956 Khrushchev speech that there were some differences in the way that Dorothy Healey dealt with things here on the West Coast, or in Southern California, from the way that the party nationally did. What did you mean by that exactly?

Margolis: Oh, she criticized the Soviet Union. She differed from party policy, and she was not afraid to speak out against what was deemed to be party policy. She also talked about more openness and more democracy within the party. And, of course, here in Southern California, she built the largest single group here, in Southern California, that had the most freedom of any group. But, of course, when she left, they turned against her much more viciously than they did against me. Then it was-- When she left, you could be expelled from the Communist Party if you socialized with her.

Balter: If you socialized with Dorothy Healey?

Margolis: That apparently was never applied to me.

Balter: Well, we're about to come tripping from the fifties into the sixties now, Ben, and a lot more goes on. One thing that I bring up mainly because it seems to occupy the attention of both the IRS [Internal Revenue Service] and the FBI for dozens of pages in your file, I thought I would ask you about it, is a lengthy IRS and FBI investigation into the tax status of the Samuel Margolis Foundation, which apparently was a foundation you were involved in, in the early sixties.

Margolis: Yes, my father and I-- Not my father, my brother and I. I have one brother, Harry Margolis, who's a tax lawyer. My father died. Shortly after his death, we decided that we wanted to set up a foundation in his memory to use for charitable, but as political as possible, means. My father himself was a socialist, and we wanted to do this out of respect for him. We never used it very much, because they-- I don't think we ever got final approval for the foundation, or maybe by the time we'd gotten it, it was-- [laughs] I don't remember how long the fight went on, two or three years, or something like that.

Balter: Apparently, yes.

Margolis: It was primarily because of my political background.

Balter: Yeah, the files don't make it-- They don't come to any conclusion. They don't make it clear whether the exemption was ever granted or not.

Margolis: I don't remember whether it either was never granted, or-- I don't think it was ever refused, finally. It was either-- Or it was granted. By the time it was granted, we'd just gone on to other things.

Balter: I noticed that one of the members of the board of trustees for the foundation was Carlton [B.] Goodlett from up in San Francisco.

Margolis: Yes.

Balter: I think we've talked about him a little bit before, in terms of-- I think that you knew him when you were in San Francisco, as I recall it.

Margolis: I knew him, but not particularly well. He was a much better friend of my brother than he was a friend of mine.

Balter: Ben, as we enter the sixties, of course this is a time of beginning of the civil rights movement and struggle around voting rights for blacks in the South, as well as, apparently, desegregating facilities even here in California. I noticed from the FBI report of January 21, 1965, there's a reference--perhaps you could tell me how accurate it is--to a situation, apparently in November of 1963 (even though the report is somewhat later), of you, your wife Valerie, and your son Roger [Steven Margolis] being involved in demonstrations concerning discrimination at a Mel's Drive-In in San Francisco. According to the report, it says all three of you were arrested, at least, at one time. Is that not correct?

Margolis: It is not correct. What is correct is that my son, Roger-- This was in San Francisco, we were living in Los Angeles. I did go to San Francisco afterwards, and helped him get out of jail and in certain other respects. I think [I] may have even spoken to a group that was involved in the demonstrations, but I was not involved and Val wasn't involved in the demonstration. That's absolutely inaccurate, although they-- I think I appeared in court for my son, and there may have been a newspaper article with respect to that. From that, they may have drawn the conclusion that I was involved in the demonstration itself; may even refer to the fact that I spoke somewhere after the demonstration, not at the demonstration. I was not living in San Francisco at the time.

Balter: Yeah, then they obviously have it wrong there, because there was a very explicit reference to that. While we're on the subject, there's also a mention, in this very same report, of sit-ins at something called the San Francisco Auto Row and also apparently at the Sheraton Hotel.

Margolis: Yes.

Balter: Now, these [were] activities that Roger was involved in?

Margolis: Roger was involved in them. Later on, my youngest son, Greg [Gregory Allen Margolis] was involved in them, and he went to jail, too. [laughs] Yes, they were both involved. All of those were in San Francisco, and I was not involved in any of them.

Balter: Now, excuse me, but since it's been so long ago, you have-- Your oldest son is Roger?

Margolis: No, my oldest son is Ken, Kenneth [Richard Margolis]. My middle son is Roger. My youngest son is Gregory.

Balter: Since we're on the subject of your sons, maybe you could tell me a little bit about what they were doing. Obviously, they were getting politically active. Were all three of them, Ken as well, active politically?

Margolis: Well, Ken at that time was-- Let's see, that was-- Ken, I think, was going to Reed College at that time and was politically active there. But Reed College, you know, is in Oregon, Portland, and there weren't any activities like that, as far as I know, in Portland at that time. If there had been, I'm sure he would have been involved. But Roger, and later Greg, went to San Francisco State College [now University]. Ken, also, later went to State for postgraduate work in dramatics. But my sons have not been particularly active, politically, although they-- Except here and there in demonstrations, they have not been active in a consistent, organizational way, although their sympathies and agreement, feelings about things, are very much the same as mine. My oldest son, Ken, works for an outfit known as Nature Conservancy. For about fourteen years, he was in charge of their Portland office and in charge of five states up there. Now he's, I think, second in command in their international office. Stationed in Washington, but travels all over for their international activities. Nature Conservancy is a very good organization that acquires land that is environmentally important and sees to it that it's preserved for the future. Very, very large national organization.

Balter: What are your other sons doing currently?

Margolis: My son Roger and son Greg-- They were all living in Portland together; not that they were living together, they were all living in Portland. My son Ken went up there first and was running a ranch up there. Got a chance to buy it on a very reasonable basis, and did so. Later brought my son Greg up there, and they both-- They each have a house on this ranch, although Ken is now in Washington. And Greg is working-- Greg didn't go to law school--he's working as a paralegal for a law firm there. And he now is the only one taking care of the ranch. They have fifty-seven acres up there and some cattle. It's not really a commercial, paying operation. They have their own meat, their own eggs, their own vegetables, fruit, things of that kind--berries. My son Roger has been trying for years, not very successfully, to become a screenwriter. He has that one ambition. He has finally landed a contract to write a screenplay and is now engaged in the writing of his first screenplay.

Balter: Okay. Sounds like they're doing well.

Margolis: Yeah, they're all right.

Balter: Now, I understand that in the, again, in the early sixties, starting around 1964, that you had some involvement in the efforts in the South, particularly in Mississippi, to get voting rights for blacks there.

Margolis: Yes, that is true.

Balter: I wonder if you could tell me about some of your activities.Well, it really in-- Well, I think if I tell about the trip I made, then I can go back. The National Lawyers Guild set up a national project to gather depositions about violation of voting rights, discrimination, and so forth, under-- There was an act in Congress that had been passed, providing for the investigation and the furnishing of information to Congress. And lawyers went to--We had our center in Jackson, Mississippi, where the guild had an office for almost three years, I believe. I'm starting in with this project. I went there for-- I was there for three weeks, taking depositions. Most of the depositions were depositions of registrars of voters. We would go into a little community, and--we had subpoena power--subpoena the registrar of voters, under this act, and examine their records.Just found a pattern of grossest, grossest discrimination by the registrars. Even when blacks came in, they would-- The level of literacy for both blacks and whites was astoundingly low. Even people who registered, who were schoolteachers--blacks and whites--could barely write, and who then-- But all of the whites would get passed, regardless of, you know, if they could only make a cross, but the blacks would be disqualified for any reason. And then they had a right to ask them certain questions. They would ask the whites the simple questions and the blacks questions they couldn't answer, so that you really had to be a very highly qualified person in order, as a black, in order to get registered. We established that through these depositions.And then I was selected to take Governor [Ross] Barnett's deposition, because the registrars were all appointed by him, and he, of course, appointed registrars who would do this. We spent a day taking his deposition. Some of the towns where we went, it was very scary, but the governor had put out bulletins saying nothing must happen to the lawyers, because we were acting on behalf of Congress on this thing. So actually nothing ever happened to us.We brought a-- We had to bring our own reporters, because we couldn't get the reporters in Mississippi to work for us. We couldn't get any Mississippi lawyers to join us. As a matter of fact, in every city we went, there were groups of lawyers, the whole community of lawyers, would come in to represent the registrar. But we had an interesting experience. Quite a few of them spoke to us--spoke to me and spoke to others--and said, "This needs doing. We're glad you're doing it, but we can't afford to do anything, except what we're doing. But keep it up." There was quite a lot of sentiment among the lawyers, but they were scared to death.We brought along a reporter, who still does our reporting, who is black. She traveled with us, and we went into restaurants where there's never been a black person at a table before. There were times when you were afraid that all the people in the restaurant were going to attack you. It was frightening.Let me stop you there so we can turn the tape over, and we'll continue.

