

Please note that this transcript is being made available for research purposes only and may not be reproduced or disseminated in any way. Should you determine you want to quote from the transcript, you must seek written permission from the UCLA Library's Center for Oral History Research:

UCLA Center for Oral History Research
Room 21564 Charles E. Young Research Library
Box 951575
Los Angeles, California 90095-1575

oral-history@library.ucla.edu

PROFESSIONAL MANAGEMENT EDUCATION AT UCLA:
THE GENESIS AND THE FLOWERING, 1922-1970

George W. Robbins

Interviewed by James V. Mink

Completed under the auspices
of the
Oral History Program
University of California
Los Angeles

Copyright © 1974
The Regents of the University of California

This manuscript is hereby made available for research purposes only. All literary rights in the manuscript, including the right to publication, are reserved to the University Library of the University of California at Los Angeles. No part of the manuscript may be quoted for publication without the written permission of the University Librarian of the University of California at Los Angeles.

* * * * *

THIS INTERVIEW WAS MADE POSSIBLE IN PART BY A GRANT TO THE UCLA ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM FROM RESEARCH FUNDS OF PROFESSOR NEIL JACOBY, FORMER DEAN OF THE UCLA SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction.vii
Interview History.	xi
TAPE NUMBER: I, Side One (March 5, 1972).	1
Childhood in Kansas--Early education--Move to California--Long Beach--Student years at Southern Branch--Ernest Carroll Moore--Development of the university--Relations with UC Berkeley--Role of Moore--Teaching job in Oregon.	
TAPE NUMBER: I, Side Two (March 5, 1972).	27
Joining the UCLA faculty--First teaching--Criteria for promotion in the university--Service on Academic Senate Committee on Reinstatement--Importance of committee service--Disciplinary faculties compared with professional school faculties--Howard S. Noble--Role of Clarence Dykstra in developing the business school--Recruiting Neil Jacoby--Work with University Extension.	
TAPE NUMBER: II, Side One* (March 5, 1972).	53
Arrival of Jacoby at UCLA--History of business studies at the university--Howard Noble's vision of the business school--Recruitment in the early years--Constantine Panunzio--Economics department faculty--State of affairs upon Jacoby's arrival--Reasons for Jacoby's acceptance--Reception of Jacoby--Problems and conflicts.	
TAPE NUMBER: III, Side One (March 19, 1972).78
Dedication of BAE building, 1948--Problems of the building--Competition for space--Work in University Extension--Business courses in Extension--Staffing Extension courses--Growth of the program.	

*Side Two was not utilized for recording.

TAPE NUMBER: III, Side Two (March 19, 1972).103

Business Administration Extension--Relations
with Department of Economics--Problems in
developing a multidisciplinary faculty--
Establishment of Institute of Industrial
Relations--Competition for space in BAE
building--Conflicts of jurisdiction--Robert G.
Sproul and UCLA.

TAPE NUMBER: IV, Side One (March 19, 1972). 128

Robert Sproul--Edward A. Dickson--Wilhelmina
Dickson--Dickson and regental support of the
university--Raymond B. Allen--Strengths and
weaknesses.

TAPE NUMBER: IV, Side Two (April 2, 1972).152

Work as associate dean--Obstacles to tenureship
--Disputes over recruiting--Powers of Academic
Senate Committees--Policy on joint appointments
--Changing image of the school--First period as
acting dean--Relations with Jacoby and faculty
--Conditions for accepting deanship in 1968.

TAPE NUMBER: V, Side One (April 2, 1972). 177

Actions and goals as dean--Student reinstatement
policy--Departmental reorganization--
Reorganization of Executive Program--Integration
of faculty--Problems of promotions in
interdisciplinary work--Administrative problems
--Support of the business community--Business
Research Associates--Conflict with USC.

TAPE NUMBER: V, Side Two (April 2, 1972). 203

Development of research activities--Bureau of
Business and Economic Research--Division of
Research--Role of Ralph Cassady--Foundation
proposals--Real Estate Research Project--
Business Forecasting Project--Introduction of
doctoral program--Jacoby's role in school's
development--Loyalty oath controversy--Student
unrest, 1968-70.

TAPE NUMBER: VI, Side One (April 9, 1972).228

Jacoby's administrative method--Problems in

doctoral program--Jacoby and the university
 administration--Confrontations with Academic
 Senate Budget Committee--Long-range plan, 1956
 --Effect on regents--Faculty reaction--Jacoby
 and faculty--Enrollment and planning--Difficulty
 in setting criteria.

TAPE NUMBER: VI, Side Two (April 9, 1972). 253

Regents and the business school--Edward Carter
 --Business history as a field of study--
 Definition of "management"--Innovative
 reputation--Western Data Processing Center--
 Robert Gross Collection--Contributions of
 Wilhelmina Dickson--Franklin D. Murphy--Clark
 Kerr.

TAPE NUMBER: VII, Side One (April 9, 1972). 279

Clark Kerr and Constantine Panunzio--Business
 studies at UC Berkeley--Flood family grant--
 Berkeley-UCLA relations--Battle for Jacob
 Marschak--Charles Hitch and the business
 school--Department administrative assistants--
 Connie Wooton--Virginia Molony Jackson--
 Selecting a new dean.

TAPE NUMBER: VII, Side Two (April 9, 1972). 305

Seeking the new dean--Harold Williams--Selection
 committee--Choosing Williams.

TAPE NUMBER: VIII, Side One (May 20, 1972). 311

Long-range plan, 1962--Work methodology--
 Issues considered--Degree programs--Accounting
 curriculum--Integrated MBA program--Student
 protest and the business school--Business-like
 approach to unrest.

TAPE NUMBER: VIII, Side Two (May 20, 1972). 336

Protest movements and the American university--
 Faculty and the role of the university--Faculty
 discipline--Donald Kalish and Angela Davis--
 Closing of Western Data Processing Center--Role
 of IBM in closing.

Index. 357

INTRODUCTION

George William Robbins was born to William Raymond and Grace (Kirkendall) Robbins on April 5, 1905, in Thayer, Kansas, where he received his early education. His father, a real estate broker, served two terms as a member of the Kansas State Legislature, during one of which George served as page in the House.

The family moved to Long Beach, California, in 1921, and Mr. Robbins graduated from Long Beach Polytechnic High School in 1922. He then enrolled at the University of California, Southern Branch, located on North Vermont Avenue. An outstanding student, he earned his BA degree in economics in 1926, then matriculated at Harvard Business School, receiving the MBA degree in 1928.

He returned to Los Angeles as director of research for the advertising firm, Farrar Company, but left the following year to accept his first teaching position, an assistant professorship at the University of Oregon. He was quickly promoted to associate professor, but when in 1931 he was invited to return to UCLA as a faculty member, he accepted.

His career at Westwood was impressive in its rise through professorial and administrative ranks, inasmuch as it paralleled the growth of the university and the

development of the business school. Hired as an assistant professor, he taught courses in accounting and in his specialization--marketing and international trade. He became associate professor in 1947, full professor in 1955, and emeritus professor upon his retirement in 1970.

His first administrative assignment was that of head of management training in the university's Engineering, Science and Management War Training Program, 1942-45, and of University Extension's business administration program from 1945 to 1948. He was responsible for organizing and guiding the curricula program established to meet the postwar needs of the business community.

Mr. Robbins was appointed associate dean of the College of Business Administration in 1948 and named associate dean of the Graduate School of Business Administration when that school was formed in 1955. From 1957 to 1964, he also served as chairman of the Department of Business Administration.

Three times during his associate deanship (1953-55, 1956-58, 1962-63), he became acting dean, replacing the peripatetic Dean Neil H. Jacoby, who was pressed into advisory service for the federal government and the United Nations. When Dean Jacoby relinquished the deanship in 1968, Professor Robbins succeeded him. He remained head of the School of Management until his retirement.

Mr. Robbins's expertise also resulted in a wide variety of assignments worldwide as teacher and consultant. He was a visiting lecturer at the University of Wisconsin in the summer of 1947. He traveled to Italy as an instructor at IPSOA (graduate school of management in Turin) in 1959 and to India in 1964 to teach at the Indian Institute of Management in Calcutta which was established on a model presented by him to the Ford Foundation and the government of India in 1959. He was a visiting professor at the University of Strathclyde in Glasgow, Scotland, in 1967.

In addition to his university-associated work, Mr. Robbins has been a market research consultant since 1944. In this capacity, he has worked with the European Productivity Agency, the Ford Foundation, and the Agency for International Development. For the Ford Foundation, he traveled to India and Chile; under the auspices of AID, he has worked in Bolivia, India, and Turkey.

From 1956 to 1967, Dean Robbins was a member of the national council of educational advisors to the American College of Life Underwriters and the American Institute of Casualty and Property Underwriters.

He is a member and past president (1952-53) of the Southern California Chapter of the American Marketing Association and holds memberships in the Western Economic

Association, Alpha Kappa Psi, Pi Gamma Mu, and Delta Upsilon. He served as national vice-president of Beta Gamma Sigma from 1963 to 1965.

In the following pages, which consist of tape-recorded interviews made with the UCLA Oral History Program, George Robbins discusses the growth and development of the study of management on the UCLA campus, culminating with the creation of the Graduate School of Management, and recalls his own participation in business management as student, teacher, administrator, and consultant from 1922 to 1970.

These recollections are part of the Program's series on University History. Records relating to this interview are located in the office of the UCLA Oral History Program.

INTERVIEW HISTORY

INTERVIEWER: James V. Mink, University Archivist and Director, Oral History Program. BA, MA, History; BLS, University of California, Berkeley; Certificate in Archival Administration, American University, Washington, D.C.

TIME AND SETTING OF THE INTERVIEW:

Place: George W. Robbins's office, Graduate School of Management, UCLA.

Dates: March 5, 19; April 2, 9; May 20, 1972.

Time of day, length of sessions, total number of recording hours: The interviews took place in the morning. Five sessions were held, lasting an average of four hours. A total of ten and three-quarter hours was recorded.

CONDUCT OF THE INTERVIEW:

The interviewer made extensive use of the records relating to Professor Robbins's tenure as dean of the School of Management extant in the files of the Chancellor's Office and the University Archives. The interviewee was asked to discuss his early education and positions held before coming to UCLA. Because he had been a member of the UCLA faculty since 1931, he was also asked to discuss the history of the School and the work of his predecessors, and to provide a frank appraisal of Dean Neil Jacoby's administration in which he had served as associate dean. In general the sessions followed a chronological approach, although Professor Robbins was also asked to discuss various topics relating to the general history of the UCLA campus.

EDITING:

The editing was done by H. Lynda Kimmell, assistant editor, UCLA Oral History Program. The verbatim transcript was checked for accuracy and edited for punctuation, paragraphing, spelling and verification of proper names. Words or phrases introduced by the editor were bracketed.

Professor Robbins reviewed and approved the edited transcript. He made few deletions or changes, but he did make some additions. The index and introduction were prepared by Joel Gardner, editor, UCLA Oral History Program. The Program's staff prepared the other front matter.

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS:

The original tape recordings and edited transcript are in the University Archives and are available under the regulations governing the use of permanent noncurrent records of the University.

Records relating to this interview are located in the office of the UCLA Oral History Program.

TAPE NUMBER: I, SIDE ONE

March 5, 1972

MINK: First of all, could you tell me where you were born and something about your early education?

ROBBINS: I'm a small-town boy. I grew up in southeastern Kansas. I was born in Thayer, Kansas, on April 5, 1905, a town of about four to five hundred people. I was in that community until I was a senior in high school.

MINK: Was this a farm community?

ROBBINS: It was a farming community. This was a small town that was a center for shopping for a small area in southeastern Kansas.

MINK: Were your parents farmers?

ROBBINS: No, my father was a real estate broker and was a member of the Kansas State Legislature for two terms. As a matter of fact, my first brush with urban society was when I accompanied my father on his first term to Topeka, Kansas, and served as a page in the house of representatives. I can remember what a thrill it was that first night when I went down the hallway of the hotel and looked down on the lighted dome of the capitol. It was one of the big thrills of my life, and I can still remember what a feeling I had. So I was not a farm boy, but on the other hand, I wasn't a city boy. I grew up sort of in between.

MINK: Were you, the only child in the family?

ROBBINS: No. I had a sister who was about seven years older and a brother who was thirteen months older and another brother who was two and a half years younger than I. It was a rural setting, no pavement, no electricity, no inside plumbing. My parents bought the little hotel in that town mostly as a place for us youngsters to get some experience meeting other people and having a responsibility for work. So I learned how to change beds and empty slops, wait on tables, wash dishes, and do some cooking when I was very young.

Then my father saved enough money for us to come to California, which was a dream of his. I don't know how it was stimulated. I think it was stimulated by a man he used to trade with who talked about California a great deal.

MINK: Did he have notions of getting into real estate out here?

ROBBINS: Yes, I think he did. He thought he could transfer his occupation to this environment, which proved to be difficult because he was one of those very honest, Middle Western farm-oriented persons that everybody had faith in. His word was absolutely his bond, and when he got into this vast company of urban realtors with all the tent shows, he was out of his element. He simply couldn't engage in this

kind of dishonesty, you see. So he didn't do too well. Well, he did fairly well.

But at any rate, that summer of 1921, he packed three boys and their mother and father into a Hudson Super Six loaded down with camping equipment, and toured about three thousand miles up to the Northwest, ending in Long Beach where I finished high school. My brother had already graduated from high school, but he waited a year so we could go to college together.

MINK: An interesting kind of a question would be--and a number of people who have been recorded have had this same experience--to compare the kind of education you received in Kansas, in high school there, with the kind of finishing education you had here in high school.

ROBBINS: Well, the change was very dramatic, because it was a very small high school with only about forty or fifty people in all four years--forty, I guess it would be. The instruction was almost uniformly mediocre. I can remember only two very outstanding teachers in all of my grades and high school.

MINK: In Kansas?

ROBBINS: In Kansas. One of them was a middle-aged woman, a maiden woman, who was the daughter of a very learned physician in that town. She was an expert in Shakespeare, and she really turned me on to literature, particularly

Shakespeare.

MINK: Do you recall her name?

ROBBINS: Yes, Evelyn DeMoss. She made us memorize most of Hamlet, for example, and I can still quote this. I got to know how to look up the meaning of Shakespeare's words and so on, and to love it. Nothing like that happened to me in the physical sciences or in the social sciences, really.

The other one was the principal of the school, whom I did not know very well. His name was Dr. Cross. He was a very learned person, and I had a high respect for him. He taught social studies. I only had one class from him, but outside of school he was a very great inspiration to me and to my family and a very good friend of my father's.

MINK: In what way?

ROBBINS: Well, conversation and his humanity; he was a great humanist. We would call him today a great humanist. He was a philosopher and a very mild-mannered but thoughtful person who was thoroughly honest intellectually. But aside from these two teachers, the instruction in Thayer was very poor, and the community was a sterile community, basically. It wasn't in the Bible Belt, but it was in the Methodist Bible Belt.

MINK: The next best thing. [laughter]

ROBBINS: Yes. I grew up going to the Methodist Church, but I never could stand it very well. My family, of

course, believed in playing cards and dancing and having fun. We lived on the main street. Our hotel had full glass windows. The drummers and itinerants who stayed in the hotel would play cribbage and play cards, and we would open up the lobby and the dining room back of it and turn on the Victrola and dance. By and large, the members of the community thought it was a very great sin to do anything like this. After prayer meeting on Wednesday nights, they would come in a very long stream past our place and look out of the corners of their eyes in order to get a real knowledge of what sin was like. [laughter] I think the community was not a very exciting one to grow up in.

On the other hand, Long Beach was a pretty big town for us at that time, and Long Beach Polytechnic High School had some very fine teachers. One of those, whose name I can't recall, a professor of social science, took a special interest in me and called me to stay after class one day after I had been there for about half a semester. He said, "I've looked up your record and I think you are eligible to belong to the California Scholarship Society." This was all news to me--I'd never even thought about scholarship--and this interested me. He then talked to me about my going to college. He thought I should certainly go to college.

MINK: Had you had any notions of going to college

up to this time?

ROBBINS: Oh, I always had, yes. I thought [first] I would go to Kansas University. My father and mother were anxious to have me go. My father was not a graduate of college, but my mother was a graduate of Kansas State Normal College. She was especially interested, of course, as mothers are, in pushing offspring. I then decided that I wanted to go to Stanford University, where I was admitted; but I wound up at UCLA in 1922 because I couldn't raise the money to pay tuition at Stanford. I've never regretted it, although I did at the time.

MINK: In this decision to go to Stanford, were you looking to attending the School of Business Administration at Stanford?

ROBBINS: Oh no, no. I had no knowledge as to what I was interested in, excepting that I was not particularly interested in sciences. I was much more interested in social sciences and languages and literature and a little bit in art. I didn't know much about art. But music was very important to all of our family.

MINK: Were they musicians?

ROBBINS: No, only as amateurs. My older brother played the piano quite well and very seriously in Kansas, and I studied the violin. But I started too late and didn't have any instruction in that local town, so I gave it up after I went to college, although I played

second fiddle in the Long Beach [Polytechnic] High School orchestra.

I've always had a very deep interest in music particularly. This was stimulated to some extent by the environment at Long Beach, because there were band concerts there--a very excellent band, free band concerts. There were other concerts that I was never able to attend. In Kansas, we had to drive fourteen miles on dirty, dusty roads to go to any kind of theater at all except a nickelodeon movie which we had in our town.

So the Long Beach environment was a stimulating one. There were concerts by good musicians. Troupes of actors would come through and give performances of good things, like Hamlet, for example, which I saw several times there. The high school had an ROTC and I liked ROTC. I didn't care much for sports; I never had an opportunity to be trained in sports in Thayer. I was always too shy. I thought I was incapable of doing much in a competitive way. And in college I didn't engage much in sports either. But there was a great contrast to that sterile sort of Middle Western atmosphere. I'm sure that it's not sterile today in that same sense. I've visited the hometown, and the town has practically disappeared because of the development of roads. Still, the people around there have travelled in Europe and go to Los Angeles,

Hawaii and New York now. They look at the same television we do, so it's a much different situation than it was at that time.

My sister studied music. She was a coloratura soprano, and she studied in Kansas City for a while. I was a coloratura soprano as a boy and sang along with Galli-Curci and others on records.

MINK: Kansas City was not a sterile place in the sense of not having good schools of music, certainly.

ROBBINS: No, it had one or two very good schools. It had, of course, a first-class newspaper; the Kansas City Star was one of the best papers in the United States at that time. We got the Kansas City Star, of course, every morning. But I didn't go to Kansas City, never was in Kansas City, until much later, after I moved here. Well, that's something of the background.

MINK: So you were not able to go to Stanford but you were able to come to Southern Branch in Los Angeles.

ROBBINS: Yes, because it was free tuition, virtually. I think we paid--what was it, six dollars a semester?

MINK: Yes, it was very reasonable.

ROBBINS: Seven-fifty or something like that.

MINK: Were you planning then to commute from Long Beach or were you going to move to Los Angeles?

ROBBINS: No, my brother and I took a room with the Lohmans near Sanborn Junction on Santa Monica Boulevard. We'd walk about a mile from there to the

university, the Southern Branch, which was a junior college branch really, a normal school, I guess. We had access to the kitchen, and we'd more or less cook our own food. My mother would send up food when we went home every weekend during our freshman and sophomore years.

MINK: Did you take the Long Beach Red Car?

ROBBINS: The big Red Cars, and we'd go down Sunset Boulevard on the Red Car and then walk over to Fifth and Main and catch the big Red Cars to Long Beach. That was for our first two years.

MINK: So you were enrolled, in the first two years, in [the College of] Letters and Science then?

ROBBINS: Yes, right.

MINK: And the date would be...

ROBBINS: Nineteen twenty-two to 1926.

MINK: I see.

ROBBINS: Yes, we had our degrees in '26. We were the second graduating class. You see, the third and fourth years were added just in time for us to continue, because when we started as freshmen we thought we would transfer. I was hoping I would transfer to Stanford.

MINK: While you're talking about the third and fourth years: we read from the administrative point of view of how this came about; but I wonder how the students actually felt about it. Was there a really strong

feeling about this?

ROBBINS: Oh, exceedingly strong. Exceedingly strong.

MINK: You talked about it a lot.

ROBBINS: Oh, we did. We, of course, had, I think, a most extraordinary group of students. I don't really know why other students went to Southern Branch, but I suspect more or less the same reasons we did.

MINK: No money.

ROBBINS: No money, or they wanted not to leave town and they didn't want to go to USC for some reason or other.

MINK: USC at this time, as a private institution, did have a tuition.

ROBBINS: Yes, it had a tuition.

MINK: Perhaps just as strenuous for that time as it is for people today.

ROBBINS: I think probably it was; I don't recall a dollar figure. But at any rate, as far as I was concerned, I wanted the best education. USC at that time did not have the reputation comparable to Stanford or Berkeley. Of course, it's a much different institution today, obviously, but at that time I wouldn't have given it a second thought.

We soon became very much involved in the campus life, in peripheral, small ways. In the junior year, we became associated with a group of students, all of whom were DeMolays, as we were, and started a DeMolay

fraternity which later, in 1929, became a chapter of Delta Upsilon, after I graduated. My brother and I were leaders in the development of the local fraternity from 1924 to 1926. I was house manager and negotiated the lease for the first house on Vermont Avenue, and a second on Heliotrope Drive. I had to work my way through school, so that managership helped. I also had a job in my senior year as a secretary to the principals of Hewitt Street School and Sixtieth Avenue School. By that time, I had gotten an old Model T Ford, to drive to these schools everyday, clear over to Avenue 60, near Pasadena.

MINK: What kind of a curriculum were you pursuing?

ROBBINS: I was interested in economics.

MINK: When did this interest really start? You said that in high school you were interested mainly in social studies. Are you able to identify when this change came about?

ROBBINS: I find it a little difficult to trace my thinking on this. Part of it was just accidental probably. I wasn't very much interested in the first course in economics, which was taught by a stockbroker downtown by the name of [Elmer S.] Nelson.

MINK: At the Southern Branch?

ROBBINS: At Southern Branch, yes. He was a lecturer brought in.

MINK: Was he teaching beginning economics?

ROBBINS: Yes, in Millspaugh Hall, to a big group, two or three hundred people. He wasn't terribly interesting or exciting. I was somewhat interested in political science also, and more in geography, also; but basically, the commerce curriculum, which it was called at that time, interested me more than anything else. The elementary accounting, then the statistics, were taught well. Ira Frisbee taught the statistics. Howard Noble taught some of the business organization courses to begin with, and they were very interesting courses to me.

MINK: Well now comes one of those interesting aspects of the university. In that period the Normal School influence was still there, and all of these courses were taught with the idea in mind that the people who were taking the courses probably would go into education.

ROBBINS: No, that wasn't the case.

MINK: You didn't feel that way?

ROBBINS: I felt no identification with the Teachers College, none at all.

MINK: None whatsoever. Was that made very distinct in that time, do you think? Were you told by the faculty that you were separate.

ROBBINS: We were in Letters and Science, separate from the Teachers College. I had no identification with Teachers College at all. I knew Marvin Darsie and,

of course, Ernest Carroll Moore and a few of the other teachers there. At that time, you see, there was developing on the faculty a nucleus of first-rate scholars, like Loye Holmes Miller, Vern Knudsen, [William Conger] Morgan in chemistry, and Gordon Watkins in economics. Cloyd H. Marvin had left the year after I got there, I think, so I just barely knew him. He became president of George Washington University in Washington, D.C., and was well known after that. And then Lily Bess Campbell in English. I didn't study with her, but we had Rieber in logic and some excellent young instructors there--Miller McClintock, for example, in political science, who later became one of the originators of traffic engineering in the United States; and Marshall McComb, who is now justice of the Supreme Court of California, a major dissenter, who was a very close friend of mine. I admired his teaching very much. He taught business law.

So there was no feeling that most of the people on the campus were going to head for teaching. I think a great many were: the girls, particularly, were getting credentials, but not many of the men.

MINK: I'm perhaps overemphasizing that. I think, however, there has been the tendency and feeling in the university, and maybe you would agree with this, that some of the early faculty were primarily the carry-over from the Normal School and oriented in

that direction.

ROBBINS: Well, I think that may be true, but I never felt it. I don't believe that these professors that I'm talking about would have come here if they were going to be a part of the Normal School.

MINK: Teaching the teachers.

ROBBINS: There was something beyond. This was a school that was going to go places, and this is what Dr. Moore told them in recruiting, I'm sure. He preached this to the students. There are two things I remember particularly in the indoctrination lecture that he gave. He got everybody together, all the freshmen together, in Millspaugh Hall, and there are two things that I remember from his speech.

One was that there are two kinds of surfaces in the quadrangle, bricks and grass; you walked on the bricks, but you did not walk on the grass. This had implications with respect to your behavior as a whole, you were in the university now, and you had to behave like ladies and gentlemen with some self-discipline. It wasn't just bricks and grass. But we got the message, most of us, I think, and we observed it quite well.

The second thing that I remember was that "this institution is in its infancy and it's going to become one of the great universities of the world." I believed him, and I think most of the rest of us

believed him, and we thought that we were a part of a pioneering enterprise that was terribly important.

MINK: Do you feel that Dr. Moore was a compelling kind of individual?

ROBBINS: Not to the ordinary student, but he was physically impressive, you see. We all knew that he boxed in the basement of his home with a punching bag, and he was robust. He was a forbidding person because of his stiff demeanor. He didn't turn his head--he turned his whole body to look at you and screwed up his mouth to talk. It was somewhat difficult for him to get a flow of verbiage, and a lot of students made fun of him. His Psychology X--this is the orientation course for all students--was much beyond most freshmen. He would give us essays to write every week, and we had no idea what we were writing about or talking about. He'd say, "What is education?" for example. You'd have to write an essay. Here's a freshman writing an essay on "What is Education?" They were thought-provoking titles, but most of us didn't get around to thinking about them until the night before the next meeting next week. So we dashed off essays which must have been pretty terrible to read. But I think we had high regard and high respect for him. We believed him when he said that this was going to be a great school.

MINK: I wanted to come back again to the matter of the third and fourth years. I had asked you a while back

if the students were really worked up about this. I suppose it was an economic consideration as far as the students were concerned, certainly. They would either have to go to Berkeley or they would have to go somewhere else to finish if this course of changing to the third and fourth year didn't come about. But what kind of activities were the students involved in, besides just talking about it? Were there any things that they became involved in to bring this about?

ROBBINS: Oh, yes. I don't think the economic considerations were the prime ones. It was a relatively small student body. When I graduated it was about three thousand, which is relatively small, about the size of Long Beach High where I graduated. No, I think we loved that campus, we loved our associations, we liked the professors and the teachers, we thought the teaching was excellent, and by and large it was very, very good. There was heavy emphasis upon that. I think we had a loyalty to that institution generated by some factors-- I don't know, leadership of the student body in part. We had some very good leaders in the student body like Fred Moyer Jordan, who was president in 1924-25. We had excellent rallies. We had a losing football team, but we all went out and rooted for it and believed in it just as much as though it were winning. I think there was developed there, in that streetcar college, a group of leaders, many of whose names are prominent

among the alumni now, who worked with the administration and worked by themselves to make something of this university. We really had a pioneering spirit. We established traditions every day. I mean we didn't do it subtly, we did it boldly. "We're going to establish a tradition today!" we'd say.

MINK: I see.

ROBBINS: I think there was a spirit there that I do not feel on the campus at the present time because we're not one of the "have-nots"--now we're one of the "haves." The students get a lot here and take it for granted that it's their lot. Well, we didn't have much. But in the senior year--to answer your question more specifically--when the bond issues were up for buying this campus...

MINK: I know there was a lot of activism then, yes.

ROBBINS: ...we organized a tremendous activity and I suppose at least fifty percent of the student body participated in electioneering, going to the polls and checking out and taking people to the polls. When that won, there was a tremendous rally out here on this campus and I stood where Founder's Rock is today, with those people in Pajamarino, and we built a big bonfire and celebrated coming out here. This was a very real thing to us.

MINK: Perhaps there wasn't anything really in an active kind of way that students could do to bring about

the third or fourth year. This was a matter that just had to come from the regents and the legislature.

ROBBINS: I don't think it came from the stimulation of the students nearly as much as it did from the foresight of men like Edward A. Dickson and Ernest Carroll Moore. Those two you think of as being the most important ones. Mrs. [Margaret] Sartori, who was on the board, I think, acquiesced. But this was against rather bitter opposition from Berkeley, and the northern regents, and the people generally of the state.

MINK: It's an interesting thing--just maybe you would want to comment on it, too--when you compare this whole matter of the third and fourth years and the right of another university in the state besides the University of California to grant the BA. It created such a furor and it came so hard, and yet, just within the last year, a piece of legislation has been signed which spreads out the right of the state colleges to grant the PhD, which up until this time has been primarily in the hands of the university.

ROBBINS: I hadn't heard that they had been given the authority.

MINK: To establish PhD programs, a select number.

ROBBINS: A select number, yes, that's right.

MINK: Nothing was heard in the way of any kind of positive action on the part of the university.

ROBBINS: Oh, I think the university has quietly been

fighting this for a long, long time in the Coordinating Council. I think it is true that many people in the University of California, and many of my colleagues on this campus, have looked askance at the development of the state colleges, and they look down their noses at the state colleges as being inferior. I can't help but remember how I was at the end of glances looking down the noses when I was at the Southern Branch. I recall that in the development of UCLA, there has been some profound change in this campus, and it has developed into a fairly good school, a fairly good university. It's entirely possible that San Diego State, Fresno State, San Jose State--which is after all much older than the University of California--might develop in the same way, given time. I have been one of those who have felt that it is very important for us in the university to help the state colleges establish higher standards and to rival us, to emulate us in the best rivalry sense--not in the current mistaken notion of the meaning of that word, "emulation." For this reason, I pushed for the development of a joint PhD between the Graduate School of Management and the School of Business Administration at San Diego State.

Now it's true, I don't think they have the faculty to compare with ours, but UCLA didn't have one that compared with Berkeley or Stanford or even USC when I was on that campus. But we have developed. I think

one has to look ahead and look at this in the context of the developing needs of the state and the resources of the state.

MINK: Were you impressed by visiting lecturers from Berkeley? I'm sure they were brought down.

ROBBINS: I don't recall that any visiting professor was ever brought down.

MINK: Never?

ROBBINS: I don't remember a single one that was brought down. I do remember that the president of the university came down, President [David P.] Barrows, and made a sterile speech before the student body. In it he made it perfectly clear that UCLA was never going to amount to anything--very cleverly done, but we must remain a junior college. I don't recall that there was any kind of intercourse at all at the faculty levels. I think the faculty at Berkeley was opposed to this development. They opposed every step of the way the third year, and then the fourth year. They opposed the development of graduate study here persistently. As late as 1940, or '38, somewhere in there, Dr. [Edward] Strong, who was the graduate dean on that faculty, said that the establishment of the Graduate Division on this campus would never occur as long as he was alive. They were very vocal about it.

We were treated as country cousins when we went up there. But we did go up; the members of student

body would go up in large numbers to the Big Game, the Cal-Stanford game. We rooted for Berkeley; we sang the Berkeley songs.

MINK: They were happy to have you, I'm sure, on these occasions.

ROBBINS: They tolerated us, I think, in some way. There's been an enormous change that I've seen, because in the last five or six years of my active life I have not sensed anything but equality between the faculty and the business school up there and down here. I think in general Berkeley is proud of UCLA now. We've won our spurs. We're better than they are in some departments, not as good in all departments as they are by any means yet.

So that battle is won, and I think that Berkeley is not now taking the same attitude towards Irvine, Santa Cruz, and San Diego that they took toward us. We suffered the development of this thing. I think it gave us a great deal of strength; this suffering pulled us together. There's nothing like suffering to pull a family together or any kind of group. Success doesn't do it. Pain does. [laughter] We had plenty of pain at the old campus.

MINK: Do you feel that Moore was a disciplinarian par excellence? I've heard this, that he was very strict in the administration of discipline on the campus.

ROBBINS: Yes, he was strict. He picked deans like

Helen Matthewson [Laughlin] who were strong. Earl Miller, on the economics faculty, who was an excellent instructor in elementary economics, a fine teacher--I didn't happen to have him as a teacher, but he had a fine reputation--was a very strong person in working with the students in a quiet but very firm way, carrying out Moore's wishes. I thought this was a good thing.

I still think it was a good thing for the head of the university to make it clear to the students that this was a privilege they had. They were using resources that were put up by somebody else and they owed an obligation to maintain these resources. I find it very, very difficult to see students walking across the lawns here, cutting across, although I think the architects, the people who lay out plots like this, are making a great mistake by putting it in squares and having people walk around the squares, when the natural flow of people is like the natural flow of water. I would much rather, in a quadrangle, have paths cross there in the square places. I think plantings should be chaparral rather than expensive turf and all this. But nevertheless, as long as it's planned that way, why not preserve it and keep it beautiful? Of course, I'm not a conformist, you can see it right away.

[laughter]

MINK: It's all right. We need them. Would you say that Moore was a visible man on the campus? Something

that we don't see too much of today is visibility; you never see the chancellor around. We used to see Dykstra. Even in the matter of sub-heads of the university, there isn't the visibility, to some degree because it's larger. Did Moore do a lot of mingling with the students on the campus?

ROBBINS: I don't think he did, but the campus was very small; it revolved mostly around the quadrangle between the library and Royce Hall. Coming in and out of the office and going home, he would walk there, and he always spoke to all students. You always felt that somehow or other behind that stiff facade, there was a man who was really interested. He just didn't let himself go. I don't think he palled around with the students at all. No, he wasn't terribly visible, but all freshmen, of course, got to know him because of Psychology X, which met once a week, and listened to him.

MINK: Was this a credit course?

ROBBINS: No, this was a noncredit course.

MINK: But you had to attend it.

ROBBINS: You had to attend it. It was an orientation course. It was an introduction to philosophy and education. He would pose questions about what education was all about and what your careers should be, like what is the meaning of science, what is the relationship between science and religion. Topics like

this, he would deal with.

MINK: Did you find it an utter bore?

ROBBINS: I found it not an utter bore; at times I was interested. But by and large, students took this as a kind of necessary joke. You had to write these papers and turn them in, and we were graded on them. He had a staff of student graders who had written good papers before.

I don't think that he was very close to the students; however, they had a respect for him generally. I think it was very, very unfortunate that the whole episode of communism on the campus, his firing of Celeste Strack as a student (disqualifying her as a student, kicking her off the campus, whatever you want to call it), that it was a very unfortunate episode which, I always thought, was engendered by his luncheon meetings with business and professional people at the California Club.

MINK: Oh?

ROBBINS: Or the City Club, or one of the clubs. I think it was the California Club.

MINK: You mean you think they influenced him in his decision?

ROBBINS: I think he sat there and listened to these businessmen who were frightened to death of communism, [but] didn't know much about it. He got very frightened about it and he thought that he had to protect the

university against the opposition and fears of the public. I think this was a misreading, as I look back now, and I thought so at the time.

MINK: Were you here then?

ROBBINS: Yes, I was here.

MINK: Well, you graduated in 1926 and then?

ROBBINS: I went directly to Harvard Business School.

I came back in 1928 to 1929 for one year as a research director for an advertising firm. I was called by a friend of mine who was dean at the business school at the University of Oregon to pinch-hit for somebody on his faculty who resigned suddenly. So in August of 1929 I asked my firm for a leave of absence for six months to go up to do this job. I had become interested in university teaching and I wanted to try it out.

MINK: This was your first teaching experience.

ROBBINS: This was my first teaching experience. I stayed with it and never went back to business. I had become interested in teaching because when I was at Harvard Business School I was recruited to be on the faculty of Lingnan University in Canton, China. Also I was recruited to be at the Higher School of Commerce at Kobe, Japan. I was very serious about both of those but decided that I wouldn't go abroad, mainly for family reasons. My father and mother needed my financial assistance here more than I could help them from China. So I was interested in teaching,

and I came to UCLA in 1931 and have remained here
ever since.

TAPE NUMBER: I, SIDE TWO

March 5, 1972

MINK: Before we began the interview, you were telling me an interesting anecdote about how you happened to be recruited to join the faculty here after the move to Westwood. I wonder if you could begin the second side by telling that again.

ROBBINS: I was at the University of Oregon in my second year, having been appointed associate professor at the end of my first year.

MINK: Oh, that's a very rapid rise.

ROBBINS: And quite undeserved, but that's the way things happened at that time at Oregon. During the summer of 1930, a friend of mine from Oregon and I were driving east by way of Los Angeles from Oregon. We came to the campus because I hadn't seen it and I wanted to look around. I met Elmer Beckman who was the executive secretary to Dr. Moore and an old friend of mine, and he showed me about the place. I went in to say hello to Dr. Moore and he seemed to remember me (I doubt if he did but he made the right kind of conversation; it pleased me anyway) and was very, very cordial. During the discussion, he said suddenly, as he did always in his conversations, changing the subject, "Tell me, why aren't you on our faculty?" And I said, "Nobody's asked me." And that's all that

was said about that. A few months later I received a telegram from Howard Noble, who was chairman of the economics department, offering me a job as an assistant professor of economics. There was, as I recall, no request for biographical information or my plans for research which, obviously, were very nebulous in those days. I was just starting teaching and the teaching load was very heavy at Oregon, as they were here in those days. I accepted because I wanted to come back to Los Angeles and I thought the future of UCLA was going to be very bright. I was indoctrinated with this as an undergraduate student, and I felt it all along. So I did accept, and the first time I saw Howard Noble again--he'd been an instructor of mine--he said, "George, why did you give up an associate professorship with Oregon..."

MINK: I was going to ask you the same thing.

ROBBINS: "...and take an assistant professorship here?" I told him that I thought really that my status at Oregon was incorrect. It was premature that I got the associate professorship but I didn't turn it down.

MINK: Did it just sort of come?

ROBBINS: The dean there was Dave Faville, the late Dave Faville. He was a dean there for only three or four years and then went down to Stanford. I had known [him] at Harvard. He was very anxious to build up his young business school faculty with people

who had backgrounds somewhat similar to his, the Harvard case method. He was interested in injecting it there, developing it. He knew I was rather anxious to get back into business life again and go back to my job.

MINK: So this was sort of a carrot he was holding out.

ROBBINS: I think he asked the president to make this promotion, and the president, Dr. Hall, did. He called me to his office and told me that he thought I was one of the promising young men who would help make the University of Oregon an important place. He thought this was a good thing for me to have an associate professorship. I didn't disagree with him on any of those sentiments, of course. [laughter]

MINK: No.

ROBBINS: But really, I got into teaching by the back door. I didn't have a doctorate; I never have gotten a doctorate. I wouldn't, of course, be able to get on the faculty, or even on the campus as dogcatcher, I suppose, now. That's the difference in standards that have occurred. I've been very instrumental in upholding those standards in recruiting faculty, too. I think that they are correct.

MINK: So you decided to give up your associate professorship.

ROBBINS: Yes, I really don't think it meant very much to me; status didn't mean very much to me in

those days.

MINK: Your tenure, of course, was a matter of job security, and it was the Depression.

ROBBINS: I was not at all concerned with the job security at that time. It just didn't enter my head that there was any problem, though I learned more about the facts of academic life as I went along.

MINK: Yes.

ROBBINS: I was very naive; but I've never regretted it, although I was assistant professor for about fifteen years during that period when, on the campus, year after year we'd wait for the list of promotions and there would be one or two or three a year on the whole campus.

MINK: This was when promotions all were decided at Berkeley.

ROBBINS: Oh, yes.

MINK: They were just forwarded to Berkeley.

ROBBINS: Yes, that's true. The chairman of the department in those days, and up to the end of the Second World War, was really chore man. He simply laid out schedules and advised students. He had no budgets; he had a buget for stamps, I think, or something like that. He was allocated secretarial service, but he didn't have a budget for it, as far as I know. He made recommendations to the provost at that time, and the provost would make the

recommendations up the line to the president. All decisions were made by Dr. Robert Sproul, I'm sure.

As a matter of fact, I can remember when I was acting chairman of the department, which was much later (I guess the first time I was acting chairman was in the summer of '45 or '46), and we had to make a decision on the appointment of a teaching assistant because one resigned. I remember classes were to begin in about a week or ten days. The department members got together and made a recommendation for someone to fill this part-time position which must have paid \$650 a semester, or maybe a year, a very small amount. We went over to Dr. Moore's office to ask him to approve and he did.

We didn't know until the end of the first week whether or not that person would be appointed. We had to telephone Berkeley three times, as I recall, to get word from them. Miss Robb, who was the president's secretary, would apparently go into the president's office and pull this recommendation off of the bottom of the pile and put it on the top. She pulled a lot of other things and put them up for other department chairmen, and the president finally would act on them. It was almost literally true that we couldn't buy a paper clip without the approval of President Sproul. And how we ever operated a campus like that with any kind of standards, I've often wondered. I guess it

was just because we had so many people on the faculty who were devoted to this place.

MINK: What were the classes that you were first assigned to teach?

ROBBINS: They were mainly elementary accounting and my own field of marketing and international trade. I would teach fifteen to eighteen hours a week, beginning at eight every morning of the week, for six mornings.

MINK: Oh, you taught on Saturdays too?

ROBBINS: We had Saturday classes. I was always a very late sleeper and I had very great difficulty in getting awake until ten o'clock. Often I wouldn't know what I had talked about at eight o'clock until I asked the students the next day where we stopped. But those were heavy teaching loads. I had usually three subjects and sometimes four: an upper division class in marketing, an upper division class in foreign trade and two or three lower division lecture classes in accounting. Sometimes there were four subjects: Accounting 1A-1B and these other two upper division courses. The classes then ran usually thirty to fifty or sixty students. Sometimes the foreign trade class would be a hundred.

MINK: Did you have much assistance in the way of readership?

ROBBINS: Very little. We had some readers. They were good readers; they were undergraduate students.

Professor William F. Brown, for example, on our present faculty here, was a reader of mine in marketing. Then he went on to graduate work elsewhere. But those were very burdensome jobs of teaching. I had no time to develop a research interest at all. I was devoted to teaching. I think the emphasis was on teaching here, good teaching, and had been all along, because we had excellent teachers. We had a few clunkers along the way, but as a student I recognized this. There were some very great teachers, some of whose names I've mentioned already.

In the Department of Economics there were good teachers: Watkins was an excellent teacher; [Paul A.] Dodd came along; [John C.] Clendenin a little bit later; [Lewis A.] Maverick a little bit later; [Floyd F.] Burtchett, in finance, was an excellent teacher; and Noble and Frisbee. So we had a reputation in the economics department of having very good teaching, but not much reputation for research in that time.

MINK: Is this the reason that you feel that you were promoted? Do you feel there was, as early as this, a bigger emphasis on research for tenure?

ROBBINS: Well, I think there was always a very heavy emphasis upon research here in promotions, I think an inordinate interest in research, all the time I've been at UCLA. I say inordinate cautiously, but I think we were very anxious to rival Berkeley. We were very

anxious to prove to Berkeley that we were as good as they were. And we were not going to promote anybody who wasn't a research scholar, who didn't have a long list of publications.

It has always been very difficult, from my experience, to give adequate recognition to people who have been outstanding teachers or who have made contributions to the development of the university in other ways--for example, organization and management and administration and educational policy leadership. There's just no doubt; all along I have had to counsel all of our young faculty members to develop their research interests very early and to succeed in that at an early date. That's the only thing they can do. They have to develop a reputation for themselves and they have to get things published.

I think this is right, this is fine, this is good. But on the other hand, there are quite a number of instances on the faculty where people would make very little contribution to the development of the university, outside their own private development as scholars. They were far more interested in becoming well known as research scholars in their field than they were in the school and the university's whole development. So they would not attend committee meetings, they would not take their fair share of advising the students and these other things that had to be done. They eschewed

those things deliberately. They succeeded in getting promoted much faster than people who gave much more well-rounded contributions to the university.

But I suppose this is all part of developing standards and trying to be found great in a short period of time. Of course, as someone who did not develop a reputation as a scholar, I'm in a difficult position to criticize. I did publish a fair share of papers along the way, but I certainly wasn't to be compared with the best research scholars. A great deal of my attention during my tenure as assistant professor was to committee work that I was asked to do and I did well. I was asked to do more.

This was true, for example, of the Reinstatement Committee, where I served for years and years, which was a very burdensome thing. All of the student discipline, academic discipline problems, were handled by one committee of the [Academic] Senate. The deans and the chairmen of the departments had nothing to do with it. Disqualified students and their parents came before that committee during its long hours at work. I would devote most of my summers, for two or three summers, to nothing but handling the interview of students and making decisions on disqualification, reentry, this kind of thing..

MINK: These were academic disqualifications.

ROBBINS: These were not behavioral problems.

MINK: Not behavioral problems but academic problems.

ROBBINS: Academic, yes. We would have to interview many parents, and of course all of them were convinced that if their children stopped now, they would never go back, and it would ruin their lives and all this kind of thing.

MINK: This is a very, very onerous responsibility.

ROBBINS: I think people who didn't serve on that committee never had an adequate vision of its importance to the students. I'm sure we developed a technique under Professor Arthur P. McKinley, for example, and Joseph Kaplan, Francis Blacet, and others who worked on that a very long time; we developed a technique which I think saved the careers of many, many students.

MINK: Could you tell me something about it? Not too many of the faculty have spoken about the committee work that they have done in the senate. I wonder if you could tell me what it was that you feel you developed?

ROBBINS: Well, we developed a philosophy of attempting to save all the people who were worthy of saving who got into academic trouble. This was from fifteen to thirty percent of the students in any class, more in freshman class.

Of course, there are many reasons for failure. One of the most important reasons had to do with immaturity, inability of the student to handle himself

when he got away from home, when he got into the more free atmosphere of the university. One philosophy that prevailed amongst many faculty members was "Well, if he can't make a C average, he shouldn't be here. Kick him out. We won't tolerate anybody around here who won't make it." But our philosophy was quite different than that; we felt that anybody who entered UCLA had proved that he had what it takes to do university work.