31. Tape Number: XVI, Side Two May 10, 1985

Balter: Ben, did you ever have any close calls, or frightening experiences, while you were in Mississippi?

Margolis: Well, there were occasions when we were followed by cars. I remember one occasion, but they didn't harm us. Everything appeared to be done to frighten us. I remember, for example, one of the small places. We were meeting in a courtroom, and we asked if we-- There was a lunch break, and we decided-- Oh, there was a strike going on in that community. There was-- What kind of a plant? I forget what kind of a plant there was, but there was a strike going on. There were workers, hard-hat workers, all over the place, and they were just so hostile. And so everywhere you went there was a crowd. And when the noon break came, we said to the attorneys on the other side, to whoever was representing the city there, whether we could stay in the room. They said okay. And then one of the attorneys came over, after they walked out, and said, "You better get out of here. You better be out in the open where you can be seen. A very dangerous thing here."So we did go out. We went through a very hostile crowd and found a restaurant. We were served, but reluctantly. But you could just feel the hostility. I think but for the governor's order, there isn't any question that we would have been attacked.The rest of my work-- And I was just there on that one trip. The rest of my work was here. I was active in Los Angeles in organizing people to go, raising funds, and you know, doing that kind of thing.The deposition of-- We used our black reporter to take the deposition of Governor Barnett, who tried to be very friendly. Afterwards, he came over and talked to me about practicing law, etcetera. But while the deposition was being taken, he could not say "Negro", yet he didn't want to say "nigger." He was struggling with the word, and it came out "niggra," you know, it was just-- And every time a little bit different. But just having the greatest trouble because trying to say "Negro" and really the habit of saying "nigger," and it came out halfway in between. All the time.Our reporter, at one point, stopped and said, when he had done a particular--something very close to "nigger"--stopped and said to him, "Governor, I didn't understand the last word, or the last sentence you used." [laughter]And made him repeat it, and he came closer to "Negro" at that time. Took a lot of guts on her part to do it, because, again, the room was filled mostly with hostile people. Although this was in Jackson, and in Jackson it wasn't quite as bad as it was in the-- It was the small communities that were just unbelievable.

Balter: Now, the results of these depositions that you took and other material that you gathered, what use did you have--

Margolis: Well, we established the pattern of discrimination, and ultimately resulted in the [Voting] Rights Act.

Balter: So in other words, this material was used directly--

Margolis: Oh, it went--sent directly to Congress.

Balter: Other than the guild, were there other organizations doing similar things while you were there?

Margolis: So far as I remember, it was totally a guild operation. Now, it is also true, however, that many people who were not guild members came along and participated under the auspices of the guild. But I believe the-- I don't think there was any organization other than the guild that did this.

Balter: Let's take a short break, and when we come back, we'll talk more about the guild itself.

Margolis: Fine. All right. [tape recorder off]I might add one other thing that's simply interesting. The office that was set up in Jackson was in charge of an attorney from Detroit, who had-- They were attorneys for the UAW [United Auto Workers of America] at that time--the firm. He had been one of the attorneys in the Smith Act case and had gone to jail for contempt in the Smith Act case. Later, he became a judge in Detroit, and now he's a congressman: George [William] Crockett [Jr.].

Balter: Yes, George Crockett.

Margolis: He's a very close personal friend of mine.

Balter: And you still-- He must be in his eighties by now, I would think, right?

Margolis: George? No. No, George is younger than that. George is younger than I am.

Balter: I see.

Margolis: I have just turned seventy-five. George is about seventy, I believe. I just saw him recently in Washington, D.C. A year or so ago, when the guild had a banquet in my honor, he came out and spoke at that.

Balter: Now, we've been talking about the guild, and I'd like to catch up with some of the history and development of the organization. Certainly by the early sixties-- Well, the guild has now become a venerable organization, having been founded back in 1937. But I'm wondering-- Obviously, the activism of the early sixties represented a, finally, sort of an opening up of ability to conduct political activity after the long period of the McCarthy era. What did this new activism, in the early sixties, mean in terms of development of the guild, recruiting of new members, and so forth?

Margolis: Well, I don't know whether we discussed what had happened to the guild during the McCarthy period, have we?

Balter: Well, insofar as that a lot of people were falling away by the middle or late fifites, but--

Margolis: Did we discuss the attempt of [Tom C.] Clark to put it on the list of subversive organizations?

Balter: I don't believe we got that far with it, no. Why don't we go into that.

Margolis: That happened during-- You know, during the McCarthy period, the attorney general created a list of, quote, "subversive organizations," unquote. He gave the guild notice that he intended to place it on the list of subversive organizations. The guild had a hearing before him, and he persisted in his intention. An action was filed, court action was filed, and an injunction was issued, temporary injunction or preliminary injunction, to prevent him from so listing the organization. Eventually, the proceeding was dropped, and the guild was never listed.But the proceeding went on over a period, I'm not sure how long, but maybe eight, ten, twelve years. During that period, a number of things happened to the guild. First of all, the guild abandoned its student chapters for the very sound reasons that while the guild was being so threatened, any student who became a member of the guild might face great difficulty in becoming admitted to the bar, and the guild didn't want to be responsible for that. Also, new members were hard to come by. As a matter of fact, there was no campaign really carried on for new members because of the fear of joining a -- Although it hadn't been listed as a subversive organization, for all practical purposes, it was treated as though it had been listed as a subversive organization. And so lawyers just weren't about to join that. They were afraid of disbarment; they were afraid of all kinds of things. Finally, a great many members dropped away for essentially the same reasons. There was just a tight core of, probably, I'm sure, less than a thousand lawyers in the whole United States who belonged to the guild, maybe closer to five hundred, in all of the country. I think in Los Angeles it got down to somewhere in the neighborhood of fifty, something like that. Nevertheless, the guild continued to be active in all kinds of things, continued to function, although it couldn't be as active as it had been otherwise.Well, when it was announced that the attorney general was abandoning his attempt to place the guild on the subversive list, the situation began to change, and change rather sharply. The guild at that point began slowly--it didn't happen overnight--to again recruit members and to establish student chapters. And it became more respectable. I don't remember when that happened, but I think it was in the very late fifties or early sixties that this happened. The guild activity increased considerably. Then a new-- In the sixties, from the mid-sixties on, a new tendency began to develop in the guild among young lawyers, an ultra-- What one might call an ultra-Left tendency. The leadership of that group on a national basis was in the hands primarily of a woman, young woman lawyer, who later went underground with the Weatherpeople [Weather Underground]. What was her name?

Balter: Bernadine Dohrn?

Margolis: Bernadine Dohrn, yes. They simply were tearing the guild apart. It was so-- Well, I'll give you an-- I think maybe by giving you one illustration of something that--specific series of things that occurred. In 1968, the national convention of the guild was held in Los Angeles. We held it in Santa Monica, at that Santa Monica hotel--

Balter: The Miramar [Hotel]?

Margolis: Miramar. I chaired the chapter committee for the convention, making all the convention arrangements.Just incidents. She came out there with a group of people. We needed to have some things done in San Francisco to get more participation from San Francisco, get certain things worked out organizationally. And so a couple of them--we gave them the money to go. They disappeared, and they never did any of the things. They just went their own way and spent the money.I remember we had an office--our office was on Sixth Street at that time--and they asked if they could have a caucus meeting at our office one night. We told them yes, they could. We came in the next morning, and the office was literally a shambles--chairs turned over, food all over the place. It was a pigpen that they had turned it into. Never an apology, never an explanation.They were very disruptive at the convention itself. Well, just one example, we had a-- At that time, the guild had a lot of community support and sold tickets. It was a money-raising affair, and we sold tickets to a lot of nonguild people, people in the community. People wanted to sit together at certain tables, so we made seating arrangements. And they said that--this group said they were opposing it. It was not democratic, but the decision--"No, we are running it." And we said, "This is the way it's got to be. We promised people; it's going to be."And so they continue to oppose it. Then on the evening of the banquet, as soon as the doors were opened, they rushed in, occupied tables: a few at each table, all over the place, so that the seating arrangements became impossible. It was just that kind of constant harassment that they were engaged in. And it created a lot of problems in the guild. Again, it created for a period a crisis in the guild, [so] that people, a lot of people, thought of dropping out, or becoming inactive, because it was too disagreeable.This went on into the seventies and began to take a somewhat different turn. Bernadine and her people went underground, and, you know, the thing became-- They were no longer present in the guild--her leadership. She was a very powerful leader. She really, you know, over those young people, had a lot of control. She was looked up to. She's very bright. These were not stupid people; they're very bright people.But a new tendency began to develop, breaks between the young and the old on an entirely different level. The guild had always been strictly a lawyers organization, and the young people said, "That's elitist. We want to make it an organization like a union. Have anybody who works in connection with the law." Secretaries, paralegals (oh, they were just beginning at that time), whoever worked--messengers--whoever worked in the office. The old people said, "We're not, we're a professional organization. We want to maintain our position as that, and we're affiliated with other organizations that are professional organizations." That kind of thing was a cause of great-- In addition to that, a peculiar thing happened during that period. The guild had always functioned not only as a lawyers organization, but as lawyers. We wrote amicus briefs; we drafted legislation; we tried cases. Our activities-- We might participate in a demonstration here and there, but that was not a central activity. Our central activities were lawyers' activities. The theory was that we could do certain things that others couldn't do, and that was our function.There was an interesting period, when young people were flocking into the legal profession, and wanted no part of the law. What they wanted to make out of the guild was entirely a political organization. Should it be a strictly political organization, which was engaged in political activities, consisting of people in the legal--connected with the law? Those were the areas of struggle that were going on. Many of us were attacked quite viciously within the guild--I don't mean physically attacked--within the guild. A lot of people, most, by the end of the seventies, I would say 90 percent of the older people had dropped out, or 80 percent had dropped out.There was a convention in Colorado, at the University of Colorado. I think in '76; I'm not sure of the year. And these tendencies, the struggle, that would struggle-- And the young people prevailed on every point, because the guild had been growing, and they substantially outnumbered the older lawyers. While the older lawyers, I would say 95 percent of them, stood together, maybe only 70 percent of the younger lawyers stood together. Nevertheless, that 70 percent outnumbered the rest of the people The constitution was amended to permit membership on the basis that they wanted. The program at the convention, what was discussed mostly was our political character. Demonstrations and so forth. The legal activity as such, of the guild, just about disappeared.Following that, there began to be a gradual change back. First of all, as far as the membership of others [was] concerned, for the most part, they didn't join. I would suppose today maybe 10 percent or 5 percent of the guild consists of nonlawyers. Oh, one of the issues was whether students would have full voting rights. In practice, that worked out. First of all, some of the legal workers became active and very good members of the guild, but for the most part they weren't there. It was still a lawyers-- It remained basically a lawyers organization, simply because it was lawyers who belonged. As far as students were concerned, they had their own groups in the universities. And as a practical matter, they didn't participate very much with the lawyers, although it was always a connection that cooperated. So that became a nonissue. Gradually, bit by bit, the guild began to return, as these people, these young people, began to get a little older and a little more experienced in the law. They were good people, they weren't bad people. They turned more and more to doing legal things. And I would say today, while the guild is interested in, and does participate in, demonstrations to a reasonable--no, to a substantial extent--its main activities are what I would call lawyers' activities. This sort of gives you a review of what the struggles have been within the guild. Now, as far as its activities, it has always been in the forefront of whatever struggles were going on on the Left. During the civil rights days, it was civil rights activities. During the Vietnam War, it was antiwar, antidraft, that kind of thing--prolabor. And so that on where the guild stood. Particularly on domestic issues there were no problems. The manner of working on those issues were where the problems were, but those have largely been solved. [telephone rings, tape recorder off] Are you interested in other areas of differences within the guild?

Balter: I think so, yes, because this will probably be one of the few oral histories of people who've been-- May be the only oral history of anybody who was actually a founding member and has been in the guild all these years.

Margolis: There was another area of struggle that began maybe ten years ago and lasted for five, six, seven years--maybe it began twelve years ago--and that is a struggle within the guild of a group who were anti-Soviet. Not simply disagreeing with the Soviet Union, but they wanted to make the guild, everything that the guild-- They wanted to make everything that the guild did have an anti-Soviet tone. Whenever a resolution was posed, they tried to introduce into the resolution something of an anti-Soviet character.There are also within-- There are really three groups, I would say, basically, within the guild. One was that group, which was a small group, but a very well organized group.

Balter: Would this have been the October League?

Margolis: Yes. These were lawyers in the October League, and they were very well organized and able people, very effective, and worked like twenty-four hours a day at what they wanted to accomplish.Then there was a group of lawyers who are still very close to, or perhaps members, I don't know, of the Communist Party, who took pretty much the Communist Party position, which is the Soviet Union can do no wrong. And there was the middle group that was opposed to the anti-Sovietism, but was prepared to criticize the Soviet Union for various things, such as their lack of democracy, more recently the invasion of Afghanistan, and that kind of thing. And of that, the October League group, there were also-- There were two or three other fringe groups besides the October League. I think there was one that grew out of it. In any event, that has pretty much disappeared in the last two or three years. I must caution you on one thing: my time judgments are likely to be the most unreliable thing that I tell you.

Balter: Okay.

Margolis: But in the last few years, it has no longer been a problem. While I would say that basically there's nobody in the guild now--or if they are, they're not active--who has that extreme anti-Soviet tendency, the ones on the other side don't push their position too much, although they're still there. And, by and large, that has ceased to be an area of confrontation. I think that today, the guild is very well unified. Not that there aren't differences of opinion on things, but they aren't really basic, you know, the kind of differences of opinion that cause dissension and difficulty within an organization.

Balter: Am I correct that you've been a member of the guild uninterruptedly this entire period of time?

Margolis: That's correct.

Balter: There's not been a time when you were out of the guild, or not active?

Margolis: Never.

Balter: Okay. So that would make it coming on fifty years [laughs] just to recall.

Margolis: I've attended every national convention of the guild, except for two.

Balter: Going back in time, again, for a minute, back to the period of the sixties and the antiwar period, I know, and you've mentioned, that the guild was active in the antiwar movement. What were some of the activities that the guild was involved in around the war in Vietnam? For example, did you get involved in any of the legal challenges to the war, so forth?