MINK: If he'd been awarded entrance, in other words.

ROBBINS: Yes, we have a rather stiff entrance, and I think the lower schools at that time were doing much more uniform work than they are now, probably, in preparing students. But we felt that we should ferret out the reasons, we should try to find the reasons for the failure and try to correct them. Experience taught us that one of the worst ways to handle a student was to let him come right back into the atmosphere in which he failed. If he were doing too much work in extra-curricular activities, he would probably go back and do the same thing. Or if he were in bad company, he'd go back and do the same thing. Or if he were immature and didn't know how to schedule his work and handle himself, didn't have a clear motivation to do good work, then he should get into another environment and prove himself on that environment and then come back.

So we generally did not reinstate immediately,

but we made people go out and do something else to prove that they could succeed, even though it was making profit selling popcorn in the street, or whatever it was--digging ditches or whatever. But there are a great many students who go to this university because their parents want them to have an education that they didn't have, and the students don't understand what the university is all about. They don't really have any background in their families, or the culture which would prepare them for a love for learning. And those people got into trouble quickly. Many of them did stay out for awhile against parents' advice. The parents would marshal all kinds of resources from the governor on down to pressure us to make the wrong decision. We learned to be pretty tough-minded about it, and I think our record of rehabilitation was excellent. But we missed on some, I'm sure. We reinstated some too quickly, I think. We did, nevertheless, have a very good track record of saving a number of people, many of whom are rather important citizens today about the state.

Well, now this was an onerous job. There were other committee assignments along the way--reorganization of the tenure rules, for example. I was secretary of that committee; that's a little later on. That took hours and hours of work. In fact, I served on over 200 committee appointments during my years here.

MINK: These committees raise an interesting point that you make: committee service is one of the five criteria for promotion in the academic ranks. But I take it from what you said that you feel, at least in the initial period of your tenure here in the university, that not too much emphasis was placed on this criterion.

ROBBINS: Oh, I don't think there was. I don't think there has ever been.

MINK: You don't think there is now?

ROBBINS: I don't think there is much emphasis now on this. It's a difficult, debatable question. See, you cannot have a first-rate department or first-rate university, or part of the university, unless you populate it with creative scholars who are also creative teachers. Those are two different things.

MINK: The best of all possible worlds.

ROBBINS: But on the other hand, you can't possibly, in my view, develop a first-rate professional school, as opposed to a disciplinary department, without having very competent, aggressive, educational policy leadership and organizational and management prowess, know-how. I think one must distinguish between the disciplinary departments and the professional schools, partly because the objective of a disciplinary department, like history or economics or physics, is to turn out more people like themselves. That's their major interest and goal, particularly at the PhD level. They

sort of tolerate the general education to freshmen and sophomores as a part of the necessary cost of doing the other thing, and the real interest is in turning out more historians, say, who are like themselves--better maybe, but like themselves.

Now the purpose of a faculty of a medical school or an engineering school or a business school or a law school (I'm not so sure about law) is to turn out people who are different from you. There is no such thing as a "professor of business administration." There are professors in various disciplines and fields that must come together in a synthesis to produce a doctor of medicine, or a manager. So the faculty as a whole is not interested in producing only more anatomists or more surgeons, but they're interested in producing a general practitioner and some specialists, too.

In the business school, I think, this has been particularly true. We do not have a discipline called business administration. I think there is a developing discipline called management, and of course our new name suggests this. But in order to turn out good people and good research in this field of business management or business administration, or whatever you want to call it, we must have a synthesis of a wide variety of disciplines from the social sciences, physical sciences, mathematics. We were one of the first faculties of business administration in the

country to appoint people who had not gotten their doctorates as economists or as accountants or business administration people. We were the first ones to bring in an engineer--Ralph Barnes, for example, who is a leading authority in his field, motion and time study. It was a joint appointment with the engineering department, but we initiated it in asking Dean [Llewellyn M.] Boelter if he would like to have him, and he of course said yes. So he was a joint appointee. But many of our colleagues, particularly at Berkeley, said, "What on earth are you doing with an engineer on the faculty of business administration?"

And we appointed a psychologist, a behavioral scientist, and other people of this kind. I've worked for a long time to try to get a business historian, a real historian--not a business administration major who has an incidental interest in history, as I and others indeed have. But we tried to find one who is a professional historian whose interest happens to be in the development of the institution called business, which is one of the most pervasive institutions in our whole society, or any society.

People think "What's he doing here?" And many people in history, for example, would say, "Well, if he's a first-rate historian, he wouldn't join a faculty of business." Or psychologists say, "If he's a first-rate psychologist, he wouldn't be in business school."

We've passed that stage now. We do have in our leading business schools absolutely first-rate scholars in those basic disciplines who do not lose their professional standing or credentials by being in the business school, but rather emphasize the fact that they are interested in the applications of their discipline to this particular field.

Now, the aim is to get a faculty together that is multidisciplinary and, hopefully, eventually interdisciplinary. This is a very difficult thing, but essential to the attack on the difficult and complex intellectual problems of organization and management. Moreover, you have to have a high order of intellectual educational policy leadership. You have to have strength to manage your resources and to knock heads together and get people to work together who have really quite divergent interests, but who must unite in one central interest--developing a first-rate professional school that will turn out managers and research scholars in this field of management. This professional school, I think, is a special kind of situation in the university.

It's not quite the same as in a history department, though I think good management in a history department may be all too rare. The whole tradition in the university, the European tradition, views the department as made up of the professor and a number of docents, and that the one professor is the best known

man and the best scholar and is, prima facie, the best organizer and manager of the whole curriculum, and so on. This notion, I think, is a bad notion, a sterile notion.

So I think that--to follow up this thought now--in promotions and recognition, if you have to have special different kinds of people working together to make a professional school, then you can't put all of them through the same sieve; you can't measure them exactly the same way.

We tended to do that in our committee system and our budget ad hoc committees dominated by representatives of departments whose aims are different from those of a professional school. I haven't been as much a critic of that system as some people. However, I think the secrecy part of this system is the dangerous thing. Then the chairman of the department, or the dean, does not know who or what is back of the decisions. One cannot get at the basic conflict in educational philosophy that may impede the development of a professional school.

Now, I think, this is breaking down; Chancellor [David S.] Saxon has done a very good job of this. I think Chancellor [Foster H.] Sherwood began it. But there were many times, as chairman of the department or dean, that I would go to the chancellor and say, "What is the reasoning behind the turning down of the department's recommendation?" And he would say, "I'm not at

liberty to tell you."

Sometimes Provost Dykstra would read me the reports of an ad hoc committee and say, "Here it is. I can't show you the letter because the signatures are there, but I'll cover these over and you can read it." But he was chastised in no uncertain terms by the Budget Committee for this practice. I think the Budget Committee has intimidated one chancellor after another on this basis, Ray Allen right on up to Murphy, but Murphy didn't tolerate this too much.

MINK: I don't know anybody who could intimidate Murphy.

ROBBINS: He solved that problem by appointing Sherwood and turning it all over to him.

MINK: That's always a good way.

ROBBINS: Sherwood was a part of the old establishment here who was pretty much convinced that secrecy was a good thing. So he didn't violate that. But he did, I think, begin to recognize and to help work with the Budget Committee to tell them that there's a difference between the professional school and other departments.

The professional school needs the people who can work with the professionals. This means the doctors who can work with doctors, or people on our faculty who can work with businessmen and other organization leaders in certain ways. We do need to be oriented to practice to some extent, not full extent by any means. We have to be out ahead of practice, but we can't very

well be ahead of practice unless we know what the practice is all about. We've always had trouble getting recognition for things like organizational leadership. In my own case, this was true. I was advised several times by very good friends to leave the university and go into business because management was my forte. I didn't want to do it. I wanted to lick this thing and stay here, because I had a vision of what a first-rate business school could be like. Neil Jacoby shared that with me, and we worked toward that end. So I tolerated this academic obstinacy, and obviously I did what I wanted to do, otherwise I would have gone someplace else.

MINK: Let's go back a little bit again to Noble. I think the assessment of Noble has been that he was, in the old College of Commerce, rather limited in his views. Would you agree with that?

ROBBINS: Oh yes, yes. I think so. I think that he was a good accountant, and he was a good Latin teacher in high school. He had a very orderly mind. I don't think that it had great expansiveness. It didn't have a great tendency toward growth and development as the field developed. During his lifetime, the field just exploded, you see; during our lifetime, the field just absolutely exploded.

MINK: Do you think that Noble recognized that he was being passed over as far as the development of the

school was concerned?

ROBBINS: Oh, I think so. I think that he felt that he had built this school and he had developed it.

Dykstra terminated him, in a sense, asked him to step down and told him he would bring in somebody else.

It turned out to be Jacoby.

MINK: Yes, but he really was figuring on bringing in somebody else before Jacoby showed up on the scene.

ROBBINS: Oh yes, I think so. I was not fairly close to this whole situation, but hindsight tells a good deal.

MINK: Well, as much as you want to talk about it.

ROBBINS: I'm perfectly willing to speak very frankly about this. I may, on editing it, find some things that shouldn't be public for awhile.

MINK: Those can always be restricted.

ROBBINS: Yes. Dykstra, when he came here, wanted to build up a first-rate business school. When he was at Wisconsin, he had a quarrel with Faye Elwell, dean of the Commerce School.

MINK: I don't know Faye Elwell.

ROBBINS: Fayette (his name) Elwell was an accountant, very much in the same vintage as Howard Noble. He was very aggressive--much more aggressive than Howard, who was a very placid and easygoing and sweet person. But Faye was a very vigorous fighting man, and he had organized an enormous backing of accountants in

Wisconsin to support him as the dean of the school there. He was a tyrannical old duck. But I loved him; I knew him quite well. But Dykstra and he had a run-in because Dykstra wanted to broaden the base of that school and make it something besides just an accounting school. And Faye didn't want to do it. So Faye organized, throughout the state, an anti-Dykstra clique which really killed Dykstra as president of Wisconsin. This is one of the major reasons why Dykstra left Wisconsin; he had to. So he came here. He told me that he thought this campus, and any first-rate university, needed a first-rate school of business administration. Now he understood management and administration; he had been a manager, city manager, and a university manager.

MINK: Yes, yes. Cincinnati, Ohio.

ROBBINS: I was a student of his here, when he lectured part time at UCLA. He was then manager of the City Club.

MINK: He was city manager of Cincinnati, Ohio.

ROBBINS: Yes. He left Los Angeles to become city manager [there]. He knew something about the breadth and scope of decision making and organizational ability required of a manager; he could see that being a first-rate accountant wasn't the only answer to the problem. So, this was one of the things he wanted to do. He looked at our school; he said, "You have some strength

but you have also weaknesses. It's just an accounting school; we've got to make it more than that." Well, what to do? And he said, "I'd welcome your advice on that." And I said, "Well, I don't have any advice at the moment except that I agree with you one hundred percent." I had tried to work with Howard and the other members of the faculty to make a professional school, a real professional school, out of this, instead of a commerce college. Of course, I had little leverage as a very young assistant professor.

MINK: Would you honestly say that they were not interested in doing it, or did they lack the breadth to do it?

ROBBINS: Well, they lacked the breadth and the modernity. The faculty was made up mostly of economists, you see. These economists were interested in economics, like my colleague next door, Ralph Cassady, who is just interested in research in economics. He and others didn't really know anything about professional schools.

Now, Howard and Ira Frisbee had graduated Harvard Business School. I did, too, but theirs was an earlier Harvard Business School, when the orientation was mostly on accounting. The Harvard curriculum was changing very rapidly, and local faculty members weren't keeping up with these changes. They didn't read about them; they didn't know about them. They were preoccupied with the basic disciplines of accounting

and economics and their applications. In the whole country, this concept that Dykstra had was new. It was not only Wisconsin and UCLA, but almost every school was suffering from this; even the Harvard Business School was suffering with internal stresses and strains.

MINK: Sort of a myopia.

ROBBINS: But Harvard was going ahead rapidly because it had a lot of funds and had some very good leadership. I was very close to those people whom I knew all these years; and I conversed with them, I studied what they were doing, and I studied what they were doing in other business schools, too. I thought this was a part of my education as a professor in this field. So I think that Dykstra wanted new leadership in the College of Business Administration. He had never actually told me this. In the summer of 1947, I was invited, by Faye Elwell, to teach in his summer session at Wisconsin. I didn't know that Dykstra was going to move ahead. I didn't really know very much about the Wisconsin situation, but I learned. I got an earful from Faye. He just hated Dykstra. But I loved Dykstra, see, so I was getting an earful.

MINK: You were in a precarious position.

ROBBINS: Oh, no, I was in an interesting position. I wasn't telling on anybody. I had no responsible position. But I got a telephone call from Dyke when

I was there saying, "Do you know Neil Jacoby?" And I said, "No, I don't, but he's in my home every Sunday on the radio on the 'Chicago Round Table of the Air.' I know him very well from that." He said, "Well, he has a summer home outside of Chicago, and I wish you'd go out and talk with him about his coming to UCLA as dean." (This was the first time I had heard of it.) He said, "This is a confidential mission." I said, "Okay. On that basis I'll go." So I drove down and talked to him about UCLA.

MINK: Had he been out here?

ROBBINS: Oh yes, before that. I should back up and say that I had met him. In the spring of 1947, I hired him to give a series of lectures to a group of stockbrokers downtown. He had written to the university saying he was going to come out and spend six months here because of the health of his child, and he'd like to have something to do while he was out here. That letter got to me as head of business administration extension, so I hired him to give this series of lectures, which was organized by my assistant, John Van de Water, for the stockbrokers. Van was a [University of] Chicago JD and knew Neil at Chicago. So I did know him, barely, that's all.

I did go down to see him, in Chicago, and talked to him about the school and the development and answered a few questions and that was it.

At the same time I was conversing with some other schools about their deanships. I was invited to be the dean of this school at Minnesota, so I was up in Minnesota interviewing them, and Dykstra was on the phone saying, "You don't want to take that job up there. You must come back here and help develop this school"--which was very flattering. I decided on other reasons not to take the job.

When I came back here then, it wasn't very long before Dykstra called me in and said, "I've offered the job to Jacoby." I think that Noble may have felt that I had something to do with getting Jacoby here, because I had hired him for extension and I had been to Wisconsin and I went down to interview him. There was no secret about my doing that, but I had no role except that of a confidential courier. Of course, after Neil came on the faculty, in about six months or so, he asked me to be his associate dean and so that lent some credence to the notion that there was synchro-mesh at work here.

But I had no thought of doing administrative work on this campus. I had been invited to be the dean at two other places, partly because of my work in University Extension. I built up the University Extension in business administration. I was the first member of the faculty in business administration to be appointed to an extension liaison office responsible for the academic

quality of extension. This was Baldwin Woods's notion, which grew out of ESMWT program. [Do] you know what those initials are?

MINK: You'd better [tell me], for the tape recording.

ROBBINS: Yes, a federal program: Engineering, Science and Management Defense Training, later changed to War Training, under University Extension. Later, the program had separate status headed by Dean M. P. O'Brien of the School of Engineering at Berkeley. The program developed courses for training people in the war industries. During a period of about two or three years when I was head of the management part of the program, we trained about 29,000 people.

TAPE NUMBER: II, SIDE ONE

March 5, 1972

MINK: You were talking, when we left off, about the coming of Neil Jacoby and the whole situation surrounding Dykstra's appointment: how this may have affected Dr. Noble's thinking and how he might have felt about you. I was going to ask you, had you any aspirations yourself for the deanship here?

ROBBINS: Oh, no, I had no such aspirations. In fact I didn't really want to become a dean. I had looked over one or two other offers and I felt that I was not prepared to assume the responsibility of a deanship anyplace. And I wasn't at all sure that I cared about the kind of work that a dean has to undertake.

MINK: I thought perhaps your interest in management might have led you in that direction.

ROBBINS: Well, it did, but my experience in management had been limited to the war training and to the University Extension effort. I felt that there was so much beginning to happen in the field of business administration, it was just beginning to broaden out and explode. I could see from my work in plants, in the war training effort, that there were so many new fields of engineering and mathematics and behavioral science opening up with management implications, I

felt that I had to have much more experience, reading and studying, before I could undertake leadership of an important faculty. And I wasn't interested in being a dean just for the sake of going through the motions or the title. I didn't need that; I didn't want that. I did think, however, there might be a time, when I was prepared, I might want to try my hand at developing an institution where these newer things were going to happen. But I had no thought of the deanship at that time.

I don't know what Noble's reaction was. He was always very pleasant to me. He did indicate indirectly to me and to others that he was a little hurt that he was being let out.

MINK: Well, he wasn't really being let out. He was simply going back to teaching.

ROBBINS: Yes, he was going back to teaching, but to him, I think, the status of deanship was very important, particularly amongst his colleagues in other universities. At that time, there were really only about twenty-five or thirty business schools that had any kind of standards at all. The deans of those schools had come together in a very informal way under leadership of Faye Elwell and others in the United States. They had met informally to talk about the problems the deans had, and it was a kind of exclusive little club where their wives would go. I enjoyed the benefit of this exclusive little

club...

MINK: Without being a dean.

ROBBINS: No, after I became associate dean; because very soon afterward Neil went on leave. He took his leaves whenever they came up, and sometimes he'd go to other places like the Council of Economic Advisors when he wasn't eligible for leave. So I would step in and go to these places for him, and it was a very nice, friendly relationship with some very fine people, the deans of these schools.

Well, this was the nucleus of the organization of the American Association of Collegiate Schools of Business, which today is a powerful accrediting association for business schools and has a membership of, I suppose now, something like two hundred, or two hundred and fifty. It encompasses an association with nonaccredited schools in the number of about six hundred.

So I think that in this group of people who knew the original organizing deans, the status was a very important thing for Howard. He enjoyed that company; and to be let out of that company, I think, probably was a little painful to him.

MINK: He'd actually been the one who was responsible for the establishment of the old College of Commerce.

ROBBINS: Yes.

MINK: You were here at the time that the college

organized.

ROBBINS: Yes.

MINK: What actually brought this into existence? Was this something that came from the faculty, or was it something that was imposed by the administration?

ROBBINS: I've frankly never known the answer to that question. I was a hard-working assistant professor just learning the trade. I'd been here three or four years when this happened, and I have never known. It's inconceivable to me that Howard would have the aggressiveness to push this thing through. I don't think he was responsible for doing it, although he probably had an important role to play. My guess is that there were some alumni who were back of this. But I've never been able to trace that history, and I've never gotten a satisfactory answer from Howard or anyone else. I'm sure it didn't come as a result of President Sproul's urging. I'm not at all sure it came as a result of Ernest Carroll Moore's urging. I doubt if he was really very much interested in the professional schools as a whole, except education. I think it probably was a group of alumni and maybe some people in the legislature. This aspect of our history I've always wanted to find out about and never did. I was present at the dinner at the University Club where Dr. Moore and a few business leaders and some alumni and members of faculty were present and where we celebrated the

establishment of the school.

MINK: A College of Commerce connotes undergraduate emphasis.

ROBBINS: It was a College of Business Administration and it never was a College of Commerce. Berkeley had a College of Commerce. In fact, it was the second oldest college of commerce in the United States, second or third.

MINK: I had somehow thought that before or prior to it becoming a College of Business Administration it had, here on this campus, been called the College of Commerce.

ROBBINS: No, never was. It started out as a College of Business Administration. It took people from the freshman year to the bachelor's degree. Students in economics or anyplace else were permitted to register in the college directly from high school or as transfers from letters and science to this college.

We had four years of this work. The first two years were almost identical with the College of Letters and Science, and there was a long debate as to what these requirements would be. It wound up to be about the same as the College of Letters and Science. We patterned it after Berkeley's College of Commerce, which always had had undergraduates--freshmen and sophomores.

Well, this was the name from the outset; and we

were very proud to have the name business administration rather than commerce, because the term commerce was much, much too vague and macro-oriented and it did not really tell anything about what we were trying to do. Subsequently, of course, most of the colleges of commerce have changed their names, as Berkeley did finally, to business administration.

But I remember that dedication ceremony downtown where Dr. Moore got up and talked about the importance of having this new college and how he looked around the country for its first dean, and he found that on our own campus we had just the man. He held up the new textbook that Howard had done, the old [James O.] McKinsey textbook. (Which South-western Publishing had asked Howard to take over when McKinsey was aging, and Howard redid that book; of course, it was "McKinsey and Noble." When McKinsey died, Noble's name went on it. It was one of the best accepted elementary textbooks in the country. In fact I guess it is, historically, the best seller.) He held this book up and said, "This is proof positive."

Howard had not written anything up to that time at all. As far as I know, I can't recall anything he did, maybe an article or two on accounting education. But he was a first-rate teacher, a very systematic, orderly organizer of work. His lifework was really editing and reediting that book. The publishers were

very astute. They told him exactly what to do to make it a best seller, and he did it, he had to do it.

They would not even allow him to include in the preface acknowledgment of the contributions to that book by his colleagues. I made some contributions to it--very minor--but some others, like Harry Simons, for example, made enormous contributions to that textbook.

MINK: Why was that?

ROBBINS: South-western Publishing Company didn't want that superfluous stuff in the book: "Cut out all that nonsense;" and they dictated that. They dictated other things. He wanted to change the verbiage, for example, to call a "reserve" for depreciation an "allowance" for depreciation, which was a new term that was beginning to be accepted in advanced circles. They wouldn't do that because "reserve for depreciation" was the traditional pattern. This was the sort of thing, and Howard went along with that. It was a vast money-making enterprise; he did very well.

Howard was devoted to the school, but really never had any concept of planning. He always would make decisions ad hoc. He gathered his faculty together on an ad hoc decision basis. Witness my own appointment and the appointment of almost everybody else on that faculty that came during Howard's tenure. People would come by, like Wayne McNaughton for example, and call

on Howard and tell him they were interested in a job. He would gather some of us together, and we'd go to lunch at his house or someplace and meet this man. The next thing we knew, Howard had asked him to be appointed, and the chancellors had gone along with him.

MINK: That's an interesting way.

ROBBINS: This is more typical than not, of course, throughout the United States. The dean, being the chairman of the department, goes to the head of the institution and they make the decision.

MINK: Do you think the faculty were resentful of this? They were in on the decision-making in a way, weren't they, because they had met the man?

ROBBINS: In a very flimsy way. He might call us together after the luncheon to say, "What do you think about him?" "Well, he looks like an interesting person"--very superficial. I don't think it was a very good way.

There were one or two of us who were always raising the question: "How does this appointment fit into your scheme of development? What's the goal, and how does this move toward that goal?" Howard just didn't understand what we were talking about; he really didn't. This method of his was solving a problem that he had, immediately. He had a budget position to fill, and this filled it. He needed a man in production management, and this fellow had experience in time and

motion study. This was the way he appointed other people. They came to us. They came through and wanted a job. Ralph Cassady was the same way, although Ralph was one of the most bitter critics of the lack of planning after he got on the faculty. Whenever any decision was to be made whether to add a new course--somebody wanted to teach a new course--some of us would raise the questions: "Why should we have this course at this time? How does it fit into the mosaic or pattern? What is our future? What will you see in the future of this school?"

Well, the fact of the matter was that Howard, and some of his colleagues, really saw the school as a training ground for CPAs. This was the main function of a business school to him. This wasn't the only school in the country: this was true of Wisconsin, for example; it was true of Illinois and a dozen other schools. Most of the deans were accountants. The reason for this was that accounting was the first field in business that developed any kind of systematic literature. It was all geared to practice and a very vital practice. It was dealing in rather specific, concrete numbers, at first elementary concepts but very vital ones. It's subsequently become much more laced with interdisciplinary work, which wasn't true at that time. As far as Howard was concerned, nobody should be in our faculty that didn't teach elementary

accounting. Everybody should teach elementary accounting.

MINK: Or at least be able to teach it.

ROBBINS: Yes. He took this point of view when he was chairman of the economics department. The year I came, Constantine Panunzio, a sociologist, came to the faculty. Constantine and I knew each other before. Curiously enough, Constantine met my father when both of them were strolling along the beach, in Long Beach, when I was in high school. They struck up a conversation, and we were nearby, and Dad called us over. This started an acquaintanceship by my older brother and myself with Constantine which lasted, a very close relationship, up to the time of his death. My brother is also an academic man.

So Constantine and I appeared on the same day to share the same office in Royce Hall. Neither one of us knew that the other was on the faculty.

MINK: We owe Constantine a great debt.

ROBBINS: Oh, my, yes. People never did know because so many people disliked him and misunderstood him. He was a trial and a difficult person to live with in many respects, but certainly we would not have the retirement system that we have today if he hadn't fought like a bulldog and if Paul Dodd hadn't gotten his bulldog jaws on this problem too.

MINK: How do you feel that Panunzio was misunderstood?

ROBBINS: Well, in the first place, he was an immigrant,

and foreigners were not too welcome in academic circles in those days.

MINK: The thirties.

ROBBINS: I really think they weren't. In the second place, he was a fierce-looking Italian. He had a walleye--he had had a firecracker ruin an eye when he was a youngster in Italy--and this gave him kind of a fierce expression. He was an intense person, extremely intense person. He drove himself. He had a Latin thermometer that just went shooting right up as soon as there was any kind of heat attached to it. He would explode, even to his best friends, and one had to learn how to be tolerant of this. One could learn this very easily if he got acquainted with him, because he was one of the most lovable persons you would ever meet.

He was intensely scholarly, intensely and broadly interested in society, of course, and everything that goes to make it up. I spent many hours with him when both of us were batching here, before I was married, living in the Glendon Apartments. We would spend Sundays roaming the hills amongst the rattlesnakes and deer and the hares. I got intensely acquainted with him, and he taught me a good deal of Italian, which came in good stead when I taught in Italy later. He would fly off the handle and people would misunderstand him. Some people reacted exactly in kind, which, of course, is a tendency that all of us have. It came to

fisticuffs on occasion in sociology, you know. At any rate, when he first joined the faculty, he did so by reason of Gordon Watkins's pleading, "We need a sociologist on the faculty." At that time, a sociologist was somewhat akin to a Communist in many minds. It was a kind of a dangerous thing to have a sociologist on the faculty, and particularly at that stage of development at UCLA. I think that probably-- I don't know this to be the case--some members of the faculty looked askance at having sociology. Howard called him in and said, "You will teach elementary accounting."

Well, of course, Constantine had never studied accounting and didn't know the first thing about accounting. He didn't have the accountant's orderly mind at all. He had an entirely different approach to things.

He just blew up. He said, "I will not. I wasn't hired to teach accounting." He wasn't; there was no agreement. They were always at odds as a result of that. He never did teach accounting, but he was scheduled to teach it. I guess finally Howard gave up, or he didn't need him for that section or something, so that solved the problem.

The environment at that time was very rigid. Watkins, who was a really first-rate mind and first-rate teacher, one of the finest teachers I ever had,

was interested in administration (he was later dean of the College of Letters and Science). Earl J. Miller was the dean of students. So you had a faculty with strong people oriented elsewhere. You had a noneconomist as head of the economics department, and you have mercurial Floyd Burtchett who was always off doing something fantastic. You had no basis for developing a first-rate economics department.

MINK: Would you say that Marvel Stockwell also was of the same ilk, more or less limited in his view?

ROBBINS: Marvel was a very good economist. He and Miller were here because Watkins had known them at Illinois, that same old incestuous sort of inbreeding. Marvel was one of the sweetest persons you'll ever know, mild and a good teacher, methodical. One knew exactly from his lectures where the indentations in the notes were. But not much inspiration; [he was] very quiet, and he did not assert himself very much. He went along with things pretty much; he was a cipher in the department. But everybody loved him. I don't think he ever shone very brightly.

Dudley Pegrum, a Canadian, came down, of course, about that time from Berkeley; he was anything but shy and retiring. He was always telling you what the decision should be, in no uncertain terms. He was not a unifying, consolidating influence, but rather a disruptive kind of influence.

MINK: Apparently the same thing happened in a number of different departments, I find through these interviews. People who came from Berkeley sort of blew things apart.

ROBBINS: Well, I don't think Dudley did it because he came from Berkeley. He would have done it anyplace, just because of his nature. He's very bombastic and cocksure. He knows the answers to all the questions before the questions are defined. He's a pretty competent economist, a very, very sensitive individual, as most of these blustery people are. One learns years later how he took offense at some casual, jocular remark that you made that had no intention of fitting that meaning. But I think this is true of Dudley. He was a hard worker and was a stimulating teacher for students. They helped him; he was youthful. But there was no foundation for real first-rate development in economics, and the economics department has always suffered from that here until more recently.

MINK: You didn't go so far as to discuss what the situation was here with Jacoby when you first talked at his home about the possibility of his coming, or did you?

ROBBINS: No, I didn't. I didn't go into details. I simply told him that I thought that there was a very sound basis for the development of the school because they had a first-rate accounting discipline. I thought

that was essential to a school, but it wasn't enough. It needed to broaden. We had to have long-range planning; we needed to fight for budgets; we needed to have systematic recruiting and systematic curriculum development. These things were lacking, but we had some good people, besides myself [laughter], on the faculty. I thought the environment was right; I thought the leadership of Dykstra would give him the backing. I thought that he would have trouble getting recognition from Berkeley from President Sproul. It would be an uphill fight but worthy. I didn't go into personalities, and I didn't talk about people, because I thought it was very unfair to him to give him a biased view.

MINK: A preconceived idea.

ROBBINS: A preconceived notion which might be quite wrong. I'm only infallible to myself. [laughter] He came out here, and he was quite naive, I think, about the situation in general, coming as he did from Chicago, where lines of authority and faculty government were simple. He knew we had a [Academic] Senate and a Budget Committee; he knew that the dean had no real budgetary authority. This came later. This was beginning to come right about that time. I can't tell you exactly when it did come, but I don't think we had much more than superficial control of the budget. I'm pretty sure that this was quite a little bit later when we could open up our own drawer and look in and see how

many FTE [Full-Time Equivalent positions] we had-- who was filling what post and how much they were making and all this kind of thing.

MINK: The question that comes about this time is, why do you think that Jacoby decided to make you his associate dean? Why not somebody else in the department?

ROBBINS: I thought you were going to ask why did he come.

MINK: Well, he has, to a degree, explained. Maybe you have something you would like to add. Answer both questions, if you would.

ROBBINS: Well, at least put my foot in it. I think there are two reasons why he came--at least two reasons. I think one of the most important was the health of his son.

MINK: Yes, I agree, from what I've heard him say.

ROBBINS: This was a very serious problem to him because they had awakened several times in the middle of the night with a blue boy there, choking, then having to rush to the hospital to have his throat cut open so he could breathe. He thought that that Chicago climate was not good for it. I think this is a very important motivation.

Another guess is that he just got kind of tired of the vice-presidency.

MINK: Well, he intimated that fund raising really

wasn't his forte.

ROBBINS: I think he had said that, and I think this is true. In retrospect, I would say this is probably true, because he never was good at it here, never was very much interested. I think he and Hutchins have always been friendly antagonists. They had admiration for each other, but not necessarily agreeing on things.

But I think he felt that it was time to move, and I suppose that he felt this maybe did have a future. I think he felt that Southern California probably was going to develop. I don't really know beyond that; it's a guess. But then why did I take the associate deanship?

MINK: Or why do you think that he asked you to take it?

ROBBINS: Well, I don't know, really. I had, of course, achieved considerable success in organizing the business administration extension and in the war training. I demonstrated I knew how to get things done, how to plan, and how to get things together. I think he felt that if he were going to accomplish what he wanted to do here, he had to get rid of some of the problems that took up all of Dean Noble's time. The biggest set of problems was the student affairs.

See, we had students all the way from freshmen through to first-year graduate. It's an enormous problem of handling of students. Disqualification

came to us with the dissolution of the Reinstatement Committee. Keeping the records on all those students and advising students was an enormous task. He didn't want to do all that, so he asked me to do it. I think he was just wise enough to see that he couldn't build without delegating responsibility. We had talked together, both in Chicago and after he arrived here, about planning, what kind of school we really should develop, and we found ourselves very much in agreement on the method of going about this--not necessarily on details--but we were simpatico on this. I guess this is the reason for what he did.

MINK: How would you say his coming was accepted in general by the rest of the faculty?

ROBBINS: I think he was not too well accepted at first.

MINK: Can you tell me why you think so?

ROBBINS: Well, there were a lot of loyalties to Howard Noble. We were all loyal to Howard Noble and we were fond of him. He and Josephine were great socializers; they had us to their home, and we had picnics in the park with the families. It was a small group and we were friendly. Howard had developed a first-rate group of teachers for CPA, and it was really, at that time, recognized as being, I guess, the best CPA preparation on the coast, perhaps west of Chicago. There were a lot of people who just faced the prospect

with discomfort, I think--having an unknown dean. They had not been consulted, as far as I know, very much about this.

MINK: That wasn't the name of the game, then, was it?

ROBBINS: No, it wasn't. Dykstra had done it pretty much on his own. I don't recall having been consulted except for what I told you, but not as a member of the faculty with others. Dykstra didn't call us in and sit down with us and say, "Well, what do we want to do?" I think if Dykstra had done that, they would have said, "Let's not change."

MINK: Now that's an interesting point. Parenthetically, yes, people don't like surprises. On the other hand, you went into particular detail and took particular care in telling that there was this criticism of Noble from the standpoint of "Where are we going?" and "Does this appointment fit into our ultimate goal?" And that, for example, Ralph Cassady, and other members of the faculty were critical of him on this standpoint. Okay. They didn't like him and yet they didn't want to change. Is that it?

ROBBINS: Well, I think that there were only two or three of us, assistant professors, who were critical of the lack of forward planning. As assistant professors you don't go around waving the flag about this sort of thing. We were living with it and planned to inject our ideas into it gradually. I think by and large the faculty was

probably fairly comfortable the way things were.

MINK: You mean complacent, maybe.

ROBBINS: Yes, even though they complained, they were fairly comfortable. They didn't know Jacoby. They didn't know what he stood for or where he wanted to go. They had no knowledge of what was happening. And I think the first meeting that Jacoby had with the faculty was a pretty frigid kind of affair.

MINK: I read the minutes of it, and it sounded that way.

ROBBINS: He wasn't terribly gracious about our past. He said, "Well, you have a good school here, but there are things we will do to change it." I think some people probably felt that he could have emphasized a little more some good points about us, you know.

Of course, they didn't know Neil at that time. They didn't know that he is probably the most rational human being, basically, that they'd ever met. I've never met a person so thoroughly logical and rational about almost everything. Nobody's that thoroughly rational, but he approaches all questions from the intellectual point of view, not from an emotional point of view. His logic may be tinged by his own emotions way back, in inarticulate major premises, but basically he is this cold, calculating, logical person. He has not ever been known for having great social graces. A lot of people felt that they never knew him,

you see, because he wouldn't slap you on the back.

MINK: Austere.

ROBBINS: Something like Ernest Carroll Moore--straight back; he doesn't move his head.

MINK: He moves his whole body.

ROBBINS: Yes, and these little things were quite a change from warm, informal arrangements we had before. I think the faculty took it in their stride. I don't think there was any enmity, except perhaps one person who was always very, very critical of any suggestion that Neil made and he's right next door here.

MINK: Oh, Professor Cassady is pretty critical of anything that anybody makes. He's very much an independent guy.

ROBBINS: He's a lone wolf. But he succeeded in thwarting Neil's development of this school for almost ten years, almost singlehandedly.

MINK: By what means? By his own influence among his colleagues on the faculty?

ROBBINS: In the [Academic] Senate.

MINK: In the senate.

ROBBINS: Not here, but in the senate. You see, he was respected in the senate because he is a scholar, a highly productive scholar. He was on the Budget Committee; he was on ad hoc committees. I think it is true that probably in the first five years that Neil was here, Ralph and Dudley Pegrum were on every ad hoc

committee, and between them they just stifled recommendations; they said "no" to everything.

MINK: That couldn't have been an accident. A committee system and the senate theoretically should function, right. It should accomplish something. Yet there's the system and there are the people in the system.

ROBBINS: Well, you see, we didn't have very many tenured members of the faculty, so when people over there [Academic Senate and administration] appointed the committee, they thought of Ralph. And as I say, they respected his scholarship; they didn't know anything about his internal operations. He didn't really have a very strong backing from the people he worked with, because he's not the sort of person you work with. He stayed by himself; he didn't even pay any attention to students or the faculty. He would not raise an objection to a proposed candidate for the faculty in a department meeting. He would even vote yes. But when he got on the ad hoc committee he'd ding it. He never took the position that he had any responsibility to the school; he had a responsibility to the university. I think he was very honest about this. Ralph tries very hard to be absolutely intellectually honest.

MINK: This wasn't a personality conflict then, was it? It was an intellectual conflict.

ROBBINS: I think it was intellectual, and I think

Ralph honestly believed that Jacoby didn't have good standards.

MINK: What kind of standards do you think Mr. Cassady would have set?

ROBBINS: Well, he would refuse to assume responsibility for this. He would never recommend anybody to the faculty. Jacoby would ask for recommendations, and as far as I know the only person that Ralph ever recommended was Professor Roland Vaile, of Minnesota, a friend of his. He kept recommending him to come here. I knew Vaile but he didn't belong here.

MINK: He ultimately had problems, didn't he? Vaile?

ROBBINS: You're thinking about Peter Vaill, who was a younger man here later on.

MINK: Yes.

ROBBINS: Entirely different situation. No, this Professor Roland S. Vaile was really the one who was instrumental in getting my invitation to Minnesota. He thought I would be a good dean for Minnesota. But Cassady would never make any recommendations; he would always sit back and be critical. And it was difficult to recruit in those days. It was not easy. Neil had a tendency to bring people from Chicago because he knew them.

MINK: Right, yes.

ROBBINS: You had [Robert] Tannenbaum, [J. Frederick] : Weston, [Cyril J.] O'Donnell, and this was something that,

I think, was subject to criticism.

MINK: Well, Noble had done the same thing, too, in the sense that he brought people to the economics department from Illinois.

ROBBINS: Right. Really I think he tended to do it the easy way, maybe. But for Neil, there were a lot of problems to be solved. The faculty was expanding rapidly and we had more students. He and I were trying to develop a long-range plan for the school which would lead it to where it is now--strictly a graduate school. We had to be kind of careful about advertising this ultimate goal. We went about it by lopping off the lower division first, because we couldn't see why on earth we should be saddled with educating freshmen and sophomores when their curriculum was the same as [those in] letters and science. Why not let letters and science do it? They ought to know better than we do what general education is all about. I don't know that they do, but they ought to. The point is we shouldn't know this; we shouldn't pretend that we know it. This was quite a struggle to get this change.

MINK: Wasn't this also a trend that was going in all business schools, toward a strictly graduate curriculum.

ROBBINS: Well, toward upper division and graduate, yes. I think the trend is now very strong for going to strictly graduate, and some of the best schools have done this. But those early days, there was an

awful lot to do, a lot of work with the administration and with the faculty in getting the respect of people for what we were doing. I think that Neil gradually won a great deal of respect of the faculty--never, I think, a great wholesome affection, because he's not the sort of person who invites this kind of thing. He soon learned, I think, that he could rely upon me to carry a fairly heavy load of internal organizational work. Eventually, of course, I graduated from being strictly a student affairs officer to being a general executive officer, and then as a real associate dean and acting dean part of the time. About forty percent of the time I was acting dean.

TAPE NUMBER: III, SIDE ONE

March 19, 1972

MINK: [Neil] Jacoby said that when he came in January, '48 that the Business Administration and Economics building, the building just to the south of the present School of Management, was about to be dedicated. What did you perceive as his attitude toward that building, as you recall it? What remarks did he make? The building was planned before he ever arrived on the scene. What did he think about it?

ROBBINS: I don't recall anything except that he was always anxious to get as much publicity as possible for the school. I think he was proud of the building, even though it had some grave limitations. He immediately set about to plan an opening, a dedication of the building. I don't recall that he was critical of the building particularly. He was frustrated in putting on that first dedication ceremony because he had asked the president of Lever Brothers, the architect...

MINK: [Charles] Luckman?

ROBBINS: ...Luckman, to come out and speak to this assembly. But Luckman turned him down more or less at the last minute, and he had to search for somebody else. He turned to his old friend, the dean at

Chicago...

MINK: Garfield Cox.

ROBBINS: Yes, Garfield Cox, who did. Garfield Cox was not known particularly, and it therefore wasn't a terribly attractive ceremony.

MINK: What kind of a speech did he give?

ROBBINS: Well, it was kind of dry. It was a good speech to read, but it was kind of dry and not very interesting.

MINK: What part did you play in the planning of this building? Could you recall some of the planning sessions?

ROBBINS: In the building we're talking about?

MINK: Yes, we're still talking about BAE, now Social Welfare.

ROBBINS: No, I didn't take a very active part in that, because I had been very, very preoccupied with the war training and then with the setting up of the business administration extension on the basis of academic strength. So my attention was put elsewhere. I think Professor William F. Brown was the one who really had the biggest part in planning that building, although at that time the architects were much stronger than the faculty in determining what was to be done.

MINK: I think that seems to be the case in so many instances.

ROBBINS: Yes, that's right. It was much less true

of our present building than it was in that one.

MINK: Well, Jacoby made some criticisms of the building, perhaps after the fact. Perhaps these weren't criticisms that he made to the faculty at the time he arrived, but they were things that he perceived as he went along.

ROBBINS: Oh yes, yes.

MINK: How would you respond to some of these? For example, he indicated that the building was predominantly given over to lecture halls versus small seminar rooms, which made it difficult to carry on a graduate program which is geared not so much to dialogue between an instructor and a large class but an intimate situation. Was the building actually planned with graduate work in mind?

ROBBINS: Oh, I don't think the building was planned with graduate work in mind. The mentality of the faculty and the architect's office was generally undergraduate in scope. There were great shortages in lecture halls at the time, and so the campus building committees looked upon every new building as an opportunity to get another five hundred-seat lecture hall for Economics I or History X or Political Science Y or whatever.

MINK: Sure.

ROBBINS: There were practically no seminar rooms in the building; this was a very grave lack. You see,

this was tied to the fact that I spoke of before: we had generally an absence of goal direction and planning in the faculty. Things were just going along from day to day without any very strong intellectual leadership in terms of defining goals for the school, what kind of a school we should have. There was in general, I think, a tendency to copy other undergraduate schools in our curriculum, so that the building was very inadequate from that standpoint; it was terribly inadequate from the standpoint of faculty offices also, because there was only a very small handful of single offices and most of us had two to an office or three to an office. We'd suffered this in Royce Hall for years and years, and the standard, of course, in the university at that time was doubling up in offices, more or less.

Economics and business administration occupied the building along with the industrial relations institute. The institute had been founded without any thought to space at all; there was never any provision for space. So they shoved it in wherever they could, which is characteristic, I guess, of the campus. They were finally given the library room, which is a big two-story, high-ceilinged room that had an enormous waste of cubic footage. The stacks of the industrial relations institute were put in there, taking up over half the space. That was

planned as a general reference reading room, and it couldn't function as such.

MINK: Prior to that, the Institute of Industrial Relations had for some time been in the library. I'm sure the library was anxious to get it out of there, irrespective of where it went.

ROBBINS: It certainly was.

MINK: Another criticism of the building from Jacoby's point of view was the lack of appropriate laboratory space. True, he says, there was space for accounting, there was space for typing and for shorthand laboratories, things he felt could have been better taken care of in secretarial school. But there was no space, for example, for laboratories in the area of management--production and so on.

ROBBINS: There was a production laboratory that was put in the basement, but it was very small. Of course, Ralph Barnes hadn't arrived at that time, so his ideas had to be implemented, sandwiched in later on.

MINK: I guess that the final point you've already touched upon, and that was this joint tenancy of the building by three separate units. You mentioned that during this time you were involved with business administration in extension.

ROBBINS: Yes.

MINK: Would you like to discuss a little more of your involvement there than you did last time, relating

it particularly to activities in the school as they began to emerge?

ROBBINS: Yes. I had been in charge of the management training in ESMDT and later ESMWT. During the latter months of that program, Baldwin Woods became director of the University Extension statewide and he had very forward-looking ideas. I admired him very much, as a person and also as an administrator and a leader; He was looking ahead with some kind of policy in mind.

One of the things I think we learned from war training was that we simply had to have strong academic leadership in the planning of the curricula and the teaching and the evaluation of students in order to have a very effective program. We used mostly industry people for the teaching, as we had for years in University Extension. It was very difficult to get supervision of these outside people and to get any kind of standards established. So Baldwin Woods's idea was that University Extension should operate with each department having an academic person who was a representative of that department in choosing instructors, developing curricula, improving the structures, developing teaching, training instructors, and the like.

MINK: He was statewide director of extension, and this is an innovation that he applied statewide?

ROBBINS: Yes.

MINK: Incidentally, Baldwin Woods has been interviewed

by the Regional Oral History Office project at Berkeley.

ROBBINS: He will probably give you an excellent tape.

I was very much impressed with the need for us, in the field of management and business administration, to establish relationships with industry, with practitioners. It seemed to me that most of our teaching was oriented toward the basic discipline of economics and it was not oriented to the professional programs in management. I felt there was a great gap between what we were teaching and what the needs of the industry were in terms of developing a high-level approach to the systematic study of management. I felt that developing a strong extension program would help the faculty in bridging this gap. It would also create for us a favorable impression on the part of business and the leaders of business in the next generation or two [who] were our students.

I looked at the extension program which we had developed down here, largely under the aegis of Margaret Wotton, who was a very able and very strong personality and carried the load of developing extension generally, and particularly in business administration, for many years against great odds. She had no help from the faculty, as far as I can see, or the chairman of the department. She came to him with people that she had picked up to teach, and he would in general say "all right," but there was no positive help--there was no

hindrance. Of course, Howard Noble had been in charge of University Extension down here for a little while and he was favorable to University Extension--he wasn't antagonistic, there simply wasn't a positive development of policy implemented.