Margolis: Yes, there were legal challenges, but those were mostly conducted--they were all conducted in the East, in Washington, mostly. We, from time to time, helped write briefs, amicus briefs, and did research and consulted. But the activity was much more centered, that kind of activity is much more centered-- One of the things that the guild did: a lot of draft counseling. We did a lot of speaking against the [war].One activity that was carried on under auspices other than the guild, because it was possible to do it on a somewhat broader basis, we formed a lawyers committee against the war in Vietnam. What had happened was that we started to form such a committee here. We were concerned basically with the domestic constitutional violations--no declaration of war and various other violations--and we were going to put out a paper on it. We were going to mention also the violations of international law, but it wasn't the basic thrust.When we learned that there was a group composed largely of guild lawyears in New York who were doing a similar job, but were concentrating basically upon the international aspects--and they had some of the leading international law professors and so forth, working with them--the two committees combined and became the Lawyers Committee Against the War in Vietnam. We put out a kind of a pamphlet that wasn't a pamphlet form, it was more like an article, which combined all of the arguments, from a legal standpoint, all of the arguments against the war in Vietnam. We had that-- We got a congressman, I forget who, to put it into the Congressional Record. And then we got, I think, a hundred thousand copies of it--it's an easy way to get this--and distributed it among lawyers throughout the country. At the time, it received a lot of recognition in the press and elsewhere, and we think was one of hundreds of activities that made some contribution toward the fight against the war. As a matter of fact, I think during the war I spent more time on that committee than any other single activity, because it was the planning of the thing, it was the organizing, it was getting out the distribution, and speaking that resulted from it, and so forth.

Balter: Now, during the Watergate era, and I know what I'm going to ask you about this is part of it, the guild's suit against the FBI, which, as I understand, has been going on for a number of years-- In addition to that, which I do want you to talk about, were there any other activities during the Watergate era that the guild was involved in, that were sort of particular to that period of time when revelations about government malfeasance, government spying, and so forth were going on? In other words, I guess the question really is, did the Watergate era indicate any particular activities for the guild, around things that were going on then?

Margolis: Outside of passing some resolutions, I can't remember anything else. Now, there may have been, but at least I wasn't involved--I'm pretty sure. We may have, again, we may have spoken about it and so forth, but I don't think we became-- It's entirely possible that the Washington chapter of the guild did more. Certain activities were more concentrated, and still are more concentrated, in the East than they are here, particularly the national legislative matters and national problems of that kind. I can't remember anything that the guild did, either nationally or locally, outside of some resolutions.

Balter: I wonder if you could give me an update, give us an update, on the guild's suit against the FBI, maybe even a little bit of background to it.

Margolis: Yes, I think it was started six or seven years ago. I have forgotten, I knew at one time, what led to its starting, but I think it may have been during the Watergate days that it came out indirectly, in some way, that there'd been wiretapping of the guild, offices broken into, and so forth. And so the guild had filed an action, in New York I guess it was, in the federal court, for damages and to enjoin the FBI from doing certain things: wiretapping, breaking and entering, using informers at meetings, etcetera, etcetera. There have been-- The amount of legal work that has been done on the case has been absolutely enormous. There have probably been an average of two lawyers working full-time ever since the suit was filed. The first thing, of course, was the discovery. And I think even before the action was filed, under the information --

Balter: Freedom of Information Act?

Margolis: --Freedom of Information Act, evidence was obtained. We had got evidence of break-ins, of wiretapping, of all of these things I've talked about, of all kinds of illegal activities directed against the guild. The discovery-- The fight that has been going on during this time has largely been around the issue of discovery, of what facts we can discover. Just tons of material have been uncovered, and there's been a special master appointed by the court in New York to handle this discovery.Now, the present status, as I understand it, is that the government has filed a demurrer to the action, which is an attempt to throw it out of the court on the grounds that, even if all of these things are true, there is no power to sue the government, that the FBI has the right to do all of these things, or even if it doesn't have the right, the only remedy lies with Congress. Now, the reason that this was not done earlier is because as long as you had a halfway liberal, or decent, Supreme Court, such a thing had no chance of success. But with the present Supreme Court-- [interruption by a visitor] With the present Supreme Court, it has a hell of a chance of success. The last I remember, which is a few months ago, is that briefs were being written, extensive briefs; some are containing summaries of the evidence. I guess it has not yet been argued.

Balter: That brings to mind that I believe that a similar demurrer was filed in Frank Wilkinson's case against the FBI--but I'm not familiar with how far along that one might be--on the same grounds, essentially.

Margolis: Well, I don't know. That's being handled by the ACLU [American Civil Liberties Union].

Balter: Right.

Margolis: The demurrer was overruled, and the case is proceeding.

Balter: In the Wilkinson case?

Margolis: Wilkinson case.

Balter: So that might bode well for your situation.

Margolis: Well, you see, who rules on it is a particular trial judge. I don't know who the trial judge [will be], you know. There are still some very good trial judges, and I don't know much about the judge in New York. But eventually the question will be decided higher up.

Balter: Of course. Before we leave the topic of the guild, perhaps you could bring us up to date on what main activities the guild is involved in currently.

Margolis: Well, the activities are really all over the lot. We have a very active immigration committee, that is involved in protecting the rights of all aliens, but particularly concerned now with refugees from San Salvador, El Salvador, and their right to remain in this country. We recently had a conference around the issue, more or less a meeting at which we had many speakers over various-- We have been active in taking positions against our policy in Nicaragua. We're very active in the state bar. The state bar has an annual conference [California State Bar Conference of Barristers] that is attended by representatives of state bar associations. While we have only very few delegates--maybe, the guild in California, maybe, has ten out of five hundred, or nine out of five hundred--the guild generally has the most interesting resolutions that involve the most controversy. And we have been quite successful in that. Two years ago, all of the leading resolutions were guild resolutions. Last year, we had had a resolution on South Africa in for five years. We'd lost four years in a row. Last year, in August of last year, for the first time, we carried such a resolution.

Balter: What was the gist of the resolution?

Margolis: The gist of the resolution is divestment, that there should be a law requiring divestment. We passed it by about 60-40, I would say the vote was, maybe a little better than that. But we've taken all kinds of-- Last time, we had a resolution on Nicaragua which was tabled, which is one way of stopping our resolution. Anyway, we've had all kinds of things.Right now we're starting a committee to deal with a growing problem of lawyers. You know, lawyers now can advertise, and the same tendency is going on in the legal profession as elsewhere: the firms are getting bigger and bigger, and smaller firms, many of them, are having more and more difficulty. This is caused by a lot of things: one is, laws become much more complex; the need for mechanized equipment, computers, and so forth, which many small offices can't afford; the inability of small offices to advertise; many other problems. We're setting up a committee now to explore the question of setting up a guild cooperative in which guild lawyers, small lawyers, small offices--single, or two, or three, or four or five lawyers--can join this cooperative, which will have a reference service and advertise on behalf of all of the groups, and various offices can specialize. It's only in its early stages, but that's a very important project, I believe, for the guild to engage in.We have, let's see, we have a functioning labor committee that takes up labor issues. It hasn't been as active in the last six months or so, but usually it is active. What it has done in the last several years, it has held seminars, attended by labor union stewards and officials, on unemployment insurance, the handling of grievances, arbitration, various subjects of that kind. In that way [it] is working closely with sections of the labor movement. Let me think for a moment. [laughs]

Balter: Okay. [tape recorder off]

Margolis: There are many other activities that we're engaged in. And then of special issues, as they arise, we take them up. We're not doing everything that we should, but we're working in many areas.

Balter: Okay. I think that's a good stopping point for today.

Margolis: All right.

32. Tape Number: XVII, Side One May 17, 1985

Balter: Ben, I've gotten the impression from some things that we've talked about off tape that beginning perhaps, oh, around the late fifties, or early sixties, that your law firm began to go through an evolution, where you were not so much involved in strictly political cases, defense cases, and so forth, but you began to perhaps broaden out, in the types of activities that your law firm was involved in. At least, that's an impression I've gotten. I wonder if you could tell me a little bit about the development of the firm over these years.

Margolis: Yes, all right. I came here in 1943 and helped to establish the firm which was then the firm of Katz, Gallagher, and Margolis. That was Charles [J.] Katz, Leo Gallagher, and myself. It was a labor law firm with eleven lawyers. Represented all of the CIO [Congress of Industrial Organizations] unions in Southern California. As a matter of fact, I was induced to move from San Francisco in order to help set up that firm. I would say 80 percent of the work consisted of labor matters, trade union matters; another 15 percent of workers compensation matters; here and there, a personal injury matter, very rarely; and maybe 5 percent of civil liberties and similar matters, like, for example, the Sleepy Lagoon case during that time. That continued until about 1947.At that time, there was a split in the CIO, with unions getting kicked out and some withdrawing. As a result, we continued to represent the unions that left the CIO, but none of the unions that stayed in the CIO would have anything to do with us. [telephone rings, tape recorder off] This left us with a relatively small labor practice, and we had-- That was our major practice. At that time, coincidentally, a flood of a different kind of work started to come in, to wit, civil liberties work, arising out of the beginning of the McCarthy period and beginning, among others, with the Hollywood Nineteen, who became the Hollywood Ten. So that over the next several years, two things happened so far as our office was concerned. Number one, the size of the office was drastically cut down to, as I remember it, about five lawyers. John [T.] McTernan and I for a number of years did virtually nothing except work arising out of the McCarthy era. The other lawyers in the office, in addition, did some, particularly John Porter, who was very active in the immigration and deportation field. That continued until about 1957 when-- There were periods in between when John and I occasionally did a few other things, but not very much. Fortunately we had accumulated--because we didn't live high--a little money, and we were able to survive during this period. But by that time, by 1957 or so, we were not only broke, but in debt. And the demand in civil liberties cases to some extent was easing up. In any event, we had to try to make a living. So we turned to general practice, continuing what little, relatively little, labor work we had, and began to get other kinds of work, largely in the personal injury field. Our practice really, as soon as John and I got back into it and started giving it attention, developed fairly well and quite rapidly.An interesting thing that we observed at that time was that the practice that we developed came almost exclusively, with a few exceptions, came from nonpolitical people. The political people who had law business, by and large, stayed away from us--and by political people, I mean those who are on the same side as we were--which is something we always resented a great deal.But we built our practice. From that time on, while we of course continued to handle civil rights cases and civil liberties cases, they were not the major part of our practice. They were the minor part of our practice. The major part of our practice was the money-making practice. We were trying to-- We got out of debt and began to get on our feet. The practice continued along those lines for a number of years. And then gradually what happened is that the types of-- We became more and more a litigation office in all kinds of fields: in entertainment law, in business law, in maritime cases (which was a major source of our business), in other personal injury cases, malpractice cases. And the cases we were handling got bigger and bigger, until, by about seven or eight years ago, we were handling only major litigation, at least what was for us major litigation. When we handled the small cases, it was only because some old client or so insisted that we do it. We have been engaged in all kinds of litigation since that time, and we now no longer do any labor work. One of the attorneys who was in our office has gone and has become house counsel for ILWU [International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union], Local 26, the warehouse local, which was our principal labor client. We send him all of the labor work. He's their house counsel and does all of the labor work, simply because our office was no longer set up for the day-to-day, routine labor work. However, I may have, to some extent, not been entirely accurate in what I said, because we do handle quite a number of large labor-matter litigation, like we have a big case of engineers who were laid off by RCA [Radio Corporation of America], involving two or three million dollars in termination pay. We have other substantial labor litigation, but we cannot consider ourselves labor lawyers, because we do not do the day-to-day trade union work anymore. We continue to do other kinds of work. We look out for the kinds of work that has a public interest. We have just finished a case against a slumlord, which has sort of set a precedent [Hernandez v. Stabach].

Balter: Yes, you were mentioning that last time.

Margolis: So we do move in fields of trying to utilize the law in ways that will help people, but again, basically, almost exclusively in major litigation.

Balter: Now, when you first began to go into personal injury and other cases like that, this development first began that you described, did you have any problems at all because of your reputation as a political law firm?

Margolis: Not really. In the first place, our original sources were mainly from people we knew. We weren't getting it from the labor movement, but people we knew in the labor movement, people who knew us. We got around and made it known we were available. And then we were quite successful, and they started referring other people.We had a very interesting experience as far as the courts were concerned, which relates somewhat to the political people not coming to us. They wouldn't come to us, because they were afraid of the answer to the question you asked. We found a peculiar thing: we have in the political cases been kicked around from pillar to post, particularly in the trial courts. Where we won, we won practically all our cases on appeal. And in the trial courts, we were treated so badly. I could tell you incident after incident of unbelievable conduct on the part of trial judges. These very same judges, when we appeared before them on nonpolitical matters, leaned over backwards: gave us the best kind of breaks.One of them, who had given us the worst kind of runaround, appointed me as counsel, where he had an opportunity, in a big air crash case, where I made, oh, I think, close to a couple hundred thousand dollars in fees. He needn't have appointed me, and he had been unbelievably bad in the political case. I often feel they had a guilty conscience. Also, I think they respected us, because they knew we had done a good job in the political cases. But we were traded--I remember [William C.] Mathes, the judge in the Smith Act case, in the Los Angeles Smith Act case [Yates v. United States], who was a red-baiting-- and I'll use it--son of a bitch. He was, he was just unbelievably bad. Afterwards we had cases before him, and he embarrassed us sometimes. I remember one occasion. He was a very tough judge with everybody; he treated people very arbitrarily. And I remember one day appearing before him. Laws and motions--there were lots of matters--were being heard. People were asking for continuances, giving very good excuses. Nobody got a continuance. And I needed some time on a case. I got up, and I started to say, "I, I need a little more time, your honor."He said, "How much time do you need?"And he gave it to me. And that's without asking another question, while he had denied every other request before him. It made me [laughs] feel very uneasy, but I think it was just his feeling of guilt.But it indicates that the people who stayed away from us in nonpolitical cases had no reason to do so. I cannot really think of any instances where [we] have been treated badly by a judge in nonpolitical cases because of our political background. You sometimes get treated badly by judges because of the kind of judges they are. They are very reactionary. They are, let's say, in personal injury cases, they are pro defense, or things of that kind, but they treat all plaintiffs' lawyers the same way. Also, when you're up against one of the real big offices, there are many judges who tend to scrape and bow to the big offices, and you have a tough time. But, by and large, we have been treated not just as well as other counsel in nonpolitical cases, but better than most.

Balter: Okay. Now, I'd like to ask you a few questions about some of the cases that you did get involved in later on. I wonder if you recall a case which, I believe, went to the California Supreme Court in the early seventies, I think it was about 1972, Gyerman v. U.S. Lines. This case apparently involved an issue of worker negligence and working in an unsafe place.

Margolis: Yes.

Balter: Do you remember the details of that one?

Margolis: Yes, it was a very technical decision, but a very important one. In maritime cases, there are two kinds of--two bases for liability. One is called negligence, where you have to prove carelessness. And the other is called unseaworthiness, in which all you have to prove is that there was a dangerous condition, regardless of whether the dangerous condition resulted from the negligence of the employer. In other words, it might have been due to nobody's fault, and yet the employer is liable, simply because the place was dangerous.It had never been settled where there was a method of work used by the employer--the procedure that he followed--where that was dangerous, whether unseaworthiness applied to that. Unseaworthiness was applied, let's say, to grease on a deck, to a condition. It generally applied to a condition. We argued, in this case, that a work method actually created an unsafe condition and unseaworthiness applied. We were sustained in the Ninth Circuit [Court of Appeals], and it's a very, in that field, a very important decision.

Balter: Do you recall some of the details of what happened?

Margolis: Yes. I don't recall the-- All I know is that they were unloading a ship, and they were using a crane. They were using a method, I don't remember the details, which was clearly a dangerous method. But it was a method that had been typically followed by many boat owners. We would have had a hard time winning on negligence. But they found-- What happened was the court refused to give us an instruction that unseaworthiness applied. We took it up on appeal. It was reversed, and, as I remember, we settled the case.