I had absolutely no feeling about Margaret Wotton except that she had been working very hard against great odds and had done a very fine job. She did have high standards, but she did not have a position of strength in enforcing them. She wasn't a member of the faculty.

MINK: Her prime responsibility was for business courses in extension?

ROBBINS: And all other courses.

MINK: And all other courses.

ROBBINS: I think practically all other courses. She was virtually the head. I'm not quite sure about her status but I'm sure that she organized classes of a wide variety of subjects.

MINK: For the Los Angeles extension?

ROBBINS: Yes, for the Los Angeles area. Of course, she was beholden to the academic and nonacademic people at Berkeley and had problems as a result of that, I'm sure. I don't really know too much about her status, except that she was aggressive and she was a very good operator.

Well, when Baldwin Woods appointed me, then, as

University Extension representative for business administration, I worked with Margaret Wotton. I hadn't any idea what her attitude toward me was; I think it probably hurt her to some extent to see an academic person brought in to do what she was doing. Our relationships were always very warm and friendly and cordial, so I had no intimation from her behavior that she resented me. But I think she probably did resent me, and the others who were brought in.

MINK: You were, as a matter of fact, in charge over her, actually supervising what she had done in the past?

ROBBINS: Yes, I took away from her her prerogatives, and she was particularly keen about business administration because she saw that as a place where revenue could be developed, and there was a great demand for it, a need for it.

But my job was mainly to assess the demand, to try to pinpoint it, and then move in with our faculty of people, or with capable instructors that I could find in the community; to focus on that demand and give courses that could immediately build up the effective program and revenue, of course, in the area. Professor [Clifford] Bell did the same thing for mathematics. He'd been in war training. Engineering had its own representative, and so on. I guess these were the three that were developed at first--engineering,

business administration, and mathematics.

MINK: But in the other areas such as history and English and all that, Miss Wotton still did that.

ROBBINS: Yes, and she had her hands full doing that. She never did anything to make it difficult for any of us. I have to say on her behalf that she was very splendid about all this, though I think it must have hurt her to see some of her best revenue-producing areas taken away from her.

MINK: Was revenue a concern that made the university move to relate these particular areas more to the academic?

ROBBINS: No, I don't think so, certainly not in my mind and I don't think in Baldwin Woods's mind. But the University Extension, of course, was dependent, and still is dependent, on revenue. Although the regents have a policy of underwriting extension to the extent of the basic administrative cost (which ran about fifteen percent of the revenue, as I recall), they never have implemented it. They would give just a few thousand or hundred thousand dollars to University Extension.

The whole idea was that the university's policy should be to subsidize extension to the extent of the administrative costs--instructors' fees, mainly. This had never been done, and Baldwin Woods was very keen about boosting the support. He was keen about increasing the revenues so that he could do some things

that needed to be done. There's just no doubt but what he and the rest of us knew that the strong market areas had to be developed in order to give us revenue to do the experimental kinds of things and to do things in the other sciences--like life sciences--and in arts and sciences, liberal arts, that couldn't be done under the old scheme. There had to be a source of funds to provide extension service in high-cost, low-participation areas like humanities and arts.

It was perfectly clear that we had to develop revenue where we could in order to pay for these things. Business administration from the outset, and a little later engineering, were successful in developing revenues that made it possible for letters and science and arts to put on programs on the experimental basis; and it enabled us to put on programs on an experimental basis, too. So revenue was important from that standpoint. I have never sensed that Baldwin Woods or anyone else was concerned about building up revenue for revenue's sake. It was all for the sake of developing for the University of California a service to the community which we felt was very vital and very important, and which the community has supported in terms of enrollments, as you know. They have continuously come in and taken courses for a variety of reasons. Finally the faculty is admitting that this is an important function: witness the planning for

master's degree programs in extended university, which was unheard of in those days, in 1940s, '50s, and even '60s.

MINK: I suppose extension, then, was a means [through] specific courses, for improving on-the-job performance or getting a promotion, for credentials in various areas, and, for students, a means of making up courses which would allow them to get back into regular session. Were those mainly the things that extension was directed toward?

ROBBINS: Yes, I think so. A very large part of extension efforts in letters and sciences was accounted for by the make-up courses. Students flunked out, needed to bolster their records, and so took the University Extension courses. This program, of course, was profoundly frowned upon by the senate and was always a difficult problem. There's just no doubt but what the evidence showed, time and again, that it's easier to get good grades in extension courses than in regular courses. And those of us on the Reinstatement Committee, after some experience, would generally counsel against disqualified students going into extension, immediately to make up grade points, because we found the causes of their failure were not intellectual or mental, but were personal and motivational. They ought not to continue school, but get out and dig ditches or do some hard work and learn the value of

education. So we discouraged that wherever we could, but nevertheless it was a very important basis.

The business administration program was almost entirely accounting at the time I took over the thing, because accounting was at the time the one well-defined, professional occupation in business administration. Certified public accountants had national recognition, national standards, examinations; the literature was very well developed. I wouldn't say the field was very well developed intellectually, as it has become since; but at any rate, it was a very attractive thing to students to work towards a CPA that was understandably the most important part of the curriculum.

The next was finance. That's very closely allied to accounting, since our financial institutions use accounting data very largely as a basis for making their decisions. At that time, finance was a very attractive career for many people--banks, investment houses, and the like. There was practically no work in management per se, or marketing and behavioral sciences for management or production management or these other areas.

So these were the things that we tried to attack, and in these fields we tried to develop a basis for them in the new program. And of course, one of my first tasks was to assess what was being done in extension and to report to the faculty my own

assessment, so that the faculty could give some guidance to me in the development, because I viewed myself as being representative of the faculty.

MINK: Now you talk about the faculty in the School of Business Administration?

ROBBINS: Yes, faculty of the School of Business Administration.

MINK: Had Jacoby arrived at this time?

ROBBINS: No, this, I think, was about 1945, as I recall. The exact date, I would have to look up. But in three or four years, by the time Neil Jacoby came, the program had doubled or tripled in size, maybe more-- I've forgotten the figures. We had experimented with new courses. We had attempted to do some in-plant work. We had attempted to take courses out to factories the way we did in the war training program, even when people from various other factories would come into that one to attend the courses.

MINK: But you said a minute ago that after your findings, you had to report to the faculty.

ROBBINS: Yes.

MINK: Did you report to them in the departmental meeting?

ROBBINS: I attempted to. I would ask the dean to give me a spot on the agenda, and I would make written reports and submit them to Howard Noble, the chairman of the department. Actually, very seldom did I get on

the agenda, and, as far as I can remember, none of my written reports was ever reproduced and sent to the faculty.

MINK: Do you attribute this to the lack of interest in extension by the faculty of the school?

ROBBINS: Well, in part, and a lack of interest or know-how in administration on the part of Howard. When I finished at ESMWT, I wrote out a report. Here is a copy of the report I submitted to him; he never distributed this to the faculty. He never even acknowledged to me that he had the report, and I thought this was an important thing for the faculty to know--what had happened--because most of the faculty members were going about their business on campus and didn't know what was happening in University Extension or in war training. They thought it was a giant boondoggle or something of the sort, or else they were just not interested because they had enough to do on campus, which is always understandable. But I never did get anything but individual support in communication with faculty members. I did always consult a faculty member in the field before I'd make an appointment of a teacher from outside the university. Dean Noble had to sign the papers. He would never question my paper: he would always just sign it. So he had obviously either absolutely no interest in this or complete confidence in what I was doing. I never knew which it was, but I

think he had confidence in what I was doing.

MINK: I would think so.

ROBBINS: I always take the typical optimistic view of things, and I think this is right. But I would have to search very diligently to find people who had credentials which would indicate to me they were expert in their subject matter and could teach. These people were very few and far between at that time.

MINK: Could you give us an example like, you know, a case in point, without naming names if you don't want to.

ROBBINS: Well, take the field of insurance, for example, which was a very important, large field that was developing national standards through CLU and CPCU--that is, Chartered Life Underwriters and Chartered Property and Casualty Underwriters. These were national examinations which would, to some extent, pattern themselves after the CPA.

MINK: I see. In order to sell this kind of insurance, the dealer had to have passed this examination.

ROBBINS: Well, yes, they were trying in this industry (out of the University of Pennsylvania) to establish some standards and lift the standards of underwriting and selling of insurance. This was a very promising program and I was backing it, trying to have us take a leadership role in helping establish that here. It was very difficult to get instructors in that field

because there were very few people who had CPCUs or CLUs. Those who did were usually so busy that they didn't have time to teach if they wanted to.

There were a few people even on our own faculty, like Floyd Burtchett, who made a lot of money personally on setting up their own coaching systems. Floyd Burtchett, for example, carried on for many years a program of extension training which was in competition with the University Extension. He would charge the same fee, or a little bit less, but he would pocket all the revenues. He would get somebody in an insurance company to give him the office free and he had no overhead to speak of. A CPCU chapter or a CLU chapter would give him publicity, and he just took the business away from us.

MINK: Well, this is an interesting facet that makes me wonder, did the university act to squash this?

ROBBINS: It was virtually impossible to do it. I tried to do it; I tried to get our department to adopt regulations concerning extracurricular activity. I didn't want to curb the revenues of outside work for faculty members, but I felt that there was something unethical about a member of the faculty running direct competition with a university program; it didn't seem to be quite right.

MINK: One would have thought that this wouldn't get you in very good stead with Mr. Burtchett.

ROBBINS: Well, it didn't, but he didn't pay any attention to me because I was just a young squirt who wasn't really interfering with him very much. Margaret Wotton had picked a man by the name of Bennett who had been a biologist and had really quite an inquiring mind. [He] was a rather scientific, quiet, thoughtful person who also had gone into the insurance business and been very successful in it. He taught the insurance courses. He had very definite ideas about what should be done. He was very jealous of his position, and he disliked very much my having appointed some other people to teach some of these courses because he thought that he should run this program. Margaret Wotton had turned it over to him more or less, you see, because that was the way to solve a problem. I'm sure that he had fine standards, but he didn't get along well with the CPCU or the CLU boys, some of [whom] wanted to dominate him--new empire builders around, you see. So this sort of thing went on in various fields where you had some ticklish situations.

MINK: This is all part of our relationships to the outside community.

ROBBINS: Yes, and they're difficult problems to resolve. Sometimes we would find a very able instructor, from the standpoint of his background, who simply would not learn how to teach. We would have to fire him and cut off his course, sometimes after two or three

meetings. He simply was driving the students away.

MINK: Would the students come to you?

ROBBINS: Yes, students would come to me, but more often the students would not return to the class--they wouldn't come to me. Of course, one of my jobs was to trace these students down and ask them questions. I'd usually do this by telephone interview. They were pretty cagey, some of them, and pretty fearful, but I was able to get a feel of the pulse of things.

MINK: You wouldn't think so, because after all you'd feel that it's a little different from the university. Maybe it isn't a little different; maybe it's the same, where you pay a fee for this and expect something in return for what you pay for.

ROBBINS: Well, I think the students in extension were by and large more critical of teaching than they were in regular session. We have a captive audience here on campus--there's no doubt about it--and the extension audience is not a captive audience. I remember when Margaret Wotton recruited me in 1932 to teach a course in advertising, in Santa Ana. She said, "Oh, there's a big market for it down there. They've been clamoring to have this course, and you're the first one that I thought we had on the faculty who was competent to teach it. Would you go down there?" Well, it so happened that I had relatives there and went back and forth frequently, and I said, "Oh, I'll try it. I've

never taught anything like extension before, and I'm not sure that first time around I'd be very good." She said, "Well, George, you've got to be good the first time around. There won't be a second time." That was absolutely true. [laughter]

MINK: The word gets around.

ROBBINS: Yes, and of course I went down and there were five people who showed up. This was the response to an insatiable demand. So I agreed. I gave them the first meeting. And they said, "Oh, we'll get you another ten or fifteen people." It had to be a minimum of twelve, you see. I think I was getting \$2.50 an hour for teaching there, something like this, and paid my own expenses down and back. So I said, "Well, I'll come down the next week." The next week two of the five didn't show up, and the other three each brought one person. So I had to cancel it out.

See, University Extension was operated on the basis of the faculty member, the teacher, taking all the risks. There had to be fifteen people, or twelve, or whatever it was, to make the thing go, because we just couldn't break even without that. Extension did not pay for any of your services unless you completed the course. The result was that time after time faculty members would devote hours to preparation and give the first one or two lectures only to find there's no revenue in it. I felt that that was absolutely wrong.

MINK: This is maybe what turned off a lot of the regular faculty towards extension.

ROBBINS: Oh, it did, and rightly so. I was strong from the outset in pushing the policy of increasing the faculty stipends. I thought the teaching of extension was more difficult than teaching on campus, by and large. You had a wider span of preparation and you didn't have anything like the selectivity, although you had many students who were better than any campus students you would get because of their maturity, motivation and background. You would have quite a few who were not really very well motivated; they were taking it for I don't know what reasons, and they were a burden on the instruction.

I also strongly recommended the development of a training program for the teachers where we'd get the teachers together in one group and motivate them toward better teaching and teach them something about the arts of teaching. This was expensive and hard to do. We did it occasionally. In engineering they carried on a much more effective program than we did in getting their people together for this purpose.

But I also was strongly in favor of having much more effective screening of students and a program which called for appointment of assistants to me, faculty members or other people who would visit the classes rather regularly and find out what was going on. But

in general we never carried out that program because of the manpower problem. I couldn't afford to be out every night of the week visiting classes and do the rest of the work, because I carried a full load of teaching and there was no compensation.

MINK: There was no compensation for your work with the extension?

ROBBINS: From the department. There was no relief of teaching from the department.

MINK: But there was compensation from extension.

ROBBINS: There was compensation from extension. I've forgotten what it was, but it was very modest. I calculated that my war training work yielded about forty cents per hour! It wasn't nearly as large a compensation as I would have gotten had I developed Burtchett's practice of giving courses of my own on the outside or consulting. But I wasn't very much interested in developing a consulting career. I was devoted to the university and to the cause that was represented by Baldwin Woods's policies.

But I think it was a successful venture and we carried it on afterward, excepting that, after my appointment, there never was a regular member of the faculty with professorial status who was in charge of extension. But we always had someone who was a lecturer, at least, in our department. Malcolm Heslip followed me and Francis Fillerup followed him,

but those people didn't have professorial status in the faculty and therefore didn't have the strength that I had, from a status standpoint. I'm sure they were more effective than I was in some aspects of recruiting instructors and going out at night and visiting, having not nearly so much to do on campus.

The program has prospered, but I don't think it ever prospered the way it should have. We were never able to find a professor, associate professor, or assistant professor, who was interested in doing this sort of thing, who would come to the campus and try to live under the Academic Senate rules because [there was] no future at all in doing this work, the administrative work. There was no future in administrative work at that time in the university, and there's not very much now. Obviously if an assistant professor devoted time to that, he wasn't going to make a record that was necessary to meet the standards of promotion.

MINK: This would in no way increase his chances of promotion. The ad hoc committee would label this, I suppose, under services to the community and let it go at that.

ROBBINS: Yes, if anything, they would label it that way, but they wouldn't pay much attention to it. They never did pay much attention to this, as far as I know. I don't believe that Howard Noble understood the importance of this or helped to support it in terms of

evaluation of performance.

MINK: Well, did you ever look on the extension as sort of a bridge to the community in terms of the future development of the school, as a PR means and so on?

ROBBINS: Oh yes, yes. I was interested mainly in the development of extension work, as I said before, because I thought that if the faculty participated in teaching in extension, they would learn a great deal more about the nature of the needs of business and would be able to improve their teaching on campus as a result of it. They would have a much closer connection with the needs of the community.

The work that was carried on in extension that was most profitable was at a very low level--Accounting 1 A-B. That's where we made the most money. But I foresaw the time when we would be able to have our campus people engaged in executive programs and programs at a high professional level. Our school is now planning for an off-campus MBA. This development is a logical outgrowth of our extension program, including the Executive Program that Dean Jacoby inaugurated. Jacoby from the outset was very strongly in favor of developing in this direction. But he felt that we should develop it at the advanced level, rather than the elementary level, and I agreed with him entirely. But I thought that as long as we had the undergraduate

program, we ought to extend this to the community, as a basis for development later on.

MINK: A revenue-producing program.

ROBBINS: I didn't think we had the strength on the faculty then to develop an executive program at that time. We had a few people who could teach advanced work, but we didn't have, on the whole, a strong faculty to command the respect of vice-presidents and presidents, this sort of thing, in the classroom.

MINK: And in general you found it difficult to get the faculty to teach in extension.

ROBBINS: Yes, it was difficult.

TAPE NUMBER: III, SIDE TWO

March 19, 1972

MINK: You said you wanted to mention one other contribution that you made to the extension program while you were in it.

ROBBINS: Yes. When I took over, some of the teachers, accounting particularly, were teaching three and four nights a week in University Extension and making very large supplements to income.

MINK: Now these were not faculty.

ROBBINS: These were faculty.

MINK: These were faculty members.

ROBBINS: They were excellent teachers, like Wilbert Karrenbrock, or Harry Simons, some of those people who were very effective accounting teachers. They would be able to get maximum compensation by teaching two, three, and sometimes four courses. I thought it was completely contrary to the spirit of senate regulations for a man to teach more than one night in extension, or at the most two. But I really felt that one was enough, from the standpoint of their own development on the faculty, because their time was just too valuable to be doing repetitive teaching merely for income.

MINK: You think they were siphoning off some of their effectiveness as faculty in the regular session.

ROBBINS: Oh, yes, I think they were. I don't know that

they were siphoning off, but they certainly did not have enough energy to devote to the development of themselves through research and to contributions to the organization--committees and so on--which are essential to the development of the school.

MINK: Also essential in their promotion.

ROBBINS: Yes. That policy of limited extra teaching was finally adopted.

MINK: Going back to the question of the building, but more in the area of the people that occupied it, we had quite a discussion during the Jacoby interviews about the relationships between the economics department and the School of Business Administration as they existed at the time that Jacoby came in 1948. I wonder if you, as an older inhabitant, might go back a little further and answer the question, and perhaps trace this relationship as it seems necessary, to answer the question: was there a traditional rivalry between economics and business administration?

ROBBINS: Of course, you have to start with the recognition that the economics department here was, from the time of Cloyd Heck Marvin, under the chairmanship of Howard Noble. I think this is literally true; I don't think there was another chairman. Howard Noble was a CPA, had an MBA from Harvard. He was not an economist, and the leading economists we had were occupied with administrative tasks, as I pointed out

before--Watkins and Earl Miller, later on Dodd--so that the economics department never flowered as an economics department.

I think the economists felt very much submerged and suppressed by this fact, but they didn't have strength enough to do anything about it. They were also glad to have someone else do the chores (as choreman!). Despite the policy rotation of chairmen, Sproul, I guess, for some reason or another, never insisted upon rotation of chairmanship in the economics department up to 1935. Maybe he didn't have that policy in effect by then, I don't recall. But certainly from about 1925 to 1935 Howard Noble was chairman. Then, when the business school was established, I think there was a great sigh of relief on the part of the economics department because they would have an autonomy of their own, and this was, I think, a very appropriate thing for them to have. It, however, suddenly shrank the department, of course, to a very few people. Paul Dodd, who came with us to business administration, and John Clendenin were economists.

Now when Jacoby came, I had a very strong feeling that the economics department was very resentful of the fact that they were not consulted on the appointment of an economist as a head of the business school, and Jacoby, of course, was a nationally well-known economist.

MINK: They were disappointed?

ROBBINS: I think they were antagonistic to his coming. I think they were disappointed because they weren't consulted on appointing an economist. Any economist on the faculty, no matter where he was, should be approved by the economics department.

MINK: This is what they felt.

ROBBINS: This is what they felt. We had the same thing with the psychology department after Jacoby came. He and I were very anxious to have a psychologist--at least one, and maybe more--of repute on our faculty. Some of the people in psychology said that no reputable psychologist would be on anything but a psychology faculty. We urged cooperation with them and said, "We will appoint only people that you approve; this is quite appropriate. We don't want a psychologist that is a second-rate one. We want a first-rate one, but we want him devoted to the development of management education." There was strong opposition to this. We failed. We had one or two appointments that were not very strong people, but we finally got approval from the psychology department for them. They didn't stay very long for one reason or another--I guess, fortunately.

But there is something to be said for this policy, you see. If the professional schools were going to develop a cadre of economists or psychologists or engineers or lawyers or whatnot, they should be

people who are recognized by their own professional groups. Or historians: take the whole field of business history, for example, which is a wide open field. We've never been able to develop this very much. There aren't very many people in the United States who are trained in this field. We wouldn't want a business historian who wasn't thoroughly respectable as a historian. I'm sure we would run up against opposition in the history department today, from some people, if we attempted to promote a business historian for our faculty. We have, of course, had relationships with history. [Theodore] Saloutos came over; we borrowed him from time to time to give some history courses. He, of course, is well known in certain aspects of business history.

MINK: You couldn't go much wrong with Ted Saloutos anyway.

ROBBINS: No, and it's a very favorable relationship. But nevertheless, it's not the same as having somebody living with our faculty and devoting himself to the needs of our students.

MINK: To develop this theme: the statement was made by Jacoby, for example, that it was the feeling of the economics department that the School of Business Administration should restrict its development of curricula to the courses that were presently taught at UCLA and to other courses in, say, political science

and so on that were being taught here that would be akin to the whole area of business administration. They were not anxious, in other words, to see new programs develop.

ROBBINS: I think this is absolutely true. There was a strong argument against the development of any course which had the title "economics" in it given in our school. We had Business Economics 100 and 101, for example, which we had taught in the economics department, and when there was a schizogenesis of the school out of economics, we brought this sequence over here, and Gordon Watkins led the fight--absolutely amazed me--in the economics department to try to get us to lop off the word "economics" on those courses because he thought that any course that had a label of economics ought to be given in the economics department. This is so unlike Watkins and his general philosophy that I think maybe he had some special motives for mounting this fight. I never knew what they were.

MINK: Was it true that the economics department would then block appointments where members of that department--naturally, I think--would be placed on the secret committees because of the relationship of economics to business administration.

ROBBINS: Well, I think that was true. There was a rather systematic blocking. I mentioned before that certain people in the economics department were always

on the committees of business administration.

You see, at that time, business administration nationally represented a kind of low-level teaching in the universities. The colleges of commerce generally were thought of as being places for the lowest level of students next to agriculture students--they were the lowest--and business administration, and so on. [laughter]
MINK: Even lower than education? [laughter]

ROBBINS: Yes, but somewhat about the same. Yet, the field of business administration had been developed by economists who were curious to find out what the facts were about the marketplace. They were generally interested in going out and writing about what was happening, and they got interested in business administration this way. Some of these people were not very good economists; they were perhaps not good enough to tackle the more difficult problems of economic theory and maybe diverted their attention to this because the applied field was a little less rigorous. But many of them were first-rate economists who were simply curious to know whether or not theories would stand up on inspection of the marketplace. Generally the interests were in macroeconomics, macro-business administration--never management per se. They just never assumed there was very much place for management--that management just somehow or other did the paperwork. But at that time, you see, business schools were staffed

by economists, and we were regarded as being applied economists; and applied anything in the university has a lower status.

MINK: Lower status than a classical economist.

ROBBINS: And when Jacoby tried to appoint some first-rate economists here, he ran into difficulties. In our own faculty there was at least one, sometimes two economists, who would block every appointment for one reason or another. One reason that was given was that "You have to pay him more money than I'm getting and nobody's going to be brought in at more money than I'm getting."

MINK: Well apparently Professor Dudley Pegrum was one who was most adamant in feeling that the school should restrict itself to courses already taught in the College of Business Administration or in political science or related areas, rather than shaping new programs.

ROBBINS: Yes, I think this is true.

MINK: What was his problem? I mean, what was his particular point of view as you understood it?

ROBBINS: Well, I don't think I could analyze that deeply. I never could see his justification. I think it mainly was opposition to anything that was new or different from what he'd seen at Berkeley or other places, in Canada for example. I think the viewpoint of these more or less classical scholars was traditional.

They were very much afraid, I think, that you would contaminate the university by teaching applied work. They did not understand at that time--and indeed many of them still don't understand--that management is a professional field, in the pursuit of which you need sustained, high-level research and development of the literature and in the practice. It's much the same position that medicine occupied a hundred years ago, where you didn't have professional practice or professional schools, and law, much more recently than that, where you simply understudied in a law office--you read your law there. There was a general feeling that all you needed to do was to sit at the elbow of a businessman and learn how he fleeced the public and got by, and that was all there was to it, very much downgrading the whole function of managing per se. It still exists to some extent. So I think this is partly the motivation; part of the motivation was they wanted to protect UCLA against downgrading the work.

MINK: The other occupant of the old building was the Institute of Industrial Relations. You have occasionally referred to it earlier when you pointed out that the institute itself came along after plans for the building were well underway, and it was shoved in at the last minute. Personally, did you welcome the establishment of the Institute of Industrial Relations? Did you consider it to be a necessary and important thing to the

future of the university?

ROBBINS: Yes, I did. As a matter of fact I was chairman of the first committee appointed by the president to set up the institute.

MINK: Very good. I knew you were, but I wondered whether you did as chairman, in fact, approve of it. I don't think you would have accepted the chairmanship had you not.

ROBBINS: No, I don't think I was really a strong enough and an old enough faculty member to carry much weight anyway.

MINK: Could you then describe, in general, what the committee did, and the birth of the institute?

ROBBINS: Well, we were faced with an appropriation of about \$100,000 for this campus, as I recall.

MINK: Do you know how that appropriation came about?

ROBBINS: Shoved through the legislature by Governor Earl Warren, who wanted apparently to attack the problem of industrial peace and warfare on a high intellectual plane. He wanted to develop two institutes of industrial relations--at least one, but there came to be two. I'm not quite sure whether he had in mind only one; somehow the southern forces got the second.

[He wanted] to establish a research and teaching program here which would help to solve the problem of industrial peace. I suppose his motives were partly political, too. Every governor likes to hit upon something that

the popular fancy would approve, and any solution to industrial peace is a good one. It's still a good issue. Nobody has the answer, but at that time it was apparently a politically strong thing for him to do.

I don't think the university had any part in proposing this. I have never seen any evidence that the president or any committees of the university proposed the plan for this. This was simply thrust on us by the legislature and the governor. Then we appointed a committee to say what should be done. I was very strongly in favor of having the industrial relations institute as a part of the business school, because I felt that it was a part of the whole field of management. It was just as important to have good union management as it was good management of hospitals or universities or businesses. I thought that one of the main problems in the industrial peace was the low level of management of industrial peace matters, both in the unions and in business. I think this is still true, although I think in some respects the unions have developed more intelligent management for the unions than has business. But at any rate, this is a debatable question.

But the economist on the committee, Gordon Watkins, was very much opposed to this point of view; he thought it was an economics matter. The labor union representatives, through Paul Dodd, who was on the

committee (he was developing the labor and economics field as his field along with Gordon Watkins) argued that the unions would not accept the institute if it were in a school of business administration.

MINK: Because it would be like a cop-out to business?

ROBBINS: Yes, that's right. The business school represented a management point of view and was antagonistic to the labor point of view. I thought this was a real case. I knew that was true.

MINK: Oh, I think so, too.

ROBBINS: But I think this was, however, something that the labor unions could be taught to accept. Whatever that may be, it was finally agreed that the institute be established as an independent unit reporting directly to the chancellor or, I think, at that time to the president, actually. Paul Dodd was the first director of that, as I recall, and then he recruited Ed Warren, who was a labor conciliator of note, to come in and operate in the field. I didn't resist the notion of having it be independent; I recognized the necessity of appreciating the point of view of labor and of giving the institute some free hand to develop in its own way. I think the members of our own faculty in the business school were pretty much indifferent to this problem.

MINK: It seems to me that the institute here has developed some very important people--Mr. Bernstein...

ROBBINS: Yes.

MINK: ...Art Carstens, and some of the others who have played an important role in industrial peacemaking.

ROBBINS: Yes, and from the outset I think our relationships with the institute have been fairly satisfactory. Our point of view has always been to cooperate with the institute in anything that it wants to do in the way of extended education. We have had many joint appointments with the institute over the years--Frederic Meyers, Bob Tannenbaum, Irving Weschler, Paul Prasow, and a number of others. I think we've always acted to build up the strength of the industrial relations institute. I hope there's no evidence to the contrary. I don't know of any evidence to the contrary.

MINK: I haven't any.

ROBBINS: I think we've always been very supportive. There has been, I think, some feeling on the part of some members of the faculty of business administration against the institute because of an antilabor sentiment maybe, or promanagement sentiment on the part of some members of the faculty.

MINK: Which in itself justifies the earlier decision. I mean, to a degree, perhaps.

ROBBINS: Yes, maybe. There's also, I think, some tendency on the part of a very few members of the faculty to feel that some of the appointments made and some of the activities of the institute

were antimanagement, anti-business administration, and there may have been some anti-Semitism also involved in this.

MINK: What about anticommunism?

ROBBINS: Well, of course, there's a strong anti-communist sentiment in the business school--there's no doubt about this.

MINK: Yes, but I mean I'm wondering about the question of some people in the institute as to whether or not their leanings are not very much, if not communist, certainly strongly socialist.

ROBBINS: Yes.

MINK: And Mr. [Arthur] Carstens, for example, is a case in point, and I'm sure he'd agree.

ROBBINS: Yes. Well, I think this has some basis. A business school faculty generally is antisocialist in its thinking.

MINK: I think it's only natural that you would tend to get in any institute, at least in part, some people on the payroll who, by their experience and history and tradition, are of the labor movement, which has been an espousing cause of the socialist movement in the United States going way back to the turn of the century.

ROBBINS: Oh, yes, there have been some such men. I don't think that our relationship with them has been anything but cordial on a whole, but they've been correct and at times very sympathetic and very

encouraging.

The problems of the housing of the industrial relations institute was one that created a great deal of animosity on the part of our faculty. Here, after being penned up in 250 Royce Hall, where we had a faculty of twenty or thirty people--two or three in those little offices where you could hear everything over the partitions--and having been shunted around Royce Hall from the west tower and various places, we thought at last we would have elbow room to develop. Then, lo and behold, our faculty members are cramped because industrial relations institute was shoehorned into the building. This was done by Paul Dodd, who just did it; he had the power to do it. There was a great deal of opposition and antagonism developed, which was unfortunate. They took over the reading room, which we thought was going to be a very important nucleus of a branch library, as well as valuable office space.

What I'd like to say, though, is that when we planned this present new building for the business school, I was very anxious to see both economics and the industrial relations institute connected with this enterprise. I pushed very hard for the building of an interconnection between the old building and this one, where we have a parking lot, where the Institute of Industrial Relations and the business school library

could be housed. The institute had developed an excellent library, and there was very much need for our students to use the library, and there was very much need for the industrial relations institute researchers to use our library, which was being built, at least on paper. And I thought that the economics department ought to have autonomy and be separate; it could be in that building. There could be an institute and a good branch library for economics and business administration between.

But both the economists and the industrial relations institute people were very much opposed to having any connection with the business school at all. This antagonism was on their part, as far as I know, not ours. The result was that the institute moved over into what is now the crowded Bunche Hall, with very inadequate quarters. The library is broken up, put over in the Research Library or someplace.

MINK: And some of it, of course, came to business administration.

ROBBINS: A very small amount of it came to the business school, very small. The only thing that came to us were textbooks that had been used in reserve, as far as I know. This is a very great weakness on this campus, and I think it's a great shame, because we could have had an absolutely outstanding collection if we combined these things. We would have had lower costs

for libraries; they wouldn't have to have their separate librarians. They would be close to the two disciplines which are most important. But that's water over the dam; they didn't do it, and it never will happen, I suspect.

MINK: Well, a little along this line: Jacoby pointed out that in spite of the antipathy, or whatever you want to call it, that existed between economics and the School of Business Administration in that early period, that he attempted to cooperate with the economics department in a number of ways. For example [he proposed] joint appointments to the faculty of the department and the school, the development of special programs in which the economics department would be included. I guess that when he attempted these joint appointments or concurrent appointments, the case he cited, that of Willard Graham, was typical of the difficulties he faced in this area.

ROBBINS: Yes.

MINK: Interdepartmental committees to review overlapping jurisdictions, I suppose in terms of courses and so on. Do you agree with this philosophy?

ROBBINS: Of cooperation?

MINK: Yes.

ROBBINS: Oh, I thoroughly agreed with Dean Jacoby's attempts to develop a liaison, and I did what I could to try to accomplish this. As the associate dean of

the business school, I was strictly a student affairs officer during the first several years and had my hands full with 1,500 students, undergraduates mostly, to take care of, trying to develop a system of accounting for the students right here rather than having all the information a block away. And so I was not really in a very strong position as an assistant professor at that time, and associate professor after that, to exert very much influence. I was not an economist, you see.

So I agree with what you're saying, though, that there was resistance. There was no constructive, forward-looking attitude which came out of economics, excepting in one or two people that I can't really quite name now. It'd be a different person in a different time who would talk to us. We were developing a strong group of young business economists, good teachers, and people who were really concerned with business policies from the standpoint of sound economic theory, micro-economics.

I think the economics department resented every good appointment to our faculty, thinking it would weaken their department. I have a strong feeling that their general attitude was anything that built up the business school was a loss to the economics department of this campus. They did not perceive that a good professional school of business would

strengthen the economics department. I think this was a mistake on their part. It proved to be a mistake, but this was the attitude. It was a jealousy, partly; it was a nationwide phenomenon of antagonism between theory and application. Because of the growth of business schools out of economics, there is everywhere a confusion over function and organization. It was a whole mistaken notion about the function of a business school. So we did have difficulties in appointments--no doubt about this.

MINK: The committee that was set up to review conflicts of jurisdiction, was it able to succeed?

ROBBINS: Very rarely. Very rarely did they meet and operate, and almost entirely it was at our initiative that the liaison committee would be called. That committee was urged by Dean Jacoby, and later on by me, to work hard to define the relationship between the economics department and the business economics group here. We urged our own business economists to try to define their special field. This was difficult on both sides to do, and it never succeeded very well. We would usually operate on the basis of crisis.

MINK: You'd call a committee when you had a crisis, in other words.

ROBBINS: A problem would arise and then we would fight it out. Gradually, I think, this thing subsided, so that I think at the present time there just isn't

anything like the antagonism there was. But there still is a lack of understanding in the economics department of what a business school is all about.

[Neil published a definitive paper on these relationships in the American Economic Review. G.R.]

MINK: Was it usual or was it rare that you would have to appeal to a higher court? In other words, if the committee itself couldn't work out the jurisdiction, I suppose it would have to go to the Academic Senate or the administration.

ROBBINS: I don't think any of our things were appealed in that form. What happened was [that] we just went ahead and did what we thought was right. I suppose there was some bickering at the higher levels in committees, particularly at the staffing level, where we had no access to the secret things that were going on.

MINK: Could you cite an example of an area or an instance in which this liaison committee functioned?

ROBBINS: Well, I think it has functioned from time to time in reconciling the differences of opinion about business economics, the basic courses in managerial economics, Business Economics 100-101 in the undergraduate division.

MINK: Oh, this is the same thing about whether or not the word "economics" would be used?

ROBBINS: Yes. That disappeared after a short while. I think after Gordon Watkins left, there was a

decreasing interest in trying to have us leave economics off titles of courses, and I think that problem was resolved. But there have been very constructive suggestions developed out of this committee, I think, in more recent years. We need to have certain kinds of instruction based upon very sound and thorough and professionally competent economists that the economics department is not interested in. Their department has never been interested in microeconomics or in developing the curricula which would support management education.

We don't criticize them; we haven't criticized them for that. But what we wanted to do was develop our own faculty who had this interest. I think it's been increasingly possible for us to do this. The economics department is developing interests of its own and strength of its own, which is fine. They have enough fish to fry over there, so they don't need to bother about us anymore. And we've also, I think, gained a good deal of academic respect over the years by our deeds.

MINK: I'd like to turn now to another topic that we frequently have discussed with individuals who have been interviewed in the series on the history of the university. That topic is the relationship of President Sproul to this campus. Maybe we can kick this off by an observation from Jacoby that he saw when he came, in 1950, what people had been seeing here

for years, the fact that Sproul ran all the campuses. As a result, much paperwork piled up on his desk, and it would be months, literally months, before decisions would be made--which tended to label his office, I suppose, on the part of people here at Los Angeles and maybe on other campuses, too, as sort of delaying and dilatory. Maybe you'd like to trace your relationships with Sproul. In the earlier history of the university, he knew all the faculty. Did you know him personally?

ROBBINS: Well, I always felt that I knew him personally. I think a lot of people felt that way because of his tendency when he met people to remember their names, to remember something about them, and to talk about them, and to make them feel that there wasn't anybody else on earth at that moment. He had this marvelous knack of apparently focusing his attention on you. That sets one up, you see, and it was a marvelous ability I think he had. But actually, I don't think it was ever any very close relationship. I do remember, of course, very clearly, a number of times that he was in our home. We'd have garden parties for the business faculty where he'd attend. I worked at the receptions that he gave annually, or semiannually, held in the gym or someplace. I would be on the receiving line, and we'd have a chance to chat a little bit. But I never was called to his office. Of course, I was just an associate dean while he was in power, so

why should he deal with me? I was acting dean a good deal of the time, and on that basis I would have thought that I might have talked with him, but he never asked for an opportunity to talk with me.

But at one of the All-University Conferences at Davis, I was housed in a suite with Dykstra and Sproul. I think this must have been 1948, something like that; I think it was before Jacoby came. We had an opportunity to chat, the three of us, before the fireplace after all the events of the day were over, and we were relaxing a little. And we were talking at one time, the three of us, about the administrative problem, the management problem in the university. I said, "Well, I should think you ought to have two or three vice-presidents who would take over some of these responsibilities" (because he had just spent a whole afternoon going over in detail his agenda for a typical week). He took his appointment calendar, and he said, "I do this, this, this, this, this..." Obviously he was making so many decisions that he shouldn't be making, that he should delegate to somebody else. And I told him I thought that he proved the necessity for having two or three vice-presidents. And he said, "Oh, George, I could use a dozen." And I said, "Won't the regents give them to you?" "Well, I wouldn't ask the regents. I would appoint them if I could find twelve people of whom I was sure that their decisions would be exactly

my decisions under the circumstances." And I said, "Every leader wishes that, but when the organization grows so large, you have to devise means of checking on the decisions of your subordinates while leaving them free to carry on their activities."

But I think this revealed a good deal of his feeling of enormous responsibility he felt for the university. I think he was very sincerely interested in developing a great university--there's no doubt about this--and I think he really was one of these managers who could not delegate. He simply did not know how to delegate. He didn't want to learn how.

Now I think, in my own mind, undoubtedly part of the delay on decision-making on this campus was an attempt to forestall the development of what he saw as being inimical to the interests of Berkeley as the center of the university. I'm sure he was never very much in favor of UCLA, or the Southern Branch, and I think he was persistently needled into developing things down here. I suppose along towards the latter part of his career, he took credit for some of the development down here and was proud of it. There's some evidence of this that I can't detail for you. I just can't recall the special instances, but at one time he did comment to me when I was acting dean, and I went to him and to Ray Allen to talk over a problem. He made some very complimentary remarks about the development of

the school and my role in doing this, which was a very nice thing. I thought it was polite conversation, but I think he must have felt that we were developing something here.

But there were so many times when we simply needed local decision-making, where the knowledge existed in the provost's or chancellor's office about our needs, resources, but where we would have to wait, and wait, and wait until it was too late. This was very largely the case in recruiting. It was bad enough for us to get a consensus in our own faculty, where we had some decisions as to a man like Willard Graham being brought in, for example, and dozens of others. But when you had to go through the long delays in the senate here, with the secret operations that we couldn't fathom and couldn't get at at all, and then trying to get something through and wait a month or six weeks or two months at Berkeley before we could get an approval--in the meantime the person had signed up someplace else. I think Dean Jacoby had an enormous stumbling block on this whole process, because time after time his proposals for staffing would be turned down by our faculty or delayed too long in the process of higher approval.

TAPE NUMBER: IV, SIDE ONE

March 19, 1972

MINK: One recollection you were discussing was meeting with Sproul and some remarks he made about the school and its progress and about you, and the fact that you felt that while he may have delayed purposefully the development of certain parts of the university here at Los Angeles, he later took the credit. You said you didn't have any specific evidence that you could cite, but you did have that feeling that he later took the credit for what he had earlier opposed.

ROBBINS: Well, I suspect that this is true. He certainly evidenced in many ways that he was proud of what happened at UCLA. He also, of course, had very close control over what happened here; and he had reason to be proud of it, I suppose, because the decisions were finally his. He was very jealous, I think, of his control over UCLA and over the public's attitude here.

MINK: That was an interesting point you made about the delegation of authority. You were on the campus in the time when Sproul regularly spent some portion of the year here.

ROBBINS: Yes.

MINK: Do you have any recollections about that period, when he was more in evidence around the university on

this campus?

ROBBINS: Well, I suppose I do have some. I remember very clearly how he felt that it was a very great condescension for him to agree to spend weeks out of every semester living on the campus, or whatever the period was. I remember also how during some of those periods he spent here, he was away at Berkeley most of the time, and Mrs. Sproul was here. He, I think, was sensitive to the criticism people had that he wasn't here often enough. I think it was good for him to be here to get acquainted with some of the things that were going on.

I have one very clear recollection of a garden party we gave--I think it was in the latter part of the '30s. We were living in a duplex apartment down on Mississippi, and we had a garden party, mainly university people. For entertainment, we hired a graphologist, a very charming woman, who was a consultant on court cases--handwriting and so on. We had seen her operating at a party like this and she was very entertaining. She'd have people write a few lines or a paragraph and then, in front of everybody else, she would analyze this. She had a way of balancing a very pungent criticism or analysis with a complimentary one. She was an entertaining artist. She didn't know who Sproul was--we hadn't told her who the guest list was--and he wrote a paragraph, didn't sign his name, I guess.

She said, "Well, here's a man who, if the whole world collapsed about him, would be standing firmly on two feet the next morning." [laughter] That was a very good analysis of Sproul. He wouldn't let anything get him down--persistent.

It's very interesting also at that time, my neighbor Ralph Cassady wrote a little for her, and she said, "Here's a real research scholar. He will follow a clue clear to the bitter end as a scholar to get the truth. But he's very secretive. He will have his cards close to his chest and nobody around him will know what he's doing." Well, that's the nearest I came to be convinced that graphology was good--two good evidences. [laughter]

MINK: I guess there must be something in it.

ROBBINS: But I don't think I have anything more to add to Sproul. He was always personally very charming to me, very attentive. If I wanted to see him, I could, after waiting a long time, see him. But I never could get very much time with him to pursue my own philosophy and get his reaction to my philosophy. Then, of course, after Dean Jacoby was appointed, I had occasion, as acting chairman of the department, or acting dean, to talk with the president. But it was very difficult to do, because I couldn't find the time when the chancellors could be with me to talk with him. The chancellors were gaining in strength,

and both Dykstra and Ray Allen were very supportive of me and of our school and Jacoby. I think they understood better than previous chancellors did the potential role of a good strong graduate school, professional school of management. And so they went to bat for us. I suppose they had relatively little opportunity to talk to Sproul.

MINK: Another individual, of course, is Edward A. Dickson.

ROBBINS: Could I interrupt just to say one thing more about Sproul?

MINK: Certainly.

ROBBINS: That is that I don't know whether Dean Jacoby has referred to the fact that our decisions and recommendations for our school were taken by Sproul to Dean [Ewald T.] Grether for his advice.

MINK: At Berkeley?

ROBBINS: At Berkeley, before decisions were made.

MINK: No, he didn't.

ROBBINS: This was true, and we discovered it by some inadvertence, some accident; we discovered that a very fundamental recommendation for the change of our school, perhaps from going to a four-year school to a two-year school, was checked by Sproul with Dean Grether at Berkeley.

MINK: How did you find this out?

ROBBINS: I don't remember how we found it out. I

think that Dean Grether blurted it out one day.

Grether was a very frank and easy, marvelous person to work with, and so I think that he just sort of casually talked about it once. And, oh, boy, did Dean Jacoby explode at that. To think that any decision of ours would be checked by our sister school.

But of course, Sproul had the notion that all the schools should develop simultaneously and in cooperation, and there was a liaison committee with the Berkeley school and so on. All that policy meant was that every dollar we got was matched by a dollar for them. But they already had a good budget foundation, you see, so we never would catch up on that basis. But I think this was undoubtedly the practice Sproul had, of letting them know what we were doing down here so that they wouldn't be caught napping and they would know. I resented this very much and so did Dean Jacoby. But now you wanted to ask about Ed Dickson, what I know about Ed Dickson.

MINK: Yes, well, I gathered maybe you knew him.

ROBBINS: I knew him socially because my wife and Ann Sumner, his "niece," were Delta Gammas together here in the undergraduate days. They were very close friends too. I was frequently a guest in the house of Edward Dickson. He always took a very fond interest in our marriage, Dorothy's and mine, because he had known Dorothy very well. So I knew him socially, and we

would talk about the university but not very much in detail. I never had an opportunity to sit down and talk with him about what I considered to be the role of a professional management school. I tried it sometimes, several times, but he seemed to be wanting to talk about something else at the time. So I never really got much of a response to management topics, although he was a businessman, you see.

MINK: Yes, that's the thing that interests me. It's obvious that you knew him better than Jacoby knew him.

ROBBINS: I think so.

MINK: Jacoby pointed out quite pungently, if that's the right word, that at the dinner that was held, I believe, in the Ambassador Hotel--which might have been referred to as an "installation dinner," so to speak, of Ray Allen as chancellor--Dickson spoke about the development of professional schools at UCLA and neglected totally to mention business administration. This prompted Jacoby to write a letter to Dickson pointing this out and sending carbon copies to Sproul and Allen. I believe that Sproul said he felt that this was just an oversight on Dickson's part. And yet, again, here's a businessman, and you would have thought that business would be close to his heart.

ROBBINS: I don't think Ed Dickson regarded himself as a businessman, ever, nearly as much as a journalist.

He was very proud of his career as a journalist, and when you'd talk to him about his career, it was always in terms of what happened when he was covering presidential conventions, and this kind of thing. He was, of course, an executive of Western Federal Savings and Loan, but as such he was merely a capitalist, I think, who was concerned with building his own empire, his own financial estate.

MINK: Was he more of a figurehead there than actually an executive, do you believe?

ROBBINS: Well, I would guess that. I have no basis for knowing. He had a very competent manager whose name I can't quite recall now [Evans], who was vice-president and ran the thing. So I don't really think he ever considered himself as a businessman. He didn't know an awful lot about business. Why be interested in industrial development, development of companies and industries? The savings and loan business is simply a very narrow kind of money management operation with lending on real estate, and it was during a period when they weren't very aggressive, as they have been subsequently.

MINK: As a matter of fact, I know, in my limited knowledge of Dickson, of no great amount of evidence, in terms of deeds and so on, that he took in the Department of Journalism, for example.

ROBBINS: I think probably he didn't. I don't know.

I think he may have been disappointed in the way the Department of Journalism developed, but I don't know.

MINK: Disappointed, how do you think?

ROBBINS: Well, I really don't think he understood the role of a professional school of journalism. I guess he's not alone in that. He grew up with an entirely different background, you see, and I don't know what he expected. He did establish an award for the journalism department here. I haven't talked with him about this, so I can't really guess. The evidence, I think, shows very much interest in it. He was much more interested in the arts and in history and in the UCLA campus as a whole. I think that if he had come along at this time--and business schools now count a great deal more in the minds of people than they did at that time--that he might be interested much more in the business school. He was interested in the medical school because he always recognized that you had to have a medical school if you were going to be a big university (and engineering also).

MINK: And, of course, law.

ROBBINS: Yes. He was interested, of course, in the arts. He fancied himself to be quite a collector, and he was a lover of Italy and the Renaissance--and I think understood really quite a little about the Renaissance. At least he probed a good deal, traveled a good deal. My earliest recollection of him was

before I was married. We would say a few words in Italian to each other. I was studying Italian, not intensively at all, but just offhand, more or less, partly because of my acquaintance with Panunzio and our conversations in Italian roaming the hills of Westwood. At that time, I gave a couple of little after-dinner speeches in Italian at his home, and he caught a few of the words and phrases and complimented me on them. He answered in Italian. So, that's kind of interesting.

He was always a very charming host, a very correct one, and there was just absolutely no doubt but what he was completely loyal to the UCLA campus and completely devoted to making this a great university.

MINK: How would you categorize him politically?

ROBBINS: Well, I think he was conservative politically. He was, I think, a Republican all of his life, I imagine.

MINK: Did you ever discuss politics with him?

ROBBINS: Not very much, no.

MINK: I was wondering, for example, what his attitude toward Earl Warren was, since Earl Warren was the governor for so many years during this period when UCLA was developing--three terms, twelve years.

ROBBINS: Yes. The only evidence that I recall was that he was favorably inclined toward the governor. I think he gave evidence of that in several instances. I can't recall specifically what we talked

about. But he was, of course, very much afraid of communism, very much afraid of socialism.

MINK: Now you came in '35, right?

ROBBINS: '31.

MINK: Excuse me, '31. Well, then you were here at the time that the five students were expelled.

ROBBINS: Yes.

MINK: That's right. Did you ever discuss this episode with him, or didn't you know him that well at that time?

ROBBINS: No, at that time I didn't know him, so I didn't discuss it with him. But he did not know what was going on in the business school. I know that from talking with him, speaking with him, and I don't think he had much interest in discussing our future. I always felt a little bit embarrassed about raising the question or talking about it unless he asked me because of the rule which Sproul harped on that you didn't talk with the regents.

MINK: Do you think that he perhaps avoided conversations with you for this reason?

ROBBINS: I don't think so.

MINK: I don't either, because it seems to me that he had a reputation for sort of disregarding this rule and using social contacts for that purpose.

ROBBINS: I'm sure that he did, but the only time that he raised the question about our business school

was after Jacoby's appointment. He would occasionally say, "How is this new fellow Jacoby coming along? What's he doing?" And I would try to answer as accurately as possible.

I remember one occasion, soon after Jacoby came, that he said, "Well, I sat next to Jacoby in a meeting and he's a very straightforward, sensible young man. What do you think about him?" And I said, "Well, he's just asked me to be his associate dean, a year ago. So I'm ex parte now, you see, and be aware of the fact that I'm a supporter of his; but I would be a supporter even though I were not a lieutenant of his, because I think that his ideas are absolutely sound about the development of the school. He is a person who is able to plan for the development of a first-rate professional school." And then he said, "Well, I'm glad to hear that. He should go far."

Occasionally Mrs. Dickson would ask me the same question, and she'd say, "Well, I sat next to him at a dinner and I was very favorably impressed by his mind." Wilhelmina, of course, was always keen to talk with men because all her life with Edward she was associated closely with him and with his colleagues. She knew what was going on, and she was used to talking seriously. She did not like women-talk very much. In her later, invalided years she was particularly anxious to have me come to talk about affairs.

The only people she could talk to were Ann [Sumner] and her friend Hansena [Frederickson], who were, of course, very loyal to her.

MINK: I take it she didn't go for this sorority bit, the sorority type.

ROBBINS: Well, I don't think she ever was a sorority woman. I don't know. I think she supported women's groups on the campus.* I think she didn't like what was called "women-talk." She wanted to talk about affairs of state and the economy. She read the Wall Street Journal, and she read Forbes and other magazines rather regularly, and she wanted to talk about these things: "What is the state of the economy?"

MINK: There's an interesting point here that has been stressed, I think, that in her later years, she always had this feeling that she was poorer than she was.

ROBBINS: Oh, yes.

MINK: Especially towards the last. She was really a very well-to-do woman; Edward left her very well off when he died, and she increased the investments that he left.

ROBBINS: She told me she doubled it.

MINK: Yes, and yet she still had this feeling--which was good, I suppose, because if you don't, why, then,

*I've since recalled that she was an honorary member of Delta Gamma. [G.R.]

you might not be as well off soon.

ROBBINS: Oh, yes, she was parsimonious. I can understand that, because after being that way all my life and now being free to spend money, I find that we're still interested in saving money. Yet we should be spending it and enjoying it while we can. Yes, she was this way, decidedly, but they were pretty poor in the early days, and they had some struggles, and she remembered this. She had this Spartan attitude toward things. She was very proud, I think, of husbanding her husband's resources and in increasing them. She gave a good deal of the credit to her financial advisor who was Huntley, an attorney.

MINK: Yes, I believe that's the name. We have the name.

ROBBINS: She would tell me that this man, who was on the board in Pomona, I think, or one of the colleges out there, was after her all the time to change her will to give the money to Pomona. She was often very favorably impressed with him because he had helped her so much with her investments and had been so wise on those things, and she felt grateful to him. She also felt that at times what was happening at UCLA was very unfortunate, you see--the leftish trends, the notoriety, particularly the more recent one, the Angela Davis thing. I think she was somewhat tempted occasionally to leave something. But she would never, ever abandon

the notion that she must carry out the wishes of Edward, and she would not vary one bit from that. And I don't think she did. She thought that she was living in order to carry out his wishes and that he loved the University of California, and she would refer to the fact that he said that other institutions in the society come and go, but universities last forever. And so she would come back to that and say, "Well, I guess UCLA will last forever and that's the place."

MINK: Tell me something--this is a question that you don't generally ask in oral history but because we're more or less on an intimate plane here with Dickson and his wife, what would be your guess about Dickson's reactions to the present situation as the university finds itself today vis-à-vis with this particular administration? What do you think his stand would have been? Here we have a conservative governor who probably in politics would be pretty much on Dickson's side. Yet we have what appears to be a running battle between this man and the university, and we have a situation where it comes out in the newspaper, and it's sort of common knowledge that many people feel that he's out to destroy the University of California. Now, maybe this isn't so, I don't know, but it's pretty common talk, we know.

ROBBINS: One has plenty of evidence that he is not appreciative of the importance of a strong University

of California. I don't know how Dickson would have reacted, really. I think he would have tended to be very much on the side of Reagan on most issues. I do think that he would tend to vote more or less, however, the way Bill Forbes has been voting on issues, and Ed Carter. Now those are two different ways of voting on some things, to be sure, but in general they have been supportive of the university in defending it, the interests of the university as I read the record. I think he would have been strongly torn, but I don't really think that he would have belonged to the clique of Campbell and Dutton and some of those people. I shouldn't put Campbell and Dutton together because they're on the opposite sides of the fence, but Campbell and Lawrence, I think, particularly.

MINK: And Meyer.

ROBBINS: And Meyer and Sherriffs in the governor's office. Because you see, when it came right down to it, anything that hindered the University of California would be just repugnant, absolutely repugnant to Edward.

MINK: In spite of the fact that he might have agreed with Reagan in his general outlook.

ROBBINS: Yes. I think he would have understood that Reagan's backers, as I see it, have been people who feel that the only way to develop strength in the private schools is to tear down the public schools.

I firmly believe this is true of Salvatori and some of his gang. I think this is a very great mistaken notion. The only reason why you have strong Stanfords and USC's and Pomonas is that you have had a very strong public school system and a university system which has held up high standards and which has stimulated a rivalry among schools and developed the standards. I don't think for a minute that Stanford would have been as great as she is now if it hadn't been for Berkeley, and vice versa. But when the governor is trying desperately to destroy, as you say--I'm not sure he really wants to destroy--or downgrade the strength and reputation of the University of California in order to upgrade the strength of the private schools, he's on very dangerous ground. This worries a lot of people, and I'm rather sure it would worry Edward a great deal.

MINK: Are there any other recollections of him that you feel are pertinent to this?

ROBBINS: Oh, I don't really think so, no. I wasn't intimately acquainted with him.

MINK: Where would you place him in the scale of economists?

ROBBINS: Edward? Edward Dickson?

MINK: Yes.

ROBBINS: He was no economist.

MINK: In economic attitudes, was he progressive? Was he a conservative?

ROBBINS: Oh, I think he had progressive periods, as I recall, when he was supportive of Hiram Johnson, I believe. On the other hand, I think he was basically quite conservative in economic matters.

MINK: Jacoby, I believe, labeled him as a progressive-conservative, in the same category that he puts himself.

ROBBINS: I think that's probably true, although I think he was not as progressive. I don't think he ever had the competence or the interest in studying economics. My guess would be that he was much more influenced by his colleagues who would lunch at the California Club, and that's a pretty conservative bunch. That's the kind of bunch that got Ernest Carroll Moore all excited about Celeste Strack.

MINK: Yes.

ROBBINS: And kind of forced him into a very bad decision on those things. [recorder stopped]

MINK: The next point that I'd like to discuss with you concerns the Allen administration. Perhaps you could point out what you feel the strength and weaknesses of Ray Allen's administration as chancellor were on the campus, possibly contrasting them with Dykstra, who was earlier.

ROBBINS: My associations with Ray Allen were from the first day he was on the campus here, the first week, when the Blue Shield Society of alumni, of which

I was a member, had a meeting at the Bel-Air Hotel to get acquainted with Ray Allen, talk with him. Ray had asked me to pick him up, or I offered to, at any rate, at the chancellor's house and drive him up there. We had a discussion in the car that was very promising, as far as I was concerned, because he asserted very clearly his support of the development of a first-rate professional school and with preference for emphasis on graduate work. And this, of course, was very pleasing to me because it confirmed my own judgment.

MINK: Did Jacoby have a chance to talk with him prior to this, do you think?

ROBBINS: No. I think I was acting dean at the time, and I can't quite remember the date.

MINK: He would have been in '52.

ROBBINS: I guess it was '52, yes. I think Jacoby was on leave. You see, Jacoby took almost every leave that he was entitled to, semisabbatical. He believed in this.

MINK: And after the [1952 general] election, he was on the Council of Economic Advisors.

ROBBINS: Yes, and he took special leaves. He'd be on the council and on UNESCO and other organizations.

So this was, I think, during a period when I was acting dean, but it doesn't matter one way or the other. I'm sure that it was earlier than Jacoby had a chance to talk to him.

I came to recognize that Ray Allen understood the role of management leadership, the role of planning, and the role of delegation. I think he was very sympathetic with our curriculum because from his own experience, he knew the deficiencies people had as leaders and managers. I was very much impressed with him. He always had a very favorable ear, and he would listen very carefully to me and would respond just as frankly as he could about his own limitations in supporting me, what he couldn't and so on. So I was a very strong supporter of Ray Allen, and he was of me, I think, too.

MINK: You say that you felt that Allen was really more supportive of the school than Murphy?

ROBBINS: No, I don't think so. It may be he was; I guess he took a little more interest in us. I don't know how I could really compare the two in those terms. I thought Murphy was quite supportive of the business school.

MINK: Certainly Dykstra was.

ROBBINS: And Dykstra was, yes. I think Murphy was supportive of the development of professional schools. The present attitude of Young on the part of professional schools came, I think, to some extent, as a result of indoctrination under Murphy. There are plenty of evidences that I have from my conversations with Murphy that he understood professional education as it

applied to a business school very well, and I think he was supportive of it. I don't think he was ever unsupportive, let's say, or ever worked against our interests in the school. I always thought both he and Allen gave very strong support.

MINK: Well, I think that generally the faculty that we have discussed these historical comparisons with have tended, in one degree or another, ranging from extreme to moderate, to categorize Allen's administration as a weak one.

ROBBINS: Well, I think there were some weaknesses that he had. I think along toward the end, he certainly didn't do his homework before one of the regents' meetings where he couldn't support the document on planning that he presented, as I understand it. I think he was not rough enough and tough enough for the job. I think he was entirely too sweet and gentle a person to ride herd on some things that needed to be done.

MINK: That's strange, isn't it, because it was just precisely this rough and tough attitude that Dickson perceived in Allen that brought him here to be chancellor in '52. At least this is the evidence that we have collected so far that shows that Dickson was very strongly in favor of Allen's appointment because of the strong stand he had taken against communism in Washington at the University of Washington.

ROBBINS: Also the stand he'd taken on the development and measurement of faculty performance--quite a system of evaluating faculty people: a card catalogue with all the ratings of students and this kind of thing. I think it was true but I don't think he...

MINK: I wasn't aware of that facet. I wonder if you could enlarge upon it.

ROBBINS: Well, it's my understanding that he didn't develop it, but he strongly supported and extended the program that had been developed at Washington for the regular evaluation of faculty members by students through questionnaires at the end of the term.

MINK: Teaching ability.

ROBBINS: Teaching ability. They had it all categorized, and there was, I think, in the office of one of the deans, a card catalogue which had, for every member of the faculty, every evaluation down, in terms of measurement numbers on a rating scale. It had really played a very important part in the role of promotion of the faculty members. I think he believed in that. I think he wasn't tough enough to stand up to Sproul, and I think he had hoped to have more autonomy, as all the chancellors have along the line. They were brought here and told they were going to have autonomy and found out they didn't, in fact. I suspect that he didn't have enough strength to stand up to Sproul, and he was frustrated by so many things.

MINK: Could you elaborate on the allegation or statement that his ultimate downfall as chancellor-- to my understanding, he was asked to resign--came about by the fact that he systematically (perhaps not systematically on his part, but at least systematically in the course of time) alienated one regent right after the other.

ROBBINS: I heard this, but I have no firm basis in experience myself in this.

MINK: This question should probably be asked of someone like Pauley.

ROBBINS: Yes. He also alienated the alumni over the fracas of the Pacific Coast [Conference], what is now the Pac-8. He didn't go to bat for UCLA, and he was wishy-washy in handling the whole fracas where UCLA was censured that fall. I can't remember the details, because it didn't really interest me terribly much. I don't think the senate ever felt very close to Ray Allen. He didn't antagonize senate committees; it's just that I don't think they really understood him and knew him very well. But I do think that he was very frustrated by the senate mechanism many times, particularly the Budget Committee and the way it operated.

MINK: One example, I think, that was given of an instance in which he alienated a group of regents was in the firing of the dean of the law school, in which he certainly took part. He appointed a committee

to look into it, and the committee recommended and he took their recommendation. [L. Dale] Coffman had assiduously courted regents and had a support within the regents' group, and this brought down this group on Allen.

ROBBINS: I knew nothing about that in detail. I just heard that this was the case. But certainly that did not alienate the senate.

MINK: In other words, the senate had strong feelings against him.

ROBBINS: Oh, I think most of the members of the senate, of course, did not like Coffman from the outset, probably because Coffman refused to come in as a part of the senate, and his faculty members were not members of the senate. He fought this.

MINK: For the traditional autonomy of law schools.

ROBBINS: Yes, yes. He had apparently found support for this autonomy in the regulations of the American Bar Association, which said that accreditation could not be given to any school that did not have autonomy. Of course, accreditation had been given Boalt Hall all these years, and this meant that if the bar association really meant what it said, then Boalt Hall and a lot of other schools were going to be discredited and not accredited. But I don't know anything personally about that squabble.

MINK: Are there any other points that you would bring up about the Allen administration?

ROBBINS: No, I don't think I have any others.

TAPE NUMBER: IV, SIDE TWO

April 2, 1972

MINK: In our interview with Neil Jacoby, in relation to your appointment to associate dean, which occurred shortly after his arrival here on the campus, he indicated that you were the person who perhaps was most responsible for his coming to UCLA (I suppose through your contacts with him in regard to the University Extension teaching which he did when he was out here prior to his accepting the appointment) it seemed to him that you were, because of your vast knowledge of the university, as he put it, perhaps the most qualified to assume the post of the associate dean in the school. He contacted you, asked you, and you agreed. Perhaps you could describe for me how this all came about, even perhaps describing the meeting that you had with him when this occurred.

ROBBINS: Well, in the first place I was not part of the Noble administration.

MINK: I mean the Noble regime, pardon me.

ROBBINS: I had served as acting dean during two summer periods when Howard was away, but I wasn't, in [any] sense, part of his administration. He didn't have any assistant or associate deans.

MINK: That wasn't the way he operated?

ROBBINS: No, it wasn't the way he operated, and I think

it wasn't the way the campus operated. One hardly thought of that as a possibility. I think even in letters and science, they didn't have any assistant or associate deans--in that great big college. I think that Neil made it clear to me that he wanted to expand the school and lift its standards and increase the size and significance of the school and move it toward upper division and graduate work. He did not want the responsibility for the detailed student affairs that took so much of Noble's time. Of course, he wanted also to gain some budgetary authority, and this meant working on the administration and the chancellors and assisting them in trying to change it a little bit, because at that time the deans were mainly student affairs officers.

MINK: In essence what you're saying--correct me if I'm wrong--is that he really wanted some free time for politicking.

ROBBINS: Well, yes, and also for his own work. He believed in teaching and research and writing; he wanted to continue that, and he couldn't see how he'd have time for that. I had had extensive experience with the Reinstatement Committee and working with student affairs and had been on a number of senate committees. So he thought, "Here's a way to get rid of all the burden of student affairs." I was willing to accept that, because I found it interesting and I did have some

experience to draw on.

So my first assignment for the first two or three years was to develop the student affairs. We had about fifteen hundred students then from freshmen on through, and at no place in the school did we have any records of our students. All the records were kept in the registrar's office. We could not tell anything about a student from the information we had in the office. So I immediately set about to develop a record system here that to some extent duplicated the registrar's work, so that when a student came in for advice we could give them sound advice on the basis of evidence. I instituted some of the examinations for admissions and the system for handling our own reinstatement affairs here. So that occupied most of my time during the first few years.

I don't recall, frankly, the meeting at which I was offered the associate deanship. But I saw myself as being able to provide some help to Jacoby and his administration through this expertise, whatever I had, in student affairs. I didn't view it as the alternate of the dean, and it was not presented to me as being the vice-dean in a sense. But I was just made most recently associate professor, and I did not feel that I had much strength or power in the faculty. There were very few tenured members on the faculty at that time, and I had no feeling that I would exert any

power in terms of faculty development or evaluation, this kind of thing.

MINK: In connection with your promotion, there's one point that Jacoby did make that it was an incident over which he had to plead long in order to bring it about.

ROBBINS: Oh, he did, yes. I was an assistant professor for fifteen years.

MINK: Isn't that uncommon? Don't they usually say, you know, either at the end of six years or seven years...

ROBBINS: Eight.

MINK: Eight years now.

ROBBINS: Now. But that rule wasn't in effect. As a matter of fact, I was secretary of a senate committee that was established to look over the whole question of revising the tenure rules. It was that committee on which Bennet Allen and Gustave Arlt and one or two others served; it was that committee that developed the "eight year up or out" rule. I think it was not terribly uncommon for assistant professors to be kept on for a long time. But when I was appointed here, I had an MBA degree and not a PhD degree. I recall having asked the provost, Ernest Moore, why he would appoint me as assistant professor when I had only an MBA. And he said, "Well, the MBA in business administration is regarded as an equivalent of a PhD as far as

appointments and promotion are concerned here." Well, I should have, of course, probably investigated further and maybe gone and got the doctorate. But I didn't; I was too involved later on in war training and things of that kind. So I was considered, I think, not to have the qualifications for tenure appointment by committees, year after year. My service, I think, was mainly in university service and I had written a few things, but not very many. However, one piece that I did was considered sufficient, I guess, by some people on the committee--I don't know whether the majority or not.

But I think it was true that Neil had to pound the table pretty hard with the chancellor, and I've forgotten which chancellor it was now. I think it was Dykstra, because Dykstra hesitated to go against committees' recommendations. However, Dykstra was very favorable. He told me that he was very favorable, but he found it very difficult to force these things through the president because, he said, "I have to ask the president for a lot of favors, and I don't like to ask for a lot of relatively small ones."

MINK: Save it for the big things.

ROBBINS: He wanted to wait for the big things, and I can understand what he meant.

MINK: Sure.

ROBBINS: So it didn't bother me. At any rate, the

president finally gave in, I guess, and wrote me a very nice letter, was very cordial to me when he met me, about bestowing this favor of tenureship on me. I wasn't really terribly concerned, because I could have easily left the university and perhaps made a good deal more money.

MINK: In consulting.

ROBBINS: Well, but I didn't do much of that at that time. There wasn't a big market for consulting, as there was after the war. But I loved what I was doing. I loved teaching, and I think I devoted a great deal of my attention to my teaching--taught many hours, fifteen to eighteen hours a week, with often three and four subjects a semester, as many of us did in those days. And I think I developed finally into a fairly good teacher.

But the point I was making in referring to tenureship was that I wasn't really any person with power in the department. I wasn't regarded as a front-line scholar of power. I was a very effective administrator; and, I think, the faculty members were very happy to let George do it, we'll say, when it came to the student affairs.

MINK: That's a pain in the neck, isn't it?

ROBBINS: The grubby work of spending hours during the summer, uncompensated hours during the summer, interviewing students and their parents in reinstatement

matters--I regarded it as a very important function for students, and there are many students whom I could name whose careers were saved by what I think were wise decisions to kick them out and let them sink or swim before they came back.

MINK: You were applying this principle that you had developed on the senate committee to the school then, this idea of temporarily suspending them, letting them get out.

ROBBINS: Yes, have them earn their way back: not through getting grades, because they'd failed in that in the best place to test it, which is inside the university; but to prove that they were mature human beings that could handle their affairs. Then, when they came back, they could succeed--and did, in large numbers. But that was my first job, during the first three or four years Neil was here, before he took his first leave--a date I can't recall, but it was about three years.

MINK: Probably to go to the Council of Economic Advisors.

ROBBINS: No, I think his first one was a semisabbatical in fall '52. You see, he followed the rule of taking semisabbaticals whenever he could. He felt that the dean should do this, and he wanted to do it largely because he simply loved to write. He had books and articles he wanted to write, so he had to get away from

the administrative procedure to do it. This was his very firm belief.

Until that time when I became acting dean for the first time, I had no concern for staffing, except that I was in the tenure group and therefore sat in the meetings of the tenure group of people where Neil would propose faculty additions. And there's just no question but what most members of the faculty felt that Neil was staffing with University of Chicago people and was not looking elsewhere, because it was the easy thing to fall back on people he knew in Chicago, like Weston and Tannenbaum and O'Donnell and others.

MINK: Would it be repetitious to ask the question, I suppose, that this didn't please them?

ROBBINS: No, it didn't please them. It didn't please the faculty particularly to have University of Chicago people. I think that it wasn't that they were against the individuals that were presented, but the mere fact that they came from Chicago. They didn't want to become a little Chicago.

MINK: Were there things that were repugnant about the Chicago philosophy within the faculty? They felt that these were not the proper kinds of philosophical areas to develop?

ROBBINS: No, I don't really think so. I think the reputation of Chicago as being a fairly good business school was established, and philosophically the Chicago

school represented classical liberal economics, more or less, and this was quite satisfactory to the people who were here. So that's not a problem. They would have been equally concerned had Neil come from Harvard and begun to staff with Harvard people, or Michigan, or Berkeley, or anyplace else.

MINK: I suppose it gets to be sort of a close-knit family.

ROBBINS: Yes, that's right. It's ingrown. I think it's also fair to say that Neil did not give evidence of widespread recruiting. Of course, I should say that Neil knew a great many economists and had worked with them and had appeared with them on his [University of Chicago Round Table]. So he knew these people personally, and he knew their reputations, and he would write to them and ask whether or not they were interested-- people who had been to Chicago for the most part and had gone to Cornell or someplace else. I don't think in all the period of Neil's deanship that he ever made a recruiting trip. He never went east or north to interview people and bring a whole list of people and have them screened and studied by us. As a matter of fact, one of the things that Ralph Cassady insisted upon in these meetings of the tenure people was that when Neil would bring a name in for approval, we have a variety of names. "Who are the available candidates? Which ones do we want?" I think this was a perfectly

appropriate thing for the faculty to insist upon.

MINK: In other words, he didn't bring in a group of candidates, he brought in a candidate.

ROBBINS: He would bring up a candidate. I remember time after time when Ralph Cassady particularly would object to the fact that "There's only one name presented for this position and there should be a number who are the available people." I think that from the very outset there was a suspicion that was developed in the minds of some of the faculty people that Neil's recruiting was not very thorough.

MINK: Well, this, it occurs to me, put you in a bad position, because if you felt with Cassady that this was an important thing (which it does seem to me to be) you were placed in a position of having, it would seem to me, as the associate dean, to uphold what Neil proposed.

ROBBINS: No, I don't think so, because my role as associate dean had nothing to do with recruiting. I was just another faculty member sitting in these meetings. It is true that I always felt a loyalty to Neil, because I felt that if I didn't feel this way honestly, I should get out of the job. I overall supported him. However I did, quietly and in his office, alone with him, talk to some extent about alternatives and getting a list of people together. He would say, "Yes, George, I suppose I should do that." And he would: the

next meeting he would have a list of names, six or eight or ten. One time I think he got a whole page of them.

MINK: Well, were these really names?

ROBBINS: They were names. They were names of people, most of them good people, well-known people.

MINK: But people he'd never met.

ROBBINS: Well, some were people he'd met; some were people whose names he got from other people or from faculty members. He asked the faculty members to suggest people. This is one interesting thing, in defense of Neil--that the faculty members did not come through with any names. As a matter of fact, most of them didn't know who the big people were in their fields or who the young people were coming into their fields.

Cassady was a case in point. When asked to mention people, he would mention Professor Vaile at Minnesota, who was a very dear friend of his and of mine, who had a master's degree in economics and that's all, but had written a number of very good books on advertising. Or he would mention Bill Brown, who is now on our faculty but who was a master's student here before he went back to Northwestern for his degree. Then he was hired by Noble to come back as a lecturer while he was finishing his degree, which took a long time. Cassady liked Bill and Cassady would push Bill on him [Jacoby]. So there were these two people whose

names came up all the time in marketing. So Neil didn't get much help from the faculty.

MINK: Did he talk to you about this, that it discouraged him?

ROBBINS: Oh, yes, I think he was discouraged by this, in a way, and in a way he rebelled against it because he thought that he was brought here to build a faculty and he should have something to say about it.

MINK: Sure.

ROBBINS: In Chicago, they did it this way. Dean Cox would decide what he wanted, go to Hutchins, and Hutchins would say, "OK." It was a completely different ballgame. When he [Jacoby] did make recommendations, they often would be turned down by the Budget Committee. Dykstra would call him over and tell him that the Budget Committee had refused and the Ad Hoc Committee was divided. Neil was very up-tight about the fact that he could not learn who was on these committees and couldn't even read the committee reports, excluding the names. The chancellor was forced merely to verbalize the summary of what it said.

MINK: This brings up an interesting point, which could be of general application as well as the specific application in the case of business. When these guys come here, don't they know in advance that this sort of a situation is going to be the rules of

the game that they're going to have to face?

Was Neil not aware?

ROBBINS: He was aware of this. We talked about it. We talked about it in his summer home near Chicago the second time I met him, when I was teaching at Wisconsin for the summer. I went down there at Dykstra's request to interview him. I went over this system with him, and he understood or was told of it. He thought it was a funny kind of system, but I think he talked with the other people about this before he came. But that doesn't matter; I think until you're really in it you don't see that it is as restrictive, and sometimes perhaps even vicious. The fact seemed to be that over the years the committees would be stacked against the business school.

MINK: That does bring up this question that has been raised by this other informant that I talked to, that this really was the way he painted it. Really [there existed] a conspiracy on the part of the letters and science people who controlled, for so many years, the Committee on Committees, by virtue of the fact that there were just so many L and S people on the Committee on Committees--which, of course, names the committees on the budget and interdepartmental relations, which in turn elects or appoints the secret committees.

ROBBINS: I don't know whether conspiracy is the right word. I think it was a natural development

of governments that you would expect in this situation. It resulted from a combination of attitudes. On the part of some people, I suspect that it was a desire simply for power, to control; on the part of other people, it was a firm resolve to maintain the highest possible standards on the campus.

MINK: Standard of conviction, in other words.

ROBBINS: Yes. But there was really a very small handful of active senate members who saw to it that, I suppose, the committees were constituted the way they wanted them. Of course the most serious problem here was that the dean (or chairman of the department-- he was both) was not allowed knowledge vital to him. Really, with respect to these matters of staffing it was not the dean's function or the dean's hat he was wearing, but the chairman's; because as dean he had no powers, as chairman he made more power. As chairman he could not even suggest members of our faculty who had the best expertise in this field or that field. Quite frequently, we would find by the grapevine or by hook or crook, that Professor X on our faculty was on the committee concerned with staffing in Area Y, about which he knew nothing.

There was a real difficulty in those days because we were an applied economics school; all of our people were economists practically. There was no understanding of the need for developing a focus on a unique professional

area of management. We were just regarded as applied economists. I remember when we wanted to bring Ralph Barnes here. I'm not sure how Barnes's name came up; it may be that he initiated the discussion with Neil-- I don't know. Ralph, of course, was a distinguished engineer and foremost authority on motion and time studies.

When that appointment came up, I remember in the faculty meeting there were discussions by economists and accountants as to why we would have an engineer on the business school faculty. They thought that time and motion study and work simplification belonged in engineering. Neil and I were firmly of the belief that operations management, production management which it was called at that time, was a function of business; and that the principles of operation management applied to all kinds of business operations; and that it was not an engineering function, although engineering techniques were essential. We thought we should have a joint appointment with engineering, and we offered it to Boelter and he picked it up immediately. He recognized our argument; he did say, at the time, that he wanted it understood that if he decided to go into that field and develop it, that he would go ahead and feel free to do it in the engineering school. We always had a very cordial joint relationship with respect to Barnes.

But the point is illustrated there--the chauvinistic view, the provincial view of business management being applied economics, that all problems of management can be solved by economic analysis--or accounting analysis which was a microform of economic analysis. There was no general feeling that the human being and his place and the development of his own satisfactions and his own expertise and so on were important, and therefore psychology and social psychology and sociology and anthropology, goodness knows, maybe biology, play important parts. That was a battle that Neil and I still had to win to get people from various disciplines in here. I wouldn't want to suggest that Neil or I, either one, saw the full implications of having a diversified faculty. I think this grew on us as time went by, but we certainly were the first school, I think, to hire an engineer, and the first school to hire a psychologist, outside of Harvard Business School.

MINK: Do you think that, as time has gone on, the faculty's attitude has changed? That they now accept this as really the way?

ROBBINS: Oh, I think so. I think this is quite accepted now. Not by everybody; there are some people who, I suppose, look upon the behavioral scientists as headshrinkers or something like this. They do use terms like this occasionally. But this is a period that has, I think, practically disappeared, because

it's perfectly clear now that all the disciplines have to be drawn upon in order to define and solve problems of organization, the difficult problems of organization. So that's water over the dam, but we did go through some strenuous periods.

MINK: Right. What did you view as the problems of your particular role as associate dean vis-à-vis the faculty and the dean?

ROBBINS: Well, during the first few years, you see, I was so busy I didn't have problems. I was too busy trying to straighten out the student affairs and also busy trying to cultivate the faculty's ideas toward jettisoning the lower division and working with letters and science to bring this about. But when I first became acting dean that first semester that Neil went on leave (fall '52), I was thrust into the saddle of leadership, and I did not feel comfortable in that role at all. I wasn't psychologically prepared for it; I'd never thought of being in that role.

MINK: That's sort of an ulcer route, isn't it?

ROBBINS: Yes, it was a problem. I did not feel that I had very much the confidence of the leaders in the senate. My background certainly wouldn't suggest that they should have much confidence in me as a leading person. The faculty generally did not view me in terms of philosophical leadership, policy leadership, this kind of thing. I had to learn the hard way. I had

very good support from the faculty, I think mainly out of pity and sympathy. I wasn't disliked personally, I think, by members of the faculty--I wasn't aware of it--and they were cooperative. I had no difficulty there. But I did feel that the whole question of staffing and recruiting staff and so on was something that I had to learn how to do: learn how to develop dossiers and write letters and work with the chancellor and circumvent the Budget Committee and whatever. So it was a very hard lesson I had to learn.

MINK: You didn't have any kind of experience from observing Jacoby or discussing with him to fall back on?

ROBBINS: Oh, yes, I had some. But, as I say, I wasn't really an understudy of his in any sense at all in the first few years. I think the next leave was 1953-1954 when he went to the council and was gone at first only for six months and then twelve months and then eighteen months (to fall, '54).

MINK: Well, I was wondering, too, to what extent this really was solely your responsibility, because even though he was gone you would have to touch base with him and get his opinion, wouldn't you, on recruiting?

ROBBINS: I did not have to do that. I did it and he listened to me and we exchanged long letters. I was in Washington once during that period. We didn't travel much in those days because the budget wouldn't allow it, but I was on a recruiting trip and I stopped

to see him and talk over some serious personnel problems we had. He would listen to me and would make comments, but I never felt that I had to touch base with him before making a decision, because he made it perfectly clear that I was the dean while he was gone and I did not have to run to him. He, I think, was prepared to back me on any decision I made. We never disagreed, as far as I can recall, but there were some very serious problems, personnel problems that came up. I learned then, as I never realized before, that members of the academic community are people and individuals who have their likes, dislikes, hates, vicious sides, and other things, along with anybody else. They were not scholarly when it came to interpersonal relations.

MINK: Are these things that you think you want to discuss?

ROBBINS: I did discuss some of these with Neil by letter.

MINK: By letter, yes.

ROBBINS: I discussed them with members of the faculty, too. I suppose really I carried on individual and group conversations of the faculty to an extent never before known in this school. Noble never did it and Jacoby never did much of this, but I consulted very widely with the faculty because I felt I needed strong faculty support.

MINK: Were these problems that were individual

problems outside of the school, personal problems, or were they problems that actually would have affected the school?

ROBBINS: Well, they were personal problems that would affect the school. There were problems of internal organization, there were problems of getting on with the senate committees, and problems of recruitment, problems of budget preparation. I checked with him on this because I thought he must have had some unarticulated goals in mind that would govern budget preparation which I did not know. I don't think that that turned out to be the case, but I wanted to check with him on that.

I was a novice at all these things, but I enjoyed it very much. The pressure was very heavy; but each semester that went by I gained more confidence and, I think, got more support from the faculty, because I was taking a stand on some things that was seen by the faculty as being stiff-backed against evil, or what have you. [laughter]

MINK: Maybe you might like to be a little more specific about that, if you could, because I think this is important, if it represented a change.

ROBBINS: I would have to refer to correspondence in order to bring back the incidents, because one of the things that's very characteristic of me is that I forget pain very quickly.

MINK: That's a good idea.

ROBBINS: I forget differences and difficulties very quickly. I don't think I could have lived as long as a dean as I did if I had harbored memories of the "slings and arrows of outrageous fortune" that were thrown at me. [laughter] So I can't recall at the moment. Well, one member of the faculty, who I will not name, was arrested in the village for purloining some toothpaste or something of this sort up his sleeve.

MINK: Shoplifting. Oh, that sort of thing, yes.

That wasn't exactly what I had in mind.

ROBBINS: This was a painful experience to go through; and later on, another painful experience with the same person was when his name was coming up for full professorship--he was a tenure member at that time. And there was some very strong feelings in some parts of the faculty that anybody who's guilty of that shouldn't be promoted and should have been fired, although this episode wasn't very widely circulated. There was also a feeling that this person was not really a very productive scholar, although he's a very outstanding teacher in his field, in technique. So there were difficult problems like this.

MINK: Those sorts of personal problems, of course, do enter into the school. The problems that really shape it, it seems to me, are the attitudes and opinions of

the faculty on which they may take a stand and cause progress to stand still.

ROBBINS: Yes, well, I always had a feeling that the members of the faculty gave me increasing support while I was acting dean. In later years, when Neil was away with UNESCO assignments and other sabbatical leaves--altogether I guess he was away thirty to forty percent of the time that he was dean--there was an increasing feeling that the faculty had confidence in me.

MINK: Were there complaints about his being away so much?

ROBBINS: Oh yes, yes. They grew, complaints grew all the time. Many members of the faculty and in the university, when they see me now, say, "Well, it's a good thing you got to be dean finally. You were doing a dean's work all along anyway." This was a source of great embarrassment to me because my colleagues both outside and inside the department would say this, or even people off campus.

MINK: I didn't realize you were dean. Were you appointed dean after Jacoby?

ROBBINS: Yes, after Jacoby left I was dean for two years.

MINK: For two years before you retired.

ROBBINS: Yes. 1968-1970.

MINK: I didn't realize that.

ROBBINS: Because, you see, I knew the truth, and the

truth was that I was not dean during any of the period; I was acting dean and as acting dean you simply cannot pose as a dean, you cannot operate as a dean. You do not have the authority of a dean, even though I think I had earned a good deal of the authority from the inside. But I also knew that our partnership, Neil's and my partnership, was one of complementarity. He could not do some of the things that I did. He could not do recruiting, for example; he could not do internal personnel work. He didn't like this sort of thing.

MINK: Well, you were sort of the one. I take it that many people found the dean irascible and difficult to deal with on a personal basis.

ROBBINS: Well, I don't think that "irascible" is a proper word.

MINK: Maybe it's not.

ROBBINS: I think indifferent, and perhaps cold and not bending.

MINK: Whereas they could come to you and get the warmth that they felt that they didn't get from him.

ROBBINS: Yes, I think this is true. I mixed with the people much more closely. On the other hand, Neil brought a great deal of prestige to the school. He brought great expertise in planning and development. He staked out goals and policies, and he pushed these things through. He worked very well with some of the chancellors. And he did things I couldn't do, so this

is truly a partnership. People that made these remarks to me were, I thought, very unfair and not really very truthful--one of these things where you look at the mirror and you know exactly who you are when other people think different, faculty or otherwise.

In the fall of '67 I announced to Neil that I was going to retire early in June of '68. I wanted to do something else, some other things. Then right after the first of the year in '68, Neil announced that he was going to quit as dean.

MINK: Did one have anything to do with the other?

ROBBINS: I don't know; not with me. It had nothing to do with it. I had no desire to be dean; I had no goal to be that; I did not wish it.

MINK: I think that Neil had pointed out that the reason that he wanted to retire was that he felt he wanted to devote more time to his research. He had become interested in the institute at Santa Barbara, the Tugwell and Hutchins Center [for the Study of Democratic Institutions].

ROBBINS: Well, that may have come later; I don't know. I couldn't tell.

MINK: He didn't give you any reasons then?

ROBBINS: Well, he gave those reasons, yes. This was not my problem; I was going to retire, and then it was somebody else's problem to find a dean. However, the chancellor and Vice-Chancellor Sherwood urged me to stay

on and become dean. I agreed finally after thinking it over a long, long time. I finally agreed to do so, provided that they searched diligently for a new dean and that they would have one within two years, or preferably within a year.

MINK: I guess you felt sort of like Knudsen felt when he became chancellor--that he would do it provided that they found somebody to be chancellor within a very short time, because he was due to retire at the time he became chancellor.

ROBBINS: Right, I did not want the job. However, I'm very happy that I had the opportunity to do it, because as dean, even though I was a lame-duck dean in a sense, I could do some things that I was not able to do before.

MINK: Well, that does bring up an interesting question that I should ask you, too. I think we'll turn the tape.

TAPE NUMBER: V, SIDE ONE

April 2, 1972

MINK: You said when we shut off the tape recorder that you welcomed the opportunity, finally after some soul-searching, to do as Foster Sherwood asked and to stay on for two years as dean--provided, of course, that they would make a diligent search for a new dean; and that this gave you an opportunity to carry out certain things that you had felt all along ought to be done in the way of change for the school.

ROBBINS: Well, some of these things we had started already. After Neil came back from the Council [of Economic Advisors] I think it was, or maybe the UNESCO experience, the department had grown very large and was getting unwieldy. The dean, who was also chairman of the department, had just too much of a load in getting dossiers together and recommendations, and handling personnel problems, as well as outside factors and so on. So I suggested to Neil that he give up the chairmanship and appoint a chairman to the department to take over this internal personnel function of the recruitment and the development of faculty.

MINK: How did he feel about that?

ROBBINS: Well, he agreed with it. He agreed with it quite readily. I think we had no argument about that at all. He said, "Well, you're the one to be the

chairman."

MINK: So you were associate dean and chairman.

ROBBINS: Associate dean and chairman. In the meantime, of course, I had taken one or two semisabbatical leaves myself.

MINK: But you hadn't proposed this with yourself in mind.

ROBBINS: No, I hadn't proposed it with myself in mind.

MINK: Well, it must have been sort of a shock to you when he said, "Well, you're the one to do it."

ROBBINS: I thought we would search for somebody else. But at any rate, when I had been on semisabbatical leaves once or twice, we had appointed a member of the faculty, another member of the faculty, to take over the acting assistant deanship, to handle the student affairs. One of them was Professor O'Donnell, for example, whose philosophy was just completely contrary to mine. We had agreed before I left on policy with respect to reinstatement and handling of disqualified students. But he didn't understand it. His idea was that if a person flunked out of school, he should be dismissed, which is a technical term meaning you never come back and you can't go to any other school.

MINK: Oh, I didn't know that. You mean if you're dismissed from here, you can never get in anywhere?

ROBBINS: The action of dismissal on your record means that no other reputable school will take you unless

they write to you and say, "Will you take him back? If you do, we'll take him." But then we had developed the technical distinction between "subject to dismissal" and "dismissed." If you were "subject to dismissal," that meant that you had not made your grade. But then there were several actions that could be taken, among which dismissal was the final tough one, which we almost never used. But we would use another one which said "May not reenter without the consent of the Reinstatement Committee or the dean or chancellor." We used this "May not reenter" as a means of rehabilitating students, telling them what they had to do to come back.

But O'Donnell's view was that if they couldn't cut the mustard, by God, they'd better not be in the university at all. This was a decision which I don't think a dean ever has a right to make without very careful consideration, because it really cuts off a student's future. Emotionally, sometimes, I felt that I wanted to do this with some of the fellows that flunked out, but we just don't dare. Well, at any rate, he really messed up the records completely by dismissing a great many students. It took months to redo that whole thing.

MINK: In other words, what you did was to go back and get in touch with these people and say to them "Well, you really aren't dismissed in the final context of the term."

ROBBINS: Yes, we had to change the records on the registrar's office by cancelling "dismissed" and saying "Subject to dismissal, may not reenter without consent of the dean."

MINK: Well, did they come to you afterwards and say they felt that they had been unfairly treated, or did you get in touch with them?

ROBBINS: No, I went to the registrar and asked if we couldn't change those records. And he said yes after awhile. So then he notified each one of the students. He got in touch with them that their record was changed to read so-and-so and that they should consult with the dean.

Then Fred Weston was in there one semester. Fred doesn't like to do administrative work, and he would pass all the questions off to his secretary, so the secretary had to become the acting assistant dean, you see--this kind of thing.

MINK: That's dangerous but frequent.

ROBBINS: So it became clear that we needed an assistant dean to take care of these matters, because I was increasingly involved with educational policy definition and personnel matters and so on. So we appointed Jim Gillies as assistant dean in charge of student affairs. That, of course, left me relatively free to take the chairmanship, you see, which was a function that I was increasingly performing anyway, so it was logical;

and I said, "I'll do this." So I was associate dean and chairman to the department.

Then I began to reorganize the department. By that time, we had accumulated so many disciplines or areas--we had behavioral sciences, and engineering, and mathematical analysis, as well as all the others, finance, marketing, accounting. And we had developed quite a lot of graduate work at that time. We hadn't made the decision yet to go to strictly graduate school. I felt that I did not have, nor did Jacoby or anybody else, have the expertise to go out and recruit for all these various subject areas. I didn't know the market among the scholars in mathematics, management insurance, behavioral sciences or other fields save my own (marketing). I was not willing to try to pretend that I did. I did that for a year and found that it was much too difficult.

MINK: Sometimes when consulting with people who you suppose know it, you can't always be sure that they aren't giving you self-serving advice.

ROBBINS: Yes, one has to go about this very cautiously, and yet you have to move fast, particularly in view of the fact that it took six months often to get an appointment through the machinery. So I thought we should have areas; I didn't like to departmentalize the school.