Balter: Okay. During the sixties, of course, a lot of things went on. I've picked up sort of tidbits, here and there, that there were certain things that went on during that period of time that you were involved in, in one way or another, to a lesser or greater degree. And I'd like to ask you to elaborate. For example, during the so-called Watts riots here in Los Angeles, my understanding is that you might have played some role in that.

Margolis: Yes. That was work done in conjunction with the [National Lawyers] Guild, the Los Angeles chapter of the guild. There was near hysteria in the courts at that time. People were being arrested at the drop of a hat. There was almost something like a kind of a civil war going on. Not that there was that much shooting, but in the way people were being treated. We volunteered to defend people who had been arrested, among other things, to get them released on bail or without bail. Because a lot of people that were being arrested were of the kind that wouldn't ordinarily qualify for being released without bail. What was happening is the jails were getting more overcrowded than usual, and they were throwing them in. So we went in, and we did succeed in getting some of the judges to be more liberal, to release a lot of the people without bail. That was the main thing we did.

Balter: Do you remember who some of the other attorneys were who worked with you on that?

Margolis: I"m pretty sure John did, John McTernan. I think Bill [William] Esterman, Frank Pestana. I'm not positive about these, you know, because it's that many years ago, and I may be confusing other things. There were about twenty or twenty-five guild lawyers who, to one extent or another, participated.

Balter: Was the ACLU [American Civil Liberties Union] involved in this also?

Margolis: Yes.

Balter: They were.

Margolis: Although my work was primarily organized through the guild.

Balter: Right. Okay. Likewise, and we've talked a little bit about this off tape, I understand that you had some involvement in writing briefs involving the challenge of the legality of the Vietnam War. I wonder if you could talk a little bit about what some of the legal theories were that were used.

Margolis: I think I've covered this with you. Let's flick off for a minute.

Balter: Okay, we'll go off tape for a second. [tape recorder off] Okay.

Margolis: What happened on that occasion was that there was a committee organized on the West Coast, in Los Angeles, to prepare a brief on the unconstitutionality of the war. And originally we were, I think-- I sometimes get confused as to just how it developed. I think originally we were approaching the question from a standpoint of international law, violations of various principles of international law. And we learned that there was another committee in New York, friends of mine, people I knew, who were doing the same thing, but approaching it from the standpoint of its legality under the U.S. Constitution. Now, we ended up working together and doing work in both areas. I may be confused, that maybe it's reversed as to where it was started. But in any event, one committee was working on one angle, and another on another angle. We learned about the work; we got together.We worked jointly and got out a report. One aspect of the report dealt primarily with the constitutionality of the war, because there'd been no declaration of war. I don't remember all the details, but various illegal things that various presidents had done in violating various statutes. The main constitutional question was no declaration of war, but there were a number of other things, details of which I've forgotten.Then, the other aspect was of international law, which again had a number of points, but fundamentally was predicated on the charter of the United Nations, which, of course, is a treaty. And under our Constitution, any treaty to which the United States is a party is the supreme law of the land. We made an argument [telephone rings, tape recorder off] that the United Nations treaty rendered the war in Vietnam illegal, because it was an aggressive war and interference in the internal affairs of another country. There were, as I say, other arguments made. It was then printed in the Congressional Record--this paper. I think Wayne Morse, if I remember right, had it printed in the Congressional Record. He was a senator from Oregon at that time. And then we had something like a hundred thousand copies made and distributed to lawyers and to others throughout the United States. And we thought it-- And it was referred to in newspapers and in magazine articles, and we thought it had considerable usefulness in the fight against the war.

Balter: What's the furthest, as you recall, at any rate, what's the furthest that anybody got, I guess, either to the highest court or whatever, in terms of actually pursuing one of these cases against the legality of the war?

Margolis: Against the-- What I've talked about up to this point is not a case.

Balter: Right, yeah.

Margolis: But there were several cases filed. As a matter of fact, one of them was filed by an attorney by the name of George Altman, a California lawyer; he's now dead. He was [chuckles] a tax lawyer, an outstanding tax lawyer, but he got very interested. And he did it entirely on his own as an individual effort. That was thrown out of court at the trial level and, what we say, at the pleading level. So far as I can recall, two or three other attempts met a similar fate at the same point.

Balter: So nobody ever even got to the point of having a full trial on the merits and the issues and so forth?

Margolis: That did not happen.

Balter: Was there ever any thought given to trying to proceed in an international court, for example, I guess with the World Court? Or is that something that you couldn't have done as lawyers in--

Margolis: No. You see, as far as proceedings in the court created under the United Nations Charter, proceedings can only be brought by a party to the charter, which is a nation. Private parties cannot bring proceedings in that court, so we had no way of doing it. What we did do with that document is we presented it, together with an argument, to the United Nations [General] Assembly. And I think it was referred to in some debates there.

Balter: One other celebrated case in the sixties, that, again, I understand you were involved in, but don't know the nature of your involvement, was the Chicago Seven case.

Margolis: Well, I wasn't involved in the Chicago Seven case directly. What happened was that the attorneys in the Chicago Seven case were charged with contempt of court for what they had done in court. And I participated in writing briefs on appeal in support of the attorneys, Lenny [Leonard I.] Weinglass and Kunstler.

Balter: William Kunstler?

Margolis: William Kunstler. And so I read, as I remember it, all of the record, or at least most of the trial record of the case; wrote the major part, or maybe all of the brief, I don't recall.

Balter: Okay. Now, according to your FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] file, it doesn't indicate any details of this, but it says in a report, January 13, 1971, that you had some involvement in the case that the Black Panther Party, here in Los Angeles, brought against the city.

Margolis: Well, I actually was the attorney that brought the case. What happened was the following: Charles Garry of San Francisco was, during that period of time, the counsel for the Panthers, Black Panthers. Charlie and I had been friends for many years, as a matter of fact, even before he was admitted to practice law. [knock at the door, tape recorder off] Charles had been a client of our San Francisco office. He had a dry cleaners association of which he was president. He came to me in Los Angeles (he was in San Francisco) and asked me if I would handle a case on behalf of the Panthers, who had been really persecuted and treated terribly badly by the police. I then began-- I agreed to do so.I spent a tremendous amount of time on preparing and filing a complaint, which involved, which set forth, if I remember correctly, sixty or seventy separate incidents of police violation of Black Panthers' rights. I did this as the result of a number of conferences with many Black Panthers, who gave me that information. I remember spending a great deal of time. One of the reasons I remember the amount of time is because of what happened afterwards. We filed the case. We proceeded to move along with the case, and it came time where we needed further cooperation of the Panthers for further information, taking of depositions, etcetera, etcetera. We got absolutely zero cooperation. They wouldn't reply to my telephone calls. They just disappeared as far as the case was concerned. I finally had to drop the case, because I couldn't handle the case without their cooperation. And the reason I remember it so well is because I just hated all that work going down the tubes, as it did. When we filed the case, it got a good deal of publicity, but never followed through.

Balter: I see. Do you remember the names of any of the Panther members that you worked with on it?

Margolis: Oh, I'm so bad on names, as I've told you before. I could probably dig up a copy of the complaint if it would be of any help to you.

Balter: It might be good to put in--

Margolis: It's about this thick. I'll make a note.

Balter: All right. What we'll do is we'll add it, together with your FBI file, for [the Department of] Special Collections. [tape recorder off] Ben, another--

Margolis: I might add one other thing about the Panthers, that I got turned off on them. While I was handling the case, there was a Lawyers Guild convention in New York City. At that convention, the Black Panthers were either honored, or were-- There was some program around them. I don't remember just what. But the Black Panthers were an important part of the convention, of the lawyers convention. And I, in going to that convention, I went to San Francisco first. Then flew to New York with Charlie and a number of members of the Black Panthers. I remember that Charlie got a room, or two or three rooms, connected. And I had an experience with them, which, again, kind of turned me off on them.What they did is they used Charlie's room to have almost a continuous party, from the time that they arrived there until the time that they left. And what they were doing-- I don't know where the money came from, but what they were doing is they were ordering bottles of booze from the hotel. I myself generally get something in my room, but I go outside and buy it, because something you'll pay eight dollars for at a store, you'll pay twenty-five for in the hotel. And they were buying them from the hotel, ordering fancy food sent up, and it was just-- I don't know how much money they spent. And I, I was sort of turned off by the whole business, which happened, it may be more so, because it happened about the time I wasn't getting any cooperation from them in connection with the work that I did. It made me doubtful about some of these people, although I know at the same time there were a lot of things that they did that were good and useful.