MINK: The way medicine has done.

ROBBINS: I think what we needed at this stage of the development of the field of management was unification and not fissiparation. I thought departmentalization would lead to building a lot of little empires, particularly if they have budgets, you see.

The business school is still groping for its soul in the United States, in a sense. This is what Clark Kerr said in the first article that was written for the California Management Review. It made Neil kind of sore that he said that the business school in the United States was groping for its soul; but I think we really are, because it's a field that's emerging. It's a new one, and we don't know really what it takes to develop good managers. We're not sure what the effective boundary lines are of our disciplines. I think the business school twenty-five years from now is going to be a much different kind of thing that it is now. It certainly is different now than it was when I started in the business.

MINK: Well, isn't it true, for example, that engineering went through a somewhat similar experience and perhaps still hasn't answered the criticism that have been levelled against engineers--this sort of humanization of engineering? You think of such things as the books that have been written--English for Engineers, you know, that sort of thing.

ROBBINS: Business English, too.

MINK: Yes, right. They sort of developed in a vacuum without taking into consideration (the way--admirably, I believe--this school has) the need to bring in people from other disciplines.

ROBBINS: Well, I don't know too much about engineering education. All I know is that Boelter, of course, tried to tackle this problem of unifying.

MINK: Oh, yes, yes.

ROBBINS: And finally has lost out because they've gone back to departmentalization. Maybe it's right now for them to do it; but, of course, the purview of an engineering school has expanded so rapidly with technological development, you see.

MINK: But you could say the same of business.

ROBBINS: But the same thing is true of business.

MINK: Computerization has affected business in many ways.

ROBBINS: Oh, yes. But, you see, the foundations of any professional school lie in the classical disciplines someplace, and yet the classical disciplines are increasingly becoming concerned with applications. In a sense, the whole university system is rocking and reeling under this change and tug-of-war. It's no longer simple to say that you're a physicist, you see, or that you're a mathematician; there's an adjective here, and it increasingly associates itself with engineering problems which are the problems of

translating basic discoveries into usable forms.

In a sense, this is what business school, or any professional school, does. I think medicine is this kind of school, also. I'm not sure about law; it's a kind of artificial school.

At any rate, I saw, and Neil saw, and some of the members of our faculty saw, that this was developing and that we should be very careful and not departmentalize and freeze the past into the future. So we called them areas, and we organized all the various fields that could have been departments with an area chairman who was appointed by the dean under the chairmanship, you see. I asked the dean to appoint these people so they'd have the authority from the top, but the area chairman reported to me as chairman. Their responsibility was personnel function and internal housekeeping--they had no budgets. They had the responsibility of personnel recruitment, indoctrination, education, appointment and evaluation, assignment, and so on, in those areas.

MINK: Subject, of course, to the authority of the dean? I mean, no appointment could be final without his approval.

ROBBINS: Oh, yes, of course, and even the chancellor-- Sherwood insisted on maintaining control! But they initiated actions. Of course, the chairman had no authority to make appointments, either. The chairman

simply delegated to the area chairman in accounting, for example, the responsibility for coming up with a plan for the development of the accounting group.

This meant that we had about eight area chairmen. Some of them were good at their jobs, and some were very bad at it. Some of them didn't know how to go about it, so it was a problem of education. Then there was also a question of coordination among these groups, because many times a man in one area would teach part of his time in another area, and I liked to encourage this, you see. We wanted this to be just as informal as possible.

All of the time, of course, we had a Staffing Committee that was composed of people from all over the faculty, tenure members of the faculty only. This committee would get the recommendations and the dossiers from the area chairmen through the chairman's office. The chairman would present it to the Staffing Committee for their advice, and then he would have to decide whether he'd follow that in his recommendations to the dean, chancellor, and the president.

This worked fairly well, although with varying success, as I say, because some of the faculty members who were experts in their own field found it very difficult to write a letter of recommendation and build a dossier about their colleagues. They didn't know how to go about it. They couldn't write a

letter. Talk about business English--they didn't know English well enough to write a letter, I suppose. It was foreign to them, this administrative business.

We had experimented with this organization sufficiently so that even before Neil resigned, as early as 1964, I had decided that I should no longer be chairman, that the chairmanship should rotate, in order to build up expertise among certain members of the faculty who could carry on after I left and after Neil left. This twenty-year period of tenure of Neil's and mine was a long period, and it's a very dangerous thing to leave an organization suddenly without adequate attention to succession of personnel. Neil, at my suggestion, appointed other people as chairman--George Brown, for example, was chairman, and Fred Meyers, Jim Jackson, and Louis Davis. Those people each made a contribution to the reorganization. For example, Fred Meyers thought we should reduce the number of areas from nine at that time to about four or five, by grouping areas together. He felt that there were just too many administrators around the place, you see, too many area chairmen, and not enough of them very successful. So he carried off that experiment, and I was backing it completely. Neil was not very much interested in or concerned with these reorganizations, partly because I guess he had confidence that I was doing it. But it did hamper me,

to some extent, and other members of the faculty, not to have him sitting in the chair in faculty meetings knowing all the things that he should know. He was not effective, sometimes, in meeting objections and arguments in faculty meetings, many of which are fatuous.

MINK: Yes.

ROBBINS: But, at any rate, I thought, when I became dean, we could solidify this organization problem, and I could perhaps reorganize the University Extension Executive Program operation. That had not operated the way I thought it should, after I left. We had very good workers there as heads of business administration extension, but they were not regular members of the faculty. Therefore, they didn't carry the prestige that they should. The Executive Program was in extension, but it had a kind of loose, independent relationship. Its relationship with extension was not good and not proper, and I felt we should have an assistant dean who was in charge of that program. So I appointed Warren Schmidt, after looking around the country for a year for all possible alternatives, finally deciding that we had right here the best man in the country, Warren Schmidt.

MINK: This sometimes happens, yes.

ROBBINS: He has taken that over and done a very good job with it, I think, because it had gone downhill very

sadly under Joe Carrabino, who was assistant dean in charge of that program. But he never would recognize the fact that he was the representative of our school with all of extension programs in business. He would only concern himself with the Executive Program, and we had lots of other programs. We had 25- to 30,000 enrollments in extension every year, class department and short courses and so on. But he was only interested in the Executive Program, I think, probably, mainly for what he could get out of it in the way of relationships with outside people and consulting opportunities, to be very frank. So he had to be replaced, and this I had recommended for two years and nothing was done about it. I don't think Neil really wanted to face this problem.

MINK: Well, in a case like that--this maybe is a naive question--do you try to point [things] out to these people? Do you go and say, "Look, Joe, the Executive Program isn't everything. Just because you want to grease your palm, we do have 30,000 other enrollees in business administration." Do you do things like that?

ROBBINS: Yes, indeed.

MINK: It's a naive question, maybe.

ROBBINS: No, no, it's not naive, because I think some administrators in the university operate by closing their eyes to the difficult problems. But no, both Neil and I had had, separately and together, conversations

with Joe pointing out his charter of what he was responsible for and what he had to do; and he would say, "All right, if this is what you want, I'll do it." And he'd go out and he wouldn't do it. It's not an easy matter for a dean to have regular weekly or monthly conferences with all the people responsible to him. He has other fish to fry, and I finally came to the conclusion two years before I became dean that that had to be changed. You just couldn't deal with it. And so the change was made after I became dean. I just told Joe that he was through in that job.

MINK: Notwithstanding.

ROBBINS: I said, "You just don't want to do what I think should be done. You know what it is, we've talked about it a long time." So he said, "All right."

There were some other matters--the departmental organization--I wanted to beef up. I wanted to strengthen it, you see. I wanted to see a faculty that was working towards an integration, a real integration.

We had a multidisciplinary attack on the problem of management because we had good people from various disciplines. But we were not interdisciplinary. Maybe it is almost an impossibility to get interdisciplinary work. But we do have one or two cases where it has worked, where you have people from various disciplines in the school and outside the school who work together on a problem, where the focus of all their interest

and attention is on that problem and not upon the development of the individual's status as an expert economist, or an expert this, that, or the other. This is difficult partly because the whole cast of the university is from the letters and science departments' viewpoint--the pure departments, if you please--where the faculty's main job is to reproduce themselves, produce people just like themselves, only better. If you're a historian, your job is to produce the best historians; if you're an economist, the best economists. And if you have a true interdisciplinary group working on a problem, the result of that problem is going to be a report that is not to be viewed and evaluated as a piece of work in one field. When this kind of report, which has three authors or five authors or even two, comes to a promotion committee, the question is raised, "Who wrote this report; who was responsible for this?" And the answer comes back that there was an equal responsibility here; everybody contributed something. Joe Blow contributed research methodology here; he's an expert in research methodology, and he contributed that. Jim Doe over here was the guy who really gave us the inspiration; he carved out the problem and he kept us going on this, and so on. This kind of problem, we found way back in our early behavioral science days, with Tannenbaum and Weschler and [Fred] Massarik. The promotion

committees could not understand this point of view-- true interdisciplinary and collaborative work.

MINK: You mean they could not use it effectively in developing a judgment of the individual's contribution as far as promotion was concerned.

ROBBINS: That's right. We put up the promotion of Tannenbaum there, for example, and it would be turned down time after time because he had a lot of things going against him. He had an undergraduate degree in accounting; he had a master's degree in accounting and administration at Chicago; and he had a doctor's degree in management. [He was] one of the first really good theorists in the field of management. This background was odd, you see. It's much easier if he'd been a physicist first and a physicist second and a physicist third, or an economist in our case. And then he was not a psychologist, but he was working in behavior science; he had moved over into the whole area of human relationships. He was concerned very much with sensitivity training, which was anathema, probably, at that time, and still is, I guess, to a lot of people. He was an idea man; he kept the group together. Weschler was an expert methodologist; he would lay out the research technique. Massarik was a good hard worker to bring these things together. Here was a team; they were beginning to do some really great work when Weschler was killed in an automobile accident.

But when Tannenbaum's promotion would come up, they would say, "Well, what is he? He's not a behavioral scientist. He's working in this field. What are his credentials?" And we'd say, "Well, here are the reviews of his work by leading people--Maslow and Roethlisberger at Harvard and so on." And they'd say, "Well, but we don't know these people too well."

What we were trying to do here, you see, and what I was anxious to try to do, was to prove that this true interdisciplinary work with teams would produce new results that are very viable and effective where practical management is concerned, as well as theoretical development of doctoral candidates. And this goes against the grain of the university, the whole university pattern. I don't know whether this high-risk effort will ever work.

But I wanted to try to nurture this work, and so our internal organization was constructed so that we could have easy flow among areas. If Area A wanted the services of Professor X in Area B, they would go to the area chairman and say, "I'd like to have this professor come over and work in our area for at least one course." And the two area chairmen would say, "Prima facie, that's good. Let's try to do it." This was completely contrary to the tendency of the area chairmen to hug their resources tightly and to eschew any tampering with "my" faculty.

And so this was the thing that we were working on. George Brown, who later became the dean of the school at Irvine, was very good in understanding this point of view of integration. And so were Fred Meyers, Lou Davis, and Jim Jackson. They were all good in helping put this point across. So I thought maybe in a year as dean I could steer the boat in this direction, and the new dean would have to go along, whoever he was, because the faculty would want to do it. I was there two years, and really it's not enough time. But it was satisfying in that, despite some very serious problems of personnel and responsibility, we, I think, implanted the notion which the new dean has been able to bring to flower to some extent, at least pushed farther than I had gone.

But one always has the difficulty of having these plans interrupted by failure of the people to perform the way they should, as administrators--like Lou Davis, for example, [a] completely unreliable person as a chairman. He has a lot of credentials, but apparently he wanted to be dean, and he would not play ball with me. In fact, he would pretend to [do so] when he was with me, but then when he was away, my back was turned, he would work against me. So finally I just had to say, "You're out as chairman of the department." This slows things up, you see, when you have people who have their own private wishes to fulfill. But it was a

very rewarding experience for me to have those two years. I was able to reorganize the extension operation, and I was able to regain the affection and support of the Executive Program Association, which had been allowed to go to pot.

MINK: What was the problem? You say regain the affection and support of the Executive Program Association.

ROBBINS: These were the 1500 graduates of our Executive Program, who were a cross section of pretty high-level people in the industry here. They had not been given very much leadership from the school. This was the job that Carrabino was supposed to have done and he didn't; he antagonized them.

MINK: But I thought you said that when he was in charge of extension he concentrated on the Executive Program to the disregard of the other factors. Now you're saying that he had lost their affection, so I'm left with the impression that he was totally ineffective.

ROBBINS: Well, he lost their affection because it became perfectly clear to them that his interest in them was in getting consulting assignments from them. While it's true that all of our alumni love to have faculty members do consulting for their firms, they soon lose confidence in the school that allows a faculty member to spend too much of his time in consulting.

MINK: Well, I can see that.

ROBBINS: And quite rightly. But for a variety of reasons, he lost their affection, and they were not about to support the school. Our 1500 businessmen, personally and through their business connections, should be the source of contributions of \$100,000 a year, at least, to our research fund--which would have been a boon. And so when I took over, I met with each board, and I got acquainted with them, and they asked, "Well, what can we do for you, George? We want to help you." I said, "Well, you can organize to collect some contributions to the school, cash contributions, that the dean can use for his own purposes and won't have to check on with anybody." And they said, "Well, how much do you have in mind?" And I said, "Just as an early goal, \$100,000 a year." And they said, "Well, that doesn't seem too much."

However, once they set about to do it, their officers made some serious mistakes that resulted in internal dissension. Hence, their campaign did not get all the money that I thought we should get. But we raised some money.

But this was one thing I felt we should do. Our relationships with the business community should be strengthened.

MINK: Isn't it funny--not to interrupt, but I am-- I had the impression, and it came through so loud and

clear, that all the time up until right now, this had been one of the great things about this school: that it had such good relations with the business community; and the business community had supported it. This is where the wherewithal came to do the things that had been done in this school. At least this is the impression that Neil left me with.

ROBBINS: I think that this is only partially true. Neil was not a person to go out and ask for money. He would not ask his friends for money. He knew probably more businessmen than any other dean in this part of the country, at least. All over the country, he was well known. But he would not go to them and organize a campaign to get funds.

MINK: Was this a personality thing with him?

ROBBINS: I think it probably was. I think he was shy. It is true that he and George Steiner (and to some extent, I was involved, but not much, because I was on leave in 1958-59 and in Europe far away) organized the UCLA Business Research Associates.

MINK: Yes, I had a question to ask you about that, so you brought it up. That's good.

ROBBINS: They had a meeting. Ed Carter hosted a meeting of the California Club, a meeting of really leading top executives of business firms in Southern California. I can't give you how many; I think thirty or forty. As I say, I wasn't present because I was in

Europe. But the purpose of the associates was just like the Harvard Business School Associates: to provide an avenue by which the firms could pay \$1,000 a year to become associates. They would get copies of publications, and they would have the satisfaction of knowing they were pushing their own discipline. And they had promises right then, that night, of \$30,000.

MINK: That's very good.

ROBBINS: You see, thirty people had promised \$1,000 apiece. I think there's no question but what this could run up to \$100- or \$200,000 a year by now, easily--\$250,000 a year.

But when word got out that we were doing this, the dean at USC went to Asa Call, the chairman of the USC trustees, and complained that we were invading their territory. The private enterprise was the territory of the private schools, because we had our nose to the public trough; we weren't getting any research money from the public troughs to speak of--\$10,000 a year or something like that. So Asa Call called up the chairman of the Board of Regents--I think it was Pauley at that time--and said that "If you don't stop this campaign of your business school, we're going to go to the legislature and see that the water is cut off from your business school." And so the regents went to the president, and the president phoned up and said, "Stop this." And we hassled over this for a

long time and finally evolved the rule that we could go to our alumni or our "friends," and ask for some money, but we couldn't go out to anybody else. This is the rule up to the present time, excepting that it was relaxed under Murphy. Murphy didn't like this rule at all, and he began to relax it.

MINK: Murphy had more clout within the regents so that he could defend his actions to them, I suppose.

ROBBINS: Yes, yes he could. But this was a tough one. You see, the regents were cowed by the private school people.

MINK: Even as they are today.

ROBBINS: Yes, and they have their own problems and I don't want to second-guess them. But in setting up the Business Research Associates we had a provision under which any scholar in any school in Southern California could apply to our Division of Research, for funds on a project basis, just as our faculty did on a project basis. We pointed out to the dean at USC that his people could have access to these funds, and it was going to help the whole enterprise of business education. In the long run, he could develop his own associates and do this sort of thing. He said, "If I ever catch any faculty member applying for your research fund, he'll be fired on the spot."

This was an effort that really disillusioned Neil. Oh, I think Neil was just sick over this. It was a

very good effort and that was it. And he never really rallied from that, in my opinion, to go out and organize the business community for funds.

MINK: Well, then, what you're really explaining, I guess, is why you feel that he has been timid about doing this.

ROBBINS: Well, this is part of the reason, and I think that it's much easier for Neil to go out and ask help for his own research, let's say, than it is to go out for the school. I don't just really know why.

I think one reason is that it's hard work and it's a work to which you have to be insensitized.

When I became dean, one of the first things that I wanted to do, because of the temper of the times, was to establish fellowships for disadvantaged students. We were thinking of Negroes at that time; we soon learned that we had to think of other people beside Negroes. So I went out to visit about fifteen or twenty leading executives, many of whom I knew, and I said, "Won't you establish a fellowship in the name of your company, \$3,000 a year on the average?" Some of them said, "How much do you want?" and they'd write a check for it; but most of them said, "Well, we give our funds to the private sector." The private schools had been very good at indoctrinating the executive on the importance of the private schools; and the suspicion they have of the public schools being leftish and so

on is really there.

MINK: It works in business, too.

ROBBINS: In business, yes. And the businessmen are not discriminating; they don't know the faculty. They don't know that on SC's faculty they have just as many leftish people as we do, always have had. They don't know that our business school is really, if anything, a little bit too much wedded to classical economics, maybe.

But I would run up against this, and I tell you, it's very difficult. My answer to them often was, "Well, do you know that USC relies for fifty or sixty or seventy percent of its revenue on government funds?" "Oh, no, that can't be right," they'd say. Well, it is true. It's not state funds; it's federal, a lot of it is. A great many of their students get scholarship funds, you see.

MINK: Do you think that USC gets more federal funds than you do?

ROBBINS: Than we do? Not in the business school. Their business school has never been research-oriented, until recent years, so they've never gotten very much money for research, and we've gotten quite a lot.

MINK: Well, what did they get their federal funds for?

ROBBINS: Well, they get federal funds to support all kinds of programs, same as we do.

MINK: Well, you're not talking about the business

school per se, you're talking about the university.

ROBBINS: I'm talking about the university as a whole.

MINK: Yes.

ROBBINS: But their argument was against the supported public school because we had our nose to the taxpayers' trough, and I was pointing out that all schools have their noses to the public trough.

MINK: This is one question I wanted to ask about SC, the crosstown rivalry notwithstanding: so often I've found in cases, from the library's point of view, a quarrel over areas of collecting, for example; that the University of Southern California would find that we were collecting in a certain area, and they would say, "Oh, no, this is really our area to collect in." Yet we find that, library-wise at least, SC has not built up. They have preserved for themselves this area, but they haven't delivered in it. I was wondering if the same thing was true on the academic side of things.

ROBBINS: No, I don't think they've said that they've staked out fields that we shouldn't go into. I've never been aware of that. They have, in recent years, gotten quite a little money.

MINK: I mean like aeronautics and movies, you know-- motion pictures and this other thing.

ROBBINS: Well, not in business administration. In recent years, Dean Bob Dockson built up quite a revenue from developing his own research associates exactly

on our pattern that we have developed. He got money for a new building. He was a very aggressive guy. He was the one who was very vicious about his faculty members coming over here for any [research funds]. On the other hand, he hired quite a number of our PhD's, so many, as a matter of fact, that some of his other faculty members felt that that was getting to be an adjunct of UCLA.

MINK: Just the way you felt you were getting to be an adjunct of Chicago.

ROBBINS: Yes. [laughter]

TAPE NUMBER: V, SIDE TWO

April 2, 1972

MINK: You said that as long as we were on the subject of research, there was another matter that you wanted to discuss.

ROBBINS: Well, the development of research in the school is a very important matter.

MINK: According to Neil it was in a sad state when he arrived. There just was no research, and he more or less depicted himself as being in the role of a prodder, prodding people to undertake research. Frequently the way in which he would evaluate members as we went through the list was, "Who took to the prod and who didn't."

ROBBINS: Yes, that's true. We had no reputation for research. We had a fine reputation for textbook writing in accounting. There were very good textbooks.

MINK: Yes, people like Frisbee.

ROBBINS: Yes, and Noble and Simons and Karrenbrock. They were very good textbook writers. And Clendenin, of course, wrote his finance textbooks. These textbooks were good scholarly works.

MINK: Even used at USC?

ROBBINS: Yes, I suppose so, because they contained new things that were a result of individual research by these authors, published for the first time in the textbook, for example. This, of course, was very difficult

to prove and to point out, as I found out in the case of Harry Simons who finally was promoted. But he didn't have a doctorate either, you see, and he'd worked on these textbooks.

MINK: In general, just to bring out that point (which I don't think I've ever discussed in the university history series with anyone) about the matter of how many points one scores for a textbook with a secret ad hoc committee: on the face of it, it would seem to me that if the textbook was innovative and new and captured a big market, it therefore had a big endorsement. So, what you would actually take to the committee was sales statistics, and that sort of thing, to prove that the textbook was a well-received and reputable textbook in the field in which it was written.

ROBBINS: Yes, but the answer from the committee members would be, "Well, that just proves that he knows how to get teaching materials together. So that's a plus on the teaching side. He's a good teacher."

MINK: Oh, not research.

ROBBINS: And so, what you'd have to do would be quote chapter and verse, the kinds of things that are in that book that would have been published in journal articles had the author chosen to do that.

MINK: What do you do? Do you get the guy that's up for appointment to do that, or do you try to do that?

ROBBINS: No, I got him to do it, to propose to me. This is another thing that we had to train the faculty here to do: we had to train the faculty to keep their own records so that when it came time for evaluation they could tell us what they'd done. It's surprising how many faculty members couldn't tell you what they'd done. Some didn't keep any records.

MINK: Well, they all have to do their annual "bio-bib" [bio-bibliography] form.

ROBBINS: Yes, but that isn't sufficient by any means. If they haven't published, there's nothing on it, you see, and yet there may be a lot of activity--community service, consultation on the outside, or work in progress.

MINK: Well, isn't the bio-bib form supposed to include all that too.

ROBBINS: Well, it doesn't. No, there's only room there to list the committees and publications. It's a skeletonized type of listing; it doesn't really tell you much. But in the case of Harry Simons, I had to get him to go through his whole work and to propose to me statements as to what parts he had actually put in there as a result of independent scholarly research. I took that--it was a half a dozen or so pages--and I submitted it to three of the top accounting professors in the country and said, "Will you evaluate this evaluation for me? Will you tell me what it was?"

I got the response, and ninety percent of the things that Harry Simons listed they said were new research. He had had to do good research in order to dig this material out and get it. Some of it was conceptualizing that was new--not much of it, some of it was.

It's true what Neil said about research here--there wasn't very much. And it is also true that some of the people that he brought in were the best people who did respond to prod; and they'd go out and get money for themselves, and they attracted money. But the university itself had practically no money for us. There was not an item in the budget for the school for research funds. Some of the members of the faculty, like myself, had some from the Research Committee. I had a cubicle allocated to me, when we had offices in Royce Hall--a big bullpen. It was in the basement of the library, a cubicle which was a deadly place to work--poor lighting, linoleum reeked with oil, and no ventilation, nothing but heat. I had that for a year, which enabled me to publish my innovative work on the origins of trading.

Then we kept pushing for Sproul to give us a Bureau of Business [and] Economic Research on this campus, and he finally did. I don't remember the year, but I think this is before Neil arrived. He gave us a little bit of a budget. But he insisted that there be only one bureau with a branch in the south, and that

there must be a liaison relationship of the committees north and south to decide on policies and be sure we don't duplicate research.

MINK: I believe Professor Cassady was appointed, wasn't he, to head up this bureau?

ROBBINS: Yes, he was appointed the head. I think he was probably the first one.

MINK: Noble appointed him to that position?

ROBBINS: I guess so. I'd have to check on that.

Ralph, of course, was very research-oriented. He was, I suppose, the most active and the most widely known researcher on our faculty at the time Neil arrived. He, of course, took over this job as director, partly, I think, because he saw in it an opportunity to advance his own research interests. He had a place to sit, he had a secretary, and he was scrupulously honest, I'm sure, in not taking any funds except those that the committee would allocate to him on the basis of projects. Ralph is an absolutely scrupulously honest person in that regard.

But over the years, he made no claims for an increase in budget; he was always putting in his budget exactly the same amount as last year. He did not see the importance as an administrator of development, in spite of the fact that he was very critical of Howard and later of Neil for not relating individual decisions to an overall plan. For himself, he never had an overall

plan that I could ever discover, and I worked very closely with him. I was on the faculty advisory committee for the bureau for many, many years. We'd meet only for the purpose of making a decision or advising him, but he would force us to make a decision on who was to get how much money. And never could we get out of him a statement of how much he had--how much was carry-over, how much was already earmarked--and historical records that would show how much each person had expended. He would simply have the applicant's project with a number of dollars. He wouldn't make a recommendation to us. We'd ask him what the budget was, and why didn't we get more budget, and he would never want to use his committee as an advisory committee but only as a committee to help make the decisions. He was very tough-minded, but he wouldn't be tough-minded unless he had the committee back of him, I guess.

So he never developed any resources here. Our relationships, his relationship, with the economics department were very fine. He always was scrupulously careful to see to it that they got full access to the funds. In fact, he leaned over backwards, I think, to give them funds in the early years. In later years, our faculty grew fast and developed some very fine researchers who drained the funds out, so in the later years most of the funds were going to the business school. I don't know what the budget was when he first

started--it was probably something like \$20,000 a year. I think by the time he finished it was \$40,000, which was certainly not a very big climb in that period of time, inflation and everything considered.

MINK: The bureau never went after outside money. It simply relied upon the organized research.

ROBBINS: Right.

MINK: Could it have, or should it have?

ROBBINS: Well, this was a policy decision which was raised occasionally, and then it just disappeared from the conversation, because it was obvious that the director had no interest in that. He feared it; I think he had a great fear of having restrictions put on research.

MINK: Was it organized research funds? Funds allocated for organized research on the campus, the bureau?

ROBBINS: The bureau?

MINK: Yes.

ROBBINS: Yes. The bureau had a budget. The bureau was an independent organization. It didn't report to the dean; it reported to the chancellor.

MINK: Well, the budget for this bureau came from what we call "organized research funds," just as, say, the budget for the Brain Research Institute, for the Institute of Industrial Relations, for the Oral History Program.

ROBBINS: Yes, it was in the regular university budget.

It went through the legislature.

MINK: And organized research. Yes, right. That's the difference between that and the individual research funds that are allocated through the Committee on Research and to individual faculty. It seems to me that one of the policies which has been pressed more and more in recent years, which is after Cassady's tenure, has been for extramural support.

ROBBINS: Oh, yes. Well, as a matter of fact, Neil Jacoby organized a Division of Research and put George Steiner in as director because there was no possibility of getting outside funds channelled through the bureau; Cassady didn't want it. We needed more funds, so we established the Division of Research. The dean and the director of Division of Research worked out this associates deal that I described, and, as a matter of fact, the Division of Research still gets a couple of thousand dollars a year from those original associates who just had it in their budgets and just kept on.

MINK: Call notwithstanding.

ROBBINS: Yes, oh yes, we were allowed to continue with the people that we had. But Lockheed, for example, would just call us every year and say, "It's about time for us to renew this, and it's in the budget," so we got it. And I'm sure that we could have gotten that established as Harvard has. Harvard has an awful lot

of firms, hundreds of firms, in the United States. They just have it in their budget, and until they have a real crisis they don't look at those items, just small items.

So that's one of the reasons why we had to have the Division of Research. We needed much more fluid funds to give the people. When we had so few funds in the bureau, one of the things that Ralph was very much concerned about was giving money to people that were likely not to use it or use it properly. The result was that there was very little experimental money given to young professors who were not tried and true.

MINK: Sure things.

ROBBINS: Our view in the Division of Research was that we should have the fluid funds to give these people a head, to give them a chance. Sure, some of them would fail, some of them would not spend their money very wisely, but this is in the nature of the operation.

MINK: So I suppose, then, that your judgment of the record of the bureau was that it did not undertake innovative research.

ROBBINS: Well, it did with respect to individuals who were capable of doing it.

MINK: I don't mean that it didn't undertake. Maybe that's to run down the type of research that it undertook, but innovative in that it was something new

and a risk.

MINK: Yes, sure.

ROBBINS: But to indicate the kind of problem you had: Fred Weston was the kind of researcher that has about a dozen or so projects going at one time. He has research assistants working on all of them, and he can't cost account these things. He can't go back. Cost accounting is telling you how many hours this person was on Project 1, Project 2, and this is a completely different method of operation than Ralph had. Ralph may have had one or two things going at one time, but he was very thoroughly concentrated on one until he got it out. And Fred Weston would be working on something that might be ten years before it came out, but when it did it was something like his merger studies, which put him right up on top of the heap, you see. Every year, Fred would come in with a request for \$8- or \$10,000, half the budget. All of this worried Ralph no end. He wanted an accounting for this, and Fred couldn't give him an accounting. Yet we knew that Fred was very active. He also hadn't proved himself the way he has later, but one of the reasons he got to prove himself was that we did finally convince Ralph that he should give this guy some money, he was on the way.

But Ralph became better at this later on, trying to pick out the young people. He would seek them out

and try to interest them in doing certain research, but he didn't do this very much. One of the reasons was, I think, that he was so busy on his own research that he did not give the bureau the kind of leadership which you normally would think a director would give. As you know, I've said before, Ralph played his cards very close to his chest, and he was a hard-working researcher, and that was his game. And there's no doubt but what his secretary, Pat Hay, who was a former student of his, ran the bureau over the years.

MINK: Another instance of secretaries running.

ROBBINS: She was marvelous, and she knew everything that went on. She had everything under control, and it was she that would bring in the information that we asked for at the meeting. And the rest of the time she was helping him on his research, which is all right, legitimate.

MINK: Well, then the two things that more or less sprung up in answer to the need for this research were the division and the bureau--the division, after the bureau didn't prove to be so good. What other ways and means did the school undertake to bolster the research record?

ROBBINS: Well, we developed proposals. Some of them were developed by individuals or groups of faculty members--quite a few of them developed by George Steiner;

some of them by Neil--proposals which were presented through the Division of Research to the Ford Foundation or the National Science Foundation or some other place requesting funds for a certain type of proposal. Some of these were very large projects which Neil had hoped to develop here to establish a reputation for our school as being the center for this kind of research, and his proposals were a little far out in advance, I think.

We were never very successful in getting those things through, partly I think because Neil didn't visit the foundations. I found this out after I began to visit them as an acting dean. I got acquainted with the Ford Foundation people, for example, and others, too; but every time I would go to see a Ford Foundation executive, there would be in the anteroom three or four fellow deans lined up there. And the Ford Foundation man finally said to me, "Well, George, we don't know what's going on out there in your school. You tell us, but we've not known up to the present time what's going on, because we've never seen Neil here. Well, these deans drop in every time they come to New York, or they're only a few miles away. They're always coming in to tell us what they're doing, so we know them. We get interested in them." So I think this was one of the weaknesses: we're so far from the source; and they didn't really know what strengths

we had. We were developing very good strengths.

But in more recent years, our reputation has developed individually, partly as a result of getting people like Marschak on the faculty, and Barnes and others. Those people attracted funds, so we would get invitations to do research, as for example the Ford Foundation coming to us because we had [Leo] Grebler here. They wanted Grebler to do the Mexican-American study, which was a great big study. They came and asked us to do it, you see.

I think basically you have to get funds on the basis of the reputation of the individual scholar to turn out the work. Foundations like to give it to people they know, but you have to cultivate these people. I don't think Neil was very good at it. And I don't think George Steiner was thoroughly devoted to that, although he knew a lot of people, particularly in government, and he did get funds through the defense department agencies. He's well regarded as an authority in that field of defense expenditures.

MINK: Would you say that when Jacoby came, that no one in the school, except for maybe Cassady, was really devoted or dedicated to research?

ROBBINS: I think this is true, basically.

MINK: It was primarily teaching. Maybe this is why there weren't so many tenured people in the school when Jacoby came.

ROBBINS: Well, I think this is true. Of course, there were only about fifteen people in the faculty when he came, I think. So we didn't have a very diversified faculty. But this was one of the things that Dykstra wanted to have our school do. He wanted it to become a truly university professional school and that's why he thought that Neil would be able to do it. And he has. Neil himself attracted people here; the fact that he was here attracted some people to come. We've finally gotten over the hump on that. I think that we probably have somewhere in the neighborhood of a half-million to a million dollars worth of research a year going on here. I can't quote the figures now.

MINK: Neil's talked about some of the other research-oriented projects that were started. I think he mentioned the institute on real estate, which was developed with Lee Burns.

ROBBINS: Well, yes. The Real Estate Research Project was developed at the request of Sproul. You see, the real estate people kept hounding Sproul to set up a school of real estate. And there were a few very enlightened real estate leaders, like Leland Reeder of Beverly Hills, who wanted to upgrade the level of the individual broker and licensed brokers.

MINK: To some extent through extension the prospective real estate broker and the...

ROBBINS: The salesman.

MINK: ...the salesman had had courses previously that would enable them to qualify for state certification.

ROBBINS: Yes, particularly in Southern California. Margaret Wotton had developed bone-up courses for real estate agents.

MINK: Like the law course that we have.

ROBBINS: To get licensed, but this was not college-level work at all.

MINK: Right.

ROBBINS: And some of these leaders saw the necessity of doing more than that, you see. Here was a tremendous industry having great influence over the development of the physical pattern of the community, and yet it was in the hands of people making decisions who were not educated. So the real estate leaders, like Senator Breed, went to Sproul about this, and they proposed that the governor be asked to send to the legislature a request for a resolution that would channel the license fees that these real estate operators were paying into education and research instead of into general funds. So the legislature did this. All the fees then were sequestered, and President Sproul appointed an advisory committee consisting of the leading real estate people of the community, about a half a dozen of them, and the deans of the two schools. Neil and I were alternately representing UCLA

in this. We thrashed out at every meeting the question of the division of these funds between research and teaching. Most of the practitioners wanted most of the funds to go to extension to finance classes for the upgrading of the present personnel. We tried to convince them that in the long run this upgrading had to be founded on much more knowledge about the physical planning process, land, economics and so on--there was a paltry amount of information about this, so we should put more and more into research--and finally they did. They gave \$100,000 to extension, and \$100,000 each to Berkeley and Los Angeles for research.

MINK: I take it that the Berkeley people were in concurrence with you on the need for the money to go into research, gain more knowledge so that teaching could be upgraded.

ROBBINS: Oh yes, we worked together--Grether and Jacoby. We had semiannual meetings then to report on the use of these funds. Neither Berkeley nor ourselves had a faculty in urban land economics, so we both went out to recruit faculty. And I recruited both Fred Case and Jim Gillies, who were our first people, very young people. They just had doctor's degrees and no record of research experience, but they were hungry for the future. They were very effective operators. Berkeley went ahead and hired some people and developed a good staff up there, as we have down here. There's been a

certain amount of rivalry, good rivalry between the two; at the same time, cooperation. This undoubtedly has resulted in University of California being the leading center of urban land study. We early developed a doctoral program which attracted some good students. We have fed these students into the mainstream of university research and education. So this was a big advance for us.

MINK: For the research in the school. Another area that we discussed was the development of business forecasting, which, of course, in itself requires statistical research.

ROBBINS: Yes. This was developed very largely and, I think, solely at the suggestion of Robert Williams. He proposed that we have this annual consensus within the faculty as to what next year was going to be like. Of course, Neil got behind that very quickly and pushed it, and it's developed now into one of the leading centers of forecasting research reporting in the country.

MINK: This required research, of course, this whole matter, because we are talking about research. I thought I'd have you respond to some of these other things that brought it along.

ROBBINS: Yes.

MINK: These were not initial thrusts. Research generally was pretty well under way by the time that these things that we're talking about now came into

existence.

ROBBINS: Well, no, Williams was working on this sort of thing before Neil arrived.

MINK: Oh, he was.

ROBBINS: But it hadn't flowered. He himself was working on forecasting; this was his own research interest. He was never very aggressive about pushing himself or pushing the project. He didn't have much support from anybody for funds, but he did get funds, I think, from the Bureau of Business and Economic Research for some of this early work. Neil has a very strong sense of promotion, self-promotion, and promotion for the image of the school. He immediately saw this as being something that would attract businessmen's attention and would get support from the business community and give us some reputation. It would give us a news story twice a year in the Los Angeles Times in the financial section and so on. This is always very important. And it did; and now, of course, it's a big annual affair.

As a matter of fact, it's a monthly affair now, because we have some associates of this program that give special funds to the project, not through the Division of Research or anyplace else, but they give it to us for this project. These are banks and insurance companies and people like that--some business executives--who are able, as a result of their belonging

to this and giving us \$3,000 a year, or whatever it is, have one of their representatives attend our quarterly meetings, where they are faced with the faculty and the faculty tell them what their research, their models, are churning out with respect to the economy. We have some very, very sharp people on the faculty who now are giving a lot of pep, excitement to this program.

MINK: One of the statements that surprised me was one that Neil made about the inauguration of the doctoral program. I think that in general, at least in the earlier period of the university, as we've seen in various places where we've touched base, there was sort of an antipathy toward the development of professional schools. Also, I suppose there was a feeling on the part of Sproul that professional schools ought not to grow on this campus at the rate that people in the community felt that they were needed-- witness the law school, the medical school, really were not Sproul-innovated but came from the outside.

ROBBINS: Yes.

MINK: But within the faculty, and therefore within the Graduate Council, which is manned by the faculty, there would be some antipathy to the proliferation of degrees within professional schools; and professional schools would be held strongly accountable for justifying down to the nth factor the reasons for

wanting to have a particular kind of professional degree. It's certainly true with education--how they fought, you know, to get the PhD. But yet the statement from Jacoby that here the doctoral degree came readily, that there was no problem.

ROBBINS: It did. I had no real part in this. I think, as a matter of fact, I was taking a semisabbatical during the semester when the proposal was put together. Neil did this; he was masterful in putting together plans and programs. He gathered some faculty members together, a few of them, and developed this proposal to go to the Graduate Council. The reaction of the council was, as stated in a letter to Neil by the graduate dean, that this is the most complete, revealing doctoral proposal that they had ever seen on this campus. He'd left no questions unanswered, and it raised questions that they hadn't thought of before; and this is always a nice experience for a committee member or dean.

So it was a beautiful job, and I think, as a matter of fact, some of the senate regulations concerning the proposals for doctoral degrees now, which have been refined since that time over and over again, originated from that proposal. The council said, "Why don't we insist that everybody present this kind of format to us?" And we had no trouble at all on that, and I think the main reason was that this

proposal was so well written and so well developed. It didn't overstate our resources; in fact, it pled for more resources. But I think this was the reason. By that time, you see, we had begun to accumulate faculty that were interested in research and were capable of doing graduate teaching. I think we had won the respect of the campus.

I think it's fair to say that the first five or six years that Neil was on the campus, he made a very favorable impression on a great many members of the senate. I remember Dean McHenry having said to me, after Neil was here a couple of years, "Oh, you have a find there in Neil Jacoby. That man should become president of the university in a few years." He was very impressed with Neil, and I think that Neil did exude a kind of expertise and knowledge and was articulate--which was another rare [quality] and was very rational. He was not petty in any way; he was above all kinds of petty politics.

MINK: It's interesting that McHenry said that because Jacoby's last tape was really a response to an invitation to me that he made, that he should conclude his series of tapes on the discussion of the school's history by applying some of the principles of management, since this was a school of management, to the University of California.

ROBBINS: Typical Jacoby.

MINK: Yes, which he was developing in Hutchins's institute in Santa Barbara. Of course, you've probably heard his spiel on what's wrong with the management of the University of California.

ROBBINS: Oh, yes.

MINK: And therefore, it would have been interesting, or it might be interesting, to see what he would do if he became president of the university.

ROBBINS: Yes.

MINK: Much of this, I'm sure he learned the hard way by dealing with the committee system here on the campus.

ROBBINS: Well, I think basically Neil has always been wedded to his own career. This is just the kind of man he is. He just is a relentless pursuer of his own research interests, you see. He loves to write and he does a beautiful job of it. And I don't really think that he has the temperament to put up with the kinds of problems that a chancellor or president has to deal with.

MINK: I think perhaps he learned that at Chicago.

ROBBINS: Yes. He may have. I've never had the slightest inkling from him that he wanted to be anything else but the dean here. I think, however, some people have suggested to me in the early years that he ought to be chancellor and he would be chancellor before long. I don't think that was ever in his thinking, but I may be wrong about that. Another

thing that endeared him to the liberal people in the letters and science faculty and all faculty members was his espousal of the Committee for Responsible University Government, which was gathered together to resist the regents in the oath controversy and to gather money to finance people who were off salary (people like John Caughey and David Saxon).

MINK: While we're talking about the oath, did you have any particular reminiscences of this? We collect them as we go along, because there is a particular interest and because the John and LaRee Caughey Foundation has given money to the Oral History Program to collect information on this. Were you involved in any particular way in the oath? Did you have any particular things to say about that?

ROBBINS: Well, I did internally. We discussed it a good deal. I was a member and contributor, in a small way, to the Committee for Responsible University Government. I argued with many members of the faculty up and down on what should be done individually. Finally, I did make the decision to sign the oath, but with reservation, which I requested be passed on to the regents and my reasons for not signing this with any degree of comfort. But I have only recollections of the sad state of affairs and the general depression which pervaded our school as well as the whole campus over the terrible situation.

MINK: Do you think that the situation that existed then was more calamitous, as far as the university is concerned, than the situation that exists now?

ROBBINS: No, I don't think it was. I thought at the time that there couldn't be anything worse. But we had a great many friends in the community and in the legislature who did not cut off our water because of this. I don't think our budgets were anywhere near as threatened. I may be wrong, but this is my recollection.

At the present time, of course, we have a governor who gives every evidence of wanting to throttle intellectual exploration and control it, who is afraid of it. He has a tremendous following in the state by reason of these positions he's taking and by reason of the fact that he's done some good things, of course, too. He's been a strong governor in some respects.

No, I think the general reaction of the public to the disturbances in the university system in 1968 was far more severe than the reactions at that time. There were some very strong feelings, but they were generally feelings wondering how anybody, faculty member or anybody else, couldn't look himself in the mirror every morning and swear allegiance to the country; they couldn't understand this. But they did not consider this to be a very great danger to their children, whereas my impression is that people at

large are very apprehensive, have been since 1967 or '68, about what would happen to their children under the permissiveness that goes on in the university-- no grades, no attending classes, and all the "hippie" movement in Berkeley. I think that we're up against a more serious situation now; that would be my guess. But I must say that I was terribly disturbed at the time.*

*I might add that I suffered a slashing verbal attack from my old college friend, John Canaday, during an alumni group meeting because I defended the faculty position in opposition to the loyalty oath. The general mood at that meeting was favorable to John and not to me. The lawyers there were especially disturbed by my suggestion that lawyers should take the same oath since they are far more influential than are teachers! [G.R.]

TAPE NUMBER: VI, SIDE ONE

April 9, 1972

MINK: You had mentioned that one point you wanted to bring out was that you found Jacoby's method of administrative operation to be quite gratifying in certain ways.

ROBBINS: Yes, that is his belief in delegation. When he appointed somebody to do a job, I think he only tended to look on the positive side on his qualifications and not any of the reservations or negative side. He then forgot about the assignment and would never make much of an evaluation or measurement of performance. I don't think he ever did formally measure what I did or tried to assess it, excepting when he was called upon to make recommendations for promotion, and then it was not very detailed. But this was very gratifying in some respects because I had a free hand up to a certain point.

Of course, one should recognize that an associate dean, or an acting dean, cannot operate the way a dean does. You do not have the patent authority. The only authority which I ever had as acting dean was that which I built up from my associates who felt that I was responsible. I earned authority from them, but I did not have it from the environment. Even though Jacoby had said, "You are the dean. When you're acting

dean, you are the dean. You just go right ahead." Nevertheless, the whole university community didn't recognize me as being the dean. I couldn't have undertaken programs which would have taken two or three years. But nevertheless, it was very gratifying to work with Neil because of the confidence he had in me. I think many times it was misplaced; I think he had more confidence in me than I had in myself.

But with respect to some other people who were his appointees--heads of this, that, or the other program--I felt that our ship could have been run a little more tightly if he had exercised a good deal more evaluation and measurement and had made some attempt to correct deficiencies.

MINK: Any areas specifically that you'd like to identify?

ROBBINS: Well, I think of the assistant deans that were appointed to work on programs; I did not have a responsibility over them. There were people like Gillies, for example, in the doctoral program. He was really the first aggressive person to develop the doctoral program insofar as recruitment of students and handling of students is concerned. Gillies was a great promoter. His main aim was to get a very large group of students and get them through quickly. He came out of Indiana, although his degree was in the economics department there; nevertheless, this was the philosophy of Dean

Art Weimer and his associates in setting up their business school: don't worry about quality, quality can come later. This was completely contrary to the wishes of our faculty, I'm sure, who wanted to build a little more slowly and who did want high quality, and they knew it when they saw it.

MINK: So you think that, as a result, some of the PhDs which were done in the earlier history of the doctoral program of this school were not as solid pieces of work as they might have been.

ROBBINS: Oh, I think that's inevitably the case; but, on the other hand, the faculty resisted these large numbers and just simply held up high standards and held up the granting of degrees. The result was that we had very little output; we had a tremendous amount of input, but very little output.

MINK: A lot of people working on doctorates but nobody getting any.

ROBBINS: Yes, and my own feeling was that this was wrong and I tried to argue against this, but I didn't have any authority over Dean Gillies at that time.

MINK: Did it happen then that all the people who started ultimately got doctorate degrees, or some of them were washed out on the way as the result of having too many people of low quality in the beginning.

ROBBINS: Well, in the very early years, of course, we were filling up the pipeline. It takes five, six, or

eight years to get the degree--it did at that time. The faculty was, on the one hand, trying to uphold standards and keep the people from getting cheap degrees, and on the other hand they were--well, I've forgotten what I was going to say on the other hand. [laughter]

MINK: They were recruiting a lot of people for the doctor's degree?

ROBBINS: No, the faculty were not recruiting so many. But there were a great many people from all over the country who heard about our program and they wanted to come here for one reason or another. I suspect some of them thought that it would be an easy school because it was new and they'd get through easily. In a sense, the faculty began to enjoy having these doctoral students around, because this is really what a faculty man likes to do--he likes to reproduce his own kind. He wanted to have seminars that gave him freedom from the routine teaching of elementary subjects. It also gave them some graduate assistants to help them in their research. Some of the faculty members were hanging on to some of the better graduate students and overburdening them with teaching and research to the point that they simply weren't getting their doctoral dissertations done.

MINK: So you had a clog in the pipeline.

ROBBINS: So you had a clog from several points of view: too many people coming in and too few being pushed out.

One conspicuous example was Mrs. Michal Ingraham. She was an assistant to Dr. Koontz. He was her advisor. She was teaching the undergraduate course 190, Elements of Management, and was a laboratory assistant for him and was relieving him of so much burden that he didn't want to let her go. This is my interpretation at any rate. I suppose he would differ with me on this; he would have a thousand reasons why she should stay. But I was pushing hard for a limitation on the tenure of these students here. I thought that once they got their course work out of the way, if they didn't get their degrees done in, say, three years, two years, or whatever it would be, they should just be thrown out.

MINK: Was this before the ceiling was actually set, I believe, at seven years by the Graduate Division?

ROBBINS: Yes, this was before that. But Gillies wasn't too much interested in getting people out at the other end. He worked very hard to get finances for these people, and he worked hard to have summer programs to speed up their work with federal funds or Ford Foundation funds. We did have a rather large Ford Foundation fund, I think, of \$100,000 that helped speed up our program. But I thought that \$100,000 was spent on the wrong things: very largely it was on students living here in the summer, when I thought it should be spent on beefing up the faculty resources and library

resources and things like this. The other help was ephemeral, and I think the students were pretty well heeled anyway, but some of them needed help. But Gillies was very aggressive about pushing this program, and it has its very good qualities as well as its limitations.

But this is an example of the sort of thing that Jacoby would just let go because he wouldn't sit down with Gillies, I think, ever and simply say, "Well, look, what we're doing here seems wrong in this direction. Let's correct this." I think he enjoyed his own freedom from this detail of management, I suspect.

MINK: Did he think that you ought to take care of this?

ROBBINS: No, he didn't delegate this to me. Student affairs were in the hands of Mr. Gillies. Gradually I began to assume control over it simply because I thought it needed it. When I did this, when I suggested doing this, I never was countered by Neil at all. He'd say, "Fine, I think that's a good idea." But it wasn't always clear to the faculty as a whole what my role was, you see, so this was sometimes difficult and embarrassing for me. But at any rate, I think this is to some extent a strong point of Neil's management, as well as a weak point.

MINK: It's interesting to me to have you relate this

because I think about his discussions of the administration of the university and what was wrong with it and particularly the fact, as he pointed out, that the regents assumed too much power, that Berkeley assumed too much power onto itself, the university-wide group, rather than delegating this, and all the way down the line not enough authority was delegated to deans. His explanation was that if this were done, then those people to whom the authority was delegated would be responsible, and if they didn't perform in their job, they'd be thrown out. In other words, if those under them didn't perform, which really makes up their performance, they would be thrown out. Perhaps in Jacoby's case it never got bad enough in terms of evaluation to make it even thought of.

ROBBINS: Oh no, no. But it is true, of course, that his method of operation and his view of his role in the university were completely contrary to the whole tradition of the university, which was tight central control and a lack of confidence in anybody except the senate. There's no doubt but what Sproul had a lot of confidence in the senate. He used the senate to divide and conquer, to get what he wanted to get done, I think. And the regents were very used to nit-picking kinds of decisions on lots of little things. They were loath to give that up because a great many of the regents--I'm sure Dickson was one of these--had a lot

of fun going around the campuses poking their noses into things and trying to decide whether the building should face east or south and what the architecture should be. And even much more detailed things than that.

But Neil, of course, felt that he was competent to organize and develop a business school; and that they should give him authority to do it, that he should present plans, which he did, with great lucidity. (He was great at envisioning innovations that would move the school toward a goal, and he was very great at a logical, clear, forceful presentation. He's a master at this writing of reports, just an absolute master.) He thought that once these reports were accepted, the proposals were accepted, then the regents and the president and the chancellor should set goals and standards of performance and measure the achievements against those goals, but this was never done.

It was never done by the Budget Committee even. The Budget Committee never once set up any kind of goal for the school or any kind of rationale and measured us against that. Whenever I, as acting dean, asked for an interview with the Budget Committee in order to present to them a vision of what we had here and the paths that we had laid out for ourselves, the goals we had and the phasing towards those goals, and the cost of this, I was refused on the ground that they simply did not have time for that kind of thing. And

I said, "You don't have time for anything else."

The Budget Committee was doing exactly what the regents and the president were doing--sitting there nit-picking.

They were going over the individual publications of an assistant professor to try to make up their own mind, even after they'd had an expert secret committee to advise them. This was an enormous waste of time.

There was one exception to that and that's when Earl Griggs was chairman of the committee. He called me when I was acting dean one time. He said, "May I come over and talk with you?" I said, "Certainly." When he got here, what he wanted to know was what our school was up to. He said, "I don't know anything about business administration, what your goals are; there's nothing in the record." So I spent about three hours with him going over all our plans and operations--our weaknesses, our strengths, what we needed in the way of support--and my own views about the very poor organization of the Budget Committee and how it overloaded itself with nit-picking detail and so on. We formed a friendship in that meeting which lasted a long time. I think he learned a great deal from it--he said he did--and I did, too.

MINK: Any salutary effects come from this?

ROBBINS: Yes, I think so. I think that was the beginning of the consideration of changing the format of the committee, which has taken place since. He

tried to develop some suggestions for enlarging the committee and dividing it up functionally so that the whole committee wouldn't be burdened with all this detail. That has taken place.

I think that if Neil had had the support of the university to operate the way he wanted to operate, that he would not have been so disillusioned; he would not have lost interest.

MINK: Neil had indicated in his interview that following his tenure on the Council of Economic Advisors, which occurred in the period of the first Eisenhower administration, around 1953 and '54, he was very tempted by the persuasive arguments of Arthur Burns to remain on the council in Washington and not to return to UCLA. He indicated that his reasons for that were that he had been unable to obtain from the chancellor, or the president anyway, a commitment to the development of the school on a long-term basis. I wondered if you could comment on that. This was still the period of some disillusionment, I believe, in the school.

ROBBINS: Yes, I suspect so. Really, he did not take me into his confidence with all those reasons.

MINK: He might have if he'd been here, but he was in Washington.

ROBBINS: He was in Washington, and I only saw him, I guess, twice while he was there. He never told me that Arthur Burns tried to keep him there, although

Arthur Burns did. Neil went back first for a year and he stayed eighteen months. But when he came back he never told me that he had been on the point of resigning here. I don't recall that he did.

MINK: I don't know how close he really was. Only this statement seems to indicate that he was vacillating.

ROBBINS: Well, I wouldn't doubt that in the least, but it's not like Neil to reveal to me, as close as we were, or to other people, a lot of these things. He keeps a lot of these things to himself. However, he did come back; he did engage in some long-range planning.

MINK: That was what I was going to ask you. When he came back, did he then give you any reasons why he suddenly engaged in this report, which I think he singled out as being particularly important?

ROBBINS: Yes, it was.

MINK: This report of 1956 was submitted and apparently was approved, and it was considered, as I understand it, to be quite innovative in terms of what a professional school had presented in the past.

ROBBINS: That's true. I think it's the first time that any school really did a long-range plan of any kind, at least to my knowledge. I think he was complemented by some of the regents on this and by the chancellor. And this led, I think to some extent, to the chancellor's trying to extend this and inaugurate

this kind of thing and have all the other schools do it. It took a long time for him to get that point. Finally Ray Allen, of course, did try to push this thing forward and required schools to do it.

MINK: Well, I think it's very true even, for example, of the library; at this period we began to be asked to project ten years or more into the future as to our budgetary needs and so on and so forth.

ROBBINS: Well, this is partly the normal process of growing up on the part of the regents and statewide office, and partly the stimulus of Neil Jacoby's excellent report.

MINK: But I would say--wouldn't you agree?--that this perhaps is one of the big impacts that Jacoby made on the whole university.

ROBBINS: Oh, I think it's true. I think one has to look back and see that the regents have always lagged about five to eight to ten years behind our responsibilities in organizing for the big job that lay ahead and that now lies ahead. They simply are not geared to operate in terms of long-range projections and high principle and all this sort of thing. They sometimes "rise above principle" and make decisions.

[laughter] But I think this is perfectly clear. It was the acceptance of this report in principle which led Neil rapidly to the development of some of the things like the Division of Research and other things.

MINK: Some of the things we've discussed already. Jacoby mentioned that in the year following, in '57, that you also prepared a report which was sort of a follow-up report on the progress of the school and on the development of its educational policies and programs.

ROBBINS: Yes, yes.

MINK: He was very complimentary about this report that you did.*

ROBBINS: Well, I think I was able to pick up where Neil left off, to fill in the skeleton with flesh, and to get down to the details.

MINK: Was that the purpose of this report, or was it really a separate thrust on your part because of some further lapse that you saw in the school?

ROBBINS: Well, I think it was both.

MINK: Could you describe what you saw that wasn't in his report that you felt needed filling in?

ROBBINS: Well, I don't really remember too clearly. I haven't looked at that report for a long time, and I wouldn't know where to put my hands on it if I did. I felt very keenly the need for our jettisoning the lower division work and for beefing up the masters program, and for organizing within the school in such

*See Tape VIII, Side 1, May 20, 1972, for correction. Jacoby was referring to the report of 1962. [G.R.]

a way as to separate the management of the undergraduate and the graduate students. I felt strongly the need of assessing in detail our responsibilities under his plan, and to define rather clearly in numbers, or ranges of numbers, the student load that we ought to expect in these various areas, and translate that into faculty requirements--~~FTE~~ requirements and space requirements and student financing requirements and things of this kind. I would never have done this, I think, on my own, because I didn't have the view that he had of long-range planning at that time.

MINK: You were asked by him to do this then?

ROBBINS: No, he really didn't ask me to do it. I just saw the need of doing it. When I talked with him about doing these things, he would encourage me. He said, "This is what we need to spend our time on," so I did. I spent a great deal of my time searching for methodology and for facts and information on which to base this report and to fill it in. What I'm saying is that he had this unusual ability for the University of California to project his mind into the future and do some long-range planning. I'm sure that it was not as sophisticated long-range planning as he would now produce, but it was pretty far out for that time.

MINK: Well, are you saying this: that while on the one hand he was able to look into the future and say here's what we ought to do; but in actually filling

in the details of what was required to do this, to reach one step and then the other, he was not...?

ROBBINS: Well, he wasn't as interested.

MINK: He was as interested?

ROBBINS: No, I don't think he was as interested in this kind of minutiae and detail.

MINK: But it's absolutely essential. You can't just say we're going to do this; you've got to outline the steps whereby you're going to reach this. All these things you're telling me--space, faculty, student enrollment--all relate. You can't just do this without having these others.

ROBBINS: Well, I think he realized this, but he wasn't interested in that kind of thing, and I was there to do it. I picked it up. It wasn't that he came to me and said, "Here's something you should do." We worked together, and I responded to the stimulus of his ideas and went ahead on my own. He never gave me very specific instructions about anything that I ever did around here. It's just that I was stimulated by his ideas and his leadership, and I happened to like to do, I guess, what I did, otherwise I wouldn't have done it. I don't think this suggests a limitation of his. I suppose if I hadn't been there to do it, he would have done it himself or had somebody else do it. But he was interested at the same time in doing some other things; he was deeply involved in writing up his experience

with the council.

MINK: Was that when he was writing up the book,

Can Prosperity Be Sustained?

ROBBINS: Yes.

MINK: A very interesting book, that I read.

ROBBINS: Yes, a very fine book, and it needed writing very badly. People still can profit by reading that book, because they still don't know what the council is all about, and the council itself doesn't know what it's about. It changes, of course, with every change of leadership.

But he was busy on that kind of thing. He had his own fish to fry. He was writing articles for various professional journals. He was always getting ideas about concepts and things that needed to be worked out, and he would sit at his typewriter, work them out, and send it in and be published. So he had a lot of interests outside the school and I didn't. Most of my interests were centered in the school, and that's one reason we were able to do so much in such a short period of time, as we complemented each other.

MINK: Yes. I was wondering how the rest of the faculty reacted to the plans, the long-range plans. Were they pretty amenable to them, or did they see objections?

ROBBINS: Well, there was, in general, agreement.

My experience with the faculty would lead me to answer that question by saying that as long as the faculty's

fairly well fed and is not disturbed too much, it will go its own way, teaching its own courses, doing its own little or big research projects. You just don't bother them too much with argument and debate over plans. The only time that the faculty would respond with very great enthusiasm or lack of enthusiasm to a plan would be where their little bailiwick was going to be cut off or changed very radically. If a faculty member had to give up teaching his two or three undergraduate courses that he had perfected and written textbooks on (and his textbooks were widely used throughout the country, as was the case of several faculty people), then if our program seemed to indicate the lopping-off of that course, he could see a threat to adoptions of his textbook. They'd say, "Well, if your textbook isn't used at UCLA, why should we use it here at Illinois?" or someplace.

MINK: And he couldn't be assured that another faculty member that took over that course would use his textbook.

ROBBINS: Yes, this is a little empire that people build up, and you know these little facts of life on the faculty. When we jettisoned the lower division, the elementary accounting textbook of Noble's was threatened. We might have a decline in the number of students who were in those classes. When we decided to revise the upper division and streamline it,

eliminate some of the dogmatic routine that we were teaching, descriptive material about institutions which students can read about on their own, or even not miss too much if they didn't get a lot of it, then you see there's a threat, say, for Clendenin's finance book. And he would respond.

So, in general, members of the faculty don't read what the dean puts out, or what the administrator puts out. They get it, but they get a lot of other stuff on their desk; and they put it in the back, and they don't read these planning programs, they don't study them. When the dean calls his council, the heads of the areas and so on, to talk about this, the discussion very quickly reverts to academic arithmetic and little details that don't amount to much. It's very difficult to keep the minds of any committee on high purpose and goals. This is true of the senate; it's true in the senate committees; I expect it's true in the regents. Whenever you face a tough problem, the group tends to spend its attention on little details that don't worry anybody too much.

MINK: Because they don't want to make the decision.

ROBBINS: They don't want to make the decision.

So when it comes to leadership here on the faculty, Neil wrote persuasive reports; and one of the characteristics of Neil's administration was when he put something down logically on paper that he believed

in, he felt that the problem was practically solved, because he had faith that other people read the way he did. Neil's mind was a logical mind. He read by himself, and he could study by himself, and he could arrive at decisions without verbalization. And he thought that other people would do this, too, but the fact is that, in my experience, faculty members come to meetings without having read the material, and they don't really know how they're going to vote until they hear themselves talk about it. They form their decisions verbally.

MINK: Would he then, much to his consternation, have to go over the ground all again?

ROBBINS: Well, yes, he would. He was very impatient in meetings with people who didn't do their homework and who weren't prepared to talk about the important issues. Neil was not a gossip. He did not like small talk, I think, at dinner parties or anyplace else. He didn't like to talk about the weather or inconsequential things; he liked to get down to business. This is his way of life. It disturbed him a great deal to have faculty members spend two or three hours talking about an element of his program that didn't exist or that was not very significant. The whole question of political strategy to try to cut off and head off the leather-lunged boys who would get up to defend their empire in terms of "high principle"--this is not

something that he was expert at.

MINK: Would you try to do this for him?

ROBBINS: I would try to do it, and two or three other people would try to do it. Fred Weston was expert at this exercise.

MINK: How do you cut it off?

ROBBINS: Well, I suppose there are a lots of strategies one uses, and there are different ones at different times. One of the best ways to do it is to try to ask the people who are running around loose in these arguments, ask them questions that specifically relate [to] the defense of their empire; this is very embarrassing to them. They begin to shut up very soon when it's exposed that their motives are sometimes spurious.

MINK: In other words, you would say, "Well, the reason you're making such a noise about this is because you see the profits from your textbook being cut off."

ROBBINS: I wouldn't put it that way; that would not succeed. What I could do, of course, is to say, "Let's look at the issue here of the shrinkage in enrollment in this course. Now what are the consequences of this? What are the costs, and what are the benefits?" I would try to emphasize the benefits of doing this and also minimize the costs that they were blowing up as being terribly important.

One of the things that I did in the field of accounting--we've had to fight this battle all the way

through--was to convince the people in accounting that there was a great need to build up here a first-rate leadership group in the research field of accounting, which never had a great deal of research done in it. There was a great deal of literature which stemmed mainly from decisions of the accounting fraternity, which has some semilegal status, which would determine how you would account for depreciation and depletion and all these things. But what we needed to do is to develop a strong faculty and some doctoral students who would lead the way toward improving the teaching of accounting and the accounting profession in other faculties and in the professional groups, and to direct our efforts here toward that rather than toward improving the teaching materials in elementary accounting. There are a lot of people who are good at improving teaching of elementary accounting that don't really know too much about theory of accounting. I taught elementary accounting very successfully a long time without knowing too much about accounting, but I knew exactly what elementary accounting was about. I knew the conceptual foundations of the whole accounting system, the double entry system, and I thought that I could do a fine job with elementary students. But I couldn't have taught an advanced [class] or seminar in accounting. Well, there's a great difference here.

Well, one would simply have to face up to these

questions, try to bring them out in the open, and to get the conversation going in terms of those specific issues. And this often would seem to be a very discouraging process, but when the vote was taken almost inevitably, those complainers would be voted down, and Jacoby's and my proposals would win out.

We had some very staunch supporters, like Fred Weston, for example, and Bob Tannenbaum and George Steiner, and some others here who really saw beyond what we were doing and were interested in the development of the school and who were not afraid of change in their own lives. As a matter of fact, they welcomed it. Look at Tannenbaum, the way he shifted all his life from accounting on over to human relations and now organizational behavior; it's a big step. Well, Bob Tannenbaum is the sort of person that demands that he change; he forces himself into change. But the typical faculty member, even in a good school like ours, will, I think, tend to resist change that's going to affect his own behavior.

But when the chips were down, our proposals would win out all the time, and there was a very large group of faculty members who never spoke out but who would vote the right way when it came time. And I think this is partly because they developed confidence in Neil and myself and would go along with it.

MINK: One of the other points that was in your report

was this matter of enrollment, and that brings me to the remark that Jacoby made about the optimum enrollment for a professional school such as business administration being, in our case here, about 800 to 900 students. My contention is, why do you have to set a figure? This seems to be static, not dynamic, to me.

ROBBINS: Well, I think you're right to some extent, but unless you have some kind of rather specific goals and figures, you can't deal with the environment or with the regents or with the administration. See, the administration, from the legislature and governor on down, tend to demand rather specific numerical figures on everything. And this is a way of appealing to them. It's also a way of bringing the issue clearly to the fore; it is important to talk about ranges of size, from 800 to 1,000, or something like this, or from 1,000 to 2,000. But I have never been happy with the specific figures. There's no magic in 800 or 850, but there is a magic in 800 to 900 or 900 to 1,000, or something like this.

The reason is if you're going to have a first-rate viable organization, such as we've tended to have here--as we have developed, I think, to some extent--you have to have what is called a "critical mass" of faculty. You can't have a good school without having a strong Department X, Y, Z, and strong research at least in three or four groups or five. You can't do everything,

but you have to decide that you can't have students working on the difficult problems of management unless you have inputs from strong faculty people in at least certain areas, and that this is going to mean numbers of people. You have to have varied points of view in each one of these fields. You don't want everybody to be just like everybody else or like the leader; you have to try to encourage a stimulating mix, to use a popular phrase. And I'm not at all sure that we know the answer to that. I never was very confident that we knew the answer to that. I tended to object to the use of specific figures, but I see that Jacoby was probably right in using them. I always wanted to talk in terms of ranges, but that's a little complex concept to contemplate.

But I think Neil tended to hit upon figures as kinds of preliminary targets and then to convince himself that they were rational and kind of stick to them. I don't think he was dynamic in that respect, but I may be wrong. I would tend to change the figures a little more frequently. And, of course, when we had 1,500 undergraduate students and were thinking about what kind of graduate school we're going to have, this is quite a change from 1,500 freshmen on through to masters, most of them undergraduate, to our goal of graduate students, nothing but master's and doctor's students. [This] was a tremendous change.

And we didn't know, from any criteria that we could get anywhere in the United States, what the guidelines were for resource needs for this group, for this many people and that many people. The whole profession of running business schools, the whole field of business school education was so new, there hadn't been developed any criteria. So we just had to use our own figures. But what I was tending to do constantly was to break this down and to get detailed analysis, a microanalysis, which sometimes led to changing a figure from, let's say, 750, we had at one time, to 800 or 900 and so on. But I still think this is a very fluid situation and you can have a good school with 150 or 200--the Amos Tuck School at Dartmouth does. I think it's 200 or 300 students, and they have a fairly good school there.

TAPE NUMBER: VI, SIDE TWO

April 9, 1972

MINK: In connection with evolving these plans and then presenting them to the Board of Regents, I had asked Neil Jacoby a question. You have a school that's dedicated to management presenting its case for its development to a group of business executives. You would think that this school would have the edge, say, over a school of nursing or medicine or law or something like that. Of course, some of these people on the regents have studied law.

ROBBINS: Most of them historically have been lawyers.

MINK: Historically they have been lawyers. Yet, a lot of them, such as Carter, Pauley, Dickson--with his experience and background in the First Federal Savings and Loan--were businessmen. You would think he could get a sympathetic ear and you might have an edge. I wondered what you thought about the regents understanding the business school as businessmen.

ROBBINS: I don't think they have except Ed Carter, and his view is very skewed in favor of the Harvard Business School model. Business education is a very new field, and there aren't very many businessmen today who have had [the] experience of going through a modern business school. Some of them went to commerce colleges or they took some descriptive courses about banking and this

kind of thing. But even as recently as fifteen or twenty years ago, there were very few top business executives who had MBAs from very good schools.

This is rapidly changing today. I think if you go through the top 500 corporations, you would probably find that the heads of five to eight percent of them are business school graduates. If you go to the vice-presidencies, this would be fifteen percent, or something like this. Twenty years from now, it's going to be a different picture. But the businessmen and the lawyers and the other people on the Board of Regents don't know what you're talking about when you're talking about business education. They tend to think of salesmanship, typing, shorthand, and dogmatic routines of various kinds. So I don't think we have had any edge as a result of that.

Ed Carter, of course, was always very anxious to see this school developed into a second Harvard Business School, I believe. I've known him quite well, you see, because he was the president of the Delta Upsilon house here when I first came back to teach and I was faculty advisor. I said before, I think, I bought my clothes from him when he worked for a time at Silverwoods. He wasn't actually in any of my classes, but I helped him, encouraged him to get to Harvard Business School, and I've seen him occasionally ever since. I have talked with him from time to time, not very often, about our

school, and I have sent him copies of reprints of articles that I have written about business education.

At least one of my early articles really picked up Jacoby's analysis of the curriculum and classification of courses and concept of undergraduate business education. I picked that up and developed it into an article which did have some impact upon the thinking of other business schools, and they rapidly moved to the common use of this classification--of tool courses, functional area courses, management courses, and the like.

And I would get responses from him on this. He would always say, "Well, this is a very fine article, and I agree with you that time is going to bring about great changes, but we really have to put our chips on graduate education." So he's always been supportive of our moves toward graduate education. When we did make the decision and pushed it through to eliminate the bachelor's degree, everybody on the board, I'm told, just looked to him and said, "Well, Ed, what do you think about this?" And with a few words he got it passed.

But Ed Carter was the man on the board that they all looked up to for these decisions. They didn't look to Ed Pauley or the other business executives, even Norton Simon (whom I don't know, but I suspect who is really not much interested in management

education as we know it). Those men were great risk takers; they made their money by seeing enormous vacuums that existed in the economics system, putting a lot of money on that and reaping the benefits from it. They were great builders in a big sense, but they had lieutenants, like our present dean here, Harold Williams, who did the work and carried it out. We also had some sympathy from other southern regents who just prima facie thought that UCLA ought to be better. I've heard Ed Carter say a number of times that he thinks that UCLA's business school ought to be the great business school in the University of California system--let the others go their way if they wanted to. And of course, he was very much opposed to having undergraduate business schools established and have other centers like Davis and Santa Barbara and so on. Well, I guess that answers your question.

MINK: I think so. My one wonderment is, do you suppose that some of these regents, such as Pauley and Simon, you mentioned, and others, as you say, being great risk takers, were of the opinion that perhaps formal training in business is really not the way, but it should be a sort of understudy thing. After all, you lift yourself up by your bootstraps and all this education isn't going to do you much good anyway.

I think it is interesting that you say that you think there was some of that; but I think that one remark is

interesting that you bring out about the rest of the regents looking to Carter and saying "How's it going to be?" Maybe they didn't have any opinion one way or the other about it.

ROBBINS: Well, I think they perhaps did tend to belong to the old school, where you couldn't be president of U.S. Steel without starting out with puddling, and that has been the history of U.S. Steel, for example. That's one of the reasons why it's had so much trouble. But they all knew that Ed Carter was an honor student at Harvard Business School, and they all had tremendous respect for him because he did accomplish a great deal, so I suspect that that had more to do with it.

MINK: Well, my next question is historically oriented. Just as these older regents were the ones that had been making business history, why has the school not really made an effort--maybe they have--to attract a top-notch business historian and to build up this area--the way, for example, that they've done in the medical school with [C. D.] O'Malley prior to his tragic death some years ago.

ROBBINS: I think it's fairly easy to answer that question. It hasn't been for a lack of appreciation on Jacoby's part or my part. But the faculty generally has not been terribly interested in the idea. That's one point.

Another point is that we had so many things to

accomplish here that the business history fell into a low category of priorities. Certain things a first-rate school has to have and we didn't have them, and you have to do those things first and then other things a little later.

The third point is that we, I think, have been a little shy of trying to develop interdepartmental support. I think both Jacoby and I felt if we had a historian here it should be somebody who perhaps had a joint appointment with the history department-- certainly somebody who is respected and wanted by the history department. And the process of getting joint appointments and using joint appointments here is an extremely difficult one, and so we shied at that.

And then another reason that is perhaps even more important than all these is the paucity of talent in that field. Harvard has a program of business history, and that's about the only business school that has had one. And they haven't turned out very many PhDs; I don't know that they've turned out any-- maybe one or two. They haven't been very aggressive in it. There just aren't very many. I canvassed the whole United States with the aid of some people like Saloutos. I didn't get very many suggestions from him, incidentally, or from anybody else in history. I've asked several. But the reason for that probably is that they themselves don't put institutional

history in a very high priority, so they can't think in those terms.

MINK: Only when you get back into the Middle Ages and you study the church as an institution, something of that nature.

ROBBINS: The church has been the major center of interest for us in business history, organizational history.

MINK: The study of the church?

ROBBINS: The study of the church. Our scholars in management refer to the organization of the church and the development of the organization of the church which we get from the literature in that field. And also the military, here and in Europe mainly. I don't think we know much about it in the Far East. But those institutions, and government institutions--we have a lot of literature about that.

But I think that the time for this hasn't arrived in business schools. This is something that's going to come in twenty-five years. I hope before then, but probably not for another twenty-five years.

We have to solve certain other problems that are basic to this. For one thing, you see, it has taken a great deal of effort to convince members of our faculty that organizational health is really the center of our concern as a professional school. The manager's job is one of creating, designing, planning,

and operating a healthful organization. I don't know whether I mentioned before that if I had my way I would have changed our name to the "School of Organizational Health," but I realize that this is too far out. People don't think of health in terms of organization, so it would have been a kooky thing. But I think the time will come when this is going to be regarded as rather a logical name.

But management is not what we're talking about. Management is the instrumentality for bringing about this other result, which is a healthful organization. In these terms, you see, historical study is absolutely essential. There have been thousands of organizations of success and lack of success and all the way in between, and the history of these and study of these ought to give us a great many clues as to the ways in which you can achieve healthful organizations.

I think what we tend to do now is to focus on the current technology and the articles of faith and the obiter dicta of some philosophers and others in the past, as the foundation for our present study. The computer, for example, and its effect on organization is something that's gripping us; and it's a very important issue right now. It's got to be solved. You don't have time to go back to history, and history won't tell us much about the impact of computers on

organization--at least we think so. So I think we're preoccupied now with a revolutionary change where we just don't have time to think about history.

MINK: Well, I do think now, hearing you, that you and Jacoby both have a sympathetic chord. I mentioned to Jacoby that this school appears, from its short history, to have relied for its development and thrust on innovative techniques. Perhaps in business, for its history thrust, it might consider developing a kind of oral history program, which is also an innovative technique in historical research, where it could make case studies of the histories of businesses and talk to individuals who have developed them. You seem to be interested in that.

ROBBINS: Oh, yes. Well, I would have liked to have taken the first innovative step in having a professor of history--not oral history, but just professor of organizational history. I wouldn't want to call it business history, because that's much too confining. But we weren't able to bring this about for reasons I've already pointed out.

You were right, incidentally, about saying that we were regarded as an innovative school. As a matter of fact, in 1959, Neil Jacoby was asked to go out to India by the Ford Foundation to study the need for and the methods of developing management education in India. He didn't want to go, so he asked me to go

instead, which I was very happy about because I wanted to do it. I had just come back from a sabbatical year in Europe where I was doing the same thing for the European Productivity Agency in Paris, where I visited about ten countries in Europe and advised them on management education. So I went to India and spent three months there and developed a report which is the foundation for graduate management education in India now.

The point I wanted to make is that when I got through that report, we were asked at UCLA by the Ford Foundation to undertake sponsorship of the Institute of Management in Ahmedabad, India. The Ford Foundation people were pretty adamant that we should do it rather than Harvard, despite the fact that Vikram Sarabhai, who was a great atomic scientist and the head of the great Sarabhai textile industry in Ahmedabad, wanted Harvard to do it simply because of prestige. Harvard was known as the business school in the United States. The Ford Foundation people said to Vikram and to me that Neil Jacoby had demonstrated a great deal of innovation, more than any other school that they could think of, in the period of time that he was here; and they thought that we would, therefore, be better able than a more stable institution that had already made its mark like Harvard Business School, who would probably want to just transplant what it did

over there. The same thing is true with respect to the WDPC. You may think that I'm dragging in too many things.

MINK: No.

ROBBINS: It's the innovation point I'm talking about now. When Dr. Hurd of IBM first decided that he wanted to have a Western Data Processing Center, or this kind of institution to match one at MIT, in order to stimulate the development of data processing (which was a big important market problem for them at that time), he picked UCLA. He told me he thought that we had demonstrated more innovation than most other business schools. I happened to be in his office in New York on the very day that the decision was made to have it here rather than at Stanford. Stanford had made a great big, expensive presentation to their board, and we had made no presentation at all. But Dr. Hurd won out on this one issue of our being an innovative school, and Stanford at that time wasn't; it was coasting on its laurels of the past. And so we did have the reputation for being innovative.

On the other hand, I think about three years ago, an assessment came across my desk from George Shultz, who is now head of the Office of Management in Washington--he was dean of the business school at Chicago. He had responded to somebody who asked about our school. I think it was our present dean who asked

him, as well as a lot of other people, about our school before he took the job. I think George Shultz said, "Well, in Neil Jacoby's first ten or twelve years he had been very innovative, good, but that had been lost. He hadn't appeared to be very much interested in forward thrusts in the last half of his administration." So this is rather an important image--this image of innovativeness or noninnovativeness. I don't know whether George Shultz's view is generally held, but I would suspect that that's the case. We had a reputation which tended to be lost in later years.

MINK: I suppose that the introduction of these new conceptual programs and innovations, one right after the other, had their impact, but then there comes a time at which you have to fill in.

ROBBINS: Yes, consolidate your gains.

MINK: Consolidate your gains. You can't continually be innovating something brand-new, unheard of anywhere in the community of professional business schools in the United States, every year, forever.

ROBBINS: That's true. I think the general impression has been that Neil lost interest. He was kind of beat down, in a sense, over not being able to get what he wanted when he wanted it. He was impatient and got interested in a lot of other things on the outside. He always was, of course, deeply interested in his own research and writing, and he always carried

on a great deal of this. I think he tended to leave the school to me more often, and some people thought he shouldn't. I shouldn't complain, because it gave me an opportunity to learn how to be an administrator, which I didn't know before. But it taught me everything about it. I learned from experience.

MINK: This innovative thing came from my suggestion to him of developing an oral history program as one way of becoming interested in business history. When the Grosses contributed this very large sum, \$500,000 I believe it was, to the school's library to begin buying materials in business history, then, I believe, the academic community felt that the school was about to launch into this area. Was this just a fortuitous circumstance that [Robert] Gross wanted to give this money for that purpose, or did the school, on the other hand, promise Mr. Gross that if he did they would develop an interest in this area?

ROBBINS: I think, in the first place, the amount is very much exaggerated. I think it's more like \$50,000.

MINK: I think you're right. I think I added on an extra cipher.

ROBBINS: With a promise of another \$50,000 which never came through.

MINK: Yes, you're right.

ROBBINS: This was done after Gross's death.

MINK: That's right. It was his widow that did this,

wasn't it?

ROBBINS: Yes, and it was Franklin D. Murphy that sparked this thing. He did not get this from us, although Franklin Murphy called Neil. I don't know whether Neil has commented on this to you. But I think he called Neil over--Neil went to see him constantly about getting money from various sources, from various people--and Murphy said, "I think Mrs. Gross is prepared to give us some money. What are the various ways you can use this money? What could you do with it here?" Without getting an answer, I think Franklin went on and answered his own questions by saying, "I think that really she would be interested in establishing a collection of rare books in the field of management, business." The reason that he thought this, was that Gross himself had established this at the Harvard Business School. He thought that Mrs. Gross, therefore, would be amenable to establishing one here because that's something her husband was interested in. Now one might very well have said, "Well, why should you have another one out here if you have one at Harvard? You'd be competing for the same materials." I don't know what the conversation was between Jacoby and Murphy, but I think this is what Murphy wanted to do, and this is what he talked her into doing; and so we accepted it.

MINK: His bookish proclivities would perhaps lead him in that direction, too.

ROBBINS: Yes. I don't believe that the idea came from us, or from Neil. It may have been one of the ideas that Neil had, but I would suspect that Neil would have mentioned other things first.

MINK: But apparently it's given an impetus to the school to do anything in this area, the fact that the collection came.

ROBBINS: No, it hasn't, for the reason that we don't have the resources and we don't have the priority. We haven't arrived at the point where that priority is more important than other things, you see. I think that we will, and at the right time it's going to be a very great attraction for us to get a good scholar here to have this, although it's a very small collection. I guess it's a good collection; I'm not able to judge, I just don't know.

MINK: I could ask you the question; but there has been some criticism, from people that I've talked to, about the incumbent librarian's expenditures of the fund.

[He has] tended to be very cautious about spending the money; and when it was spent that it was not spent for items that were particularly significant in terms of trying to build a homogenous type of collection; and that it really just didn't get off the ground at all.

ROBBINS: Well, I think it's probably true, and also

the funds were withdrawn. We were, I think, more or less promised another \$50,000.

MINK: I understood one of the reasons that the funds were withdrawn--I don't know the whole story on it--was that there didn't seem to be much interest and it didn't seem to be going ahead very fast.

ROBBINS: I don't know. I'm inclined to think that that's not the basic reason. I think Mrs. Gross became senile, and her feelings were hurt over something--I don't know what it is now, I've forgotten, but I did know at one time. Her feelings were very much hurt.

MINK: Incidentally, the same thing happened with Mrs. Dickson to a large degree; and had it not been, I think, for the prevailing devotion that she had to her husband and his feelings about the UCLA, the same thing would have happened to her money.

ROBBINS: Oh, I think that's true. I'm pretty well acquainted with that situation. I think it's true. She felt particularly, I think, that Franklin Murphy paid no attention to her when he came. Everybody had made so much over her, you see.

MINK: Do you think it was really senility though?

ROBBINS: On the part of Mrs. Dickson?

MINK: Yes.

ROBBINS: Oh, no, she was never senile.

MINK: No, never, even up to the time she died?

ROBBINS: I don't think, except the last week maybe. But oh, no, her mind was very sharp. She had some prejudices she clung to, I suppose, as we all do as we get a little older, that got cemented. But oh, she was very vital. No. At the time that Murphy wanted to change Dickson Hall's name--when they put the new art building up here--Murphy sent Hansena Frederickson down to talk with Mrs. Dickson about this change. He had forgotten all about consulting with her about this. And Mrs. Dickson told me that despite the fact that she had known Hansena and liked her very much and subsequently, of course, renewed her affection for her, she said "This little pipsqueak that he sent down here..."

MINK: It's like the pope sending the cardinal to do his own business.

ROBBINS: "...to tell me that Dickson's name was all over the place, so changing it wouldn't have any effect on his memory" or something like this. She disliked the fact that Hansena was sent to do this and did it in a flippant kind of way. She thought that Murphy should have come down himself and explained what he was doing. And I don't think she ever forgave him for that.

MINK: I think he should have.

ROBBINS: This was one of the things. And another thing, of course, was that she was continuously bombarded

by Huntley, her attorney, who was a Pomona-C Claremont man, with suggestions that she should transfer her affections to them, because the private school was the thing and the university was a red place and too liberal and all this kind of thing.

MINK: At the public trough.

ROBBINS: Mrs. Dickson was very, very conservative herself, very apprehensive. She read the U.S. News and World Report religiously all the way through; and anybody who does that, of course, is likely to have a very jaundiced view, if you don't read other things as well.

But I think Murphy's interest in books and his desire to have a collection here similar to Harvard's was the thing that was back of this, and I think the timing was unfortunate. The last time I saw Mrs. Gross she certainly did not seem to have much interest in this. She may have felt that we weren't doing very much with it, I don't know.

MINK: To just pick up on Murphy, because he was mentioned in connection with this failure to consult with Mrs. Dickson, brings up a question that I would ask you for just a point of view. Murphy always used to talk, it seemed to me, about the fact that UCLA had so few traditions. I think his expression was, "We make our traditions as we go along." Maybe we did.

ROBBINS: Oh, we always have!

MINK: And that we lacked these traditions that the older institutions leaned back on. And yet, his cavalier, shall we say, ignoring of Mrs. Dickson, and what really was one of our real traditions, and what Dickson had done here to start the institutions, seems to be sort of contrary in view of his concern with tradition and the need for it.

ROBBINS: Well, I can understand how it might happen. He was so busy; he had so many things, so many decisions to make, so many problems to solve. He was virtually running the whole University of California, I think, for a while, by the back door. He was the spokesman for all the other chancellors and leading the way. This was a relatively trivial matter to him. It's true, from the very outset here, the impression that Murphy gave to me and to my friends was that he had suddenly discovered Southern California, and he'd suddenly discovered the University of California, and that now it was going to go places. This was the impression that he gave to people.

MINK: And what had gone on here before wasn't really very important.

ROBBINS: No, it's not very important. So his historical perspective seemed to be a little bit, I don't know, provincial or some sort of thing.

MINK: Well, I think that in the library, which was one of his major interests while he was chancellor here,

the same impression was given. For example, in the time of the retirement of Lawrence Clark Powell as librarian, the speech he made at that party for Powell's retirement was shocking to my way of thinking and was sort of demeaning of Lawrence Clark Powell and all that he had done for the library. Before there was nothing, but now, since Murphy had come, the library was really blossoming forward.

ROBBINS: Well, I think, one of the reasons why Murphy had so many detractors is that people resented this. I didn't particularly. I thought, well, that's relatively insignificant, because he did do a great many things. For example, he did help the library enormously after that. So it's just one of these little idiosyncrasies. I was a great booster of Murphy.

I think he was the right man at the right time for us. Other people don't take this broader view, perhaps.

MINK: Did you ever hear any kind of disdain, or sense any feeling of disdain, on the part of some faculty.

Let me try to give you an example: the type of PR that he put out. I think in the library there was some feeling that the mere fact that you said over and over that the university was growing better and better every day in every way, qualitatively and quantitatively-- just the mere fact of saying it made it so. But it wasn't necessarily true, even under his administration, that this was happening. There was a lot of what some

people called the Madison Avenue approach to trying to develop the image of UCLA--you know, lots of puff and fluff, but not much behind it.

ROBBINS: Personally I didn't feel that way, because, in perspective, we had gone through long periods of time when our relationship with the community was negative or sterile. We were cloistered. We weren't really trying to communicate with the total community. I felt that that was very good for UCLA, from the standpoint of outsiders. People listened to him because he talked frequently and he spoke well extemporaneously, and he wasn't stuffy like Moore or perhaps a little quiet and abstruse like Allen. So I think that was very good for us at that time. I did resent, as I said before, some of the implications which I read in what he said, and I'm sure they were inferences on his part, that now we were going to go places because he'd taken hold.

But he did a great many very positive things, so I'm sure he maybe oversold his participation at points, but I don't object to this. I had to do it here in the school in order to survive and to get interest in it. Jacoby had to do it. Maybe we were criticized for doing it, but I liked to talk about the successes we had, and I didn't like to talk publicly about our failures or our limitations. Some people may have said that Jacoby and I exaggerated what happened.

I hope maybe they did say that, because I hope we did.

MINK: Things happened, you know: the face of the landscape was changed; the names of the streets were given during Murphy's administration; and so many of the buildings took on names of individuals living and dead. And then the administration building was named after Murphy. There have been many chancellors and there will be many more after him. Why [name it] after him? The sculpture garden seems more appropriate to me, because he was really the innovator and developer of that. It's an interesting period and I just wondered what you'd heard other faculty say, or whether you sensed a large proportion of the faculty feeling this sort of Madison Avenue approach.

ROBBINS: No, I never sensed that it was an overwhelming impression. I think some people had it; I heard a few. But in our faculty I didn't. I never heard much of this, because our faculty had great growth and health under Murphy. Murphy understood better than any chancellor what this study of management was all about. Allen did too, and Dykstra--all those people did--but Murphy was the one that understood more clearly, and he was willing to push us ahead and he did. And he, I'm sure, in many cases overruled the tendency of Foster Sherwood to restrict our school and gave us things.

MINK: Was Foster Sherwood one of your enemies, or was

he restrictive against all professional schools?

ROBBINS: Well, I think Foster is a very complex, curious product who grew up during the early days of the senate control and the absence of any authority or power on the part of the dean. He was a part of the power structure of the senate and manipulated it. And I think that Murphy probably chose him, because he said, "Well, here's a guy who's the leader of the senate. He's been through all this. I could turn over the management of the university to him and go on about my own business of external relations and so on." I think he often wondered whether or not he was wise in doing that.

MINK: If he hadn't turned it over to Sherwood he might have turned it over to [Paul] Dodd.

ROBBINS: He might have; I don't know. Of course I don't know whether Dodd would have taken it. I think Dodd was very unhappy about not being made chancellor. I think he had very strong desires to be chancellor, and I think he would have left if Murphy had asked him to do it. I don't think it would have been a very good solution, probably. I don't know.

But Foster was very much in favor of preserving the status quo with respect to the senate operations and its stranglehold of the Budget Committee. I will have to say that over the years he changed quite a little bit, probably as a result of the tutelage, if

not the hammering over the head, by Murphy when certain things would have to be done. He did develop a much greater appreciation of what we did. In the first year of my two years as dean, he was very sympathetic and was supportive, and I really think he had changed somewhat in his views toward business administration. But on the whole, he wasn't very helpful during the early years of his vice-chancellorship.

MINK: One point that you made about Murphy perhaps running the university at one point really leads me to ask, first of all, did you feel that [Clark] Kerr was a weak president? And then to answer after that, what had you thought other faculty felt about Kerr?

ROBBINS: In the first place, my remark was a hyperbole when I said he [Murphy] was running the university. What he was really doing was marshalling the resources of the chancellors to fight for decentralization. In this sense, he was guiding the direction of the university, I think, in the right direction.

No, I always felt that Kerr was a bad choice as president because I had never thought--from my early acquaintance with him when he was a graduate student and was down here consulting with Constantine Panunzio when I was sharing an office with him and I met him there--that he had some of the qualities that a president needed. But he proved to be very strong in some respects and very very weak in others, I thought.

On the whole, I think he curiously flopped over from being very opposed to centralization when he was chancellor and could never get anything done because Sproul ran the Berkeley campus without regard to him at all. It was very embarrassing. And when he got to be president, he did exactly the same thing. He got to be another Sproul--centralized operation. He did, of course, develop the organization statewide, with a lot of assistants and staff and bureaucrats. I say that in a sympathetic way because I've been one of them. [laughter] I really don't think that he was ever very interested in UCLA and this followed the Sproul pattern also.

MINK: Well, how do you account for the fact that he chose to be inaugurated on the UCLA campus first?

ROBBINS: I think this was just purely a strategic political decision on his part. I think that this is where the population is, and this is where the political power in the legislature is.

MINK: But secretly you don't think he was sympathetic towards UCLA?

ROBBINS: No, I don't think he was. He certainly never was sympathetic toward our school. I think he never regarded the business school as being a very legitimate part of the university, although he was a member of the faculty of the business school at Berkeley. But that was a matter of convenience, I suspect, as far as

he's concerned.