Balter: Do you think that-- The Black Panthers certainly were embraced by a large part of the Left movement at that time as being a very important sort of vanguard-type organization, but was there an ambivalence, in your memory, to that acceptance?

Margolis: Oh--

Balter: Speaking not only of yourself, but other people that you were associated with.

Margolis: No, I think my adverse reaction was rather unique, and it occurred only because of these experiences that I had. But from a public relations standpoint, no. The papers said a lot of bad things about them, but I didn't believe what was in the papers. I think the overwhelming majority of progressive and Left people supported them and thought that they were just great. I want to make it clear that along with the criticisms that I have, I also know they ran some schools, they got food for children.There were also reports that I got, particularly of what they were doing in Oakland to black businessmen. The claim was--and I think there may be some validity to it--that they were ripping off black businessmen, saying, "Look, you better contribute to us, or else." That some of that went on.But I also know that-- And I think some of this money might have been used for the sort of thing we're talking about. But I also know that they did good things with the money. They, you know, they had schools for the children, they fed children, and they did those kind of things. So when I got through, I felt that they were an organization that did some good things, but that they weren't on a solid foundation, on a principled, solid foundation that would last.

Balter: Okay. Ben, I know that there was a criminal case that you mentioned off tape. You were particularly proud of your involvement in People v. Iglesias, which you handled in 1970. As I understand it, it was the only criminal case you had handled since the Smith Act cases, I suppose about twenty or so years earlier. I wonder if you could tell me some things about that case.

Margolis: Yes. Our practice, by the way, is entirely a civil practice. We do not handle criminal cases. If somebody comes in, we refer them to a lawyer in that field.I was approached by some people whom I had known from the Sleepy Lagoon days. Don't ask me for the names of the people, because I don't remember. And they told me about this young Mexican lad [Trinidad Iglesias], who was at that time, I think, just around twenty-one, who was in jail, charged with first-degree murder--and the death penalty was still in effect in those days--who was charged with murdering a policeman. And in fact, he had killed the policeman. I think he had a public defender, and the public defender, he was sure, would sell him out. They asked if I would go out and represent him. I told them that I would consider it.I went out, went to the jail and had a discussion with him. Found him a rather remarkable young man, who was, while very poorly educated, inadequately educated, was very bright and had very good instincts. His record showed that his big problem was that he didn't have any judgment as to when to resist and when not to resist, that he was always in trouble, because he wouldn't take being kicked around. And if he's being kicked around by sixteen policemen, he'd fight them all. That was the-- You know, no judgment in that sense. And this was a-- It also turned out that this was a boy who, since he was eleven or twelve years old up to the time I saw him in jail, had probably spent no more than three or four months, at one time, outside of jail or juvenile youth camp or one of those places. And probably in the eight or ten years, not more than a year and a half altogether out of jail. He was constantly getting out and going back in.He told me the following story of the incident that occurred. He said that he-- Oh, he was a member of a gang, too, had been a member of a gang for a number of years. That was a Sunday, and he and his gang were in a park when, according to the story he told me, there were several other gangs also meeting in the park. One gang, a short distance from them, but where they could see them, was meeting, and a knife fight developed between members of that other gang. Not between his gang and the other gang, but between members of that other gang. Somebody called the police--not them--and the police started coming.Everybody, from all of the gangs, started running, because, as he said, whenever anything happened, the police had a practice of picking up every young Mexican in the area. And so he ran, and he was followed by a police officer. He jumped some fences, and then ran around through the backyard of the home of a friend of his, where he had been before, and came through the house and out to the front porch.The policeman followed him and caught him there on the porch and started grappling with him. And they-- You know, trying to place him under arrest, and he resisted, as he always did whenever he thought that it wasn't justified. They grappled, they fell off the porch and onto the ground, were rolling around on the ground. And he was getting the better of the officer. He had the officer under him, and he was on top of the officer. He felt the officer pulling at his gun, in his holster, at his side. And somehow, during the course of it, he took away the gun of the officer, stood above the officer, who was still on the ground, and fired three shots into him and killed him.I asked him, you know, if whether-- What he intended to do? Why did he do it?He said, "I just blew my mind. I really, you know, I just realized that I'd done it after I did it."And then he ran away about two blocks and was caught. There was never any question that he had killed the officer and that the incident, pretty much as I've described it, occurred.

Balter: Now, this was a Los Angeles police officer, you say?

Margolis: Los Angeles police officer. I was so impressed with him as a person, and it looked like he might get the death penalty, that I agreed to represent him. First of all, I went to the district attorney's office and tried to make a deal. My main purpose in the deal was to avoid the death penalty, because once you've killed a police officer-- And here, he stood above this police officer and fired three shots down into him, while the police officer was helpless, disarmed and helpless on the ground. That's, that's pretty tough, pretty tough situation. The district attorney refused to bargain. What happened, however, is that while the trial was in progress, the [California] Supreme Court decision came down, declaring the death penalty unconstitutional. So he could never-- At the outset when I tried to bargain, he could have been given death. But by the time, I think, we were in the middle of the trial, he could no longer be given the death penalty. What I did is I prepared a defense of diminished capacity. The theory of the defense [door opens] was that-- Excuse me, let me get this. [tape recorder off] The theory of the defense was diminished capacity. He had been abused so much by the police that there had been built up in him a feeling of anger and resentment because of the abuse. And that when this incident happened, under the tremendous stress, all of this exploded, and he really wasn't aware of what he was doing. All of this resentment against the past exploded, and didn't then-- Doesn't know what happened to him. I got a professor from UCLA, who was Mexican and who was an expert in the field (he was a psychiatrist), and I got a psychologist who worked for the city, or the county, out in that area, to go along with me to be my expert witnesses. And I did an unusual thing. Ordinarily, in the case of this kind, you try to keep out the defendant's record, because he had a record this long. And ordinarily what happens is when you have a record--

Balter: You're indicating about three feet with your--

Margolis: Yeah.

Balter: [laughs] Right.

Margolis: With that, you know, that prejudices the jury against him. But I had him take the witness stand and testify about all of these instances. And about how in each of these instances he was kicked around by the police, and how this built up. And then had him testify that everything went black. And I had the experts testify to this diminished-capacity business.I had an interesting job. It took us about two weeks to select the jury, because I had an interesting problem in selecting the jury, in that about half of the jury panel was Mexican, but middle-class Mexican. And I learned from just talking to people that, generally speaking, most of the middle-class Mexicans were very resentful of, particularly, gangs and the poorer Mexicans. They thought they injured them and their reputations and their abilities to go ahead. So that I did a-- Used the two weeks to really try to educate these people about discrimination and how it affected them.We tried the case. We put out this evidence, and then the prosecution made a classical mistake. We must have had eight or nine incidents that [he] testified about. They called the police to contradict his testimony on each of those eight or nine incidents. In every instance, they called two or more policemen concerning that incident, and we, of course, had the opportunity to cross-examine them. And in every incident there were numerous contradictions between the police officers. If they'd had only one police officer, then it would have been his [Iglesias's] word against the police officer's word in each case. But because they put more than one officer, trying to build their case-- The fact of the matter is, I said, you couldn't believe any of them on these things.The result was the jury was out for several days, and brought in a conviction for voluntary manslaughter, in what was really a first-degree murder case. And I found out that they had been-- None of them went for first-degree murder after this went in. All of them believed, at least to some extent, his story and, to some extent, the diminished capacity. But the question was, how diminished was it? And so, originally, they divided six to six: six for second-degree murder and six for innocent. Actually got six votes for innocent. And interestingly enough, on the jury there were six Mexicans, and they divided three and three. Three were among the ones favoring the prosecution. But the worst that anybody wanted was second-degree murder. They finally compromised on voluntary manslaughter.The judge was absolutely furious and gave him the maximum sentence that the law permitted, which I think was seven years. He went to San Quentin, served his time, came out. He came to see me. He got married. Oh, he had been married before he went in. His wife was killed while he was in prison. Wife and his baby were killed while he was in prison. She was raped and killed. She had been in the bathtub or something, and somebody came in and killed her and the baby. He got out and got married again, a very beautiful, young Anglo woman. And went to work.I advised him to get out of town. I said, "The police are not going to leave you alone."And he said, "Look, my family--" He was very close with his family. He said, "My family is here. I'm not going to move out; they're not going to chase me out of town. My wife's family is here." He had a job with his father-in-law, a very good job, doing well at it.

Balter: Ben, let me interrupt you there, because we're about to run out of tape. I don't want to miss anything. Okay.

33. Tape Number: XVII, Side Two May 17, 1985

Margolis: Sure enough, he was charged with another murder that happened. He was living somewhere on the southeast of Los Angeles, and this happened in a bar out in the [San Fernando] Valley. It was an absolute frameup. He had never been in this bar where this happened. I did not defend him on that, but he was acquitted. They were just attempting to get him.And then he came to me and said, "Look, you were right. I'm going to get out of town."He moved to Portland, Oregon, where I happen to have three sons living. It's just a coincidence. He has two-- I see him from time to time, still, when I go to Portland. He has settled down. They have two beautiful children. He has a steady job, his wife works, and he's living a normal and good life. And the police there have not bothered him. He is not getting into any kind of trouble at all up in Oregon. I'm sure if he had stayed here, he would never have any peace.

Balter: That's quite a story. Yeah. Ben, we're really pretty much coming to the end of what's been a long, long haul. I did want to ask you a couple, just a couple of quick things, though, before we do end. One is to bring things up to the present. I had the pleasure of being at your seventy-fifth birthday party. And many of your friends, and colleagues over the years were there, at a restaurant near here. There were a lot of jokes being made during that dinner about the fact that you were supposed to be retired. [laughs] I wonder if you could tell me what your plans were supposed to be, or are, and do you have plans for retirement now?

Margolis: Well, in 1978--seven years ago!-- John McTernan and I, along with three others, three younger people, were the partners in the firm. At that time, we arranged to turn over the partnership to the younger people; to stay on really, technically, as employees of the firm with no responsibilities for the finances, and so forth, with their buying us out for our assets, and things of that kind.At that time, John and I had a number of pending cases, and we agreed to continue to work full-time, just until those pending cases were finished. We had expected that would be two, three years, somewhere in that order. Well, some of the cases, at least one of the cases-- Two of the cases still haven't been finished. They're still pending, on appeal now. And there were extra trials--Well, three of them are still pending. That's right, I forgot about the Arkansas case. There are three of them still pending.About three or four years ago, both John and I decided to go on half-time. What we planned to do was not necessarily to spend much less time in the office, because John and I are both well and wanted to be active. We wanted to be free to devote much more time to political and social things, but also have the feeling if-- And to take on no new cases of any kind. And to act, except for old cases that we were still involved in, to act primarily as assistant to others. Thus, for example, I recently participated in a trial against a slumlord, lasted eleven weeks, twelve weeks, but the main responsibility was carried by Barbara Hadsell. I participated in a secondary capacity to a certain extent, although for certain reasons, because of my experience, I had to take the lead. But basically the responsibility for the case, main responsibility, was hers. The fact is that you just keep getting-- It's very hard to be in a law office and work on a half-time basis. We constantly keep getting involved in other things. You have observed, when you're here, what happens with the phone keeping ringing. I have a brother [Harry Margolis] who's practicing law in Saratoga [California]. Several years ago, he was indicted by the IRS [Internal Revenue Service] on the charge of-- For tax charge. He was a tax lawyer, and I helped him on his trial. Spent a lot of time. He was acquitted on all counts. They're after him again, and I'm involved in that again. There's always a lot of things happening, and we keep getting kidded, because actually we're working more than half-time. Although it is a fact that aside from the cases, the old cases, which are still taking a lot of time, some of them, we're not taking responsibility for new cases. The major responsibility is always with somebody else, and we act in an advisory capacity and so forth. So they kid us about our retirement, because both John and I are here nine to five or six, most times. But I'm doing a lot of other things, too, like this oral history is an example.

Balter: Right. [laughs] Well, this hopefully has been a nice break for you on some days. As you think back, and, of course, we had an interruption of several months which makes it more difficult to remember, but as you think back over what we've talked about for many hours now, do you feel that there are any, perhaps, important omissions that we've made, things that we should have talked about?

Margolis: I can't recall any, but a lot of things happened during those years.

Balter: Right. Okay. I think the last question I'll ask you is, as we've gone through this process of going back, remembering the things that you've done in your life, and the things that have happened, have there been any things that have sort of either surprised you or been particularly meaningful to you, in terms of remembering things over the years that perhaps you hadn't thought about for quite a while?

Margolis: Not exactly that. I really appreciate the opportunity to have done this, and found it very useful. Because, while I think I've expressed feelings that I've held for some time, that weren't developed yesterday, they were feelings that, for the most part, I was not required to formulate. You know, I wasn't expressing those feelings toward them. And many of the things that I've told you-- I haven't gone around talking to people about my changes of mind and history. Although what I told you isn't something that happened just now.

Balter: Sure.

Margolis: It was-- And so it helped sort of clarify. You know, when you talk about something that you think about, you clarify the thing in your own mind. So it did serve that useful purpose. I feel a little clearer about where I stand, and where I stood, than if I hadn't expressed myself in my discussions with you. And for that, I thank you.

Balter: Okay. Well, I thank you, too, Ben, for a very enjoyable twenty-five hours or so.

Margolis: All right.

Contents

Copyright Law

Table of Contents

1. Tape Number: I, Side One May 14, 1984

2. Tape Number: I, Side Two May 14, 1984

3. Tape Number: II, Side One May 14, 1984

4. Tape Number: II, Side Two June 14, 1984

5. Tape Number: III, Side One June 14, 1984

6. Tape Number: III, Side Two June 14, 1984

7. Tape Number: IV, Side One July 2, 1984

8. Tape Number: IV, Side Two July 2, 1984

9. Tape Number: V, Side One July 9, 1984

10. Tape Number V, Side Two July 9, 1984

11. Tape Number: VI, Side One July 24, 1984

12. Tape Number VI, Side Two July 24, 1984

13. Tape Number: VII, Side One July 31, 1984

14. Tape Number: VII, Side Two July 31, 1984

15. Tape Number: VIII, Side One September 13, 1984

16. Tape Number: VIII, Side Two September 13, 1984

17. Tape Number: IX, Side One September 19, 1984

18. Tape Number: IX, Side Two September 19, 1984

19. Tape Number: X, Side One September 19, 1984

20. Tape Number: X, Side Two September 27, 1984

21. Tape Number: XI, Side One September 27, 1984

22. Tape Number: XI, Side Two October 11, 1984

23. Tape Number: XII, Side One October 11, 1984

24. Tape Number: XII, Side Two October 25, 1984

25. Tape Number: XIII, Side One October 25, 1984

26. Tape Number: XIII, Side Two November 5, 1984

27. Tape Number: XIV, Side One November 5, 1984

28. Tape Number: XV, Side One May 3, 1985

29. Tape Number: XV, Side Two May 3, 1985

30. Tape Number: XVI, Side One May 10, 1985

31. Tape Number: XVI, Side Two May 10, 1985

32. Tape Number: XVII, Side One May 17, 1985

33. Tape Number: XVII, Side Two May 17, 1985

Index