TAPE NUMBER: VII, SIDE ONE

April 9, 1972

MINK: Because you did know Kerr, could you give some recollections of what he was like when you were rooming with Panunzio, he used to come down, and you saw him then? I saw him a little later when he used to come to the Bancroft [Library] when I used to work there, but I didn't get too much of an impression of him.

ROBBINS: I wouldn't want you to get the impression that I knew him very well or intimately, but I observed him there. He apparently found Panunzio to be a source of stimulation, as many people did, and he came to visit him. I guess he was at the University of Washington as a graduate student at that time.

MINK: Yes. Panunzio was teaching here.

ROBBINS: Panunzio was teaching here, in his second or third year, something like that. I thought that he was a very wide-eyed, bright, pleasant intellectual. This is really the image he gave to me.

MINK: Was he a liberal kind of person for the time?

ROBBINS: Oh, I think he was interested in liberal ideas. I really can't say too much.

MINK: Not liberal causes necessarily, in an active way.

ROBBINS: No, but he was keenly interested in Constantine's

views on self-help cooperatives, which at that time Constantine was writing on and was very much absorbed with. I think that was the thing that he was talking about, mainly.

And then, of course, I saw him only occasionally after that when he was in Berkeley and in the industrial relations institute, and he was always giving me the same impression. Here was an intellectual guy, devoted to intellectual ideas. He was a fair-minded, objective kind of observer, with perhaps, however, a little bias toward the worker, the laborer, the unionist.

MINK: Ah, then the question: would you make any assessment--or do you feel you're in a position to do so--of his career and his reputation as a labor arbitrator?

ROBBINS: I think he strove to be very very fair and objective, and prided himself on this. I have a feeling that he was somewhat like almost all of the people in that field, who tended to be partial toward labor organization.

MINK: How would you compare him with our man here, [Irving] Bernstein?

ROBBINS: Well, I can't really make that comparison. I have a feeling that he was considerably above our man, in terms of his intellectual capacity and his thoroughness and objectiveness. This would have to be labelled as a...

MINK: A personal opinion.

ROBBINS: A very rough opinion, because I'm not thoroughly familiar with Irv's writings. But I have seen some evidences of his work, and it certainly is good.

MINK: It is good?

ROBBINS: Well, yes. I think he's good in the kinds of things he's doing. I was not at all impressed by his report as chairman of the senate Committee on Reorganization of the Regents, for example. I thought that report was tremendously biased, not judicious, and not broadly based. The argument was just entirely too pointed to the conclusions which he had, which was to reduce the tenure, reduce the number of people, and make it more broadly representative. I thought that he did not spend much time on that report pointing out the very great dangers of the short term. I've seen this in other universities. But I don't know that my judgment's very good on that. But when Clark was president, I don't believe that he ever asked Jacoby-- certainly he never asked me--to talk with him about our school. I think it was a little difficult for Jacoby to get to Kerr.

MINK: Apparently Murphy could get to Kerr like nothing flat. Why? He had a "hot line," if you want to use that expression. The impression I get is (of course, I haven't had the opportunity--I hope I will soon--to

interview Murphy) that he was really telling Kerr what to do a lot of the time.

ROBBINS: I wouldn't be a bit surprised. I don't know that from personal experience. But you see, Kerr was a product, as far as business administration is concerned, of the Berkeley campus atmosphere.

MINK: Now that's an interesting question, too. And as you go along, maybe this would be an opportunity for you to cast these two into the mill and to contrast and define what you think of as the Berkeley atmosphere as opposed to the UCLA atmosphere.

ROBBINS: Yes, the university established at Berkeley a College of Commerce in 1896, I think it was.

MINK: Yes, around in there.

ROBBINS: That and the school at Chicago were organized at the same time. They were, I think, second and third after the Wharton School, which was 1875 or something like that. So it was an old part of the university.

It had been run as a kind of liberal arts college with special emphasis on commerce--that is, the institutions, and transportation, and foreign trade. [Henry F.] Grady, of course, who was later dean, was professor of foreign trade.

MINK: Great expert.

ROBBINS: Interested in it and expert in it. They had some very good people in those fields. They were classical economists who were devoting their attentions and analytical abilities to those commercial institutions.

The school always was populated by people who were members, I think, of both the economics department in letters and science and the College of Commerce. So there was quite a little relationship there and close ties. In more recent times that I knew about, Dean Grether was a member of the economics department, was a Flood professor.

You see, the Flood family gave the university quite a sum of money--I don't know what it was--to found or at least supplement and to help out the College of Commerce up there. The Flood funds have always supported a great deal of the business school. I remember once when Jacoby searched out the original charter of the Flood Foundation, which did not specify Berkeley but the University of California, and he argued that we should have some of the Flood funds into our commerce school.

MINK: Boy, I bet that created a furor.

ROBBINS: That was quite a problem. I think we got a little money once in a while. I think maybe \$1,000 occasionally. It seems to me I've seen that on the budget years ago.

MINK: I suppose the danger that Berkeley saw in this was if UCLA got any, the other seven campuses could argue similarly where there were those interests.

ROBBINS: Yes, and I think one could very well argue that the Flood family meant Berkeley because that was

the only part of the University of California. I never thought it was an issue that was terribly important. I'd much rather go after our own money. Grether was a first-rate economist.

MINK: Incidentally, did he argue this after his failure--not failure but his knuckle-rapping--as a result of the Business Associates boondoggle?

ROBBINS: I can't remember that. I think it was afterwards.

MINK: You see what I'm getting at. I'm wondering if he was guided or staying away from outside money and then turning into the university to see where he could find money.

ROBBINS: Oh, I think so. Jacoby was searching for help.

MINK: Once having had his knuckles rapped for the outside things through Asa Call and that group there.

ROBBINS: I think it's possible; I really don't know. But at any rate, I want to point out that Grether was a very effective, strong dean in Berkeley, a marvelous fellow, one of the sweetest, nicest guys I ever knew in my life. However, he was very convinced that the tradition of business administration being applied economics was right. He never could understand until later years what we were doing hiring psychologists, engineers, mathematicians.

Now that's changed to some extent at Berkeley;

but still the Berkeley tradition is one of carrying on the old commerce college in the name of the business school. They finally did lop off the first two years as we did, after we did, but they have never gone so far as we have gone to jettison the undergraduate degree. They still have that. They think it's a very important thing for them to have. Their bachelor's degree program is really a kind of applied economics, academic program. It really isn't, in my view, a professional school; it's more an academic kind of applied school. And now this may be changing to some extent. They are now giving an MBA degree in extended university over in San Francisco, but it is not anything like the innovative degree that we're developing here for our extended program. It's really a kind of transplanting of the MBA that they developed for youngsters.

I don't think this is a good idea myself. I think it's very important to tailor this to the needs of more mature people. It's a different group, and I think you can't dish out the same thing and expect to get the same stimulus.

So Grether and Jacoby never saw eye to eye on this development, and I think that Berkeley people have always been very jealous of the development of this school and of our reputation. They have never been fully cooperative with us in anything. We were

always, until recently, the young little brother when we'd go up there for meetings, like the Statewide Real Estate Advisory Committee or the Joint Committee on the Bureau of Business and Economic Research. They would deign to listen to us and condescend to agree with us. Now maybe this feeling was partly my own reaction to this. One can never tell.

MINK: Well, it's an interesting point, I think, that you bring up as to what extent over the years this has been, shall we say, a UCLA syndrome and to what extent it's actually been true. Would you agree with the idea that perhaps mostly under Sproul, the syndrome tended to develop; perhaps the syndrome lingered under Kerr, Kerr, of course, being a Berkeley man; but Hitch, being totally a stranger to the university, brings to it sort of an anonymous quality?

ROBBINS: Yes. Well, it may be. I think that there was no doubt but that we felt we were put upon all the time. We always looked for evidences of this. But I think what I'm describing really existed. However, it diminished considerably, and in Grether's last two or three years he was very much different. The whole atmosphere was very much different, and over the years some of his lieutenants or associate deans and assistant deans and I worked together very harmoniously. I think they gained some respect for us, and then our acquisition of Marschak was the last straw. I mean they

really looked up to us then for getting Marschak. I think they were terribly jealous; they even made some suggestion of having a statewide appointment for him so they could share in his time. That appointment, incidentally, was another thing that gave fuel to this fire I'm talking about. I don't know whether I've referred to this before.

MINK: No. You've talked about Marschak's appointment.

ROBBINS: Well, Marschak came to our attention as being in the market by some means.

MINK: Could you say a little about his background, too?

ROBBINS: Well, Jascha Marschak is a German who had degrees in Germany, one of the outstanding economists that had come to the United States. He held positions in the University of Chicago and at Yale and other places. He's really regarded as one of the innovative top econometricians in the world. He's a great mathematician; his applications of mathematics to economic theory have been just overwhelmingly great.

MINK: How did he first come to your attention?

[interruption]

ROBBINS: He was at Yale at the Cowles Commission. The work of the commission was concluding, and Jascha's children were moving out here to California, and I think he wanted to come out here to this climate. He knew Neil, as everybody does, and I think he wrote to

Neil saying that he might be interested--or somebody wrote to Neil for him and suggested this. So Neil immediately picked it up and got in touch with him and then turned the matter over to me for negotiations, and I was the one who really negotiated with Jascha on all the details.

MINK: Did you go back there?

ROBBINS: No, I didn't; it was by mail, all entirely by mail. Jascha is a very meticulous, thorough prober of every question, so that every aspect of his appointment was clear and on paper. My responses were very satisfying to him.

MINK: Did you check your responses with Neil as you went along?

ROBBINS: Yes, I did, excepting that I think Neil was on leave at the time, and so I wasn't able to check it every day. By that time, I had had enough experience to go fight these battles and go through the thing myself. But we quickly got together the materials, and we got the Faculty Committee together inside the school, and we got their immediate approval of this, and went to the chancellor. Neil took this to the chancellor directly and said that in order to get him we have to have the decision by a week from Friday, or something like that--very short time, half a month. And of course it's unheard of to get appointments through in less than six months for our school.

MINK: Yes, I think Jacoby refers to it as "the glacial speed" with which the university moves.

ROBBINS: The chancellor said, "Fine, we have to have this." I think it was Paul Dodd*, and Paul, of course, knew Marschak too. So we rushed it up to Berkeley, and Neil called Ed Carter and said, "Ed, we've got to have some support to get this on the agenda of the Finance Committee of the regents. We can get this man. He's got to make up his mind, and a lot of people are bidding for him. This would really be a major coup." And so Carter said, "All right, I'll do it." When it got to the regents, I think what happened was that the acting president--it was an acting president, Wellman--opposed it and finally put in the stipulation that the appointment would have to be financed outside the regular budget, with the Ford Foundation funds we had left over from half a million dollars that was granted to us to develop the school. I think it was a half a million; we had allocated most of this money to research, development of the Division of Research, faculty unstructured research. So they agreed on that basis.

The result was that Jascha Marschak has always been in a very precarious position on this faculty, the only faculty member I know of who doesn't have a

*Confirmed. It was Dodd in 1960.

line on the budget. We never had a FTE for him. Wellman did this deliberately to stifle our getting him. Wellman, I was told by someone, and I don't know whether it was Regent Carter or someone else, tried to get the appointment shifted to Berkeley. He, I think, called Grether and asked Grether if he wouldn't go after Marschak to try to get him to go to Berkeley. I'm hazy about this, but I think that he did this in order to keep us from getting Marschak. I think Wellman was like this. I lost whatever respect I had for him, which never was very great, as a scholar. But when I learned about this--it was a dirty, nasty trick, and the result was that Marschak's position on this faculty became less and less tenable as the Ford Foundation funds gave out. The only way we were able to keep Marschak here was to use some FTE and funds from the other provisions on our budget. So we had to use funds from two or three assistant professorships, because he was an expensive man, and we had to use the resources from two or three FTE of assistant professors in order to get together enough. And every year we had to battle this through, and we had to battle through whether or not he was entitled to be on the retirement system, which we did get. We had to battle through whether or not he would be subject to the merit increases and the adjustments. Foster Sherwood would argue with us that he wasn't on the roster, therefore

could not be given the merit increases or adjustments in pay that we got from time to time, that this was a special contractual arrangement. And it was very embarrassing to Marschak.

MINK: Wasn't Sherwood aware of what Wellman had done?

ROBBINS: Oh, sure he was aware of what he did.

MINK: Then you would think he would be sympathetically trying to get it done.

ROBBINS: I don't think he was unsympathetic, but Foster Sherwood went by the book. If the rules said this, there was no exception. This was until the last couple of years when he got religion.

MINK: When he got the message.

ROBBINS: Until that time he would look up the rule and the precedent, and reason, "That's the way we'll do it." This was a sad, sad chapter for us. But this is an example of the kind of things that gives credence to our dislike of Berkeley.

MINK: Yes, I think that there must have been this syndrome. Well, all this very interesting discussion grew out of the response that you had made to the statement about Kerr, and the fact that he really was in the atmosphere of the Berkeley School of Business Administration. I picked you up on this and asked you to contrast the two. Have you anything more that you wanted to discuss about Kerr?

ROBBINS: Well, I don't think so. I think I referred

earlier to the fact that Kerr wrote a leading article in the first issue of California Management Review on business education and his statement was, "Business schools are searching for their souls." Neil didn't like this at all, because he was talking obviously about the Berkeley school. He didn't know what was going on down here. While we were searching for our souls, and I think still are--I think this was a correct statement--Kerr didn't know the status of our search and was 'way ahead of Berkeley's. [laughter]

MINK: Well, wasn't Murphy able to do anything to shake Kerr out of his ignorance of the school, or to get him to take an interest in it?

ROBBINS: I suppose he did, because we got budget support. We had pretty good budget support from Murphy and he must have worked it through Kerr. I don't know beyond that.

MINK: On the other hand, Hitch has really taken quite an interest in the school, hasn't he?

ROBBINS: We tried to hire Hitch. I tried to hire Hitch when he was leaving the Pentagon. Neil had suggested this when he was on leave at that time, and he said, "Why don't we try to get Hitch?" So I wrote some presentation, I think Neil actually signed the letter. Then Hitch had expressed an interest to him in exploring this and we thought we might make him a statewide Regents professor, or a statewide professor

at least. Finally Hitch wrote back and said that his family needs were for far more finances than we could offer him in that position. This was what he said the reason for turning us down. Then he became president.

MINK: Well, he got a better salary.

ROBBINS: Yes, quite a better salary. Well, he had a young family; he was late in having a family. He was foreseeing lots of need for cash.

MINK: You mentioned a while back that the history of the administrative assistants within the school presents an interesting case study in itself.

ROBBINS: The administrative assistant in the university is a very important person.

MINK: Apparently so.

ROBBINS: Much more important than is recognized by the formal organization, and perhaps even by the informal organization. But a good administrative assistant can really do marvelous things for a dean. We started out the early days with one or two temporary assistants (actually secretaries). Then we got a very capable woman by the name of Connie Wooton.

MINK: Corinne Wooton, yes.

ROBBINS: Corinne Wooton. She was very efficient and very out-giving person who had known one of our professors, Alfred Nicols, when both were undergraduates here. Connie helped to reorganize and took a lot of

burden off of Neil's shoulders before I became the real associate dean. I was pretty much operating by myself in the student office, you see, at first. Then when Neil went on the council, I was, of course, Connie's direct boss and we worked together very well. She's a very outspoken person and was very well acquainted with all the faculty members. She knew all of them by their first names. She called me by my first name.

Frankly, I've never felt this is quite right. Not that I wanted to be "mistered," and of all things, not "deaned" or "doctored." It always seems to me-- I grew up with the feeling that you should call a man "mister" if you're a subordinate of his.

Well, I didn't mind this in the least of Connie because she was a charming personality, and I knew what she meant and it was not disrespectful at all. The reason I'm mentioning this is that we had a real problem here. One day when I was acting dean, Neil called me up in the morning and said that he had had a call from Mrs. Phil Neff. Phil Neff was a professor on our campus, a very able economist, but a rough-spoken guy who used four-letter words normally whenever possible.

MINK: For emphasis.

ROBBINS: Mrs. Neff had threatened to call the FBI and charge her husband with subversive behavior with

communist groups.

MINK: Charge Professor Neff?

ROBBINS: Yes. And the reason she was doing this was that Professor Neff was living with Connie Wooton, and Connie Wooton was married to a young dental student who was just starting up practice of dentistry here, a nice guy. These two were carrying on. Neil didn't know anything about this, and I didn't know anything about it. Of course, the boss is always the last one to know. But apparently a number of the faculty people knew that they were living together, and that Connie took her vacation and went back and stayed with Phil Neff in New York for a week or two when he was working there. This threatened to be quite a mess. So Neil came in from his leave--he was working upstairs anyway. We talked over what to do.

MINK: I should imagine that these kinds of things would be pretty shocking to him. He's sort of proper.

ROBBINS: Yes, they were shocking to him and shocking to me. I'm proper, too.

MINK: Yes, sure.

ROBBINS: Except where my own foibles are considered. But he called the two in and immediately terminated Connie Wooton. She just could not be here with this sort of a thing. It was touch and go for a long time and Phil resigned. I needn't go into detail.

Connie got a divorce and so did Phil get a

divorce, and then they were married and they have a family now and they're very happily married. For several years, I am told by some of the participants, Connie and Phil would invite Nicols and some other faculty people over and they would conspire on ways to embarrass Neil and me. And they did; they worked this and it was sometimes very difficult and trying. And I mention this as one of the things.

MINK: This is sort of an example of what can happen in the way which personal life can infringe upon professional life.

ROBBINS: You see, this took an enormous amount of energy and nervous energy and time for Neil and me when we were right in the midst of doing very important things, and I resented this terribly. Well, that was one episode. Belle Shawhart came in from University Extension, a Texas gal, who had been an administrator for some time in extension. She was administrative assistant for some time, and she was very proper and so on. But finally she got tired of the job; it was too big for her, I guess she felt, and she asked to be transferred to the assistant dean's office in charge of executive programs in extension. So she has been there ever since. She really has been a kind of mother to all the students who have gone through executive programs, and she found her niche there.

Then, when that was vacant, Virginia Molony was

sent to us by the personnel office. Her husband, a well-known physician, had just died, and she had to work at something. Ed Carter was a very close friend of hers--they were in school at UCLA together, she and her husband and Ed Carter. Ed Carter had offered her a job at The Broadway because she had been a department store buyer.

MINK: Was he going to offer her any money? I didn't think that Ed Carter paid any money to these people. They worked at sweatshop wages.

ROBBINS: Department stores don't. They can't afford to pay anything except to top executives, because they don't need much brains at the counter. This is the nature of retailing. They can't afford to pay very much and get good brains because the productivity isn't there. There is high productivity in the top echelon and that's where, really, the money is. That's the nature of the institution.

She was very tempted to get back into that, but she liked the idea of our being here and not having to go downtown. Her three kids were at school here and she has a home very near on Comstock, so she took our job. I can remember the first day she came in. She came in just as if she was prepared for the beach. She had sandals, no stockings, and kind of a flamboyant long skirt which now would seem quite all right, but it was a beach sort of thing. She's a very loose-jointed,

out-giving person.

MINK: Yes, I like her very much.

ROBBINS: Is just herself completely. And a strong, kind of a mannish way in expression. I interviewed her-- the first time I'd known her. I'd known about her and her husband, and I thought, "Oh gee, this is marvelous to get a person like this. This is just what we need." She interviewed Jacoby, and Jacoby was very much put off by her. He argued--it's the only time we ever argued very much about appointments--he said, "I don't think she's the type." And I said, "No, I think she is exactly what we need." He said, "Oh, all right," and gave in.

She did prove to be a marvelous social catalyst in the school, because she knew everybody. Within a week she knew everybody by his first name and she knew a lot about everybody.

She, I think, was too easy on the nonacademic employees; she was too much of a good fellow. She was terribly involved in their personal lives, which is marvelous in one respect; but, on the other hand, it led to some problems of discipline. But she knew all about the faculty. She knew where all the rumors were; she knew where all the skeletons were in the closet. She was very circumspect and very discreet with confidences when it came to talking with me, but she was absolutely loyal to Jacoby and me, through

thick and thin. She knew all of our foibles, and she knew our strengths, and she helped us out.

And it was a really great shock one day when she came in and said that she was going to marry Jim Jackson, who was a member of the faculty. I thought, "Here we go again with a faculty and administrative assistant." However, I was terribly pleased for her because I knew what a problem she had with these children and I knew what a fine person Jim Jackson was. I had absolutely no reason to suspect that there was anything indiscreet or anything like this. So all I could do was wish her well and tell her that I thought she was letting me down, it was awful and I hoped she had an unhappy marriage. [laughter]

But we've always been very very close friends ever since, and we always will be, but that's the way she is. I suppose she knows more people among the alumni over the years than anybody I can mention.

MINK: They probably all came to her with their troubles.

ROBBINS: She was a ringleader, you know; that's great. We filled her vacancy with Judy Lantz who is now Mrs. Meyers.

MINK: Another faculty wife.

ROBBINS: Yes. Judy Lantz came to us from the medical school. She had been administrator under [Stafford] Warren, and she knew the medical center very well; she

knew the campus very well. She's a very serious, competent woman whose department has always been just absolutely impeccable. She had quite a trial to fit in after Virginia because she was not an out-giving, palsy-walsy person, and she bore down a little on the discipline. I backed her up, of course, on this. It was just right. And she did a very good job. Then she came in and said that she was going to marry Fred Meyers, and so I had to say adieu again.

Then we got Sue Bastian, also from the medical school. And this was a very interesting thing, because by that time I had developed a diffusion of the responsibility and function of the faculty. The chairman of the department was an independent person, you see, and reported to me. He had some strengths and so on, and he had his own needs and his own office. This happened to be Lou Davis at the time. Lou Davis really demonstrated there that he did not want to hire anybody that I wanted. It was perfectly clear to me; he didn't find anybody else, other candidates, and the one or two that he did were just impossible.

But Susie Bastian was obviously exactly what we needed at that time--good discipline, very effective operations, knowledge of the whole campus, and an ability to pick good people. I think that the other administrative assistants, none of them had quite the ability that Susie has for picking awfully good people

and developing a maturity and a stability in nonacademic ranks. We'd always had mostly fly-by-night girls who'd come in for a short time and marry one of the students, or was already married, and left. But she brought in Betty Schweninger and Mrs. Rinehardt and some other older, mature people that stabilized this place.

But as a result of that episode where Davis just absolutely made life miserable--it almost lost Susie because he interviewed her and spent all the time running me down, running the school down, and making her scared to death to come in here--I just simply had to dismiss Davis as chairman of the department, just had to let him go. And I think this is just as well for the school because he wouldn't have been a good administrator and good dean. He is a good promoter of research. I don't know whether he's a good researcher, but he's a good promoter of money for research and has stimulated the development of the interdisciplinary management area of study, so it worked out very well. But we have marvelous support from the nonacademic people now, and it's one of the things that pleased me very much about turning the deanship over, because the new dean had a good staff to work with.

MINK: Maybe you could just spend the rest of this session, and the rest of the tape, telling how it was you went about selecting the new dean. You said you

were involved in that process. [tape recorder turned off] I thought it would be interesting to perhaps have it on record as part of the chronology of the school.

ROBBINS: Yes, I think the selection of a dean is a very difficult problem, as we know. One of the things that we tried to do was, I think, innovative. This is largely as a result of the suggestions and help from a few members of the faculty who are interested in organizational development--Bob Tannenbaum, Warren Schmidt, Bill McWhinney, and Dick Mason, and some of these younger people too who are very up-to-date on the theories of organizational development and the philosophy of organizational change. And I was very grateful for these suggestions, because it's not my field and I wasn't very imaginative about it, but I fell in with it very easily.

What we decided to do was ask Chancellor Young for enough money to put on a symposium on organizational development as a guise under which we would bring here the leading candidates that had been winnowed out of the long list by both the school's and chancellor's committee. Now we had been through this same exercise in May of that year, '68, with the Visiting Committee. I was acting dean that period too, which was '68. I think Neil was ill at that time, and was out a good deal of the time that spring. In order to experiment with something more interesting for the members of the

Visiting Committee, we designed a model for combining the Visiting Committee members with the faculty and students, and presenting the group as a whole with an issue to be discussed. We then broke up into small groups and returned to the whole group. This proved to be stimulating for the members of the Visiting Committee and we thought we would use much that same technique with these people we were bringing here to look over as dean. We had had one associate dean from MIT here under direct contact with faculty. He met with the faculty individually and in a meeting. That didn't prove very fruitful. It was very difficult for the candidate himself to do this kind of thing. We really didn't get to know him very well this way for some reason or other. But there were reasons why he wasn't going to work out anyway from his point of view as well as ours.

So we brought about five or six people who were candidates, and we presented them with the question of the reorganization and the future of the school: how should a school like this define its goals; what should the goals be; how should he go about doing this, you see? These were all experts in organization. Harold Williams was one of the men. He was suggested to us by the chancellor, and I think he had talked with the chancellor about his desire to get into education.

MINK: Where was he at this point?

ROBBINS: He was chairman of the board of Norton Simon. And Norton Simon, Inc., was undergoing some radical changes with new people coming in.

TAPE NUMBER: VII, SIDE TWO

April 9, 1972

ROBBINS: Harold Williams, I think, was anxious to change his career. You see, he was a very young man when he graduated here at UCLA in three years.

MINK: From your school.

ROBBINS: No. He graduated in political science, I think, and he went to Harvard Law School. This was in the speed-up period anyway, but he accomplished it in three years. He is very bright. He went to Harvard Law School and got his law degree. I'm not sure of all of his background, but he did very early come to the attention of Norton Simon who picked him off as a young man to bring in and tool up for management purposes. I think one of Norton Simon's good points is his ability to pick good men. It is probably true of any of these giants. He went up through the ranks and became very quickly, I guess, the legal counsel and then their corporate secretary or, at any rate,, finance officer. He was very largely responsible for putting together many of the companies--Canada Dry and McCall's--and the mergers that went into Norton Simon, [Inc.]. Then, after Simon left the company, he was made chairman of the board and Mahoney was brought in as president. Mahoney wanted to change policies considerably, and he wanted to move to New York. At

age forty-five or whatever it is, Harold--so he tells me--felt that he wanted a new career. He had gone through this corporate battle. He was interested in education, was always interested in UCLA, and he knew that this job was open. So he had talked to Young, and Young from the outset pushed it very hard but discreetly. We didn't see the fine hand that was pushing behind the scene. But Williams attended this seminar and he was, interestingly enough, the least impressive of all the candidates.

MINK: In their ways of reorganizing?

ROBBINS: No, in participation. He was relatively quiet. We made each one of these persons serve as rapporteur of each one of the groups that met separately; and in his reporting of the discussion of his group, he was the least persuasive and attractive in making the report. It had nothing to do with content, really. It was thoughtful, but he's a relatively quiet fellow, and a lot of these people were old academicians who knew how to spin a yarn. But it turned out that none of these people we had here were really candidates when it came right down to it, for one reason or another--they were not available for the deanship.

MINK: Even though you had picked them, you hadn't actually asked them.

ROBBINS: No, we hadn't asked them, but they all knew why they were here. There was no doubt about that,

I think, although we didn't talk about it. I think they knew what was going on. We considered other people, considered having another session, but it costs quite a little to do this and we felt that we had gone far enough. Earlier, the campus committee had been set up under the chairman of E. Buffa, a member of our faculty. We had our internal faculty committee in the school. We had had a lot of discussion internally, so the faculty was kept aware of what was going on.

Before this meeting that I talked about took place, Bob Tannenbaum and one or two others got together a long questionnaire--an inquiry; it really wasn't as formal as a questionnaire--that gave opportunities for unstructured responses and open-ended responses. Each faculty member was asked to respond to a long series, maybe forty, fifty, sixty questions which related to the future of the school: how we're to get there, the qualifications of the people who should lead us. It was a very good job, and it's something that I think should be in the library as a matter of resource material.

The committee got the responses to this and studied it very carefully and came out with a report to the faculty on what the faculty thought. There was obviously a very growing consensus that what we needed was somebody who could bring about organizational change fast and without too much friction, and who

could maintain a flexibility in organization in the school so that we could roll with the punches, so to speak, and we could grow as the technology increased and as our fields developed. One cannot really predict what a business school is going to be like twenty-five years from now, although there are fairly good guidelines that would indicate that it's going to be quite different from the present type.

So with this ammunition, we went out to assess these people. Well, we turned over our list of people. Our faculty developed, through this committee that the dean appointed, a list of people.

MINK: Who appointed this committee?

ROBBINS: Neil had appointed this committee.

MINK: And at this time you were acting dean.

ROBBINS: I was associate dean and was part of the time that year acting dean, because he had a long period of illness, I recall, that spring. He did not participate in this exercise, which is probably just as well. I didn't either, quite as much as I might have had I not planned to continue as dean. At that time, I had made up my mind that I would accept the deanship for a year or hopefully even less than that if they found another dean. I guess this was really in '69 that we had this exercise. Yes, it was a year later. We developed this all during the year.

Then in '70, the campus committee finally

agreed on a recommendation after interviewing quite a number of people and discussing it back and forth. Since Elwood Buffa was in both camps, we could therefore get a communication, which often you can't do on these select committees of the senate. They finally came up with Williams as the number one candidate. We had screened the country pretty carefully. By that time we knew him better. He had visited here quite a number of times and talked with many people; he had made a much better impression that he did at first. On the whole, we thought it was better to have a man grow on you than a flashy person that wouldn't grow on you. We became more and more impressed with the fact that here was a man who really understood a lot about education, was very sympathetic to education, very sympathetic to the points of view that the leaders of the school had had, so there wouldn't be an abrupt change, and yet he was aggressive. He was going to change things; he wasn't going to sit back and be a dean for twenty years. I think he will probably try to make his mark in four or five years and then go on to something else. This is my guess, but it may be different.

In a sense, I think this is the way a deanship for this kind of school should go. It should be a relatively young man who's full of fire and is willing to change and will get out before it's too

late. I think I was here too long, and I think maybe Jacoby was here too long, too. You get tired, and you don't have quite the stamina that you had. Although my wisdom increased right up to the last minute.
[laughter] So I think it was a very happy selection, and it's worked out well.

TAPE NUMBER: VIII, SIDE ONE

May 20, 1972

MINK: You pointed out to me that you felt you hadn't thoroughly answered one of the questions I asked you about long-range planning in the School of Management, particularly as related to the period around 1962.

ROBBINS: Well, I thought you had referred earlier to Jacoby's long-range plans in 1956. Actually we didn't cover the long-range plan of '62.

MINK: How did this plan come about?

ROBBINS: Well, it came about as a result of an accumulative strong feeling on the part of myself and George Brown, Jim Jackson, and other members on the faculty that we simply had to move faster to change our nature and to change our curriculum and to identify our long-range goals. And so, when I was named acting dean for the year 1962-63, or in the spring of '63, while I was also chairman of the department, I appointed George Brown as chairman of the department. He and I and some others decided that we would try to practice what we preached on long-range planning. Of course this is one of the major objectives of top management, long-range planning. Nobody has really done a long-range planning job, to my knowledge, in the University of California at any one of the departmental levels.

I tried to find out who had done this and who hadn't.

MINK: This was before Jacoby had presented his long-range planning to the regents, the plans which then made the regents request this of other departments?

ROBBINS: No, this was six years later, an updating. It is true that there had been some so-called long-range planning, but it was episodic and spasmodic. We teach as a management technique that long-range planning is a permanent, continuing exercise in an organization, particularly a complex organization like a corporation or a university. And I think it's fair to say that nobody really understands the function of long-range planning and how to do it.

MINK: Here in the university.

ROBBINS: Well, anyplace.

MINK: Anyplace.

ROBBINS: Yes. Of course one of the leading authorities on this subject is our own George Steiner, who has written an authoritative book on this subject. Any careful look at that book will indicate the whole philosophy and technique of this has not been--well, it's in its infancy, let's say that. We could expect in the next twenty-five years that this will be one of the major contributions of scholarship in the field of organization and of business administration management.

We thought we ought to try to practice what we were preaching. So I got a group of the faculty

members to agree to spend a great deal of their time during the summer of 1963 on their own. They weren't paid for this, and that includes myself. As dean and chairman of the department I was on a nine-month contract, as everybody was, up until about '66 or '67 when this was changed. But these people made their contributions freely by agreeing to meet once or twice or three times a week as a group--there were about twelve or fifteen of us--and then to meet between times in smaller groups to develop in task forces some working papers to be submitted to the whole group. We divided the topics up amongst us, and the groups worked on the working papers. As a matter of fact, the way it turned out, I think I wrote most of the working papers and presented them to the task forces to chew over and to modify because this is the only way you can get things done. But these people were quite faithful, and we kept a thorough record. I have it in a book here, all the activities. I don't know what to do with this book, incidentally, because I think if it were put in the files it would disappear pretty soon, and it really has some historical value here.

MINK: Well, you can always give it to us, if you want.

ROBBINS: Well, I think it would be good. It's not in

terribly good shape, but it has a lot of good information in it. At any rate, this resulted in a number of very firm recommendations which we presented to the faculty in the fall. We reproduced all these task force reports, sent them to the faculty. I divided the faculty up into groups of about six or eight or ten or twelve--it varied--so that each one of these small groups, under the leadership of one of the members of the summer task force, would digest and discuss these reports.

My experience has led me to believe that faculty members come to meetings on critical issues without having read the back-up work. They don't want to read; they'd much rather talk and write than read. And they vote without proper information, and they're swayed by the leather-lunged boys on the faculty. And so I decided that we would not bring anything to a vote in the faculty meeting that year until these small groups had actually sat down and found out what they believed by talking. The only way a man knows how he is going to vote is by talking, you see, not reading.

There are a great many myths and superstitions about curricula and courses and teaching. The whole university bit, as you well know, is just shot through with all kinds of hypotheses and myths and traditions that are not scrutinized very carefully. Here we are in a new field which is a professional field and we've always been kind of regarded as a bastard undergraduate

letters and science thing, with too much vocational emphasis. I think that was not wholly true at UCLA, but by and large throughout the country it's a criticism that's justified.

But the major problems that we had to face, which are the difficult, intellectual problems facing formal organizations, we weren't tackling because we were so busy doing this undergraduate nit-picking kind of thing. Those of us who wanted to move toward a graduate school so that we could devote all our energies to the more difficult problems and to the more advanced students were convinced that this was the time we had to do it. Now this plan worked because the people got involved in small groups, and they soon found out that personalities weren't nearly as important to them as they thought. They would generally vote because "Well, Robbins says it's okay. I have faith in Robbins" or "Robbins says it's okay and I don't like Robbins so I'll vote against it"--you see. Now they found pretty soon that this was fading away and that they were really getting into the gut issues.

These issues, I think, are worth just mentioning. One of them is whether or not we would abandon the undergraduate bachelor of science degree program--that was a major issue. And another one was whether or not we were to institute a master of science degree along with an MBA, which is a professional management-oriented

degree. The purpose of the proposed master of science was to allow people to specialize in their master's work, if they had the proper foundation, and not to take a lot of the management-oriented practice courses. Business does demand and hire a great many specialists who are contributors to management, like computer scientists and organizational experts, behavioral scientists, market research people. In order to fill those jobs, which are pretty high-powered jobs requiring a lot of preparation and intellectual effort, a person has to concentrate a good deal more than we allow in the master of business administration degree.

Another issue was the reformation of the PhD program to allow people to get into their work faster and to find out if we could determine the research ability of a person before he had invested too much time in the degree. In general, the PhD program, here and elsewhere, leads people on with little bits and pieces, accumulations of course materials and covering of fields, and then when they pass examinations and face a thesis, we find they have not had much experience in research. I'm sure this isn't so true in history or some other fields as it is in the professional schools.

MINK: The School of Management doesn't offer any courses, or didn't offer any course at this time, in research methodology?

ROBBINS: Oh, we did, we did, but I don't think you can teach people to do research except by doing it. So what we finally decided to do on that, to dispose of the question of PhDs, we decided to devise means by which we could test early the person's ability to take a problem and research it and get through and get a finished job. We encouraged students to take rather small tasks, not a very big one. They'd just gotten their master's degrees, for example, and were not capable of handling big questions, the kind of question that most PhD people start out with but don't end with. But they have to do a research paper, and we encouraged them to do it with a member of the faculty, if they want to--any way, just so they get some experience in research and they get some idea of the kind of dedication and point of view that a researcher has to have, which is quite different from the point of view of a student who from the freshman year begins to accumulate grades, isolated bits of information, you see. Well, this was one of the questions.

We tackled first of all the BS degree program. There was a great deal of sentiment in the faculty in favor of continuing the BS degree program, partly because this is the way many of the members of the faculty had grown up and lived. This is what they knew; they had their courses already arranged. If we were going to shift, they were going to have to change. The newer members of the faculty didn't have

to face this problem. They, in general, were much more favorable to change. Many of them came out of strictly graduate schools of business.

We also had a very critical problem with accounting, because we had had one of the best accounting curricula in the United States here. We had started out in the sophomore year with elementary accounting, and by the time they were seniors, they were almost ready to compete for the national CPA examinations. To change that and to jettison that would be to change the whole complexion of accounting here. I was in favor of changing the whole complexion, because I thought there's so many difficult problems that should be tackled at the graduate research level, you see, that I thought we could transfer to the state colleges, or to other universities, the problem of preparing CPAs. Our role should be one of taking a critical look at the whole field of accounting and to prepare PhDs to teach in these other institutions.

There had been a report of the Committee on Curriculum and Courses in the senate under the leadership of Professor Pillsbury in 1958 which was highly critical of our school for having vocationally-oriented courses. This was a kind of a jolt to the faculty, a worthwhile jolt, although I felt the committee had made its decision without consultation with our faculty and without the facts. I strongly objected to that

procedure in the senate. But this is what one has to fight all the time. There wasn't even a member of our school on that committee, and they did not consult with us. But at any rate, I welcomed the committee's report generally because it did help to face the question in 1963.

One of the interesting proposals which came out of this discussion of the undergraduate program is worth recording, I think. In the field of management, or of business administration, or business, there is a role for a graduate faculty to play in giving courses for undergraduates who are in economics, political science, history, engineering, and other places. That role is to give a truly liberalizing and liberal arts course which would focus upon the history and development of the business enterprise in society, its role, and would, in a macro fashion and then in a micro fashion, look at the nature of management leadership and of the corporate form: multinational corporations; their role in the development of the whole economy; the effect of that upon the society as a whole; and the effects of other things happening in society upon those organizations.

This is a perfectly legitimate area, and I think it can be argued that it's highly important that somebody do this at some time because we found, on investigation, that most of the undergraduate references to

business enterprise and its role in society come from muckraking literature, and from the professors in the social sciences who have an antibusiness bias. They're just against the enterprise system either in a vague sort of way or in a very specific communist-socialist way, for example. I think this is harmful to society, because it's certainly not an objective view, and it might actually result in destruction of institutions that are valuable to us. After all, the business institutions are the major creators of wealth in the country.

Well, many members of our faculty became very much enamored of this kind of course, or even an undergraduate program, carrying on the undergraduate school with this kind of focus. But when it came right down to it, we could not find faculty members who were willing to devote their careers to this kind of thing, and without that you have no curricula.

MINK: You mean you couldn't find faculty here who would do it, and you didn't want to recruit faculty from elsewhere to do it?

ROBBINS: Well, we didn't want to recruit them and we would find it very difficult to recruit them, because there aren't very many of these people. A few that you could mention, like [Robert L.] Heilbroner, for example, who was at that time I think at Virginia--a very brilliant writer on subjects like this--he was

either not available or too erratic a scholar in his interests to undertake this. And so it was not a practical matter to pursue, however important it is.

MINK: I would have thought that someone like Ralph Cassady, for example, who does deal in the historical end of things, might be turned on by something like this.

ROBBINS: Well, I don't think that's true. He's turned on to that from the standpoint of research, in a micro way, but I don't think he has the general tendency to want to devote his time to the macro end of it, although he would have been very capable of doing a fine job. Besides, it ought to be some group of scholars who would define this field and make it a special UCLA kind of contribution. It would probably have to be a team effort in some respects. It would hopefully involve some interdepartmental cooperation, because there are people around various departments, sociology and history and economics, who could make some very important contributions. But it turned out to be impractical.

Finally, however, the majority of the people of the faculty, it seemed, were going to be favorable to moving toward abolition of the bachelor of science degree. So when we got through with all this discussion in the spring of the year (1964), or right after the Christmas holidays, we'd thought we'd exhausted the

discussion and that we knew where the sentiment was. So we put the matter to a vote at a meeting, and it was approved that we abolish the bachelor of science degree. This could not have been done without a good deal of planning effort and without the technique of small group discussion.

This technique, incidentally, was the first time that we had any formal exercise which forced people to get acquainted with each other. We designed these small groups so as to have groups of people that didn't know each other from different parts of the school, you see. So, many people got acquainted with each other, and as a result of this there have been a number of group exercises in research and planning for curricula and the like.

The third problem I'll mention is the MBA. Many of us feel that the MBA was a catchall degree for people who were planning to be specialist contributors and those who were preparing themselves in a broad way in careers which would lead up to general management. And we felt that our MBA degree was too fissionated and scattered, and that we probably should have an integrated MBA program where a group of students would come in, in the fall and work together all year, have their summer planned as part of the program, and then have the second year as part of the group. We had not followed this practice; we had followed the practice of allowing

somebody to come into the MBA program in any quarter. The result was that the students didn't know each other; there was no coherence in the effort. We were losing a good deal of the valuable opportunity we gave to students here by not having the students work together and learn from each other.

This is one of the greatest contributions which I experienced at the Harvard Business School. As weak as the school was in many respects at that time, it did give us a place where we could work together. We lived together in the dormitories right across the street from classes, and most of the learning which was most valuable to me took place in the dormitories in group discussions. We carried on from the classroom right into the dining halls and so on.

That concept, Neil and I tried to put over here by requesting that the dormitories for the business school, and perhaps the law school, be located up where the parking structure is in the northeast part of the campus. That was killed because the people on the building committee mainly were arts and science people. They said, "Oh, a university should be a place where you have all the students from all the disciplines mixed together. This is the way a dormitory should be operated." Well, I wouldn't quarrel with that for an undergraduate college, but for a graduate professional school, you need that. What you need is a concentration

on the professional curriculum.

MINK: Well, I think that one of the major arguments that Stafford Warren used in locating the medical school on the campus here was this fact, that certainly here you have a group of one profession at the graduate level, working towards an MD, who would mingle with the arts and letters people on the northern campus. This was advocated, of course, rather than putting it downtown which would isolate it totally from the campus. So that was an argument that was used very strongly in the forties.

ROBBINS: But that's quite a different problem. You see, what he wanted to do was get the integration of the faculty. He wanted the contributions of the engineering and the physical sciences to the faculty. There is not an integration at the student body level, never was and couldn't be.

MINK: I think he hoped for it, though.

ROBBINS: Well, he may have, but there were no dormitories. You couldn't expect medical students to be very happy in a dormitory that has freshmen and sophomores studying all kinds of humanities, letters and sciences and other things. There is no common point of interest. I suspect that if we had the dormitories for medical students that it would be very welcomed by the students and be an addition.

We were already on the campus so far as integration

into the campus is concerned. As a matter of fact, we had tried very hard over the years to have joint appointments with other faculties, and we met with great resistance on this for a number of reasons. What we wanted was a place where the students could live together so that they would not run off campus and forget all about their courses the minute the lecture or the course was over. Well, that was stymied, and I think that has been a permanent deadly blow to the development of this school, because I think that we will never be able to recover from that.

MINK: I guess you have to take the view, don't you, that if you were to ask for this, some of the other professional schools might say, "Well, we'd like to have a dormitory where all the people from social welfare or all the people from public health or all the people from the School of Library Service can live."

ROBBINS: I think that's fine, if they want it. I couldn't make a judgment about whether it's good for library science, but I can about business administration.

MINK: Well, I was wondering if they didn't use that argument with you, because to allow for one professional school would...

ROBBINS: I don't recall that that argument came up. The argument arose out of the lack of understanding of what a graduate professional management school was all about. It still is not understood by most people

on the faculty, and I think it won't be for another twenty-five or fifty years maybe. But as I say, we were pioneering, and the pioneers sometimes lose out on things.

But be that as it may, we did agree to institute an integrated MBA program as an experimental program which would take a few people, as many as thirty-five or forty, of the applicants who wanted to go into that program, and handle them as a separate group through two years. We had had some experience in having an integrated undergraduate senior year of this kind, which was very, very successful. It was successful for the reason that we really came to grips with the problem of changing the personalities of the students. I think this is the correct way to put it. We were concerned with changing their total personality, so that they would be more adjusted to the careers that they were preparing for. And I think we were very successful in changing these people, but it was interesting to me that what we did was to change their focus from going into business to a focus of going into doctoral programs. We turned them on in the subject matter. Many of these students who are now in leading university faculties around the country got turned on to academic life through this integrated program in the undergraduate management school, which is a rather interesting comment.

At any rate, we abandoned that when we abandoned the undergraduate degree program, but we carried over some of the same philosophy of integration for the students taken as a group. One of the first things we discovered when the students were in a group by themselves was that they began to tell the faculty to shut up and let the students talk. They say, "Don't talk so much. You be there as a resource person, but let us solve the problems. Let us work the way we want to work." This was a very rewarding experience for the students and I think for the faculty members, too.

However, it never was as successful as it could have been, because the whole school wasn't devoted to this. We were still operating the old type of MBA program along with this new type, and many of the faculty were very much more interested in teaching doctoral students than they were master's students anyway. So it was very difficult to recruit faculty members who would devote their time and attention to the integrated program. It required much more input of faculty, people with time to do this. The students demanded it.

Well, we did agree on these things. We got the faculty to make these decisions, and I think that as a result of this experience, which was carried over into faculty organization--the methodology of having discussion groups--we were able to engage in a similar

kind of planning when it came to the years '66 to '68. By that time, we had a very strong faculty--I think the strongest faculty in the United States on planning. It included Eric Trist from the Tavistock Institute (who unfortunately stayed with us only about three years and then went back to England) [and] a very strong group of people including Lou Davis and Bob Tannenbaum, and some of the newer members of the faculty here who are interested in organizational health, organizational development as such. They had attracted a group of graduate students who were working in this field. So we began to learn from them the techniques of long-range planning. During the year 1967-68, in the summer of '67 and during that year, we had a long-range planning session [to] which we invited leading scholars from around the country to come and sit with a group of faculty people to debate the issue of where a school like this should go, how should it operate. Then when it came time, in 1970, to find the new dean, we used the same technique [to] which I've already referred.

MINK: You described that.

ROBBINS: I described it. The same technique of involving the faculty members, and some non-faculty members, too, in this process--some of our alumni and students, for example, involved in that. I'm sure that as a result of all of that background experience the faculty was in the mood and was prepared for the kind

of radical change--I say it's radical, I'm not so sure that's the correct word--which Dean Williams has tried to put into force this year. He has, for example, moved toward the abolition of the MS degree and the incorporation of all students in a kind of MBA professional program. He couldn't have done that without this background of preparation. We've also modified the PhD program by tackling the language problem and fighting that through. So I think this planning exercise is worth mentioning in the history of the school; it was a turning point.

MINK: There's another question that comes to mind which I didn't ask you. The whole question of protest at the time we were interviewing a few months ago was dormant, but now it's come again to the fore. Of course, we all remember how strong it was in May of 1970 and the antecedents in Berkeley. I was wondering if you could speak for just a minute on the effects of the school. How turned on to the protest do you think the management students were and are?

ROBBINS: Well, it was a traumatic experience which heightened my pleasure in leaving the deanship in 1970. But I think it's fair to say that by far the majority of the students, perhaps ninety percent of the students in the business school, did not want interruption of classes. They wanted to continue their work; they were, of course, graduate students, professionally oriented.

There were probably about ten percent of the students who were inclined to join the strike movement, recommended it and would actually participate in disruption of classes, marking the walls and this kind of thing.

I think we were very fortunate in having some people on the faculty like Warren Schmidt--he has to be named first and foremost, I think, in this--and Dick Mason, Jim Jackson, Fred Meyers, and Bob Tannenbaum, and others that you could mention, who recognized in this event an opportunity for the school, faculty and students alike to learn something about organizational behavior. This is what we taught; this is what we're teaching. Here is a crisis which is not dissimilar to the crises that businessmen face, or other types of organizations face from time to time. The cause may be different, but there's a disruption in the organization, and an organization cannot survive if there are not some kinds of threads of continuity, if there aren't some types of techniques to handle this kind of problem, so that the centrifugal forces just don't throw everything awry.

So, we said, what would we do if we were in a business organization where we had a strike? What do you do? Well, there are several alternatives. We have scholars that know all about these things, and we said, "How do we apply those things here?" We found out that there were not very good ways of applying this.

But one thing we did know was that there was a substantial number of members of the faculty--I suppose maybe ten percent or twelve percent--who were very sympathetic to closing down the university, and about that percentage of students. Well, this is enough to disrupt the organization.

What we did was to open up that Executive Program lounge and library downstairs and create a business school strike center, where we brought together all the students who wanted to participate and the faculty members into one place where they could work. We provided them with the tools. We provided them with a bulletin board, with whatever other materials they needed. We also organized the students into groups, discussion groups. We invited people from off campus, business executives, to meet with them. We advertised this.

One of the things that they wanted to do, of course, was to go down en masse and picket in front of this company or that company, and force the businessmen's attention to the problem of Vietnam and militarism and all these things. Of course, the way they were going about it was to alienate the people they wanted to convince. We were trying to point out that this was the case and we would help them to learn how to speak to the businessmen and to get their point across. So we invited businessmen--some of them were our regents,

some of them were our alumni, leading alumni from the Executive Program and otherwise. They would come out here and sit down and listen to the students harangue and harangue and harangue, and these students would tell them exactly how to operate their business and how to think on political questions. Pretty soon then the businessmen would just begin to ask some pointed questions and say, "Well now, here's my business. What do you do today if you were in my business?" And the students began to say, "Well, I'd close it right down" and began to say these crazy things, you see. Pretty soon they were able to learn from the businessmen that there is a very strong sense of responsibility that the executives have, for not only their stockholders but their employees and employees' families and vendors and providers and a lot of other people; and that if their function was really to change the government, this was a poor way to go about it. It wasn't a very effective way to go about it.

Well, the techniques of bringing the students together and providing a center here, I think, was original with us. I don't believe anybody on campus did it as well as we did or as thoroughly as we did. Some of them came over, learned what was going on, and copied us. But we took the thing out of the classroom and out of the halls and put it where it could be effective. We began then to get some of our graduate

students who were doctoral students, who were very keen about blowing up the place and closing it down, and turned their attention to the intellectual problem of organizational development and change. How do you bring about organizational change? This is what they're writing their theses about, but they never thought of applying it to the particular situation here. It was a learning experience that I think was very valuable to the faculty as well as the students, and we have ever since kept that lounge open for students who want to use it for any purpose.

MINK: For a forum.

ROBBINS: Forum, anything.

MINK: Much criticism was levelled at the university by the legislature for turning attention away from teaching at that time and for forgiveness in grades, and I wondered what the policy was that was followed here as far as forgiveness of grades and so on at that time.

ROBBINS: Well, we were a little pusillanimous about this at the outset, as many people were. We tended to go along with the senate action, which was to excuse people from grades if they said they wanted to be. Then we soon changed our minds about that and said that we would only, as I recall, excuse those people who could demonstrate to us that they were bona-fidely involved in organizations on the campus that

were constructive. This was a difficult thing to administer, but there were some students who were not interested at all in Vietnam or in the university and took advantage of this to be relieved of grades, when they were getting Fs and this kind of thing. I thought that was absolutely wrong.

As a matter of fact, I and most of the faculty thought it was absolutely wrong to relieve anybody of responsibility. There's no reason why a person shouldn't act on the basis of his conscience, but in this circumstance if he felt it was more important to stop his studies and do something on this issue, then he would have withdrawn from the university and taken the penalty, whatever it is. But what these people wanted was both their academic record and their ability to go out and strike. So I think we finally had relatively little waiver of scholarship requirements for these people in the school. It was not a very serious problem, as it turned out. It was in the beginning, of course, and there were many faculty people who were arguing in favor of just giving up the university. If you're going to do it for that issue, you could do it for any other kind of issue that comes along.

MINK: By giving up the university, you mean just closing it down until the war was over.

ROBBINS: Closing down the university until the war was over, or next time closing it down until the grape

strike was finished, or anything else. The function of the university is, of course, to stay open and do its work, and if you turn the university into a political instrument and a propaganda agency, then it's no longer a university. This is exactly what many people wanted to have done in order to satisfy their own prejudices about an important political issue. It isn't a question of whether their prejudices are mine, or like mine at all. It's a question of their not recognizing the fundamental purpose of a university.

I don't know what's going on at the present time, but my impression is that the business school has not been interrupted very seriously by these current events. I think it's perfectly clear to some of the students that I've talked to that they recognize that the leadership of the present strike movement is external to the university. They can identify these people. When it's Peace and Freedom party and other things like this, you know who's back of it. They have some students who are dupes, like Bill Walton, who go along and get arrested. The poor guy pays the penalty. I think our students are a little too wise for this now.

MINK: Once bitten; twice shy, perhaps.

ROBBINS: Maybe.

TAPE NUMBER: VIII, SIDE TWO

May 20, 1972

MINK: This whole notion of shutting down the university, the idea of "On strike, shut it down," I can't think of any time in the history of American higher education where an external occurrence caused this kind of an attitude to develop among the students. Maybe, perhaps, there have been times when faculty have been out up in arms, the faculty revolution at Berkeley in the 1920s and such, but the whole notion of actually just closing the university as an institution seems to me to be unprecedented. I'm wondering if you agree, and if you could, in your own mind, isolate the facts that have caused this brand-new concept.

ROBBINS: I don't know the history of schools. I know that there has been turmoil in American universities off and on over the last couple hundred years, but I'm not too well acquainted with that history. I think that the University Center for Rational Alternatives has quite a lot of literature on that.

But of course, this is not at all new in South American universities. When I was in South America, I was appalled at the fact that the students would close down the university and that they would govern the university. In Bolivia, for example, the outside

of the university building is pockmarked from gunfire. The students elect their representatives in the classes, and the first week of classes is devoted to political action between the Falangists and the Communists to see who's going to be president and secretary of each class--not course, but class. The instructor frequently just doesn't go to class during that first week, because he doesn't want to be involved in that.

Then these representatives go to a central council, and the upshot of it is that the students and the faculty have about equal voice in running the university; and the faculty members don't show up to vote, so the students run it. The reason the faculty members do not show up to vote is that they're scared. Most of them are not full-time faculty; they are part-time. They are professional people--lawyers, doctors, and this sort of person--who come in to teach a class or two. The administrators are cowed by the students. The students are frequently going on strike and closing the university down. This is true in San Marcos in Lima and at San Andrés in Bolivia at the time I was down there.

But this is a way of life among university students. University students do not have to take examinations; they enroll, and they can postpone taking examinations year after year and carry the student card which gives them free rides on buses or low bus prices and discounts

at stores and this kind of thing. So they're perpetual students. Many of them are not real students at all.

This kind of atmosphere makes for poor universities, of course. I must say that the students that I worked with and conferred with at San Andrés University in Bolivia were highly articulate, intelligent people. They were very well educated at the secondary level. Most of their teachers were communist teachers at the secondary schools, so they had all this bias; all questions had to be referred to communist ideology for the solution. But they were highly articulate, much more articulate than our students were. Maybe these were just leaders. I'm not sure that I got the rank and file of students. But this atmosphere does not prevail in the American university, hasn't prevailed, so you can't explain it by the same means. There is no doubt, however, that there has been an increasing attempt--I've witnessed but I can't document it--on the part of certain student groups (I think they're leftish, maybe communist-inspired groups) to rival the South American university in this regard. I've increasingly heard it said by American students, "Well, in South America they do this," without realizing what they're talking about. Student power is something, I think, like black power or the kind of power which is a kind of fad today. Groups are organizing for political purposes and political power.

The thing that amazes me is the willingness of faculty members to close down the university. I think a faculty member ought to keep the university open. A closed university can't perform any useful function that I can see. I have attributed this tendency on the part of the faculty to a number of things. One is the rapid increase in the number of faculty people. The number of people going to school, of course, the percentage of this age group going to college, has jumped in the last generation from twenty to fifty or sixty or something like this. And this makes the student body much different. We have hired many, many teachers. The increase in the number of teachers has been phenomenal. New schools, new universities open--they don't have any roots, cultural roots or academic roots. I certainly understand this. I grew up in this institution which had no roots at all, except those that we borrowed from Berkeley. But you have all the state colleges, in this state, with very few if any roots at all.

And there are many faculty members, the young faculty members, who really do not know what the academic game is all about, and they don't realize that they won't know until they've had a number of years of experience. Just because you have a PhD is no sign you're even an educated man, let alone an educator. And I think many of the young members of the faculty do not have a sense of responsibility to academia as

such. Certainly there is a tendency for them to have more sense of responsibility to their profession as such, as economists or political scientists, than to a university in which they're engaged. The musical chairs bit amongst faculty members and the competition for faculty members in the last twenty-five years has, I think, created a sense of lack of responsibility or an interest in any particular institution. All those things weaken the school and weaken its resistance to the tendencies to disintegrate. Well, those are some things.

Of course, the whole university society throughout the world has been disrupted. Japan's universities are closed down most of the time now, and I would suspect that ten or fifteen years from now the Japanese society is going to suffer enormously from the lack of well-trained doctors and lawyers and people like that.

I'm afraid we are, too, if this thing continues.

MINK: Another question which is closer to home: there has been a tendency on this campus, I think, to blame a particular group of faculty for many of the problems which we've had here in this whole Vietnam context, and particularly Professor [Donald] Kalish from the philosophy department. Do you think that the opposition, as you've heard people talk against Kalish, has grown since 1970?

ROBBINS: Oh, I think it has. I think it has grown. Of course, one of the weaknesses of the university

organization is that the faculty has never faced up to its responsibility to discipline its members.

MINK: In other words, you feel that it would be the duty of this faculty to discipline Kalish for what he's done?

ROBBINS: Well, I think it certainly should come to grips with the problem. I don't know whether he should be disciplined or not, because I don't know all the facts. But from the facts that I know and from the statements that I've heard him make and the statements he's quoted as making, I don't think that there's any question but what he should be disciplined, because he has been reported to have said that the university should be closed down, and this is perhaps our last opportunity, these last fifteen days, to start a civil war in the United States. He was reported to have said that, and I don't know whether it's true or not, but any faculty member who does that incites students to behavior which I don't think is appropriate in academia. But the senate members will march right up to a difficult problem and fade away very fast when it comes to voting.

Of course this is true of the legal profession, also. The legal profession doesn't disbar very many people. You have to be really pretty scandalous to get disbarred from the legal profession. Whenever any attack is made on a member, it seems to me the whole

body surrounds him and protects him. We've had this tradition of protecting people against tyrannical administrators and tyrannical trustees. This is understandable, I suppose.

MINK: While it's perfectly true that what went on in Berkeley, first of all, in the period of the free speech movement, and the period of the People's Park, and the other demonstrations there that were particularly violent, has caused the legislators of the state and the people reflecting to the legislators their feelings, their violent feelings about this, there have been problems at UCLA, such as the hiring and firing of Angela Davis, and the problems here have been centered around this man. I'm wondering, in your conversations with faculty whether you found that they blame Professor [Donald] Kalish for the disciplinary actions that have been taken, punitive actions perhaps rather than disciplinary, against faculty and academic people by withholding salary raises and so on; whether they place this at the foot of Kalish and his group?

ROBBINS: Well, I would suspect that a large percentage of the faculty in this school have a strong feeling that that is the case. You see, members of our faculty mix with the town a great deal, the business groups, and they're probably conservative people. And of course, when we're in business groups we hear nothing but condemnation of hiring a communist, or condemnation

of Kalish, who's always out in front of these issues, and name and picture in the paper. They can't understand why we don't get rid of him, and it's not easy to explain.

It's not easy to explain to legislators and people why it is appropriate to have a communist on the faculty. I can't do it because I don't think it's appropriate to have a communist on the faculty. As Angela Davis has said, her role on the faculty is to promote communism and to disrupt the society. She's made those statements, so I don't think she can be a very objective scholar, but I may be wrong on that. I know a lot of people will disagree with me in the university. They would say that I am prejudiced in my own way and my background, and I am indoctrinating my students from the standpoint of that prejudice. I have always, however, avowed that I watch for this prejudice. I don't think it can be said of my record that I have deliberately propagandized the voluntary enterprise system for the United States. I believe in it. I think it's the right system, and undoubtedly my teaching has been influenced by this. My students know it. But on the other hand, I have raised questions about it, the way it operates. All my life I've raised questions for students--as a matter of fact, sometimes gotten the wrath of businessmen down on my head for doing this. Students go home and report

that Robbins said that wages are low in the department stores, for example--and the fact is well known--and I didn't condemn department stores for paying low wages; I was simply trying to explain that you can't run a department store, or a five-and-ten-cents store, store, with a million-dollar baby behind the counter. You can't afford it. You've got to get only people who know how to make change and speak English. So I'm prejudiced in this score. [tape recorder stopped for phone conversation]

MINK: By the same token, you wouldn't want to see someone like [John] Rousselot on the faculty.

ROBBINS: No, no, I wouldn't.

MINK: He's an avowed right-winger.

ROBBINS: He's an avowed propagandist. He's not a scholar. I don't think that Angela Davis's credentials as a scholar are proven yet. One of the reasons why she had a temporary appointment was that she hadn't done the first step, which is to get the degree. She never has, as far as I know, finished this degree. Even after that, I think she has to prove it through a probationary period that most of us went through for six to fifteen years. But she isn't going to go through that step and then get maturity. To speak as a person outside of the university with her prejudices--this is perfectly all right. No, I wouldn't hire just anybody on the faculty; I think we

ought to be pretty careful to get people who at least try to be scholarly and objective and thorough. That's the name of the ball game as far as I know.

MINK: You said, also, that you wanted to make some comments about the closing down of the Western Data Processing Center. Perhaps you'd like to talk about this from your standpoint, which perhaps is a little different from Neil Jacoby's.

ROBBINS: Yes. I'll simply point out from my experience that from the very outset the Western Data Processing Center here, the whole concept, was anathema to one of the computer science persons here who has been on the faculty for a long time.

MINK: You don't want to name him?

ROBBINS: No, I can't think of his name. He was in the Institute of Numerical Analysis and then moved over to mathematics. Tommy Tompkins.

Tommy was very unhappy because IBM wanted to establish this here. He wanted to control, I'm sure, all of the computers.

MINK: It was conflict of empires, in other words.

ROBBINS: Maybe that, and maybe he's right--maybe he should have had it. I don't go into that issue because I'm not competent to make the judgment. However, I do know that IBM made this decision on the basis of the advice of Dr. Hurd, their vice-president.

MINK: By the way, just not to interrupt your train of thought, but I am, I realize. At this point, had your relationships been good with the Institute of Numerical Analysis? You'd been able to make use of their shop?

ROBBINS: Not very much, because we hadn't very many faculty members who were interested in doing that.

One of the real problems we had with IBM coming here was the problem of staffing to meet the challenge, and actually we didn't do a good enough job on that. It was very hard to get faculty members at the salaries we were paying. The good people, the PhDs, were going to IBM, into industry, and to some other schools like Harvard where they paid salaries twice as high as ours. But at any rate, we were fortunate, I think, to be able to get George Brown, who was on our faculty at the time and also on the engineering faculty, to head that institution.

I don't want to go into the history of the institution, but rather to cover that whole period by a statement, which reflects my own opinion, that there was a constant attempt on the part of Tommy Tompkins to do something about the WDPC. I don't know what it was, but George Brown was sufficiently a big diplomatic man to work with Tommy and resolve these questions. George was not a fighter; he rolled with the punches. But he had the cards; he had all the aces.

However, we [came] to a period where the technology had changed considerably, where the big computers were coming in, the giant ones, and there was a whole legitimate question as to whether or not centralization or decentralization was the way to run computers then. I think that hasn't been resolved yet. And I don't think it soon will be; it's a legitimate question. Tommy Tompkins was in favor of a central system, and he convinced Foster Sherwood, who was delegated this whole responsibility, as far as I know, to solve this problem. Foster, of course, had no competence at all in the field of computers. He did have competence in the organization of the university. He was very close to it. He knew where the bodies were hidden.

The first time we heard that there was going to be a centralization and IBM's contract was going to be cancelled was when one of our PhDs who is a professor at Harvard Business School, Jim McKenney, dropped in one day to see me. I was acting dean at the time. And he said, "You know, George, that they're going to take WDPC away from the business school." And I said, "I have not heard of such a thing." And he says, "Well, I'm out here on a consulting assignment to Foster Sherwood to advise him on this, and this is the way the land lies. They're going to centralize computers on this campus, and you're not going to have WDPC."

Well, this wasn't too shocking to me.

MINK: Neil didn't know it?

ROBBINS: Neil didn't know it.

MINK: He was away?

ROBBINS. He was away in Europe at a meeting of the United Nations Social and Economic Council. Although the WDPC was assigned to the dean of the business school, the central administration never recognized that it was a part of the business school. They always handled it from the standpoint of budget separately and would report to us afterward. They never regarded it as being part of the business school. I don't think we fought hard enough to insist upon that. We had a lot of other fish to fry, and we had a good arrangement with IBM and lots of money was pouring in there, so we simply just let things coast.

MINK: You don't think there was any disgruntlement on IBM's part about your obligations in connection with them?

ROBBINS: They swear that that is not the case. They swear up and down that that is not the case. I doubt if it is. I think IBM, however, did believe that we hadn't exploited the institution vigorously enough. I think they were a little disappointed, perhaps, that George Brown wasn't more dynamic in pushing the curricula matters and this sort of thing. George was not a dynamic pusher. However, they have only high

praise for George and what we'd done.

We did, of course, establish connections with some 105 institutions from California, Mexico, Hawaii, up to Alaska, whose scholars could come down here without cost or with minimum cost in using it. We had training centers for them. I don't think we developed our own computer PhD program and the MBA curriculum fast enough. The main reason we didn't was that we could not find the faculty people to do it, the faculty people who could be approved as professors under our system. They could be approved at Harvard very quickly and get in there and do a job, but we couldn't get them on our faculty. We couldn't get them through committee, and we couldn't get them the salary.

But as soon as I heard this from Jim McKenney, I called Foster Sherwood and I said, "I have a rumor only that WDPC is going to be changed fundamentally." And he said, "I don't know what the rumor is, but I wouldn't pay any attention to it." Something like this, I can't remember the exact conversation. Well, I got on the phone immediately and called Tom Watson, Jr., president of IBM, and he was not in. He was in Europe. The call was referred to the vice-president in charge of domestic sales, and he called me right back and said, "Mr. Watson wants me to handle whatever problem you have. What is it you want to talk about?" I told him, and he said, "Oh, there's absolutely nothing

to that at all. I've heard nothing of that. We have nothing but the highest praise for your school and you are top rated by IBM." And he said, "I'll come out tomorrow morning and talk with you."

So he hopped on a plane and came out here and was in my office at nine o'clock the next morning. He said, "I don't understand this problem that you have. We have no intention of cancelling the contract. I think we'll have to change the focus and direction of the WDPC a little bit, because most of the institutions we've been pouring money into through WDPC now have their own computer setups, and we don't need to do that. That part of it we don't need to do, but there are research elements that we need to do, so we'll change the focus a little."

Well, I called Foster Sherwood again, finally got him on the phone and told him what I had done. He was patently quite disturbed by my having called IBM.
MINK: Oh?

ROBBINS: Yes, he made it perfectly clear to me that that was--he didn't use the word--insubordination. I should have gone through him. I reminded him that I was responsible as dean for WDPC in the organizational structure of the university. WDPC was under the dean, and the director of WDPC reported to the dean; and therefore, if any change in WDPC was to take place, that I should be at the center of the discussion.

MINK: Absolutely.

ROBBINS: And he, I think, demonstrated over the phone by his fumbling that he had forgotten all about that organizational problem--a small matter. Well, I don't know. I think he had just never regarded the business school as being very important. He changed his mind on that, I think, a little bit later. Certainly he gave evidence during the last two years when I was dean of respecting our school a good deal more than he had before.

MINK: But I think perhaps he gave evidence of a lot of things differently than he did before, because he realized he was on the way out. He might be on the skids if he didn't shape up; he was going to get kicked out. And of course, ultimately, he was kicked out. Young got rid of him the minute Murphy left, and I think it was a good thing, probably.

ROBBINS: Well, that may be. I think it's a very complicated situation.

But at any rate, he made it clear to me that WDPC was going to be changed--they were going to centralize computing. And so I got on the phone and called this vice-president of IBM again. I said, "I'm still head of WDPC. The director reports to the dean, and the chancellor has told me that there is some stuff going on to change WDPC, and I've got to know about it." And he

said, "No, that is not true."

MINK: This is Watson again you were talking to, even after he'd been out here.

ROBBINS: This is Watson's vice-president. He said, "I'm going to send another vice-president out who is really in charge of that whole area--the first one wasn't really in charge of that--and he'll be in your office tomorrow morning at nine o'clock."

All right, he was there at nine o'clock. He was in charge of all these negotiations, and he sat there and told me that there was not going to be a change. The minute he got back to New York, it became perfectly clear that he was not telling the truth. I don't know why officials of IBM would dissemble this way to me. I wasn't that important to them. This behavior was so unnecessary. They could have simply said, "Well, we've loved you, but we've got to change now. You've got to be prepared for it, and we don't want to hurt your feelings."

MINK: Maybe they felt that leaking the news in advance of their decision would be bad publicity for IBM?

ROBBINS: No, I don't think that was it, but I haven't any idea. From that point on, we had lost WDPC, and it was perfectly clear that Tommy Tompkins had won out on centralization. Now this was a great blow to us, because we had no budget with which to substitute for what we had. We never have gotten a budget. I got

in touch with Jacoby right away about this, and Jacoby got in touch with Chancellor Murphy, which I had not been able to do, and complained about this whole thing. When Jacoby came back here, he visited the chancellor, and he got the chancellor to put in writing the statement that if anything happened to WDPC, we would be guaranteed the same quantity and quality of assistance in computers that we had under the IBM setup.

MINK: Without having to pay for the computer time?

ROBBINS: Yes. We'd have the same quantity and quality of service. Well, that promise of the chancellor's was never redeemed; we never have gotten the same service.

MINK: I just don't understand; maybe you don't understand either. Do you feel that IBM wouldn't have done this if it hadn't been that pressure was being brought on them by the chancellor's office to jettison the project?

ROBBINS: I have that feeling. I can't prove it. I have a very strong feeling that Tommy Tompkins won out. The man in IBM who turned out to have the decision was a former classmate in graduate school of Tommy Tompkins, a very good friend of his. So the change there took place in IBM. He was a staff member, really, but the IBM officials themselves wouldn't face up to this and tell us the truth, because they probably were against the move. Some of these officials were probably

against the move, but altogether they were forced into it.

MINK: By UCLA?

ROBBINS: I think by UCLA. Now I'm not at all convinced that it's a bad move to have centralization. As a matter of fact, in the whole University of California, or perhaps in the whole higher education system, or perhaps the whole state government, we need just one giant computer. But I don't know--that's a technology question.

MINK: What I can't understand is: what concern it would be to Mr. Tompkins if the School of Management was to rely on its own source of computer facilities?

ROBBINS: Well, it was the money. He wanted \$100,000 that IBM was putting into WDPC.

MINK Where would it come from?

ROBBINS: IBM. IBM was putting \$100,000 into it.

MINK: Oh, in other words, IBM when they withdrew, did not withdraw their finances. They continued to contribute to the Central Computing Network.

ROBBINS: Oh, they contributed far more in the new contract than they did to WDPC. That's cost IBM a very pretty penny to put this big computer in over there. But I think that it may very well be, when all the dust has settled here, that decentralization of computers will come back. I remember when the Monroe calculators and Marchant calculators were first used in

our laboratories, there was a strong argument put forth by Provost Hedrick's office that they should have a central place where everybody would go to use the calculators. Well, I think we may be going through that same chauvinistic philosophy now, where we centralize all this computer, because, you see, it gets so big and so cumbersome and the finances are so great that the only people who get service out of the central computer center are the people who make the most contributions to it financially. And those are the people who get the huge grants from HEW--medical school and engineering. We don't get these big grants. The result is that we just get pushed aside; we have no priority. You establish your priority with muscle. I think it would be far better for our school if we had a simpler machine here, which you can now buy on the market for relatively little. We could run it ourselves; we could have outlets and inputs all over the building here.

MINK: Well, this is an interesting theme. Maybe it's a way of finishing the interview, because it's a topic that I have run up against in my job, and I'm sure others have in theirs. There are certain elements within the university's organization which must show a profit.

Now the one I'm most familiar with--I know there are many others--is the photographic department, which must show a profit. Therefore, it doesn't have a budget.

ROBBINS: Yes, Buildings and Grounds.

MINK: Buildings and Grounds is the same way. The bindery is the same way. The printing and production offices are all geared to this kind of an organization. Therefore, in the photographic service, for example, the one where it was not centralized but there were several on the campus, when one showed no profit they think of eliminating it and centralizing in the other. In the bindery, for example, which was part of printing and reproduction, they were very jealous of going anywhere outside to have any printing done. They wanted all printing done through them. Now this kind of a setup within the university seems to me to have its disadvantages.

ROBBINS: Well, I think it's very questionable. You see, it is not competitive; it doesn't become competitive. You build up a bureaucracy in an organization, then you have to get revenue, so you charge high fees to the captive audience--on printing, for example, and this sort of thing. You have no competition with enterprises outside who could do it much cheaper. The printing of our catalogues...

MINK: And yet you can't go outside.

ROBBINS: You can't go out, no. The rules prevent it. You build up a big empire on these services that is just not justified. I think it's a basically sad policy.

INDEX

A

Academic Senate, UCLA	35, 73, 74, 100, 103, 122, 127, 149, 150, 153, 155, 165, 222, 234, 245, 275, 318-319, 341
Ad Hoc Committee	163
Committee on the Budget and Inter- departmental Relations	44, 73, 149, 163, 169, 235, 236, 275
Committee on Committees	164
Committee on Curriculum	318-319
Committee on Reorganization of the Regents	281
Reinstatement Committee	35-38, 70, 89, 153, 157-159, 179
<u>Accounting Principles</u> (McKinsey and Noble)	58
Allen, Bennet M.	155
Allen, Raymond B.	44, 126, 131, 144- 146, 147-151, 239, 273, 274
American Association of Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB)	55
American Bar Association	150
<u>American Economic Review</u> (periodical)	122
Arlt, Gustave O.	155

B

Barnes, Ralph M.	41, 82, 166, 215
Barrows, David P.	20
Bastian, Sue	300-301
Beckman, Elmer	27
Bel-Air Hotel, Los Angeles	145
Bell, Clifford	86
Bennett, Mr. _____ (UCLA Extension)	95, 96
Bernstein, Irving	114, 280-281
Blacet, Francis E.	36
Blue Shield Society, UCLA	144
Boelter, Llewellyn M.K.	41, 166, 183
Bolivia	336-337
Breed, Arthur H., Jr.	217
Broadway, The	297
Brown, George	186, 193, 311, 346 348-349

Brown, William F.	33, 79, 162
Buffa, Elwood S.	307, 309
Buildings and Grounds, UCLA	355-356
Bunche Hall, UCLA	118
Burns, Arthur F.	237-238
Burns, Leland S.	216
Burtchett, Floyd F.	33, 65, 94, 95, 99
Business Administration and Economics Building	78-84, 104, 111
Business Administration, College of, GSM	49, 55-58, 59-62, 64, 110
Business Administration, Department of, GSM	31, 32, 46-48
Business Administration Extension, GSM	50, 69, 79, 88, 90, 97-102, 103
Business Administration, School of	50, 53, 66-67, 68, 69-70, 72, 73, 74, 76-77, 81, 90-92, 94, 99, 102, 103, 104-111, 113, 114, 115-123, 127-128, 130-132, 133, 137, 138, 145, 146, 147, 152-155, 157-158, 159-182, 184-187, 188, 189-206, 208, 213, 214-216, 218, 219, 220, 221-224, 228-233, 235, 238-256, 257-268, 273, 274, 276, 277, 283, 285-291, 292-335
Business and Economic Research, Bureau of, GSM	206-210, 212-216, 220
Business Research Associates, GSM	196-199, 284

C

California Club	24, 144, 196
<u>California Management Review</u> (periodical)	182, 292
California Scholarship Society	5
California State University, Fresno	19
California State University, San Jose	19
Call, Asa V.	197, 284
Campbell, Lily Bess	13
Campbell, W. Glenn	142
Canada Dry Corporation	305
Carrabino, Joseph D.	188, 189, 194-195
Carstens, Arthur	115, 116
Carter, Edward W.	142, 196, 253, 254-

Carter, Edward W. [cont'd]	257, 289, 290, 297
Case, Fred E.	218
Cassady, Ralph, Jr.	48, 61, 71, 73, 74- 75, 130, 160, 161, 162, 207-209, 210, 211, 212-213, 215, 321
Caughey, John W.	225
Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara	175, 224
Central Computing Network, UCLA	354
Chancellor, Office of the, UCLA	209, 288
Chartered Life Underwriters (CLU)	93, 94, 95
Chartered Property and Casualty Underwriters (CPCU)	93, 94, 95
Chemistry, Department of, UCLA	13
Cincinnati, Ohio	47
City Club, Los Angeles	24, 47
Claremont Colleges	140, 143, 270
Clendenin, John C.	33, 105, 203, 245
Coffman, L. Dale	150
Committee for Responsible University Government	225
Council of Economic Advisors	55, 145, 158, 237, 243
Cox, Garfield V.	79, 163
Cross, Dr. _____ (principal)	4
D	
Darsie, Marvin L.	12
Dartmouth College	252
Amos Tuck School of Business Administration	252
Davis, Angela	342, 343, 344
Davis, Louis E.	186, 193, 300, 301, 328
Delta Upsilon (fraternity)	10-11, 254
DeMoss, Evelyn	3-4
Dickson, Edward A.	18, 131, 132-138, 139, 140, 141-142, 143-144, 147, 234, 253, 271
Dickson, Wilhelmina (Mrs. Edward)	138-141, 268-270, 271
Dickson Hall, UCLA	269
Dockson, Robert R.	201-202
Dodd, Paul A.	33, 62, 105, 113- 114, 117, 275, 288, 289
Dutton, Frederick G.	142

Dykstra, Clarence A.	23, 44, 46-48, 49- 50, 51, 53, 67, 71, 125, 131, 144, 146, 156, 163, 164, 216, 274
----------------------	--

E

Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC)	348
Economics, Department of, UCLA	13, 28, 31-33, 104- 106, 107-110, 119- 123 237
Eisenhower, Dwight D.	46-47, 49, 54
Elwell, Fayette H.	166, 182-183, 355
Engineering, College of, UCLA	13
English, Department of, UCLA	262
European Productivity Agency	134
Evans, Hugh	101, 187-189, 194, 296, 332
Executive Program, GSM	194-195
Executive Program Association	

F

Faculty Committee, UCLA	288
Faville, David E.	28
Fillerup, Francis	99
Flood, Cora J., Foundation	283
Forbes, William E.	142
Ford Foundation	214, 215, 232, 261, 262, 289, 290
Founder's Rock, UCLA	17
Frederickson, Hansena	139, 269
Frisbee, Ira N.	12, 33, 48, 203

G

Galli-Curci, Amelita	8
George Washington University	13
Gillies, James M.	180, 218, 229, 230, 232-233
Graduate Council, UCLA	221, 222
Graduate Division, UCLA	232
Graduate School of Management building	78
Grady, Henry F.	282
Graham, Willard J.	119, 127
Grebler, Leo	215
Grether, Ewald T.	131, 132, 218, 283, 284, 285, 286, 290

Griggs, Earl	236
Gross, Mary (Mrs. Robert)	265, 266, 268, 270
Gross, Robert E.	265

H

Hall, Arnold Bennett	29
Hamlet (Shakespeare)	4, 7
Harvard University	346, 349
Business School Associates	197
Graduate School of Business	25, 28, 29, 48, 49,
Administration	104, 167, 192, 210-
	211, 253, 254, 257,
	258, 262, 266, 270,
	323, 347
Law School	305
Hay, Pat	213
Hedrick, Earle R.	355
Heilbroner, Robert L.	320
Heslip, Malcom F.	99
Hewitt Street School, Los Angeles	11
Higher School of Commerce, Kobe, Japan	25
Hitch, Charles J.	286, 292-293
Huntley, Earl	140, 270
Hurd, Cuthbert C.	263, 345
Hutchins, Robert M.	163, 175, 224

I

India	261-262
Industrial Relations, Institute	81-82, 111-119
of, UCLA	
Ingraham, Mrs. S. Michal	232
International Business Machines	263, 345, 346, 347,
Corporation (IBM)	348, 349-350, 351-
	352, 353, 354

J

Jackson, James R.	186, 193, 299, 311,
	330
Jackson, Virginia (Molony)	296-299, 300
Jacoby, Neil H.	45-46, 50, 51, 53,
	55, 66-70, 72-73, 75,
	76-77, 78, 80, 82,
	91, 101, 104, 105,
	106, 107, 110, 119,
	122, 123, 125, 127,
	130, 131, 132, 133,
	138, 144, 145, 152-

Jacoby, Neil H. [cont'd]	153, 154, 155, 156, 158-159, 160-164, 166- 167, 168, 169, 170, 173, 174, 175, 177, 178, 181, 182, 184, 186-187, 188, 196, 198- 199, 203, 206, 207, 210, 214, 215, 216, 217-218, 219, 220, 221-222, 223, 224- 225, 228-229, 233- 235, 237-239, 240, 241-247, 249-251, 253, 255, 257, 258, 261, 262, 264-265, 266, 267, 273, 281, 283, 284, 285, 287, 288, 289, 292, 294, 295, 296, 298, 304, 308, 310, 311, 312, 323, 345, 348, 353
<u>Can Prosperity be Sustained?</u>	243
Japan	340
John and LaRee Caughey Foundation	225
Johnson, Hiram	144
Jordan, Fred Moyer	16
Journalism, School of, UCLA	134-135
K	
Kalish, Donald	340-341, 342-343
Kansas City, Missouri	8
<u>Kansas City Star</u> (newspaper)	8
<u>Kansas State Normal College</u>	6
Kaplan, Joseph	36
Karrenbrock, Wilbert B.	103, 203
Kerr, Clark	182, 276-278, 279- 280, 281-282, 286, 291-292
Knudsen, Vern O.	13, 176
Koontz, Harold	232
L	
Laughlin, Helen Matthewson	22
Law, School of, UCLA	149
Lawrence, John H.	142
Letters and Science, College of, UCLA	9, 12, 57, 65, 153, 164, 189
Lever Brothers Company	78

Lingnan University, Canton, China	25
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation	210
Lohman family	8
Long Beach, California	5, 7
Long Beach Polytechnic High School	5, 7, 16
<u>Los Angeles Times</u> (newspaper)	220
<u>Luckman, Charles</u>	78

M

McCall's Publishing Company	305
McClintock, Miller	13
McComb, Marshall F.	13
McHenry, Dean E.	223
McKenney, Jim	347, 349
McKinley, Arthur P.	36
McKinsey, James O.	58
McNaughton, Wayne L.	59
McWhinney, William H.	302
Mahoney, David J., Jr.	305
Management, Graduate School of, UCLA	19-20, 40-43, 44, 45, 76, 101, 345-356
<u>see also</u> Business Administration, College of; Department of; School of; and individual listings	
Management, Institute of, Ahmedabad, India	262
Management Library, GSM	118
Management, Office of, U.S.	263
Marschak, Jacob	215, 286-291
Marvin, Cloyd H.	13, 104
Maslow, Abraham H.	192
Mason, Richard O.	302, 330
Massachusetts Institute of Technology	263, 303
Massarik, Fred	190, 191
Maverick, Lewis A.	33
Medicine, School of, UCLA	135, 182, 257, 300, 324, 355
Meyer, Theodore R.	142
Meyers, Frederic	115, 186, 193, 300, 330
Meyers, Judy (Lantz)	299
Miller, Earl J.	22, 65, 105
Miller, Loye Holmes	13
Millspaugh Hall, UCLA	12, 14
Molony, Clement J.	297
Moore, Ernest Carroll	13, 14-15, 18, 21- 24, 27, 31, 56, 58, 73, 144, 155, 273
Morgan, William Conger	13

Murphy, Franklin D.	44, 146, 198, 265, 268, 269, 270-274, 275, 276, 281, 282, 292, 351, 353
---------------------	--

N

National Science Foundation	214
Neff, Corinne (Wooton)	293-296
Neff, Philip	294, 295, 296
Neff, Mrs. Philip	294-295
Nelson, Elmer S.	11-12
Nicols, Alfred	293, 296
Noble, Howard S.	12, 27, 33, 45, 48, 51, 54, 55, 56, 58- 62, 64, 69, 70-71, 76, 85, 91, 92-93, 100, 104, 105, 152, 153, 162, 170, 203, 207, 244
Noble, Josephine (Mrs. Howard S.)	70
Northwestern University	162
Norton Simon Enterprises	304
Numerical Analysis, Institute of, UCLA	345, 346

O

O'Brien, Morrough P.	52
O'Donnell, Cyril J.	75, 159, 178-179
O'Malley, C.D.	257
Oral History Program, UCLA	225

P

Pacific Coast Conference	149
Panunzio, Constantine	62-64, 136, 276, 279, 280
Pauley, Edwin W.	149, 197, 253, 255, 256
Pegrum, Dudley F.	65-66, 73, 110
People's Park, Berkeley	342
Pillsbury, Arthur F.	318
Pomona College	140, 143, 270
<u>see</u> Claremont Colleges	
Powell, Lawrence Clark	272
Prasow, Paul	115
Psychology, Department of, UCLA	106

R

Reagan, Ronald	141-143, 226
----------------	--------------

Real Estate Research Project, GSM	216-219
Reeder, Leland P.	216
Registrar, Office of the, UCLA	154, 180
Research, Division of, GSM	198, 210-212, 213, 214, 220, 239, 289
Rieber, Charles H.	13
Rinehardt, Mrs. _____ (GSM staff)	301
Robb, Agnes R.	31
Robbins, Dorothy (Mrs. George)	132
Robbins, F. Walter	2
Robbins, Grace K. (Mrs. William)	3, 6, 9, 25
Robbins, James J.	2, 3, 6, 8, 62
Robbins, Marie	8
Robbins, William R.	1, 2-3, 4, 6, 25, 62
Roethlisberger, Fritz J.	192
Rousselot, John H.	344
Royce Hall, UCLA	62, 81, 117, 206
S	
Saloutos, Theodore	107, 258
Salvatori, Henry	143
San Diego State University	19
School of Business Administration	19
Sarabhai, Vikram	262
Sartori, Margaret R.	18
Saxon, David S.	43, 225
Schmidt, Warren	187, 302, 330
Schweninger, Betty	301
Shawhart, Belle	296
Sherriffs, Alex C.	142
Sherwood, Foster H.	43, 44, 175, 177, 184, 274-276, 290- 291, 347, 349, 350- 351
Shultz, George P.	263-264
Silverwoods	254
Simon, Norton	255, 256, 305
Simons, Harry	59, 103, 203, 204, 205-206
Sixtieth Avenue School, Los Angeles	11
South-western Publishing Company	58, 59
Sproul, Robert G.	31, 56, 67, 105, 123- 132, 137, 148, 206, 216, 217, 221, 234, 236, 277, 286
Sproul, Mrs. Robert G.	129
Staffing Committee, GSM	185
Stanford University	6, 8, 9, 10, 19, 21, 28, 143, 263

Steiner, George A.	196, 210, 213, 215, 249, 312
Stockwell, Marvel	65
Strack, Celeste	24, 144
Strong, Edward W.	20
Sumner, Ann	132, 139
T	
Tannenbaum, Robert	75, 115, 159, 190, 191, 192, 249, 302, 307, 328, 330
Teachers College, UCLA	12
Thayer, Kansas	1, 4-5, 7
Tompkins, Tommy	345, 346, 347, 352, 353, 354
Topeka, Kansas	1
Travistock Institute of Human Relations, London	328
Trist, Eric L.	328
Tugwell, Rexford G.	175
U	
<u>U.S. News and World Report</u> (periodical)	270
Universidad Boliviana Mayor de San Andrés, Bolivia	337, 338
Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos de Lima, Peru	337
University Center for Rational Alternatives, UCLA	336
University Club, Los Angeles	56
University Extension, UCLA	51, 53, 84, 85, 86, 87, 89, 92, 94, 103, 152, 216, 218, 296
Engineering Extension	86, 88
Engineering, Science and Management War Training (ESMWT)	52, 83, 92
Mathematics Extension	86, 87
University of California	18-19, 88, 141-142, 143, 219, 223, 224, 234, 256, 271, 283, 284, 311
Board of Regents	197, 198, 234, 236, 239, 253, 254, 257, 289, 312
Committee on Finance	289
Coordinating Council	19
University Extension	83, 87
University of California, Berkeley	10, 16, 18, 19, 21,

University of California, Berkeley [cont'd]	30, 33-34, 41, 57, 58, 65, 66, 67, 85, 110, 126, 127, 131, 132, 143, 218, 277, 280, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 290, 291, 336, 339, 342
Bancroft Library	279
College of Letters and Science	283
Department of Economics	283
Extended University	285
Institute of Industrial Relations	280
Regional Oral History Office	84
School of Business Administration	57, 277, 282-285, 291, 292
School of Engineering	52
School of Law	150
University of California, Davis	256
University of California, Irvine	21
Graduate School of Business Administration	193
University of California, San Diego	21
University of California, Santa Barbara	256
University of California, Santa Cruz	21
University of Chicago	50, 67, 75, 79, 159, 163, 191, 224, 287
Graduate School of Business	159-160, 263, 282
<u>University of Chicago Round Table</u>	50, 160
<u>University of Illinois</u>	61, 65, 76
University of Indiana	229
University of Minnesota	75, 162
University of Oregon	25, 27-28, 29
University of Pennsylvania	93
Wharton School of Finance and Commerce	282
University of Southern California	10, 19, 143, 197, 198, 200-202
School of Business	201-202
University of Washington	147, 148, 279
University of Wisconsin	46, 47, 51, 164
Commerce School	46-47, 49, 61
University Research Library, UCLA	118
Library Photographic	355-356
V	
Vaile, Roland S.	75, 162
Vaill, Peter	75
Van de Water, John	50

Visiting Committee, GSM

302-303

W

Walton, Bill	335
Warren, Earl	112-113, 136
Warren, Edgar L.	114
Warren, Stafford L.	299, 324
Watkins, Gordon S.	13, 33, 64, 65, 105, 108, 113, 114, 122
	349, 352
Watson, Thomas, Jr.	229-230
Weimer, Arthur M.	289, 290, 291
Wellman, Harry R.	115, 190, 191
Weschler, Irving R.	263, 345-355
Western Data Processing Center, UCLA	134, 253
Western Federal Savings and Loan	75, 159, 180, 212, 247, 249
Weston, J. Frederick	256, 303-310, 329
	219-220
Williams, Harold M.	52, 83-84, 85, 87- 88, 99
Williams, Robert M.	293-296
Woods, Baldwin M.	84-85, 86, 87, 95, 96-97, 217
Wooton, Corinne	
Wotton, Margaret	

Y

Yale University	287
Cowles Commission	287
Young, Charles E.	146, 302, 306, 351